The Long Game (30 page)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In writing this book I have accumulated many debts, and am deeply grateful to all of those who have helped along the way.

That starts with my bosses during the six years I spent in the Obama administration at the State Department, White House and Pentagon. Thanks to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon for giving me the opportunities of a lifetime.

My conversations with many former colleagues helped shape my thinking about foreign policy during the Obama years, and I'd especially like to thank Ben Rhodes, Michael McFaul, Jake Sullivan, Colin Kahl, Warren Bass, and Mark Lippert for their insights and friendship. I have also benefitted from many discussions about these events with some of the best informed and most astute (and often critical) observers of the Obama administration, including Les Gelb, Jeffrey Goldberg, Greg Jaffe, Robert D. Kaplan, Mark Landler, George Packer and David Rothkopf.

Since leaving the administration, I could not have asked for a better institutional home than The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and I owe a lot to my boss and friend, Karen Donfried, for her unstinting and encouraging support, including by providing so many thoughtful comments on a draft. I also could not have done this without the help of my closest GMF colleagues, Kelsey Guyette, Taylor Budak, and particularly Steven Keil, who also gave the manuscript a close read and offered many good suggestions.

To assist with the research, I got indispensable help from Ali Wyne, an accomplished foreign policy thinker and writer now at Harvard, who has a very bright future ahead. At a critical stage in the drafting I also received an important assist from Jacob Freedman, an immensely talented former Pentagon colleague who helped ensure things read smoothly.

One of the great pleasures of being out of government is having the freedom to write and reflect, and I am grateful to those who gave me an initial opportunity to develop some of the ideas that appear in this book. That starts with Kevin Baron and the terrific team at
Defense One,
who in just a few years have created a must-read publication for anyone interested in US national security. I also wish to thank Gideon Rose at
Foreign Affairs,
David Rothkopf at
Foreign Policy,
Uri Friedman at
The Atlantic,
and Nicholas Gvosdev, formerly of
The National Interest,
for giving me a chance to think hard and first write about many of the issues addressed here.

I have benefitted greatly by being able to road test my thinking and arguments with some of the finest and most discerning scholars of recent American foreign policy. Peter Feaver at Duke University's Program in American Grand Strategy, and Will Inboden at The Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas, invited me to participate in workshops that helped develop many of my ideas. And I especially thank Robert Jervis and the team at Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies for hosting several lively seminars to discuss this book.

Many friends and former colleagues read all or parts of the book, and I am deeply grateful to them for their willingness take time out of their busy schedules to share insights, help refresh my memory, offer editorial suggestions, and save me from embarrassing errors (of course, any remaining mistakes and the opinions expressed here are my own). I thank Ivo Daalder, Evelyn Farkas, Ben Fishman, Phil Gordon, Lisa Samp, and Matt Spence for their many comments and course-corrections. Kurt Campbell deserves a special shout-out not only for reading an early draft, but for welcoming me to his Iron Bell Run Farm, which is an ideal writers retreat. And in his own category is Bill Burns, the dean of modern American diplomacy who has been my mentor and friend for nearly a quarter century, who added to the book with his customary keen insight and wisdom.

I also received invaluable advice from several scholars: my longtime friend and collaborator Jim Goldgeier gave the entire book a careful read; RAND's Chris
Chivvis offered numerous insights on Libya, and I learned a lot from his own fine work; Hal Brands, a rising star at Duke University and a leading scholar of US grand strategy, provided many thoughtful comments on the manuscript and offered numerous insights which are reflected here; and most of all Robert Jervis, my teacher for over two decades, has been an enthusiastic supporter of this project and made it better with so many smart suggestions.

The US government reviewed this manuscript to ensure it does not compromise any national security information, yet all statements of fact, opinion, and analysis are mine and do not necessarily reflect official US government views. I appreciate the assistance of John Powers at the National Security Council and Mark Langerman and his team at the Department of Defense for handling the review process so efficiently and with great professionalism.

Once again, a huge thanks to Clive Priddle. During the past eight years, this is the third book I have had the pleasure of working on with Clive and the PublicAffairs team, and I am very fortunate to have partners who are so talented, steadfast, and fun. Peter Osnos was an early champion and helped clarify my thinking, Melissa Raymond kept us on task, Marco Pavia helped copyedit and gave the book its elegant design, and Chris Juby made sure it got some attention. Thanks to all.

Finally, and most important, to my family: Lucas, Aerin and, most of all, Heather. For six years they had to deal with a distracted and stressed-out government official, and for the past year they have had to deal with just a slightly less distracted and stressed-out book author. Through it all, they helped me keep perspective and ensured our lives were full of joy. They are the reason this book was possible, which is why it is dedicated to them.

INDEX

Accra,
66

Adams, John Quincy

   
influence of,
213

   
Obama compared to,
214

Afghanistan

   
Bush administration relationship with,
68–69
,
74

   
Clinton, H., views of,
87

   
finances in,
72

   
military power in,
71–72
,
79
,
144–145

   
Obama's strategies for,
68–78

   
security forces of,
144–145

   
troops in,
70

Af-Pak strategy,
69–71

AIIB.
See
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank

airstrikes

   
in ISIS crisis,
153

   
in Israel,
12
,
24

   
in Libya,
xi
,
100–101

   
in Middle East,
2

   
in Syria,
3
,
153

al-Qaeda

   
strategies for,
69

   
terrorism in,
144

al-Assad, Bashar

   
attacks by,
2–3

   
backers of,
130

   
leaving of,
128–129

   
See also
Assad regime

al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah,
119–120

America

   
during Arab Spring,
92–93

   
Asia partnership with,
53–60

   
big short in,
46

   
Cairo supported by,
117–118

   
China relationship with,
46
,
57

   
decaying power of,
46–47

   
economy of,
47

   
Egypt relationship with,
117–118
,
121–122
,
125

   
European relationship with,
61–63

   
Gulf Arab relationship with,
196–197

   
homes in,
51

   
imperfections in,
224

   
interests in,
xi

   
leadership in,
44–45
,
227

   
Muslims in,
67–68
,
117
,
133–134

   
“New American Moment,”
87–88

   
new Middle East relations with,
93–94

   
Pakistan relationship with,
69–70

   
partners of,
145–147

   
power in,
47
,
53–54
,
60–61
,
80
,
85
,
87–88

   
prosperity of,
73–74

   
rebalancing of,
52–61

   
reset in,
61–68

   
resurgence of,
68–78

   
role of,
228

   
Russia relationship with,
63–64
,
159–164

   
security forces in,
118

   
strength of,
42–49

   
Tehran relationship with,
183–184

   
during Vietnam War,
3
,
45

American University,
29–30
,
201–202

Ankara,
66

Annan, Kofi,
135

antiwar statements,
28–30

APEC,
56

Arab Spring

   
America during,
92–93

   
beginning of,
90

   
foreign policy during,
91–92

   
Obama administration approach to,
91–92

   
speech about,
95

   
White House view of,
90

Arab-Israeli settlement,
93

Armed Services Committee,
12

Asia

   
American partnership with,
53–60

   
Clinton, H., involved with,
59–60

   
Donilon in,
60

Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
58

Assad regime

   
attacks by,
2–3
,
153

   
end of,
128
,
156

   
Moscow pressure on,
17

   
in Syria,
159

   
weapons in,
132

   
See also
al-Assad, Bashar

The Audacity of Hope
(Obama)

   
Adams in,
213

   
debate in,
48

   
leadership in,
43
,
103

   
9/11 in,
33

   
Roosevelt in,
44

August 2010 speech,
86

Australian parliament,
54
,
60

Bacevich, Andrew,
30

Baker, James

   
in Bosnia,
207

   
success of,
33–34

balance,
215–218

Balkans

   
agreements on,
32

   
debate about,
134

   
intervention in,
100
,
135

   
lessons in,
136

   
peace attempts to,
35
,
85

Ball, George,
3

Barak, Ehud

   
emergency trip of,
194

   
meetings of,
195

Benghazi

   
attacks,
112–114

   
in Libya crisis,
96–97

   
protection of,
95

   
See also
Dunkirk Option

Bergen, Peter,
150

Berlin

   
address in,
61–62

   
Wall,
31
,
33

Betts, Richard,
22

“big short,”
46

blackmail,
42

border security,
123

Bosnia,
135

Brooks, David,
224–225

Brzezinski, Zbigniew,
82

buffer zone,
130

Buffett, Warren,
xviii
,
229

Burma,
55

Bush, George H.W.,
xiv

   
foreign policy of,
34
,
209–210

   
in Kiev,
208

   
lessons from,
206–212

   
security advisors of,
33–34

   
as underrated,
209

Bush, George W.

   
America's power during,
47

   
crisis management of,
35–36

   
foreign policy of,
34–37

Bush administration

   
Afghanistan relationship during,
68–69
,
74

   
Democrats during,
37–38

   
Europe during,
62

   
fateful choices of,
xx

   
Iran after,
181–182

   
Israel relationship with,
192

   
Obama administration after,
x
,
xii
,
37–38

   
Republicans during,
36–37

   
turning page on,
65

   
“with-us-or-against-us” mentality in,
47

Bush-Baker-Scowcroft team,
210

Bush/Cheney foreign policy,
37

Cairo

   
American support of,
117–118

   
instability in,
119

   
trap,
94

   
University of,
66

Camp David

   
Cairo support after,
117–118

   
Egypt support after,
122

   
foundations of,
197

Campbell, Kurt,
58

Cape Ray,
18–19

Carter, Ashton,
189

Carter, Jimmy

   
peace treaty of,
199

   
perceived weakness of,
204
,
228

Carter administration,
82
,
85

“cash flow financing,”
122

The Checklist Manifesto,
215

chemical weapons

   
convention,
17

   
destroying of,
19

   
Israel's concern about,
11–12

   
OPCW,
19

   
in Syria,
8–11

   
See also
weapons

“Chicken Kiev” speech,
208

China

   
behavior of,
58

   
confrontation of,
58–59

   
foreign policy for,
59

   
Long Game strategy in,
58–59

   
power of,
46
,
57

   
rebalancing in,
59–60

   
Sea,
53–54

civilian protection mission,
104–105

Clinton, Bill

   
American power during,
47

   
foreign policy of,
34–35

Clinton, Hillary

   
in Afghanistan,
87

   
in Asia,
59–60

   
campaign of,
30–31

   
Council of Foreign Relations speech by,
87–88

   
Doha speech by,
93

   
Foreign Policy
essay of,
60–61

   
in Iran,
185–186

   
in Libya,
110–111
,
116

   
military power strategies of,
87–88

   
Obama relationship with,
65

   
in Syria,
141

Cohen, Roger,
156

Cold War

   
end of,
xiv
,
xix
,
31–32

   
NATO after,
32

Communism,
32

Congress, U.S.

   
Obama administration battles with,
94

   
during Syrian crisis,
6–7
,
14–16

Council of Foreign Relations speech,
87–88

counterterrorism,
123

Cruz, Ted,
16

cyber weapons,
206

Damascus suburb attack,
1

Democrats

   
during Bush administration,
37–38

   
in Libya,
111

   
military power of,
38–39

   
recent history of,
204–205

   
Scowcroft,
208

   
struggles among,
39
,
42

Dempsey, Martin,
146

DePaul University,
28
,
49

Dermer, Ron,
192

Destler, I. M.,
47

diplomacy, coercive,
19

Donilon, Tom

   
in Asian affairs,
54
,
60

   
models for,
208–209

Dowd, Maureen,
103

Dunkirk Option,
98

economy

   
in America,
47

   
in Iran,
185–186

   
under Morsi,
118

Egypt

   
America relationship with,
117–118
,
121–122
,
125

   
balance with,
120–121

   
border security in,
123

   
changes in,
90

   
counterterrorism in,
123