The Long Game (24 page)

B
EING PREPARED WAS
about more than having the right weapons in place. Because Iran was constantly developing new ways to hide or defend its nuclear sites (as the discovery of the Qom facility illustrated), the US military also had to keep pace by developing its own innovative means to conduct successful strikes. To do so, the Obama administration invested heavily in special weapons to penetrate Iran's defenses. The most notable of these is a fifteen-ton bomb, the “Massive Ordnance Penetrator,” more commonly referred to as the “MOP.” Designed to be dropped from an aircraft flying at 20,000 feet, this massive weapon had remarkable accuracy and the ability to burrow hundreds of feet underground. It was the ultimate bunker-buster.

Although many of the MOP's details were shrouded in secrecy inside the government—any information about it had to be carried around the Pentagon inside a locked bag—its existence was not a secret, and it was the subject of numerous press accounts and one could even see it in action on YouTube in videos posted by press outlets and defense industry trade publications. And it was hardly a mystery what it was built for.

Ashton Carter, who served as the Pentagon's weapons acquisition chief before becoming Obama's fourth secretary of defense, explained to a journalist in 2015 that the weapon was specifically designed for such deep underground targets, and that the investment in the “MOP was a directive from on high,” meaning from the White House. “And I'm still under instructions to refine it [and] improve it,” Carter said, at the cost of millions of dollars. When asked by another journalist if such refinements enabled the MOP to destroy facilities like those underground in Iran, Carter said simply, “Yes. That's what it was designed to do.”
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While we hoped such steps would convince the leadership in Tehran not to test America's resolve, the most discerning—and skeptical—observers sat in Tel Aviv.

MANAGING ISRAELI ANXIETIES

The Israelis' discomfort with Obama's approach toward Iran was understandable. After all, a nuclear weapon in the hands of a regime that had pledged to wipe Israel off the map was an existential threat. Iran had skillfully manipulated the international community for years. In addition to nuclear weapons, Iran fueled Israel's enemies through its support of terrorist proxies and its proliferation of conventional weapons.

Yet because of divergent interests, the Israelis also didn't fully trust the administration. They worried that in Obama's eagerness to get a deal, the United States would leave them vulnerable. At times such doubts led them to consider taking matters into their own hands and attacking Iran, which on at least one occasion they were only weeks away from doing. Both governments believed in a policy of
preventing
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, as opposed to containment, but they profoundly disagreed on how to execute it. These differences—which simmered throughout Obama's presidency but boiled over when the Israelis actively opposed the 2015 nuclear deal—defined what has been one of the most turbulent periods in US–Israel relations since Israel's independence in 1948.

The honest policy disagreement was exacerbated at the highest levels by a combustible mixture of personalities and politics. That started at the top, with the enormously complicated relationship between Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Obama believed deeply in the need to maintain a strong US–Israel relationship, and he admired the Israelis' historic resilience, especially in the face of terrorism. But he was skeptical of offering unconditional
support. And he neither fully trusted Netanyahu nor was impressed by his bombast. Netanyahu clearly valued close ties with the United States, but his and his team's willingness to play in US politics to weaken Obama or limit his choices—whether that meant currying favor with Mitt Romney during the 2012 election or lobbying Congress directly to reject the Iran deal—only fueled the mutual suspicion.

The long-time Middle East negotiator and former Obama White House official Dennis Ross accurately observed that inside the administration, there were two mindsets about how to handle Israel. Some believed the relationship was fundamentally competitive, thinking that Israel took from the United States but offered little in return. Others saw the relationship as fundamentally cooperative, believing that ever closer collaboration was in American interests. While both mindsets had powerful advocates, Obama's policy ended up being an unusual blending of the two, which often left outside observers (including many Israelis) confused. The result was a US–Israeli relationship that was at once engulfed in bitter distrust and, in critical ways, the strongest it has ever been.
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T
HE DRAMA AND
public discord masked how extraordinarily close the US–Israeli security relationship had become. Those of us working below the political storm and in the bureaucratic trenches certainly felt this way. But more significantly, so did those who brought historical perspective. Robert Gates, who had played a key role in the relationship while working for eight presidents of both political parties, recalled in his memoirs that “no US administration ha[s] done more, in concrete ways, for Israel's defense than Obama's.” Dennis Ross, who also was at the center of US–Israel policy for decades and helped shape the modern strategic relationship during the Reagan administration, observed that “the scope of the security relationship went beyond what any previous administration had put in place.”
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It's easy (and perhaps self-serving) for American officials to make such assertions. So listen to Israeli leaders. Former defense minister Ehud Barak has said there is more “intimacy” between the two militaries than ever before. Current defense minister Moshe Ya'alon describes the relationship as “deep and intimate, and unprecedented in its scope.” Ron Dermer, Israel's ambassador in Washington who has been in the middle of the most heated recent political imbroglios, heralds how the Obama administration has “upgraded security cooperation” with the Israelis. And Netanyahu himself called the two countries' defense ties a “remarkable partnership.”

At the core of this is the significant security assistance the United States provides the Israeli military—well over $100 billion in total during the past few decades, and increasing in the past few years. Such support is bipartisan: in 2007 President George W. Bush agreed to provide Israel with $30 billion for a decade, which Obama has agreed to extend and will likely increase in the coming years. Annually, this adds up to over half of the total US support for foreign militaries worldwide.

This assistance provided Israel with the most advanced weapons capabilities, from precision munitions to sophisticated fighter aircraft. Israel is the only country in the region that will get the high-performance capabilities like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (which is the future of the US's own air force) and the first country in the world that the US agreed to provide the tilt-rotor
V-22
Osprey. Perhaps the most famous example of US–Israel security cooperation is in missile defense, where the two sides have worked together to develop and finance the Iron Dome system, which has proved its effectiveness in protecting Israeli cities from Hamas rockets.

Yet the strength of these ties goes beyond money and hardware. It includes policy, such as the common interest in fighting extremists, maintaining a strong relationship with Jordan and ensuring that Israel maintains its “qualitative military edge”, or “QME,” in the
region—which is policy-speak for the idea that Israel has the capability to protect itself, by itself, against larger-sized militaries in the region. The former Israeli ambassador to the US Michael Oren accurately describes QME as the “DNA of the US–Israel Alliance.” During the Obama years, the level of consultation, coordination, and sharing on these issues between US and Israeli military and intelligence officials has been unprecedented.
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Ironically, the military relationship was undergirded by what many perceived to be the most brittle area of the American-Israeli partnership under Obama: the personal relations among leaders. For all four of Obama's defense secretaries—Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, Chuck Hagel, and Ashton Carter—the relationships with their Israeli counterparts have been among the closest of any around the world.

This is something I saw up close during many hours of meetings and phone calls Secretaries Panetta and Hagel had with their counterparts (and I spent more time with the Israelis than any other foreign counterparts). Panetta and Barak had worked closely together since the Clinton administration and had an easy relationship. And Hagel, who before taking office endured harsh criticism alleging a lack of support for Israel, met more often with Defense Minister Ya'alon than any other counterpart; they developed an especially warm relationship, and upon leaving office Ya'alon publicly praised Hagel as a “true friend” of Israel. This close partnership has continued under Carter (although Ya'alon had a less charitable view of Secretary of State John Kerry, exacerbated by their differences over the Israeli-Palestinian peace process).

D
ESPITE SUCH STRONG
security ties, the Israelis worried that Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapon would outpace our diplomatic efforts to stop it. They warned that Iran's successes in defending its nuclear facilities, combined with its advances in acquiring
just enough nuclear material and technological know-how, would provide what they called a “zone of immunity,” in which it would be too late for the military option to work. They argued that Iran could then remain on the cusp of getting a bomb without actually crossing the line, effectively keeping the gun cocked and loaded while evading the consequences. The Israelis found the prospect of living with such an enduring threat unacceptable, and were itching to take action.

Inside the administration, there was a lot of nervous speculation about whether the Israelis would strike. Our worries became especially intense in the spring and summer of 2012, when the Israelis began talking more openly about the need to act. We sought to use our close ties to reassure them, but wondered whether this would be enough—and in several instances, we were on edge that an attack was imminent.

One such moment came in the summer of 2012, when Ehud Barak called to say he needed to come to the Pentagon immediately to talk with Secretary Panetta about Iran. The next day, Barak joined Panetta and several of us for breakfast in the defense secretary's spacious Pentagon office. In a discussion that lasted the entire day, the Israeli defense minister explained that the Netanyahu government's concerns about Iran had reached a tipping point.

The problem, Panetta recalled saying to Barak, “is that if you attack them now, you can only set them back by a few years…you'll give them a black eye. We, on the other hand, can deliver the knockout punch.” Moreover, he warned Barak that an Israeli action would have the unintended consequence of undermining the effectiveness of any American military option.
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Barak still questioned whether Obama had the resolve ever to take action. For added insurance, he asked for the United States to give Israel the capability to do this on its own. Barak was disappointed not to get even more, but promised to return home to try to
make the case for delay. In the end we averted this crisis, but knew that another one was just around the corner.

T
HE DUALITY OF
Obama's approach to Israel—heated political competition and suspicion alongside unprecedented strategic collaboration and trust—often left it open to misinterpretation. This was especially the case when, as happened all too often, our differences exploded into public.

At times the temptation to score political points proved overwhelming, causing frictions that could have been avoided. But even when disagreements were at their most open and bitter at the political level, especially over what to do about Iran, the core security relationship never suffered. It only became stronger. The criticism that Obama sometimes mishandled the Israelis is warranted. Too often, the president and those aides closest to him let their personal pique get the better of them, leading to unnecessary squabbles and slights. But critics often overlook that what matters most for the long term—the depth and breadth of the core security partnership—has never wavered.

GULF PRESSURE

The Israelis weren't the only ones in the Middle East who were suspicious about where our diplomacy with Iran would lead. We also had a lot of work to do with our partners in the Persian Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The strategic convergence between the Israelis and the Gulf partners over Iran was significant. They both viewed Iran as an existential enemy intent on becoming a regional hegemon. Like the Israelis, America's Gulf partners were suspicious about our diplomatic effort, preferring the United States to take military action—or, in the memorable words of the late Saudi King Abdullah Al Saud, to “cut
the head off the snake.” Short of this, they were looking for reassurance in two ways. First, for the US to prevent Iran from getting a weapon (without much of their help, by the way); and second—in the event we actually succeeded and achieved a nuclear deal—to assuage their fears about an Iran unburdened of sanctions. So just as Obama set out to strengthen the US–Israeli security relationship, he also pursued policies to revitalize Persian Gulf security.

Yet this, too, unfolded in a contradictory way. While Obama pressed to do more for Gulf security, and worked intensively to engage with their leaders, he also expressed great frustration with some Gulf allies for their reckless behavior (such as pouring cash and weapons into Syria and Libya with little regard where they ended up), political repression, and endemic misogyny. Obama and some of his senior aides also resented the role the Gulf countries played in US politics, sometimes blaming them for undue influence in the Washington foreign policy community (a claim that, I believe, is overblown).