The Long Game (21 page)

Critics asserted that they had been right all along, deriding Obama's past declarations of wars ending as his own “mission accomplished” moment. Most commentators use Syria as the single prism to interpret Obama's approach to the world. As the columnist Roger Cohen
argues, “Syria is the question the Obama Doctrine must answer if it is not to be deemed modest to the point of meaninglessness.”
²²

Considering the scope and scale of America's military campaign against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, it is true the tide of war is still with us. In retrospect, some of Obama's declarative rhetoric suggested starker conclusions than actually existed. Each day, thousands of US military personnel take the fight to ISIS, whether by conducting direct military action or by supporting partners and allies on the ground, often at great risk. Given that Obama's strategy is premised on sustainability and patience, this battle will be conducted far into the future. He has always been clear about that fact.

This is where Obama is misunderstood—and, by some, purposely misportrayed. He has never believed in complete US withdrawal from the Middle East or renounced the importance of military power. In words and actions, Obama has made clear his commitment to America's interests and partners in the region, and to defeating ISIS. But he is equally determined not to ruin the country in the process or let the problems of the Middle East become the singular obsession of American foreign policy.

The key is not to allow the “long war” to return as the organizing principle for America in the world, causing everything else—our other interests, our values, our resource decisions—to be swallowed up. This fight must always be waged in the context of the Long Game.

CHAPTER 6

THE BEAR ROARS BACK

W
hen the Russian military escalated its involvement in Syria in September 2015, unleashing a brutal air assault on behalf of the Assad regime, many saw this as a fundamental failure of Obama's approach to Moscow. Coming less than two years after Russia's illegal takeover of Crimea, and amid its ongoing military support for separatists in Ukraine and escalating military threats to America's European allies, the Kremlin's moves stoked tensions between Russia and the West that were reminiscent of the Cold War.

During Obama's first term in office, the “reset” had paid dividends. Over the course of several years, the United States and Russia were able to achieve genuine successes where their interests converged. In 2010, the two countries worked together in the UN to impose the toughest sanctions ever against Iran. They also signed and ratified the “New START” treaty, eliminating a third of their nuclear weapons as a result. They cooperated on shoring up a key supply line for American troops in Afghanistan—the “Northern Distribution Network”—enabling the United States to reduce its reliance for access on a volatile Pakistan. The two countries also
increased trade and foreign direct investment, and the United States helped Russia enter the World Trade Organization. And on Libya, they worked together to allow the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force against the Qaddafi regime; Russia's abstention was the first time a Kremlin leader had allowed the UN to authorize a humanitarian intervention (of course this would come back to bite us, as Vladimir Putin was clearly determined never to let such a thing happen again).
¹

But the reset was never mistaken for a honeymoon. Meaningful cooperation existed alongside a pile of disagreements and troubling Russian behavior. Official Russian attitudes about the United States remained laced with grievance and blame, claiming that NATO presented a threat and that Moscow had been repeatedly lied to about the alliance's true intentions and in fact viewed Russia as an enemy (which was, at least up until 2014, not true). Russia also used the reset era to modernize its military and address the shortcomings that had been exposed in the 2008 Georgia War—cutting its bloated ranks and investing in rapidly deployable forces. To display its might, Russia conducted several large-scale exercises involving tens of thousands of troops and featuring provocative scenarios that included a war with NATO-like forces and a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw.

At the end of 2011, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev announced he would step aside and let Putin, who had been prime minister, return to the presidency. Obama had developed an easy relationship with Medvedev. They were close in age and both lawyers who favored a coolheaded and practical approach. Medvedev seemed to care about his relations with the West and wanted to improve them, and the United States was happy to oblige. There was no question that Putin, even if behind the curtain, remained the country's most powerful person, but we had sought to get as much done with Medvedev as possible.

As Putin reemerged from the shadows, things quickly soured. After Russia's parliamentary elections in December 2011 were marred by reports of fraud and voter intimidation, Putin publicly blamed the United States (specifically, Hillary Clinton) for fomenting public protests. Putin's return as president in 2012 created a heightened atmosphere of conspiracy, resentment, and suspicion with the West, as well as more repression at home. The reset was over.

A
S THE SITUATION
with Russia grew worse, especially after Ukraine exploded in 2014, critics were quick to allege that the reset was a token of American accommodation that Putin had been able to exploit. Yet such assertions don't hold up to scrutiny.

In the quarter century since the Soviet Union collapsed, America's interactions with Russia have followed a familiar cycle. Presidents enter office believing that relations are adrift, so they seek to renew ties and enhance cooperation. But over time tensions rise, engagement ebbs, and critics declare that the initial approach was naïve. This was true for Bill Clinton, who closely cooperated with Yeltsin in the 1990s, only to be later criticized for “losing” Russia; and George W. Bush, who claimed to have looked into Putin's soul in 2001, only to see this ground lost with the Russian invasion in Georgia. Obama's experience followed the same rhythm.
²

Obama's alleged “weakness” did not drive Putin's aggression. After all, Putin still rolled into Georgia despite years of the Bush administration's supposed “toughness.” Moreover, the downturn in relations began almost immediately after Putin reassumed office, with the Obama administration signing sanctions legislation into law, speaking out forcefully about Putin's domestic crackdowns (especially against democracy organizations and those calling for LGBT rights), and canceling planned summits. At the Pentagon, our own modest efforts to develop productive military-to-military relations—exploring joint
projects such as counter-terrorism—fizzled out, as the Russians showed little interest and we weren't going to chase them.

Considering what the reset achieved—fewer nuclear weapons; greater international action against countries like Iran, North Korea, and Libya; critical supply routes to American troops in Afghanistan—the US got a lot out of it. It behooves those who believe the reset policies were foolhardy to answer whether we would have been better off without such achievements, or how they could have been otherwise accomplished.

The reset with Russia was always thought of as a temporary measure, a kind of diplomatic phase, not as a lasting new era in the relationship. If the administration erred, it was in allowing the reset to be oversold and, after Putin returned to power in 2012, being too slow to declare it over. As Hillary Clinton recalled, “the reset was not a reward; it was a recognition that America has many important strategic and security interests, and we need to make progress where we can.”
³

R
USSIA
'
S INVASION OF
Ukraine in 2014 and its illegal occupation of Crimea precipitated the worst European security crisis since the demise of the Soviet Union. The Russians attempted to redraw an international border by force, supported rebel groups with military equipment and personnel, and worked to undermine a sovereign government in Kiev. The conflict would cost around 8,000 lives by 2016, and its onset sparked deep worries about what might come next. Would Russia try to take over all of Ukraine, or invade the Baltics, sparking a direct confrontation with NATO? While we were not shocked that Putin felt compelled to do something once his client regime in Kiev had collapsed, we were very surprised that he went as far as he did, gobbling up Crimea and fomenting a violent rebellion in Ukraine's east.

In response, Obama pursued a policy that was firm but precisely calibrated. He warned that escalation would provoke a broader
crisis and give Putin exactly what he wanted: a confrontation between two great powers akin to the Cold War (here it is important to recall the origins of the Ukraine crisis had nothing to do with the United States or NATO—it started over steps to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union).

Even before the Ukraine crisis, Obama never doubted that the United States had to stand up to Putin. In one meeting soon after Putin returned as president in 2012, Obama told us the main challenge is to put him in a box to stop making mischief. Yet he struggled with how to send this message in a way the Russian leader would understand. The president said we have to look him in the eye—knowingly referring to George W. Bush saying in 2001 that he had “looked into Putin's eye” and “got a sense of his soul”—and make clear that if he acted out, there would be consequences.

While many Washington commentators (and some administration officials) clamored for the United States to respond more forcefully, especially by doing a little more military saber-rattling, Obama resisted. The day after Russia invaded Crimea in early March 2014, Obama told his national security team that it needed to “right size our response to actual interests, rather than be side tracked by the chattering classes.”

The heart of this debate within the administration was about the nature and extent of Russia's threat. Some officials, especially those in the military, believed Russia was one of the greatest threats the United States faced. Its military capabilities, combined with its nefarious intentions, could do great harm to American interests.

Obama did not dispute this fact, but saw Russia fundamentally as a country driven more by weakness than by strength. It was, he said, a “regional power with a strong military.” That did not make Russia unimportant—it could still do great damage, and history shows that declining, weak states are more prone to risky behavior and instability than stronger powers. In considering his options, Obama said he did
not want to make decisions defensively, as though Russia were “ten feet tall,” and was wary of turning even small conflicts into old-school superpower showdowns. He also believed that Putin's Russia would not change anytime soon—under the Russia constitution Putin could serve as president until 2024—so the US needed an approach that would endure.

Therefore, the strategy Obama devised to address the Ukraine crisis and the Russia challenge had three components: to punish Russia, to reassure our allies, and to support Ukraine.

FROM RESET TO RESOLVE

The first part of the strategy was to put Russia into the penalty box. This began with relatively easy moves—cancelling planned trips and meetings and severing military contacts, eventually leading to disinviting Russia from high-profile international for a such as the G-8 leaders meeting. Although symbolic, such actions were necessary. We never expected that canceling a meeting would force Putin out of Ukraine, but it certainly would not make him happy. Putin was one of the most image-conscious leaders on the planet, both for himself and his country; he did not spend tens of billions on the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics just because of his love of sport.

The more tangible punishment came in the form of economic sanctions against dozens of individuals and institutions inside Russia, including the government figures and private sector cronies closest to Putin, such as his chief of staff. By making it hard, if not impossible, for influential Russian leaders to travel, access their money, or do business, the sanctions raised the costs on those calling the shots in Moscow.

Importantly, the sanctions were imposed together with the countries of the European Union, which made their bite far more painful. At the time, many in Washington asserted that the Europeans were
too concerned with their deep economic ties to Russia and would never stand with us, chiding Obama for waiting for the Europeans to act (one should note that at every turn, Washington pundits have predicted the Europeans would fold, but they have held firm). But our view was that it was worth taking the time to act in concert with our European allies—both because the sanctions would be more effective and because it would send a strong message of transatlantic unity. Putin wanted to control Ukraine, but the far bigger prize would be to divide the United States from Europe. We needed to stick together.

Obama wanted to ensure that Putin had a way out should he choose to take it. Throughout the crisis, Obama referred to this as the “off-ramp.” He wanted to make Russia face a stark choice. If Putin had a change of heart and decided to resolve his issues with Ukraine in a way that upheld the basic rights of sovereignty, independence, and self-determination that the Ukrainian people should enjoy, the United States and the West would welcome Russia back into the fold.

Critics wailed that any discussion of an “off-ramp” was a sign of weakness. But if we did not want to make confrontation inevitable, we needed a way to deescalate the crisis and make clear to Putin there was a path out. Moreover, Obama saw the “off-ramp” as an essential way to strengthen America's hand. If Putin took the offer and relinquished his support for the rebels and returned Crimea to Ukraine, all the better. But in the more likely scenario that he would stay the course, the United States would be in an even better position to rally the world behind a strong response (the logic being that in order to maintain support for tougher measures, we needed to make sure Putin was perceived as the one at fault). It was the same logic the Obama administration applied to the Iranian nuclear threat.

The “off-ramp” was necessary for another reason—to control escalation. Obama recognized that there was an asymmetry of interests
in Ukraine, with Russia willing to gamble more. Put simply, Moscow had more at stake. As Obama reportedly said in one meeting, “if I wanted to invade Canada or Mexico, no one could do much about it.”
⁴
If both sides engaged in a tit-for-tat exchange of escalatory policies, inching closer to direct confrontation, this would not be in the US's interest (or Europe's, and especially not in Ukraine's). And concerns about escalation were foremost on Obama's mind when it came to the question of how to help Ukraine defend itself.

T
HE STRATEGY
'
S SECOND
component was to reassure our European partners, especially with American military power. We needed to make clear to Europe that we had its back.

The heart of the transatlantic security alliance is the mutual pledge to defend one another—that an attack against one is an attack against all—enshrined in “Article Five” of the 1949 NATO Charter. In the days after Russia's takeover of Crimea, the US and other European partners deployed fighter jets, ships, and troops to front-line NATO states bordering Russia, making clear to Moscow not to test our willingness to enforce Article Five.

Obama reaffirmed this pact in a speech during a September 2014 visit to Tallinn, Estonia. In many ways, that address can be read as a bookend to Obama's first speech in Europe, in Germany, over six years before. As a candidate in Berlin, Obama's audience was a rapturous crowd desperate for change. As a president in Tallinn, Obama now spoke to a nervous audience, desperate to hear that the United States stood by them against Russia. He reaffirmed that “solemn duty,” stating clearly that the United States would defend the territory of every NATO ally. “If you ever ask again, who will come to help, you'll know the answer,” Obama said.