The Grand Alliance (161 page)

5. Returning to the Army of the Nile, with its sixteen
divisions, it must be observed that, once Benghazi has
been taken and strongly fortified with a field force
based upon it, the conditions in Egypt should be such
as to enable internal order to be maintained by Indian
divisions, who will in fact be living very close to the
possible centres of disturbance, and who will not have
to take the field like a British division acting in France or
Flanders, or even a British division at home. What scale
of L. of C. troops are you providing for these? Do you
think it necessary to organise them in corps, and supply
them with the European quota of medium and heavy
artillery, etc.?

6. We must however contemplate as our main
objective in this theatre the bringing into heavy action of
the largest possible force from the Army of the Nile to
fight in aid of Greece or Turkey or both. How many
divisions, or their equivalent, do you contemplate being
available by July for action in Southeast Europe? I
should have thought that the four Australian, one New
Zealand, one of the two South Africans, the three
British, and three of the six Indian divisions, should be
available – total twelve. These troops must be equipped
on the highest scale, for it is Germans they will have to
fight. On the other hand, they will come into action only
gradually – probably four divisions by the end of March,
and the rest as shipping and equipment becomes
available. The problem therefore is for a first-class
scale for twelve divisions against the Germans, a very
much reduced second-class scale against the disorders
in Egypt or to take charge of conquered Italian territory,
and a still lower scale for the so-called African Colonial
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Division. I hope that with this picture, which the General
Staff should consider carefully, your problem may be
more precisely defined – viz., five British divisions at
home at highest mobility; ten at secondary, working up
to twelve in the Middle East in action against the
Germans in Greece or Turkey on the highest scale; four
in Egypt, Sudan, etc., on a moderate scale; and four
African Colonials, according to local conditions – total
thirty-five, to which must be added two Indian divisions,
for service in Malaya, total thirty-seven, leaving from
your total of fifty-eight
19
twenty-one divisions. Of these
nine are armoured divisions, leaving twelve British
infantry divisions to be accounted for.

7. What is the picture and forecast for these twelve
British divisions? Up to six they have to go at very short
notice to French North Africa, or alternatively perhaps
to work with a friendly Spain. We cannot do both.

These six divisions will come into operation in 2 corps
of three divisions each, but owing to shipping
exigencies they can only come gradually into operation.

In so far as they come into action at all, it will be against
the Germans. Therefore, whatever is thought to be the
most appropriate scale must be provided. It must
however be observed that neither of these theatres
offers opportunities for the use of heavy or much
medium artillery, and that in the Spanish alternative the
war might well take a guerrilla form.

8. We cannot hope to arm the remaining six
divisions to the full scale for many months to come, but
if they were brought to the anti-German scale for
overseas operations by the end of August it would be
satisfactory.

9. Nine armoured divisions are comprised in the total
number of fifty-eight. What is the distribution contemplated for these? At first sight four at home, two available for amphibious action in the West, and three in the
Middle East or Balkan theatre would seem appropriate.

It is clear that the rearward and repair services of any of
these divisions sent abroad require to be on a larger
scale than those which lie handy to all the great work-The Grand Alliance

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shops of Great Britain. Have these differentiations been
allowed for?

10. Battle wastage at 8500 a month is not excessive
as a theoretical forecast. In practice however it does
not seem likely that, apart from invasion, action on this
scale will begin for several months. It might be safe as
a working arrangement to bring this monthly figure of
8500 into account only from July 1, 1941. This would
save 60,000 men [from the calculation].

11. The wastage from normal causes of 18,750 a
month, or 243,750 a year, appears a high figure, and
one wonders whether it may not be reduced as better
accommodation and more settled conditions are
established in Great Britain, and as the men themselves become more seasoned. ... I should like to know
how many of these men discharged from the Army are
unfit for any other form of war work. What is the number
of deaths per month, the total incapacitated, those fit
for lighter duties, and those fit for munitions work? I
should expect that at least ten thousand a month would
be capable of some other form of employment. This
point is important for the War Office, as in stating the
man-power demand which is to be made upon the
nation the Army should credit itself with any men who
are yielded up who are still capable of civilian service.

This of course does not affect the problem, but only the
statement of the problem; none the less it is important.

12. I regard A.D.G.B. as a source which may well at
some future date yield economies because of new
methods and our increasing ascendancy in the air. It is
astonishing how great are the numbers of men required
per gun. Careful study should make it possible to
reduce the numbers in many localities, and to accept a
slightly lower scale of immediate preparedness. Even a
small percentage of saving under these heads would
enable the additional guns and searchlights now
coming into action to be manned with a smaller
demand upon man-power.

13. I hope I am not to infer from the expression

“beach battalions” that any body of young, physically fit,
efficiently trained men would be relegated to a
particular function. It is indispensable that a continuous
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rotation should take place, all brigades taking their
place on the beaches in turn, or coming into the back
areas for service in the mobile divisions.

14. Generally speaking, I do not consider that a
demand by the Army for 900,000 men, less 60,000,
less 150,000 (paragraphs 10 and 11) = 690,000 net up
to October 1, 1942, is excessive. The training process
must be maintained; wastage must be made good.

[When] once the Army is heavily engaged it would be
more natural to draw large numbers from the public and
to comb the munitions and A.R.P. services. It is the
demand in the next six months, while military
operations are at a minimum, that I am anxious to keep
within limits.

15. I await the further information which I ask for in
this paper, but meanwhile I should greatly regret to see
twenty medium regiments or 480 guns retrenched for a
mere saving of 18,000 men out of the enormous totals
presented, and similarly, seven field regiments of 168

guns for the sake of saving 5600 men. It is essential to
strengthen the Army in fighting troops, and it is better to
take some risks in theoretical calculations of wastage,
even if these should be falsified at a later date, than to
fail at this moment to produce the proper quota of
artillery.

ARMY SCALES

Directive by the Minister of Defence
6 March 41

When in September, 1939, the Cabinet approved
the formation of a Field Army of fifty-five divisions it was
not realised that a division as contemplated by the War
Office, with its share of corps, Army, G.H.Q., and L. of
C. formations, would require 42,000 men, exclusive of
all training establishments and of all garrisons, depots,
or troops not included in the Field Army. At that time
also it was assumed that the bulk of our Army would
stand in the line with the French under conditions
comparable to those of the last war, whereas the bulk
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of our Army now has to stay at home and defend the
Island against invasion. Thirdly, the shipping stringency
makes it impossible to transport and maintain very large
forces overseas, especially on the high scales which
the War Office regard as necessary.

2. Out of the fifty-five divisions (now become fifty-seven), thirty-six are British and twenty-one overseas
troops. Of the thirty-six British divisions, one (so-called)
division is in Iceland, and one (the 6th) is forming in
Egypt, together with two armoured divisions there, total
British divisions now overseas, four.

3. Twenty-five British infantry divisions and the
equivalent of seven armoured divisions in process of
formation, total thirty-two, are now included in the
Home Forces Army. At 19,500 men apiece, these
twenty-five British infantry divisions aggregate 487,500

men, and the seven armoured divisions at 14,000

apiece aggregate 98,000, total 575,500. In addition to
the divisional organisation, C.-in-C. Home Forces has
ten independent brigades, including the Guards
brigades, twenty-seven beach brigades, and fourteen
unbrigaded battalions, all British. At an average of 3500

men apiece, these forty-two brigades or equivalents
account for about 150,000 men. Therefore, the total
number of British in tactical formations at home
amounts to 735,500 men.

4. There are on our ration strength at home
1,800,000 British soldiers; 735,500 are accounted for in
the above formations, leaving 1,064,500 to be
explained as corps, Army, and G.H.Q. troops and A.D.

G.B., or as training establishments, depots, etc., and as
part of the rearward services of the forces overseas.

5. It is upon this pool of 1,064,500 that the Army
must live. By wise economies, by thrifty and ingenious
use of man-power, by altering establishments to fit
resources, it should be possible to make a very great
improvement in the fighting strength. Apart from this
capital fund of manpower, the Army can count each
year upon its eighteens and nineteens. It is only in the
event of heavy casualties being sustained through
many divisions being simultaneously and continuously
in action, which, except in the case of invasion, is
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extremely unlikely, that any further inroad can be
allowed upon the man-power resources of Great
Britain. In other words, the Army can rely on being kept
up to something like their present figure of about two
million British, and they will be judged by the effective
fighting use they make of it.

6. At the same time, it will be well to plan an
eventual increase of armoured formations to the equivalent of fourteen armoured divisions (or fifteen if the
Australian armoured division materialises), in which
would be included the Army Tank Brigades. A reduction
of several infantry divisions would be required, and the
British Army would then be composed of fourteen
armoured divisions (or their equivalent) and about
twenty-two infantry divisions. The War Office and
Ministry of Supply should work out proposals on these
lines.

7. The three East African divisions and the West
African division should not be organised in formations
higher than brigades or small mobile groups adapted to
the duties they have to perform.