Authors: Richard F. Kuisel
The French Way
Richard F. Kuisel
How France Embraced and Rejected
American Values and Power
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kuisel, Richard F.
The French way : how France embraced and rejected American values and power / Richard F. Kuisel.
p. cm.
I ncludes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-691-15181-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. United States.Relations. France. 2. France.Relations.United States. 3. France.Civilization.American influences. 4. Anti-Americanism.France. 5. United States.Foreign public opinion, French. 6. Public opinion.France. I . T itle.
E183.8.F8K85 2011
327.73044.dc22 2011012261
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
This book has been composed in Garamond Premier Pro
Printed on acid-free paper.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Sally McCarthy Kuisel
1947–2008
She met life with grace, kindness
,
courage, and a beautiful smile.
1 America à la Mode: The 1980s
2 Anti-Americanism in Retreat: Jack Lang, Cultural Imperialism,
and the Anti-Anti-Americans
3 Reverie and Rivalry: Mitterrand and Reagan-Bush
4 The Adventures of Mickey Mouse, Big Mac, and Coke
in the Land of the Gauls
5 aming the Hyperpower: The 1990s
6 The French Way: Economy, Society, and Culture
in the 1990s
7 The Paradox of the Fin de Siècle: Anti-Americanism
and Americanization
Figure 1. Wolinski's parody ofJean-François Millet's painting
The Angelus
Figure 2. Jack Lang awards sylvester stallone the honor of chevalier des Arts et Lettres
Figure 4. Presidents Francois Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan at the Williamsburg summit
Figure 5. Presidents George H. W. Bush and Francois Mitterrand at the Elysee
Figure 6. Farmers' tractors block the opening of Euro Disney
Figure 7. “Taste Week” for a class of seven-year-old schoolchildren in Paris wearing paper toques
Figure 8. A jubilant Jose Bove at his trial
Figure 9. Poster for an exhibition at the carrousel du Louvre,
Art or Advertising
?
Figure 10. Farmers in Paris protesting against the GATT
Figure 11. Presidents Jacques Chirac and Bill Clinton at the Elysèe
Figure 12. Theaters on the champs-Elysees showing Hollywood movies, including
Jurassic Park
Figure 13. U.s. military and financial power invading France
Figure 14. shady French businessman: “But I've never drunk coca-cola!”
By the end of the twentieth century America was the object of French fascination, anxiety, and scorn. If the New World had been observed by the French since Jacques cartier's explorations of the st. Lawrence River in the 1530s, it was not until over four hundred years later that America became the foil for national identity. By the 1980s America had become the standard by which the French measured their progress or decline. success in foreign affairs meant acting as the partner of the United states yet keeping a comfortable distance and counterbalancing the U.s. government's hegemony. The “good society” was defined by rejecting mainstream American notions of work and leisure. similarly, a modern economy did not imitate the “wild capitalism” of the United states; if some borrowing of American practice was necessary, it had to be adapted or repackaged as French. And culture, the nation's pride, needed to be protected against the onslaught of Hollywood movies, American English, and fast food. Viewed from France, the United states was engaged in a transatlantic competition whose stakes were national identity, independence, and prestige. Viewed from the United states, France was of little account except when it got in the way. It was an asymmetrical rivalry.
This study examines how, why, and with what consequences America served as a foil for France in the final two decades of the twentieth century. It is the story of France's effort at designing its own path
to modernity, a path that moved at a tangent from the one represented by America.
Perceiving America as a model to be emulated or avoided did not start during the most recent fin de siecle. Beginning as early as the eighteenth century, travelers, intellectuals, journalists, and others observed and commented on transatlantic developments creating a veritable “discourse,” much of which was anti-American. The tempo of commentary accelerated between the two world wars, but it was only after 1945 with the advent of the United States as a superpower, an economic-social model, and a cultural juggernaut that America came to be a major concern of policy makers and the public alike. Nevertheless, one would not say that the French in the early postwar decades were yet obsessed with America. They were not yet persuaded that America represented a form of modernity that had to be reckoned with and countered. French businessmen, for example, who visited the United States as guests of the Marshall Plan, were unconvinced that they either could, or should, try to transfer what they observed in American factories, offices, and shops. Similarly, French filmmakers and directors believed they could make movies as they did before the war and hold their own against Hollywood—if only they had adequate government assistance. And engineers and scientists were confident they could develop high-technology sectors like high-speed trains, nuclear energy, and even nuclear weapons without the Americans. After 1958 President Charles de Gaulle thought the French could move ahead without depending on American investments and without knowing English. As late as the 1960s many intellectuals believed America was irrelevant and could be ignored.
By the final decades of the century, however, America could no longer be kept at a distance and it had become a pressing issue of both public concern and government policy. The allure of the model and anxiety about its power had escalated beyond any previous level: America had become a national fixation.
It is my principal task to examine how the French perceived America, why they came to measure themselves against the Americans,
and how they designed policies in response to this model in the final decades of the century. This inquiry leads to the larger question of whether or not they found a divergent “French path” to modernity in contrast to that of the American way. Had the French, by the end of the century, charted a distinctive and viable alternative to what their transatlantic cousins championed as the only way forward?
America, for the purpose of this study, imposed itself on the French in three ways: in international affairs, economics, and culture. These three arenas often overlapped and interacted and thus, when appropriate, will be treated concurrently rather than analyzed separately. What these three dimensions of America all connoted was power and modernity. simply stated, America raised two questions for the French: How can we avoid American hegemony and remain independent? How can we be modern and yet remain French?
The final two decades of the twentieth century offer something of a contrast in perceptions and attitudes among both the French elites and the populace about America. If widespread interest and concern, against a background of indifference, characterized both decades, the overall balance tipped from positive to negative in the 1990s. Whereas the 1980s featured a veritable belle epoque of transatlantic harmony, one in which the French in general admired American society and economic prowess; eagerly embraced American fads in fashion, music, and food; and warmed to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the 1990s, in contrast, witnessed a degradation of views. After the end of the cold War, the French grew increasingly disenchanted with the U.s. government's triumphalism, with what came to be called the American hyperpower and, to a certain extent, with America itself including its values.
Were the French unique among Europeans in focusing their attention on their transatlantic cousins and on systematically trying to find ways at keeping their distance? Without attempting to explore this comparison in depth, the obvious answer is “yes.” The British, Germans, Italians, Belgians, Dutch, Poles, and others (Yugoslavia aside)
did not treat the United states as did the French at the end of the century. They all had their differences with the Americans, but they did not, for the most part, measure themselves against the New World. None of these other Europeans officially tried to prevent the spread of American English. None went so far as the French in trying to contain American television programs and movies. None trashed a McDonald's franchise. None burned the stars and stripes as did French farmers. None tried consistently to use the European Union as a counterweight to Washington. None defined their identity in opposition to the Americans as did the French. There was something peculiar, if not unique, about the French.
Gallic fascination with the New World raises an obvious para-dox—that of a nation that, in many respects, embraced America and at the same time rejected it. France was seduced by America after the second World War: it Americanized as much as any other European country. The spread of McDonald's outlets, the ubiquitous coca-cola bottles in cafes, and the construction of Euro Disney outside Paris all illustrate how the French fully shared in the European-wide process of Americanization. At the same time they mounted a shrill effort at resisting and criticizing it. Gallic anti-American attitudes, compared to those registered by other Europeans, remained relatively potent. This paradox of the simultaneous advance of Americanization and persistent anti-Americanism requires an explanation. It is my contention that a historical perspective helps understand this phenomenon. If one examines the last half of the twentieth century there seems to be a pattern to anti-American perceptions: they have been cyclical; they surge and recede according to certain variables. One can also see this pattern at work both in the rather benign 1980s and in the more acerbic mood of the late 1990s. Hopefully a historical analysis of this perennial, yet cyclical, phenomenon will help explain it.
Comprehensiveness, for this topic, is an unattainable aim. It would be impossible to examine all the ways in which the French measured themselves against America: such an effort would require more skills
and learning than I possess—not to speak of hundreds of additional pages that would test any reader's endurance. My investigation has three dimensions: international relations, economic policy, and popular culture. Other topics are for other scholars. Thus I shall refrain from addressing a host of other issues where America may also have acted as a foil, such as immigration policy, multiculturalism, race, feminism, science and technology, education, high culture, or scholarship.
One might ask, Why would a historian address such a contemporary topic ? Few of the essential records like government archives and private papers are available, and historical perspective is limited. In fact, historians can consult copious secondary, and even some primary, sources for the period. The available historical record is surprisingly rich. There is, in addition, a compelling issue of historical and contemporary dimensions that deserves our attention.
This study will offer reflection on a hypothesis about what some analysts see as a significant trend in European-American relations—their drifting apart. One Italian scholar has boldly asserted that “there is no longer an Atlantic or a Euro-American community.”
1
Despite convergence around democracy, a market economy, and American-led globalization there have been long-term developments that point to a growing estrangement between Europe and the United States, toward a widening of the Atlantic. The American model that dominated the transatlantic community during the Cold War, in this view, is being supplanted by the European way. The dispute over the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003 demonstrated not only a new assertiveness among Europeans about international affairs but also exposed even more fundamental differences over political, economic, social, and cultural practices. America and Europe seem in recent years to have diverged over such essentials as the role of government in social and economic life, social solidarity, lifestyles, and the value of cultural diversity while expressions of anti-Americanism persist. Distancing also takes the form of growing uneasiness about the imbalance in the Atlantic Alliance and differences over issues like the role of international organizations
in peacekeeping, environmental protection, recourse to military force, and globalization. Europeans appear more confident, even smug, about the superiority of a continent where life is more humane, more communitarian, and more enlightened—for example, in the turn away from capital punishment and religious-based morality. In a word they think of themselves as more
civilized
than their American cousins.
To be sure, this collective perception of divergence contains some wishful thinking, and Europeans do not speak with a single voice. And what some see as a trend may be little more than appreciation of a historic and enduring transatlantic distance that recent events have simply highlighted. There may not be a trend, just recognition of a gap. Moreover, there has been a counterpoint to drift, for, as this study will demonstrate, in many ways France and America were growing together at the fin de siecle. France may be an example not of continental drift but of the dynamic of globalization/Americanization that makes nations defy growing interdependence and uniformity by asserting difference. In fact, this simultaneous homogenization and assertion of national identity forms the crux of this study.
Only time will tell whether French resistance to America was a temporary deviation in the grand narrative of an ever closer transatlantic community or if it represents growing estrangement. If the latter is confirmed, then France was at the forefront of this trend, it was Europe's leader. As this study argues, the French at the fin de siecle used America as a foil for change, as a way to chart their own path toward modernity and to assert their independence.
The French Way
describes how and why and with what consequences—some meritorious, others unfortunate—France marked out its distance from its transatlantic ally. This study frames the recent history of transatlantic relations around the notion of competing conceptions of social and economic modernity, cultural status, and political power with America serving as a standard of measurement for Europeans.
