The Generals (35 page)

Captain Schmidt
: Stop there, Velder. That’s enough. The preliminary investigation contains an account many pages long of this intercourse. It begins on page four hundred and sixty-one in Volume Nine.

Major von Peters
: Why did you point out that particular detail, Schmidt? And in that tone of voice?

Colonel Orbal
: Exactly, Captain Schmidt. Watch your step.

Captain Schmidt
: I beg your pardon, sir.

Major von Peters
: Don’t let it happen again.

Colonel Orbal
: Exactly. Which page did he say, Carl? Oh, yes, note it down.

Captain Schmidt
: Would you try to lift the accused’s thoughts, so to speak, a little further in time, Captain Endicott?

Colonel Pigafetta
: I should like to put a question to the Prosecuting Officer. What in heaven’s name is this episode supposed to prove?

Captain Schmidt
: In the case for the prosecution, the testimony in question has been registered as evidence in charge number one hundred and thirteen, concerning criminal promiscuity.

Commander Kampenmann
: It seems somewhat incomprehensible to me, or somewhat doubtful.

Major von Peters
: Doubtful? That these filthy wretches practised intercourse any old how, just like rabbits, and clearly in the most perverted forms! You surprise me, Kampenmann.

Velder
: Carla had extended leave and was free until eleven o’clock the next morning, so she got up at a quarter to ten. She stood for a moment looking down at her own body—there weren’t any mirrors—and ran her hands over her loins and breasts, fingering her large nipples. Then she said: ‘Funny. You had two wives, Erwin. Now I’ve got two husbands. I never thought that would happen.’ Then she quickly pulled on her pants and bra and khaki overalls and socks and boots and left. That was the last time I ever saw her. Later, however, I got a telling-off from Ludolf and Stoloff, because I’d brought her there. Ludolf went so far as to say we really ought to transfer her to headquarters or have her shot. He seemed quite serious when he said it.

Commander Kampenmann
: What happened to this woman?

Captain Schmidt
: Carla Velder was executed for murder on the twenty-second of May the following year. Seven months to a day later, that is.

Major von Peters
: Murder? Of whom?

Captain Schmidt
: A warrant officer in the Peace Corps. She killed him with his own bayonet.

Major von Peters
: Delightful young lady.

Colonel Pigafetta
: May I suggest we take our lunch break.

Major von Peters
: Adjourn the session, Mateo.

Colonel Orbal
: What? What did you say? What’s the fuss, Carl?

Major von Peters
: The interim Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force has requested a lunch break.

Colonel Orbal
: Oh, yes. The session is adjourned for two hours.

*   *   *

Colonel Pigafetta
: Not that I’m especially interested, but I happened to think about a small point over lunch. At an earlier stage in the session, Velder refused to say a word about his relations with
this woman and now he’s described exactly the same thing so extremely thoroughly and copiously that it seems to have given the President of the court martial an hour’s reading. A trifle puzzling, isn’t it?

Major von Peters
: I don’t think so at all. The man’s quite simply mental.

Lieutenant Brown
: I think I can explain that, sir. In the previous case, it was a matter of home circumstances during Velder’s so-called marriage. They haven’t managed to persuade him that those particular events were criminal, and as a result he had decided that what happened within the walls of his own home was his private life, which he considers inviolable. In the latter case, on the other hand, he has been made to realise that he was guilty of criminal promiscuity because he had a relationship with another man’s wife.

Major von Peters
: As I said, the man’s stark staring mad.

Colonel Pigafetta
: Oh, yes. Uhuh. Shrewd explanation, Brown. Almost too shrewd.

Colonel Orbal
: Do you call that an explanation. Everything gets more and more incomprehensible. Who smells of garlic, by the way?

Major von Peters
: No, now let’s get going.

Colonel Orbal
: Yes, perhaps that’s best. Before we all go mad. Call in the parties, Brown.

Captain Schmidt
: I now intend to demonstrate the accused’s responsibility for and participation in the so-called Plan B. This is, considering the damage done, the most serious crime Velder has been involved in. Before the accused’s testimony continues, I shall refer to the concentrated account of the military situation which is described in Appendix V X/3x. I request that the officer presenting the case read this.

Lieutenant Brown
: Appendix V X/3x, concerning the disturbances. Summary of the outline compiled at the National Historical Department of the General Staff. The document is stamped Secret, Grade Three. That is, paragraphs …

Major von Peters
: Yes, yes. We know. That’s all of them except the obscenity paragraph.

Lieutenant Brown
: The text is as follows: The situation in the country during the first half of November did not seem to give cause
for special alarm. A sixth of the area of the country, that is, the southern sector of the Eastern Province, was in fact still controlled by the Reds, but the area was cut off from all connections with the outer world, and the preparations for the final clearing operations were almost complete. The planning of these operations was not done by General Oswald’s staff, but as a result of international pressure, had been entrusted to the Peace Corps. Despite their experience of other centres of unrest, they did not have sufficient knowledge of either the special geographical difficulties or the desperation and ruthlessness which to a greater and greater extent had come to set their stamp on the rebels and their activities. When the deep harbour in Oswaldsport (Ludolfsport) was again in use at the beginning of November, the Peace Corps leaders decided to bring in the exchange-troops (in reality reinforcements) which were considered necessary for the final clearing operations, through this harbour. These troops, who consisted of specially trained storm-troopers with heavy equipment, arrived at Oswaldsport (Ludolfsport) late in the evening of the eighteenth of November, on board two large transports. Only one of these was able to dock at the quay, which to some extent delayed and complicated disembarkation, which could not start until shortly before midnight. As recently as a month before, in a memorandum through the General Staff, the Chief-of-State had warned the leaders of the Peace Corps against allowing transport ships to dock at Oswaldsport (Ludolfsport), and instead had suggested Marbella as being safer. However, this warning was ignored by the Peace Corps leaders.

It was pointed out that no activity from the rebels’ side had occurred for several months, that conditions in the harbour were considerably better in Oswaldsport than in Marbella and that landing the storm-troopers and their equipment on the east coast, i.e. in the immediate proximity of the section of land where they would shortly be sent into action, achieved a much-needed off-loading from the two still usable roads which led to the western part of the Eastern Province. These advantages were considered sufficiently worthy of consideration that General Oswald’s memorandum was not awarded appropriate significance, just as little as the fact that the Reds’ forward posts were only six to seven kilometres south of the harbour in Oswaldsport (Ludolfsport). To protect disembarkation as
much as possible, General Oswald gave orders to cover the north-eastern part of the southern sector with a blanket of artillery fire, but the unsuitable weather conditions made the regrouping of the guns very much more difficult.

Colonel Pigafetta
: That is undoubtedly the right paper to be marked secret. Our allies in the pact would certainly not appreciate that type of honest history writing.

Major von Peters
: Christ, no.

Commander Kampenmann
: If we’re to be absolutely honest, that much talked-of memorandum—which incidentally came from Naval Command—was really a warning against a certain danger from mines outside the harbour. And the harbour entrance was swept, as far as I know, very thoroughly before the troop transports came in.

Major von Peters
: Now listen, Kampenmann, that was almost the most bloody awful remark I’ve ever heard.

Colonel Orbal
: Quite wrong, Kampenmann, quite wrong.

Colonel Pigafetta
: There are limits even to honesty, commander.

Major von Peters
: And to cheek, Kampenmann.

Colonel Orbal
: Yes, watch your step.

Colonel Pigafetta
: If nothing else, you should consider the sensitivity our friends usually show in matters like this.

Commander Kampenmann
: Naturally. I apologise.

Colonel Pigafetta
: I don’t think there’s any need for us to go any further into the subject. Perhaps the Prosecuting Officer would continue to develop his case.

Captain Schmidt
: Velder. The matter in hand is the so-called Plan B. Describe briefly what you know about it and your own part in its conception and execution.

Captain Endicott
: All you’ve got to do is to start where we said, Velder. Plan B, it was.

Velder
: We’d been very successful in two things. An external intelligence service which was small in so far as it occupied very few people, but which never offered anything but essential information. And then we’d been able to break down a lot of their codes. We knew about these troop transports to Ludolfsport two days beforehand. That knowledge was decisive for setting Plan B into action. Those three plans, A, B and C had been worked out more or less
parallel at headquarters. Plan B was incomparably the most important. The basic features of it had been sketched out by Ludolf and Stoloff, then we completed it as best we could. When I heard it mentioned for the first time, Ludolf gave me a very concise description. He said: ‘Plan A is a preparatory stage, Plan C is what remains when everything else has failed.’ I was the one who came up with the logical question: ‘But what about Plan B?’ Ludolf was silent for a long time, and then he said: ‘Plan B is a constructive and perfectly feasible offensive operation. If it is carried out correctly and at the right moment, it will lead Socialism to victory within three or four days. The only thing that can crack it is something utterly unexpected. Provided, as I said, we don’t choose the wrong moment.’ That conversation must have been held sometime in early April. Then followed two months’ planning, and that in its turn we’d completed by the sixteenth of June. On that day we had a thorough run-through of Plan B at headquarters. Only three people were present, Ludolf, Stoloff and myself. The principles were as follows: At a certain given moment, we were to throw all our resources into a combined counter-action, which included two major offensives in different directions, plus two minor offensives which were mainly intended as diversions. General Ludolf …

Colonel Orbal
: What’s gone wrong now?

Major von Peters
: He’s probably been choked by calling that filthy bandit general. The word itself got stuck in his throat, so to speak.

Captain Endicott
: I think there’s some technical fault in the voice-strengthener.

Major von Peters
: Practically the only words I’ve heard you say during these sessions, Endicott, have been ‘think’ and ‘try’ and ‘perhaps’ and ‘I don’t know’.

Captain Endicott
: With all due respect, sir …

Colonel Pigafetta
: Don’t stand there arguing, Endicott. Get that apparatus repaired instead. Our own electrical engineers made it. Brown’ll help you dismande it.

Lieutenant Brown
: Yes, sir.

Colonel Pigafetta
: That’s it. Send the thing down to the lab. Get it off, now.

Captain Endicott
: Yes, sir.

Colonel Orbal
: What shall we do now, then? Go up and have a beer?

Captain Schmidt
: I suggest we diverge from the routine again, as we did once before. Namely, that we let Lieutenant Brown read the next part of Velder’s testimony directly out of the record of the preliminary investigation. You’ll find the document on page seventy-six in the first part of Volume Ten.

Colonel Pigafetta
: Excellent. That’ll save us time.

Lieutenant Brown
: Document V X/5B. Interrogation of Erwin Velder. Interrogation number one thousand one hundred and two. The text repeats what was said by the enemies of the people, Joakim Ludolf, Boris Stoloff and Erwin Velder at a run-through of what was called Plan B, on the sixteenth of June. The text is as follows:

The discussion was largely held between Joakim Ludolf and Boris Stoloff, who—according to the witness—had obviously often discussed the plan between them.

Ludolf confirmed conclusively that the combined counter-action would embrace two major offensives, one in a north-westerly and the other in a north-easterly direction, simultaneously with minor amphibious units outflanking the enemy in the south and east and setting up two bridgeheads; one in a small fishing village on the south coast thirty kilometres east of the river-mouth, which coincided with what was then the front line. The other amphibious force would take by surprise the lighthouse and the pilot-station fifteen kilometres north of Oswaldsport (Ludolfsport) and establish themselves on the point where these installations were situated. After that came the following conversation (wording should be considered approximate):

Ludolf: Have we got enough boats for the amphibious operations and are they all fully seaworthy?

Velder: Yes. They’re also well protected in the cliff cave. (The witness indicates here that he was responsible for this special transport detail.)