The Grand Alliance (159 page)

Let every one

Kill a Hun.

This spirit must be inculcated ceaselessly into all
ranks of H.M. forces – in particular military schools,
training establishments, depots. All the rearward
services must develop a quality of stern, individual
resistance. No building occupied by troops should be
surrendered without having to be stormed. Every man
must have a weapon of some kind, be it only a mace or
a pike. The spirit of intense individual resistance to this
new form of sporadic invasion is a fundamental necessity. I have no doubt a great deal is being done.

Please let me know exactly how many uniformed
men you have on ration strength in this Island, and how
they are armed.

I should like Sir Alan Brooke to see this minute and
enclosure, and to give me his views about it. Let me
also see some patterns of maces and pikes.

Prime Minister to General

30.VI.41.

Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

Although we take a heavy toll, very large enemy
reinforcements are crossing to Africa continually. The
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Navy seem unable to do anything. The air force only
stop perhaps a fifth. You are no doubt impressed with
the full gravity of the situation.

(Action this day.) Prime

30.VI.41.

Minister to Minister of Supply
In the secret session on Sir Andrew Duncan’s vote
questions were asked by Mr. Shinwell and others about
how we stood in “heavy tanks.” We have hitherto
regarded A.22 as the heaviest we should make, though
a great deal of work has been done, I think by Stern, on
a still larger type. I believe there is even a pilot model.

Of course, our problem is different from the Russian or
great Continental Powers because of shipment, although that is no final bar.

However, it now appears, on the highest authority,
that the Russians have produced a very large tank, said
to be over seventy tons, against which the German A/T

six-pounder has proved useless. It seems to me that
the question of a much heavier tank has now come
sharply to the front. The whole position must be reviewed, and we must know where we are – and that
soon.

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Appendix D, Book One

ESTIMATED BRITISH AND GERMAN AIR STRENGTHS,
DECEMBER, 1940

NOTE BY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
16

Since the war began fifteen months ago the German Air Force is believed to have received 22,000 aircraft of all types, and the British Air Force 18,000 of all types for use in all theatres and for all purposes. In the last eight months of hard fighting the German Air Force has received from April to November inclusive 12,000 new machines, and the British Air Force 11,000, exclusive of 1000 from overseas. In these eight battle months, when both air forces have been at full extension, the intake has been about equal, averaging 1400 to 1500

machines a month.

2. During these eight months the front-line strength of the British Air Force of about 2100 machines has scarcely changed. Thus a monthly output of 1400

machines has just sufficed in a period of active warfare to keep up a front-line strength of 2100 machines.

If we reckon that of the 1400 machines 500 were trainers, and another 200 were operational machines devoted to training – a very generous allowance in the heat of the battle – this implies that 700 operational machines, i.e., one-third of our front-line establishment, was written off every month. Actually the number is probably greater than this, at any rate in the bomber squadrons, where a number of bombers equal to two-fifths of the front-line establishment is lost monthly.

3. The German losses have certainly not been less
pro rata.
Their battle losses between May and August The Grand Alliance

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were estimated by the Air Ministry as about 3000, and from August to the end of October as 2800 machines –

i.e., 5800 in all. Our battle losses in the equivalent period were less than half of this.

4. Information leads the Air Intelligence Branch at the Air Ministry to believe that the German front-line Air Force on May 1 was about three times as great as ours

– say, 6000 machines. If this were so, and their
pro rata
losses were not higher than ours, their monthly wastage must have been at least 2000 machines (on the two-fifths figure even higher). If our figures for their average output, i.e., 1500 machines, are correct, and if the statement that 1100 of these were operational is accepted, the German Air Force must diminish at the rate of 2000 minus 100, i.e., at least 900 machines in the first month. As the front line decreased, of course the losses and the rate of drop would fall, but the strength would be well below 4000 at the end of four months.

The only way of escaping this conclusion is to assume that the Germans carried an immense reserve of machines stored for such an eventuality. The prewar output does not justify such an assumption. In any event, it would be an uneconomical proceeding, as the machines would rapidly become out of date. Any well-arranged air force reckons to have a reserve at the outbreak of war to tide it over the first two or three months while the war machine begins to operate, and to run on production thereafter.

An investigation should be made showing exactly what proportion of our front-line establishment was written off each month, and what were the causes. It should be possible to make a fairly accurate estimate of our battle losses and the German battle losses, and the calculation should be made assuming that their other losses are
pro rata
the same as ours. It should be borne in mind that the Germans must send to the training establishments and write off therein an equivalent number of those which we have to devote to this purpose, O.T.U.’s counting as training establishments.

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5. According to our information, only four hundred German trainers are produced each month. This number seems most inadequate to replace the pilot wastage in such a huge air force as the Air Intelligence attributes to the Germans. We use considerably more, without counting those delivered direct to the training schools in Canada.

We are told that Germany had a huge reserve of pilots trained before the war, and that few pilots trained since have been found amongst the prisoners. If this were so, and if the huge reserve of machines also had really been in existence, it seems inconceivable that they should not have been brought together and the operational strength correspondingly increased for the duration of the great air battles.

6. Every effort must be made to clear up the present contradiction. The M.E.W. estimate for the output is incompatible with a front-line strength much higher than three thousand machines. This figure is consonant with the weight of the German effort at Dunkirk and in the Battle of Britain (taking account of the favourable geographical factors). The Air Intelligence estimate is nearly twice as great.

At present the only possible explanations seem to be:(
a
) That M.E.W. is wildly wrong, and that the German output is nearly twice as great as they believe.

Further, that the Germans did not make any very great effort in the Battle of Britain or at Dunkirk. (
b
) That, on the contrary, our German Section have been misled, possibly intentionally, by the Germans, and are pinning their faith to an estimate far in excess of the real figure, (
c
) That the units identified by the German Intelligence Section are not all of them what we should call front-line units, but that a considerable proportion of them (at least one-third) are non-operational, perhaps corresponding to O.T.U.’s.

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Appendix E, Book One

MONTHLY SUMMARY OF LOSSES 17 OF BRITISH, ALLIED, AND

NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS AND FISHING VESSELS BY ENEMY

ACTION

(Figures corrected to May 1, 1949)

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Appendix F, Book One

MILITARY DIRECTIVES AND MINUTES

January—June,
1941

Prime Minister to Secretary of
6.I.41.

State for War and C.I.G.S.

W.S.5A has already started and B starts immediately. There is there fore no question about them. They
contain together 55,000 men, of whom 12,000 are for
India, etc., and 43,000 for M.E. Of the 43,000 M.E.,
about 22,000 are for fighting units and drafts, and
21,000 technical, L. of C., base, etc., of which about
4000 are Navy and R.A.F. Thus the Army in M.E.

receives 22,000 fighting and 17,000 other men.

2. The present composition of the Army in the
Middle East (excluding Kenya and Aden, nearly 70,000)
reveals 150,000 fighting troops. Behind this are 40,000

L. of C. and 20,000 base establishments and details – i.

e., 150,000 to 60,000. To this will now be added by W.

S.5A and B 22,000 fighting and 17,000 L. of C., base,
etc., making a total of 172,000 fighting and 77,000

rearward services.

3. Convoy W.S.6, now being loaded, contains 8500

fighting troops, plus fighting share of 4000 drafts – say
2500 – equals total fighting troops 11,000; excluding
the mobile naval base, 5300 (of which later); and the R.