The Grand Alliance (23 page)

“Influx” [descent on Sicily] or Tripoli. We are advised
from many quarters that our ignominious ejection from
Greece would do us more harm in Spain and Vichy
than the fact of submission of Balkans, which with our
scanty forces alone we have never been expected to
prevent.

I send you this to prepare your mind for what, in the
absence of facts very different from those now before
us, will probably be expressed in Cabinet decision
tomorrow.

Attached to this was the grave commentary, summarised above, of the Chiefs of Staff.

As soon as my warning telegram was read by Sir Michael Palairet in Athens he showed lively distress, and telegraphed to the Foreign Secretary, who had now reached Cairo, as follows:

6 March 41

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I have just read the Prime Minister’s message to
you. I need not emphasise to you the effect of our now
withdrawing from the agreement actually signed between Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Greek
Commander-in-Chief and now in process of execution
here by General Wilson himself. How can we possibly
abandon the King of Greece after the assurances given
him by the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the
Imperial General Staff as to reasonable chances of
success? This seems to me quite unthinkable. We shall
be pilloried by the Greeks and the world in general as
going back on our word.

2. There is no question of “liberating the Greeks
from feeling bound to reject the ultimatum.” They have
decided to fight Germany alone if necessary. The
question is whether we help or abandon them.

And again to Mr. Eden later in the day:
King of Greece spoke today to Air Attaché with deep
appreciation of your visit and absolute determination to
carry out agreed plan of action against German attack.

He has every confidence in the chances for success,
and is satisfied that this confidence is shared by General Papagos and his Government. He emphasised the
great importance of speed, and particularly of adequate
air forces here, in order to break up the German air
attack, which is their customary opening offensive.

Initial German defeat in the air would, more than
anything else, do away with the myth of German
invincibility and give the whole country the same
confidence which he has in prospects for success. I
have not yet seen him myself since you left.

And still later:

General Wilson has had a most satisfactory talk with
General Papagos this morning. He is greatly encouraged by the marked improvement in the latter’s attitude.

He found him most helpful and anxious to co-operate in
every possible way.

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Prime

Minister

to

6 March 41

Mr. Eden
(
Cairo
)

War Cabinet are taking no decision until we receive
your reply.

Mr. Eden to Prime

6 March 41

Minister

Chief of Imperial General Staff and I, in consultation
with the three Commanders-in-Chief, have this afternoon re-examined the question. We are unanimously
agreed that, despite the heavy commitments and grave
risks which are undoubtedly involved, especially in view
of our limited naval and air resources, the right decision
was taken in Athens. Palairet’s telegrams to Cairo show
the position from Greek angle.

2. This is merely to indicate to you how our minds
are working while we await Cabinet view.

And later:

Mr. Eden to Prime

6 March 41

Minister

We have had further discussion this evening with
General Smuts and Commanders-in-Chief, and further
detailed appreciation follows tomorrow morning.

Prime

Minister

to

7 March 41

Mr. Eden, Cairo

I will bring your measured and deliberate reply
before the Cabinet today. Meanwhile all preparations
and movements should go forward at utmost speed.

2. I am deeply impressed with steadfast attitude
maintained by you and your military advisers, Dill,
Wavell, and, I presume, Wilson, on the broad merits,
after full knowledge of local and technical situation and
in view of the memorandum by the C.O.S. Committee.

3. Two points are dominant. First, we must not take
on our shoulders responsibility of urging Greeks against
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their better judgment to fight a hopeless battle and
involve their country in probable speedy ruin. If, however, knowing how little we can send at particular dates,
they resolve to fight to the death, obviously we must, as
I have already said, share their ordeal. It must not be
said, and on your showing it cannot be said, that,
having so little to give, we dragged them in by overpersuasion. I take it, from your attitude and Athens telegrams, that you are sure on this point.

4. Second point. It happens that most of the troops
to be devoted to this solemn duty are the New Zealand
Division and after March the Australians. We must be
able to tell the New Zealand and Australian Governments faithfully that this hazard, from which they will not
shrink, is undertaken, not because of any commitment
entered into by a British Cabinet Minister at Athens and
signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but
because Dill, Wavell, and other Commanders-in-Chief
are convinced that there is a reasonable fighting
chance. This I regard as implied by your positive
reactions to our questioning telegrams.

5. Please remember in your stresses that, so far,
you have given us few facts or reasons on their authority which can be presented to these Dominions as
justifying the operation on any grounds but noblesse
oblige. A precise military appreciation is indispensable.

6. You know how our hearts are with you and your
great officers.

On the seventh the promised fuller statement of the case reached us in London.

Mr. Eden to Prime

7 March 41

Minister

Following are the views of your envoys:
Whole position again fully reviewed with the Commanders-in-Chief and Smuts. While we are all conscious of the gravity of the decision, we can find no
reason to vary our previous judgment.

2. There has been no question of urging Greece
against her better judgment. At our first meeting at
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Tatoi Greek Prime Minister handed me at the outset of
the

proceedings

written

statement

announcing

Greece’s determination to resist an attack by Italy or
Germany, if necessary alone. The Greek Government
have consistently maintained this attitude, with varying
degrees of confidence as to the outcome. The Greeks
appreciate that there is no honourable peace open to
them with Italy and Germany menacing their frontiers.

The Greeks can only share the fate of Rumania, or
continue the struggle whatever the odds.

3. We have already undertaken commitments
towards Greece. Eight squadrons of the R.A.F., ground
defences and anti-aircraft personnel, have been operating there for months past.

4. Collapse of Greece without further effort on our
part to save her by intervention on land, after the
Libyan victories had, as all the world knows, made
forces available, would be the greatest calamity.

Yugoslavia would then certainly be lost; nor can we feel
confident that even Turkey would have the strength to
remain steadfast if the Germans and Italians were
established in Greece without effort on our part to resist
them. No doubt our prestige will suffer if we are ignominiously ejected, but in any event to have fought and
suffered in Greece would be less damaging to us than
to have left Greece to her fate….

In the existing situation we are all agreed that the
course advocated should be followed and help given to
Greece.

We devoutly trust, therefore, that no difficulties will
arise with regard to the dispatch of Dominions forces as
arranged. At the same time, if the operation is to have a
fair chance of success, it is vital to find means of
supplementing the very serious gap in our forces,
particularly in the air. As we have already many times
emphasised since our arrival, weakness in the air is our
chief anxiety in this theatre of war. Germans, working
on interior lines, are increasing their weight of attack
from Sicily and Tripoli, from the Balkans and the Dodecanese. We are making no corresponding increase in
our own reinforcements, and drastic reduction in the
promised allotment of Tomahawks has come as a
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grievous blow. Royal Air Force here are daily engaged
with the Italian Metropolitan Air Force in Albania, and
with an ever-increasing proportion of German Air Force
in other areas.

The struggle in the air in this theatre will be a stern
one. Longmore requires all the help that can be given.

If he can hold his own most of the dangers and difficulties of this enterprise will disappear.

Accompanied by the Chiefs of Staff, I brought the issue before the War Cabinet, who were fully apprised of everything as it happened, for final decision. In spite of the fact that we could not send more aircraft than were already ordered and on the way, there was no hesitation or division among us. Personally I felt that the men on the spot had been searchingly tested. There was no doubt that their hands had not been forced in any way by political pressure from home. Smuts, with all his wisdom, and from his separate angle of thought and fresh eye, had concurred.

Nor could anyone suggest that we had thrust ourselves upon Greece against her wishes. No one had been overpersuaded. Certainly we had with us the highest expert authority, acting in full freedom and with all knowledge of the men and the scene. My colleagues, who were toughened by the many risks we had run successfully, had independently reached the same conclusions. Mr. Menzies, on whom a special burden rested, was full of courage.

There was a strong glow for action. The Cabinet was short; the decision final.

Prime

Minister

to

7 March 41

Mr. Eden, Cairo

Cabinet this morning considered project in light of
your telegrams from Athens and Cairo, and my telegrams. Chiefs of Staff advised that, in view of steadfastly expressed opinion of Commanders-in-Chief on the
spot, of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and

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commanders of the forces to be employed, it would be
right to go on. Cabinet decided to authorise you to
proceed with the operation, and by so doing Cabinet
accepts for itself the fullest responsibility.
2
We will
communicate with Australian and New Zealand Governments accordingly.

In a more personal strain I telegraphed two days later:
Prime