The Irish Revolution, 1916-1923 (25 page)

In the period immediately following the political split efforts were made to maintain the unity of the IRA. Plans were formulated to hold an army convention in March, an idea that was initially supported by Mulcahy, the chief-of-staff. However, due to increased tensions between both wings of the IRA, in particular over the contested occupation of vacated barracks in Limerick, Mulcahy grew wary of the divisive potential of the convention and prohibited it. Anti-treaty IRA leaders went ahead with it in defiance of his order and the convention reaffirmed the IRA's commitment to republicanism, withdrew recognition of the Dáil as the recognised government of the republic and established an alternative army executive, widening further the gulf between the pro- and anti-treaty factions (Laffan, 1999: 374).

While the debate about the army convention was taking place British soldiers withdrew from barracks in Limerick City. Pro-treaty forces were unwilling to allow the local anti-treaty IRA take control of these barracks as they would provide an important strategic link between anti-treaty strongholds in Munster and Connaught, and isolate pro-treaty bases in Athlone and Clare. A stand-off ensued between pro-treaty forces and Ernie O’Malley's Second Southern Division (anti-treaty IRA) that was only resolved when the pro-treaty side agreed to a compromise, which was in effect a climb-down, allowing Limerick Corporation to take control of police barracks while a small force of anti-treaty IRA under Liam Lynch occupied the city's two military barracks. While a confrontation was narrowly avoided, the situation highlighted how the existence of two opposing armed factions held the potential for the treaty split to spread from being a political dispute to a military conflict.

On two further occasions in April 1922 there was potential for the split to become militarised. On 13 April an anti-treaty IRA faction led by Rory O’Connor occupied the Four Courts, the most important judicial building in Dublin, in open defiance of the pro-treaty government. The inability of the government or the pro-treaty IRA to remove them highlighted the weakness of the government to deal with the IRA's resistance to the treaty. Later that month the anti-treaty IRA tried to prevent Griffith from speaking in Sligo Town, and a serious confrontation was averted when the local IRA leader, Liam Pilkington, allowed the address to proceed. During May and June further talks were held between delegations from the pro- and antitreaty IRA factions in a last ditch effort to preserve the force's unity, but the treaty remained a sticking point with the pro-treaty faction insisting that acceptance of the treaty was the basis for negotiation. When the talks broke down in June the hitherto peaceful co-existence of two opposing armed forces appeared to be doomed.

Contemporaneous political developments also increased the likelihood of a civil war. Following the Dáil's vote in favour of the treaty a Provisional Government, headed by Collins, was formed that would remain in place until the official creation of the Free State in December 1922, one year from the date of the signing of the treaty. However, the Dáil Government, headed by Griffith, also remained in place because the Second Dáil was still in existence, and many ministers held the same portfolio in both administrations. Gradually most governmental work was taken over by the Provisional Government and the Dáil Cabinet was marginalised. Political opponents of the treaty were also becoming more vehement and the language of their public pronouncements was increasingly inflammatory. This was especially the case with de Valera, who made a number of strident speeches against the settlement, the most notable of which was delivered at
Thurles in County Tipperary where he spoke of having to ‘wade through Irish blood, through the blood of the soldiers of the Irish Government, and through, perhaps, the blood of some of the members of the Government in order to get Irish freedom’. De Valera was the leader of the political opposition to the treaty, and was not active in the anti-treaty IRA. His defenders argue that these were warnings of what might happen, rather than a threat of violence. Nevertheless, in the tense atmosphere of the time, with two opposing militant wings of the IRA vying for control of territory, it is difficult to disagree with the assessment that his statements were ‘at best incautious and at worst very wildly irresponsible’ (Laffan, 1999: 381).

The divided Sinn Féin Party also had to come to terms with how best to contest the general election that was planned for June 1922, which would effectively be a referendum on the treaty. Unlike the previous two elections in 1918 and 1921, the field was much more open, with Labour, Independents and Farmers (comprising some former home rulers) contesting a number of constituencies. In May, Collins and de Valera agreed a pact whereby a panel of pro- and anti-treaty Sinn Féin candidates would be put forward based on the existing strength of both wings within the Second Dáil. The cabinet to be appointed after the election was to have five pro- and four antitreaty members. The pact was extremely unpopular with the non-Sinn Féin parties as well as supporters of the treaty and the British Government, who saw it as robbing the electorate of a clear choice and making unjustified concessions to republicans, who were largely pleased with an agreement that seemed to guarantee them a decent allocation of seats (Laffan, 1999: 388–9; Regan, 1999: 59–61). The pact was another last-ditch effort to avoid the split descending into violence, especially before the election. It does not appear to have been honoured universally, especially not by supporters of the treaty. Even Collins appears to have been luke-warm about it, urging voters in Cork two days before polling to ‘vote for the candidates you think best of ’, though this did not amount to the outright repudiation of the pact that it is sometimes interpreted as (Gallagher, 1979: 412–13).

The election, held using proportional representation, was the most strongly contested election since 1892, with only seven of the 28 constituencies returning deputies unopposed. The result was a triumph for the pro-treaty wing of Sinn Féin, which won 41 of the seats in contested constituencies, as opposed to 19 for the anti-treatyites (17 of each side were returned unopposed). Only seven pro-treaty candidates were defeated in contrast to 22 republicans, including prominent figures such as Liam Mellows and Erskine Childers, who, like his cousin, Robert Barton, had since repudiated the treaty. Four of the six women who had voted against the treaty – Kathleen Clarke, Margaret Pearse, Countess Markievicz and Dr Ada English – were also rejected. Kate O’Callaghan was returned unopposed and Mary MacSwiney was re-elected
by a slim margin. Dan Breen, who could not decide between the pro- and anti-treaty factions, was also defeated, as was his fellow Tipperary IRA comrade, Seamus Robinson. The constituency of Sligo–East Mayo was the only one in which the anti-treaty side won a majority of the votes cast (Laffan, 1999: 403–7).

Labour was the other winner in the contest, returning 17 of its 18 candidates and proving that it had not been terminally damaged by abstaining from the two previous elections. Seven Farmers’ Party TDs and 10 independents (including four returned opposed for Trinity College) made up the final result (O’Leary, 1979: 12). If the election is to be seen as a referendum on the treaty then it was a resounding endorsement of it by the electorate as all of the other parties – Labour, Farmers and independents – were supporters of it. However, the success of the Provisional Government in achieving this result was tempered somewhat by the artificiality of the pact, the fact that pro-treaty Sinn Féin only won 38.5 per cent of the votes cast and allegations of ‘widespread and not fully reported intimidation of Farmers’ and Independent candidates’ (Regan, 1999: 66–7).

While there was serious potential for a civil war to break out before June 1922, the desire to await the outcome of political events, such as the general election, partly explains why it did not. Another significant process in this regard was the framing of the Irish Free State constitution. In January 1922 Collins appointed a committee to draw up a new constitution for the Free State. He appears to have hoped that by omitting reference to the most contentious aspects of the treaty – the oath, the Governor General (the King's representative) and the treaty ports – the Provisional Government could produce an essentially republican constitution that would satisfy many of the treaty's opponents. This attempted sleight-of-hand did not fool the British Government, which demanded many changes to the draft constitution submitted to it in May. It was especially chagrined by the assertion that ‘Ireland is a free and sovereign nation’, the omission of any reference to the oath and the description of the Governor General as a ‘Commissioner of the British Commonwealth’. Combined with what they saw as unacceptable tolerance of the anti-treaty IRA's activities, the British Government was not prepared to accept any further efforts by the Provisional Government to temporise with the treaty and insisted on a new version that included references to the oath, the Governor General and the right of final judicial appeal to the British Privy Council (Farrell, 1988: 23–6). The revised draft, published in June, was unacceptable to republicans, ending yet another slim chance of retaining unity.

One final factor that preserved a tenuous unity within the IRA was Collins's northern offensive in early 1922. In his dual capacity as president of both the Provisional Government and the IRB, Collins pursued a contradictory policy towards Northern Ireland following the signing of the treaty. In January
1922 he agreed what was known as the Craig–Collins Pact with Sir James Craig, promising an immediate end to the Belfast boycott in return for the re-instatement of expelled Catholic shipyard workers. Parallel to this official policy Collins and the Provisional Government set about trying to undermine Northern Ireland by encouraging Catholics in their non-recognition of the Northern Government, including paying the salaries of teachers in Catholic schools in the north for six months between February and October 1922, a gesture that achieved ‘little but draining the fledgling Southern government of much needed resources’ (Lynch, 2006: 98–9).

Collins's more sinister scheme for undermining Northern Ireland involved using the IRA to foment violence and unrest there, although it is unclear whether he was using the IRA to destabilise the north, or using the north to help stave off the split in the IRA; Northern Ireland was one issue around which the sundering republican army could unite. In January 1922 Collins formed an Ulster Council within the IRA, led by himself and the most senior IRA leader in the six counties, Frank Aiken. A co-ordinated effort by this body to kidnap prominent unionists in border areas of Monaghan, Tyrone and Fermanagh, in response to the imprisonment and threatened execution of a number of IRA men captured in Tyrone in January 1922, led to violent skirmishes between the IRA and the
B Specials
. Armed confrontations between the IRA and the Specials along the border continued during the first half of 1922, often leading to fatalities, including the deaths of four Specials and one IRA man at Clones railway station in County Monaghan on 11 February. The event reverberated in Belfast where another spate of intercommunal violence resulted in the deaths of 43 people (27 Catholics and 16 Protestants) during February.

B Specials
: See
Ulster Special Constabulary.

Belfast's death toll rose to 59 (37 of whom were Catholics) in March, as attacks on police barracks, Orange Halls and individual Protestants, and bombing raids by the IRA intensified along the border provoking a violent backlash against the city's Catholic population. The most notorious of these incidents was the killing of a well-known Catholic publican, Owen MacMahon, who had no connections to the republican movement, along with three of his sons and an employee, by RIC and B Specials at the MacMahon family home on the Antrim Road in north Belfast on 24 March. The IRA's attempt to show its muscle along the border was ultimately counter-productive and resulted in a murderous backlash against many innocent Catholics in Belfast (Lynch, 2006: 107–26).

The split in the IRA confirmed by the army convention in March heightened Collins's efforts to use the north as a ploy to retain republican unity and damage the Northern Government. While some significant northern IRA leaders joined the anti-treaty side the majority of the rank and file remained loyal to GHQ, while Frank Aiken tried to steer a neutral course. A joint offensive by
both wings of the IRA, including the Provisional Government's new army that had evolved from the pro-treaty IRA, was planned for May 1922, in which an uprising against Northern Ireland would be carried out by the northern IRA using arms and equipment provided by the Provisional Government Army. However, due to poor co-ordination, divisions within the IRA over the treaty and the southern leaders’ increasing preoccupation with the deterioration of the political and military situation in the south, the elaborate offensive never materialised and the attacks which did take place were quashed forcefully and brutally by the B Specials (Lynch, 2006: 129–47).

This failed offensive provided the backdrop to one of the worst atrocities of the period, on a par with the massacre of the MacMahons. On 17 June a contingent of the IRA's Fourth Northern Division, based in Dundalk, County Louth, crossed the border and attacked a number of Presbyterian farmers in the townlands of Altnaveigh and Lisdrumliska in County Armagh, shooting dead six Protestant civilians, injuring many others and causing extensive damage to their property. Altnaveigh was a well-planned sectarian attack on innocent Protestants, ostensibly carried out as a reprisal for the killing of two local Catholics three days previously. More recent research suggests that it had more complex roots and was a response to a raid by the USC on the public house and home belonging to a local republican, James McGuill, during which it is alleged that McGuill's heavily pregnant wife was raped, a reaction to what was perceived as a campaign of violence against local Catholics, and ‘part of a wider escalation of violence in the region around Newry’ in the summer of 1922 (Lynch, 2010: 184–210).