The Grand Alliance (88 page)

Prime

Minister

to

11 Aug. 41

Foreign Secretary

The position about Japan is as follows:
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President proposed to Japan some time ago neutralisation of Indo-China and Siam under joint guarantee of
United States, Japan, Britain, China, and others.

Japanese reply, which will be cabled you fully as soon
as more urgent messages have been dealt with, agrees
to the principle of no encroachment upon Siam and
military withdrawal from Indo-China, but adds a number
of conditions fundamentally unacceptable. For instance,
the withdrawal to take place after the China incident is
settled, meaning thereby after Chiang Kai-shek is
strangled, and further requiring recognition of Japan’s
preponderant position in these regions; also requiring
United States to abstain from all further military preparations in these regions, and seeking lifting of the economic sanctions.

2. President’s idea is to negotiate about these
unacceptable conditions and thus procure a moratorium
of, say, thirty days in which we may improve our
position in Singapore area and the Japanese will have
to stand still. But he will make it a condition that the
Japanese meanwhile encroach no farther, and do not
use Indo-China as a base for attack on China. He will
also maintain in full force the economic measures
directed against Japan. These negotiations show little
chance of succeeding, but President considers that a
month gained will be valuable. I pointed out of course
that the Japanese would double-cross him and would
try to attack China or cut the Burma communications.

However, you may take it that they consider it right to
begin the negotiations on these lines, and in view of
what has passed between United States and Japan it
will be necessary to accept this fact.

3. In the course of these negotiations President
would renew his proposals for neutralisation of Siam as
well as Indo-China.

4. At the end of the Note which the President will
hand to the Japanese Ambassador when he returns
from his cruise in about a week’s time he will add the
following passage, which is taken from my draft: “Any
further encroachment by Japan in the Southwest
Pacific would produce a situation in which the United
States Government would be compelled to take counter-

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measures, even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.” He would also
add something to the effect that it was obvious that, the
Soviet being a friendly Power, United States Government would be similarly interested in any similar conflict
in the Northwest Pacific.

5. I think this is entirely good, and that we should
associate ourselves therewith and endeavour to get the
Dutch to join in full agreement, because either the
Japanese will refuse the conditions the President
prescribes – namely, continuance of the economic
sanctions and no movement on the Japanese part and
no invasion of Siam – or alternatively they will go on
with their military action while lying about it diplomatical-ly. In this case the conditions indicated by the final
passage just quoted [in paragraph 4] would come into
play with great force, and the full effect of parallel
declarations could be realised. The Soviet Government
should also be kept informed. It might be dangerous to
tell the Chinese what we are doing for them, though
they might be assured in general terms that we have
had their security in mind in all that we have done.

6. On all these grounds I consider that we should
endorse the proposed course of action, and that the
Dominions should be told about it and made to see that
it is a very great advance towards the gripping of
Japanese aggression by united forces.

To Mr. Attlee I sent a comprehensive summary of all the main points under discussion.

Prime

Minister

to

11 Aug. 41

Lord Privy Seal

Have reached satisfactory settlement about Naval
Plan Number 4 [the United States Navy to take over the
America-Iceland stretch of the Atlantic].

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Secondly, President is prepared to take very helpful
action corresponding with, or consequent upon, Operation “Pilgrim.”

Thirdly, he intends to negotiate with Japan on the
basis of a moratorium for, say, a month, during which
no further military movements are to be made by Japan
in Indo-China and no encroachment upon Siam. He has
agreed to end his communication with a severe
warning, which I drafted….

Fourthly, the President wishes to issue at the
moment of general release of meeting story, probably
14th or 15th, a Joint Declaration, signed by him and me
on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, of the broad
principles which animate the United States and Great
Britain at this favourable time. I send you herewith his
draft of the statement, which you will see is not free
from the difficulties attaching to all such declarations.

The fourth condition would evidently have to be amended to safeguard our obligations contracted in Ottawa
and not prejudice the future of Imperial Preference.

This might fall into its place after the war in a general
economic settlement, with decisive lowering of tariffs
and trade barriers throughout the world. But we cannot
settle it now. For the sake of speedy agreement I have
little doubt he will accept our amendments.

The seventh paragraph is most remarkable for its
realism. The President undoubtedly contemplates the
disarmament of the guilty nations, coupled with the
maintenance of strong united British and American
armaments both by sea and air for a long indefinite
period.

Having regard to our views about the League of
Nations or other international organisations, I would
suggest the following amendment after the word

“essential”: “pending the establishment of a wider and
more permanent system of general security.”

He will not like this very much, but he attaches so
much importance to the Joint Declaration, which he
believes will affect the whole movement of United
States opinion, that I think he will agree.

It would be most imprudent on our part to raise
unnecessary difficulties. We must regard this as an

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interim and partial statement of war aims designed to
assure all countries of our righteous purpose, and not
the complete structure which we should build after
victory.

You should summon the full War Cabinet, with any
others you may think necessary, to meet tonight, and
please let me have your views without the slightest
delay. Meanwhile full accounts are being sent you
immediately on the other points, together with Cadogan’s report of the conversation. I fear the President will
be very much upset if no Joint Statement can be
issued, and grave and vital interests might be affected.

I had purposed to leave afternoon 12th, but we have
both now postponed departure twenty-four hours.

I had only finished dictating the telegrams about 2 P.M., and that I should have had in my hands within the next twelve hours the War Cabinet’s most helpful reply reflects credit on all concerned. I subsequently learned that my telegrams had not reached London until after midnight, and that many of the Ministers had already gone to bed. Nevertheless, a War Cabinet meeting was summoned for 1.45 A.M., and there was a full attendance, including Mr. Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, who was in England at the time. As a result of a full discussion they sent me a telegram just after 4 A.M., welcoming the proposal and suggesting a further version of Point 4 (non-discrimination in world trade) and the insertion of a new paragraph dealing with social security. Meanwhile I had heard that the President had accepted all the amendments I had suggested to him on August 11.

On August 12, about noon, I went to see the President to agree with him the final form of the Declaration. I put to the President the Cabinet’s revised version of Point 4, but he The Grand Alliance

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preferred to adhere to the phrasing already agreed, and I did not press him further on this point. He readily accepted the insertion of the new paragraph about social security desired by the Cabinet. A number of verbal alterations were agreed, and the Declaration was then in its final shape.

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME

MINISTER

August
12, 1941

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity. Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their The Grand Alliance

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own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.