The Grand Alliance (81 page)

5. If we do not use the lull accorded us by the
German entanglement in Russia to restore the situation
in Cyrenaica, the opportunity may never recur. A month
has passed since the failure at Sollum, and presumably
another month may have to pass before a renewed
effort is possible. This interval should certainly give
plenty of time for training. It would seem justifiable to
fight a hard and decisive battle in the Western Desert
before the situation changes to our detriment, and to
run those major risks without which victory has rarely
been gained.

We still think that Wilson should have the command
of the next offensive, if there is to be one, unless of
course you propose to take personal command yourself.

On July 23 General Auchinleck answered my message.

The decision, he said, to put the 50th Division into Cyprus was taken by him after the most careful consideration. “If you wish I can send you detailed reasons which actuated me and which appeared to me incontestable. I hope you will leave me complete discretion concerning dispositions of this kind.” He thought that a German offensive against Syria through Anatolia might develop in the first half of September.

General

Auchinleck

23 July 41

to Prime Minister

I entirely agree as to the desirability of using present
German preoccupation in Russia to hit enemy in Libya,
but I must repeat that to launch an offensive with the
inadequate means at present at our disposal is not, in

The Grand Alliance

498

my opinion, a justifiable operation of War, and is almost
certain to result in a further lengthy postponement of
the date on which we can assume offensive with
reasonable chances of success. To gain results risks
must be run, and I am ready to run them if they are
reasonably justifiable.

Finally:

My immediate intentions are: First, to consolidate
our positions in Cyprus and Syria as rapidly as
possible, and to maintain our position in latter. Second,
to press on with the sadly needed regrouping, reorganisation, and re-equipment of divisions and brigades,
which have not only suffered casualties and losses of
equipment in Greece, Crete, Libya, Eritrea, and Syria,
but have had to be [used] in most instances not as
formations but piecemeal. Third, with the Intendant-General, to expedite the reorganisation and modernisa-tion of the rearward services of supply, movement, and
repairs. Fourth, to safeguard the training and
equipment of our armoured formations, without which
no offensive is possible. Fifth, to reconnoitre and plan
intensively for an offensive in Libya as foreshadowed in
telegram of July 19 from Commanders-in-Chief to
Chiefs of Staff. As a result of this planning, I shall, I am
sure, be asking you in near future for further means
necessary to success.

I could not help feeling at this time a stiffness in General Auchinleck’s attitude, which would not be helpful to the interests we all served. Books written since the war have shown how subordinate but influential portions of the Cairo Operations Staff had deplored the decision to send the army to Greece. They did not know how fully and willingly General Wavell had accepted this policy, still less how searchingly the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff had put the The Grand Alliance

499

issue to him, almost inviting a negative. Wavell, it was suggested, had been led astray by the politicians, and the whole chain of disasters had followed on his compliance with their wishes. Now as a reward for his good-nature he had been removed after all his victories in the moment of defeat. I cannot doubt that in these circles of the Staff there was a strong feeling that the new Commander should not let himself be pressed into hazardous adventures, but should take his time and work on certainties. Such a mood might well have been imparted to General Auchinleck. It was already clear that not much progress would be made by correspondence.

Prime

Minister

to

23 July 41

General Auchinleck

All your telegrams to us and ours to you show that
we should have a talk. Chiefs of Staff greatly desire
this. Unless the immediate military situation prevents
you leaving, hope you will come at once, bringing with
you one or two Staff officers. In your absence, which
should be kept secret, Blarney will act for you.

Auchinleck was willing to come. His brief visit to London was from many points of view helpful. He placed himself in harmonious relations with members of the War Cabinet, with the Chiefs of Staff, and with the War Office. He spent a long week-end with me at Chequers. As we got to know better this distinguished officer, upon whose qualities our fortunes were now so largely to depend, and as he became acquainted with the high circle of the British war machine and saw how easily and smoothly it worked, mutual confidence grew. On the other hand, we could not induce him to depart from his resolve to have a prolonged delay in order to prepare a set-piece offensive on November 1. This was to be called “Crusader,” and would be the largest operation we had yet launched. He certainly shook my

The Grand Alliance

500

military advisers with all the detailed argument he produced. I was myself unconvinced. But General Auchinleck’s unquestioned abilities, his powers of exposition, his high, dignified, and commanding personality, gave me the feeling that he might after all be right, and that even if wrong he was still the best man. I therefore yielded to the November date for the offensive, and turned my energies to making it a success. We were all very sorry that we could not persuade him to entrust the battle, when it should come, to General Maitland Wilson. He preferred instead General Alan Cunningham, whose reputation stood high on the morrow of the Abyssinian victories. We had to make the best of it, and that is never worth doing by halves.

Thus we shared his responsibility by endorsing his decisions.

We now have a very full knowledge of what the German High Command thought of Rommel’s situation. They greatly admired his audacity and the incredible successes which had crowned it, but none the less they deemed him in great peril. They strictly forbade him to run any further risks until he could be strongly reinforced. Perhaps, with his prestige, he might bluff it out, in the precarious position in which he stood, until they could bring him the utmost aid in their power. His line of communications trailed back a thousand miles to Tripoli. Benghazi was a valuable short cut for a part at any rate of his supplies and fresh troops, but a toll of increasing severity had to be paid on the sea transport to both these bases. The British forces, already largely superior in numbers, were growing daily. The German tank superiority existed only in quality and organisation. They were weaker in the air. They were very short of artillery ammunition, and feared greatly to have to fire it off. Tobruk The Grand Alliance

501

seemed a deadly threat in Rommel’s rear, from which at any moment a sortie might be made, cutting his communications. They could not tell what offensive plans we had, either by sallying from Tobruk or by the advance of our main body. However, while we remained motionless they could be thankful for every day that passed.

On June 2, 1941, a conference had been held at the Brenner Pass, at which the military principals were Field-Marshal Keitel and General Cavallero. Keitel agreed that the offensive against Egypt could not begin before the autumn. It should be carried out, not with a mass of troops, but with a small number of well-equipped special troops.

The strength of the attacking forces should be four Panzer divisions, two of them German, and three motorised divisions.
There could not be any superfluous consumers of
food in North Africa, but only as many fightingmen as could
be supplied.
General Cavallero said that the Italian divisions serving under the Afrika Corps were worn out; they had lost forty to sixty per cent of their personnel and material. The vehicle situation was very bad, and
the Pavia division had
only twenty-seven lorries.

Keitel considered an even more pressing need to be the provision of flak and coastal artillery to afford better protection against enemy attacks on ports of supply and supply dumps. After this it was important that artillery reinforcements for the Afrika Corps should be brought over, for one of the first conditions for subsequent operations would be the capture of Tobruk. At present German and Italian troops could not reach it without heavy artillery. Apart from supplying the fighting troops, it was absolutely necessary to make large-scale provision of supplies and to prepare transport columns before the start of the offensive.

Supplies required for the German Afrika Corps alone amounted to 40,000 to 50,000 tons per month; in addition The Grand Alliance

502

there were supplies for the Italians. The Italians would get all the vehicles not required by the Afrika Corps. German air transport had very little space available. The Italians alone must protect sea and coastal transports, because the German air forces were being withdrawn from Sicily.

Stronger Luftwaffe units were being posted to North Africa to protect the coast and coastal transport.

General Cavallero thanked the German chief for his statement. Both he and the Duce shared his opinions.

Italy’s most important task was to hold her present positions. Defence forces in North Africa were too small.

The troops taking part in the siege of Tobruk must be relieved for a rest period. The situation at Sollum was one of constant danger.

In August the Luftwaffe Operations Staff reported: The strain on the supply position of our forces in North Africa is well known. … So far full use has not been made of the harbour capacity at Benghazi. Since the recapture of Derna nothing has been done in the harbour area to repair the damage caused by the British…. Bardia Harbour must be repaired as well. We therefore urgently request that the Italians be informed that they should begin the necessary work immediately.

It is absolutely necessary to make use of Benghazi, Derna, and Bardia for supplies; this will take some weight from the port of Tripoli and will reduce the dangerous coastal traffic from Tripoli to Benghazi. It is still more vital if we look at the very serious transport situation in Africa, which makes ever more difficult the use of the land route from Tripoli to Benghazi.

Reinforcement of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean
area is impossible until after the cessation of operations
in the East.

At the end of August, at a conference held at Hitler’s Headquarters on the Russian front between Keitel and The Grand Alliance

503

General Cavallero, Keitel said the position in North Africa could not be regarded as fixed until Tobruk had fallen. If all went well with regard to transport to Africa the German forces selected for the attack would be ready in the middle of September. General Cavallero replied that the Duce had ordered a speed-up in the preparations for the attack on Tobruk. It was certain that the Italians would not be ready for an offensive by the middle of September; they would probably not be ready until the end of the month.

They were not in fact ready at the end of September; nor were either Germans or Italians ready in October; nor in November. They could no doubt have offered a stiff resistance if attacked.

Agreement was reached between the German and Italian staffs on August 29 that –