The Great Depression (6 page)

8/26/36

 

The Kirsch property was bought eventually by the U—family for about $7500 but instead of using cash they used Home Savings & Loan Co. pass books which were selling at 50¢ on the dollar. This family has bought much real estate this way and in the next few years will reap a harvest.

 

6/28/62

 

The U—family bought half of East Federal St. at sheriff sales in the 1930s. However down-town real estate has gone to pot because of the growth of suburban shopping centers. The U—family still owns half of E. Federal St. but the buildings are empty and they cannot sell.

 

7/10/70

 

Almost all of E. Federal has been purchased by Urban Renewal at modest prices. The stores are vacant or have been torn down. The cheap E. Federal stores have moved to W. Federal and the good stores have moved to the suburbs.

 

 

8/26/36

 

Looking back now it is clear that the Toledo bank failures were but a fore-runner of the closing of the Youngstown banks later and of the National Bank holiday in March 1933. Very few people foresaw. We could not believe that Youngstown banks like the Dollar Bank, the Commercial and the City Banks would close their doors. We thought it could not happen here—and yet it did. It is cheering however to note that both Toledo and Youngstown survived the bank closings and are prosperous cities again with bright futures. In the Commercial and Dollar Banks the depositors lost nothing. In the City Bank they lost about 40% altho even for that they hold certificates against questionable assets.

 

 

10/30/41

 

I am not sorry I did not buy the lots. Vacant residential lots in Youngstown have not been a good investment unless you build on them at once and get a return on your investment. If those Wickliffe lots had been purchased at $25 each in 1931 they would be worth less today than the original $25 investment plus accumulated taxes and interest for 10 years.

 

 

EDITOR’S NOTE

 

The strain on charitable organizations, in Roth’s Youngstown as elsewhere, was tremendous. Without public assistance programs to help the poor and out of work feed their families in the 1920s, charities stood on the front lines. Until the Great Depression, joblessness was usually perceived as a temporary setback; if a man tried hard enough to get another job, his need for charity would end. Family members, ethnic communities, or neighbors came to his aid until he “got back on his feet.” Neighbors or relatives would contribute a dollar apiece to feed a down-and-out family; churches or private charities provided meals.

 

But the sheer volume of the needy in the first few years of the Depression tapped the normal capabilities of these organizations. In Youngstown the Allied Council, the local charity, handed out relief to 100 people in August 1931. By September 4 they handled 1,150 desperate calls. Furthermore, initiatives that raised funds in the past had dried up: A fund in Detroit that needed $3.5 million in 1931, for example, could raise only $645,000. On this score, President Hoover was tragically out of touch. In the winter of 1930-1931 he felt the country’s unified “‘sense of voluntary organization and community service’ could take care of the unemployed,” according to Arthur Schlesinger Jr. About a year later, in late 1931, President Hoover did create the Organization for Unemployment Relief to help drive the wealthy to donate money to private charities, but he simply did not believe the government needed to directly assist the unemployed. For one, Hoover considered it the responsibility of local communities to handle and feed their own out-of-work citizens. But he was also afraid that any federal assistance would provide an excuse for the wealthy in America to stop providing charity and funds to the needy “have-nots” in their communities. Amazingly, many Americans sided with Hoover on this topic in the early days of the Depression.