The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (77 page)

who had taken only light casualties and enjoyed the taste of victory. The afternoon drifted by while Washington tried to reorganize his battered army. The next day, August 28, still determined to hold Brooklyn Heights, he had three regiments transported from Manhattan to Brooklyn. That night Howe began constructing "regular approaches," as trenches and breastworks near the enemy's lines were called. It was a technique ordinarily used in siege warfare, though Howe was not facing a well-fortified enemy but a dispirited collection, badly entrenched and lacking tentage, food, and other supplies. A northeasterly came in the same day, soaking both sides and rendering the Americans vulnerable to a bayonet charge, a tactic Howe's grenadiers and light infantry were eager to use.
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By August 29, Washington saw, or was made to see by a council of his officers, that his position could not be held. He must evacuate Long Island while he could, for when the storm subsided Admiral Howe would be able to station his frigates in the East River, trapping the Americans once and for all. During the night and extending into the early morning of August 30, two Massachusetts regiments, adept in the use of small boats, ferried the American force across the river to New York City. In all, 9500 men were carried over, with all but a few of their cannon (several of the heaviest sank into the mud up to their hubs, Washington reported), provisions, equipment, and horses, all without the British detecting the move. It was a well-executed evacuation, for which Washington deserves the credit, just as he must take the responsibility for the disaster of August 27.
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The discovery that Washington had slipped away did not set General Howe ablaze with desire to close with him once more. Howe delayed here as he had in June the previous year at Boston when the Americans occupied Bunker Hill, and early in the summer when he put ashore on Staten Island, and then on August 27 when he held back before Brooklyn Heights. There is no way to explain with complete assurance this pattern of failure to exploit obvious advantage. We do know that he did not ever wish to take heavy losses to gain a victory, because he recognized that still another battle might be necessary and his ability to call on reinforcements was limited. At this time, September 1, pursuit across the East River to Manhattan would have required an enormous effort. The Americans were dug in -- they had spent the summer throwing up breastworks on the southern end of the island -- and the navy's ability

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to transport Howe depended on wind, tide, and careful organization. A landing into Washington's teeth was unnecessary anyway; putting ashore farther up the island might enable him to trap Washington in the south. And so Howe began almost immediately to get ready to clamp off escape to the north.

Washington, of course, badly wanted to discover Howe's intentions. The immediate problems of his army now demanded attention, if so disorganized and dispirited a force could be called an army. The soldiers may have been impressed by their general's ability to rescue them from disaster, but they gave no evidence of rallying themselves for the next fight. The militia proved particularly unreliable, as Washington expected, deserting almost by regiments. Their going affected the Continentals, whose discipline in September could not have been much better. There was the usual rambling about in the American camp, soldiers coming and mostly going. As usual, supplies of everything were short, and partly as a result sickness increased. A defeated army almost always has a higher rate of sickness than a victorious one.

Washington and his officers resorted to familiar techniques to pull the regiments up to some sort of standard. Exhortation always failed but it was tried, and more direct means too -- courts-martial and whipping. No regular routine of training on a day-to-day basis seems to have been observed in the regiments, then or ever in 1776. But in order to stop the constant traffic that disturbed the camps and the lines, Washington ordered frequent musters to be held, and begged for returns, which would give him some idea of the number of troops he had. Low morale, lack of discipline and organization, shortages of every sort were immediate problems and persistent ones as well. Most pressing of all problems was deciding what to do. Should the American army attempt to defend New York City, or should it pull out and burn the city as Nathanael Greene urged?
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Congress soon gave Washington instructions on this last matter -he must not destroy the city should he decide to leave it. The Congress disabused Washington of the notion that it was requiring him to defend the city, a dangerous idea that he had harbored all summer. Freed of this "requirement," Washington began to consider evacuation of Manhattan while he could still escape. A council of his officers urged him to move to the north, at least as far as Kingsbridge, where the Harlem River emptied into the Hudson.
The army began sending out its stores

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and the sick that day, and the troops began preparations for the withdrawal, which promised to be difficult to manage, for they were stretched out on a line from the southern tip of the island sixteen miles to the north.
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Howe meanwhile had decided to avoid the southern end of Manhattan in favor of landing where his enemy was not so heavily concentrated and, in effect, to outflank Washington once more. On September 13 he alerted his troops, reminding them that they had smashed the Americans on Long Island and recommending, as a British officer noted in his diary, "an entire dependence upon their bayonets, with which they will ever command that success which their bravery so well deserves."
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This appeal suited the professional character of Howe's troops -- no evocation of the "sacred cause" here, nor any reference to the blessings of liberty, but simply look to your bayonets and behave bravely as British soldiers should.

To be successful the landing at Kip's Bay depended on more than bayonets. Admiral Howe put five ships up the East River about 200 yards offshore. Around eleven in the morning, they opened up with broadsides in order to -- in Washington's phrase -- "scour the Grounds and cover the landing of their Troops." Scour the ground they did, battering down the thin line of earthworks -- hardly more than a few ditches -- and causing the militia, which had not come under heavy fire before, to take to its heels. Barges carried troops from Long Island about an hour later; they landed unopposed and by late afternoon were all ashore. Long before most of these troops stepped on land, the remnants of opposition had been broken, and Washington himself, who had ridden from Harlem to Kip's Bay when he heard the ships open up, had almost been captured. As Washington approached the bay he ran into the flight of the militia, most of them from a Connecticut brigade commanded by Captain William Douglas. Appalled at what he saw, Washington lost that firm control of himself that everyone admired, and took to flogging officers and men with his riding cane. In his rage he threw his hat to the ground and was heedless of the approaching British. An aide finally grabbed the bridle of his horse and led him out of danger.
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The remnants of the army to the south in the city escaped too, as good luck, the determination of several leaders -- or rather the guts of

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Israel Putnam -- and a return of Howe's lethargy pulled them through. Israel Putnam, at his best in a disaster, helped lead and drive the militia up the west side of the island along little-traveled roads. Young Aaron Burr served as guide for several detachments. Putnam rode up and down the west side near the Hudson, hurrying, cajoling, and organizing the retreat. Most stores and the heavy artillery of Knox were abandoned as the troops fled, hoping they would not be cut off by Howe's light infantry. Howe considerately stayed on the east side, though he did send columns left and right, south and north, along the Post Road, the main highway on Manhattan. These soldiers soon entered the city, seizing stores and untended artillery. The column that moved up the Post Road paralleled the disorganized militia on the other side of the island for a time. But Howe did not push across, and by nightfall the Americans were on the high ground called Harlem Heights, their left flank on the Harlem River and their right on the Hudson.

The next day British carelessness and contempt for their enemy produced the battle of Harlem Heights, hardly More than a skirmish between several hundred light infantry and Colonel Thomas Knowlton's Connecticut regiment just forward of the American line. As Frederick Mackenzie confided to his
Diary
, the light infantry pursued the Americans without "proper precautions or support" and blundered into an unfavorable position "and were rather severely handled by them." The "victory" gave American soldiers a shred of confidence but at the cost of Knowlton's life, and Knowlton was one of the best regimental commanders in the army.
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The next two months, until Cornwallis captured Fort Lee on the west bank of the Hudson on November 20, saw Washington's army fall back from one post to another. And in the three weeks that followed the flight from Fort Lee until December 7, 1776, when the Americans crossed the Delaware River from Trenton into Pennsylvania, the army was in full retreat, running desperately to avoid Cornwallis. For most of this period before Fort Lee fell, Washington proved indecisive and at times inept. The indecisiveness is easily understood: he did not know what Howe's plans were -- would Howe strike through the highlands into southern New England? Or would he bead through New Jersey toward Philadelphia? Washington's peculiar ineptness did not mar the disposition,

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the training, or even the leading of troops; rather it affected his dealings with his commanders, especially General Charles Lee.

On the surface at least, something approaching stagnation overtook the two armies on Harlem Heights after the battle of September 16. The Americans dug further into the ground, improved their lines, and tried to reorganize their forces. The British did some of the same though not at the frantic pace of their enemy. Below the surface, Washington was active, trying in particular to hold his forces together and -- most intrusive of all his problems -- recruiting in anticipation of the virtual dissolution of his army when enlistments expired in November and December. Shortly after the battle of Long Island the Congress had authorized recruitments up to 80,000 men, a well-timed and immensely heartening decision, but what the Congress gave, it -- like the Lord -would take away. In this case the Congress did not so much take away as make rapid enlistment of troops impossible by requiring that state legislatures appoint committees which would then select the regimental officers who would do the actual recruiting. The state legislatures acted slowly, or rather did nothing at all for several months, and the authorized regiments went unfilled while Washington begged for soldiers.
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