The Long Game (8 page)

In other words, the “foreign policy breakdown” makes playing the Long Game even harder. This dynamic would be the defining struggle of Obama's presidency.

CHAPTER 3

REBALANCE, RESET, RESURGE

E
very new president enters office surfing a wave of expectations and opportunity, but must grapple with the undertow of peril. That was especially true for Barack Obama. Few presidents have been elected who carried such a mix of high hopes and excitement combined with domestic crisis and global danger. Robert Gates, Obama's first secretary of defense who was one of Washington's most experienced policy hands, recalled, “It is hard to think of a president who entered office facing more challenges of historic magnitude.”
¹

Obama and his team had to wrestle with the worst global financial crisis since the 1930s; a US economy in freefall, with millions thrown out of their homes and losing their jobs; draining wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with over 150,000 troops in harm's way; a massive new global counter-terrorism effort; rising powers like China and surging regional players like Iran; and urgent global issues like a warming climate. It was a double-sided problem: the international agenda was unforgiving, while the reservoir of
American capacity and credibility to project power was in danger of being depleted.

This was a daunting inbox, and there was a profound sense of urgency. Yet Obama was determined to play the Long Game. He wanted to take a hard look at America's existing foreign policy priorities and see how they squared with the country's long-term interests. He wanted to know where we were “underweighted” or “overweighted” in the world—and how we could regain and sustain America's leadership position. His initial approach to handling this difficult inheritance, and his attempt to devise a strategy for the future, had three components: rebalance, reset, and resurge.

REBALANCE

The imperative to
rebalance
was based on a set of assumptions that there was a fundamental imbalance in US foreign policy in 2009.

One assumption was that there had been not enough attention given to the foundation of American leadership at home, including the US economy, jobs, education and health care. Another was that there had been an over-emphasis on the military instrument of power at the expense of other tools in the national security toolbox, such as diplomacy, international economics, and development assistance. There was the sense that while counter-terrorism certainly remained a priority, the United States needed to reestablish its credibility by trying to close the Guantanamo Bay prison and renouncing torture. It also needed to do more to address pressing global challenges such as climate change—an issue many of Obama's political opponents denied was even a problem—and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

In this sense, Obama set out to go beyond just dealing with the issues that other forces had set upon him (as important as that would be); he wanted to drive a new affirmative agenda. That is why he acted not just to save the economy, but to change it fundamentally by enacting
financial reform, implementing a nearly $800 billion economic stimulus package, and overhauling the health care system. It is why Secretary of State Clinton, with the crucial help of Defense Secretary Gates, stressed the importance of elevating diplomacy and development to work alongside defense as the “three D's” of American power. And it's why Obama used his first year in office to set out a bold agenda to tackle challenges such as climate change and nuclear proliferation.

Most prominently, the “rebalance” reflected the imperative to shift regional priorities from the preoccupation with the problems of the Middle East—which remained vitally important but had, in Obama's view, consumed far too much of America's time, attention, and resources—toward expending more leadership bandwidth in the Asia-Pacific.

A
MERICA HAS ALWAYS
been a Pacific power. For decades it has underwritten the regional order through its network of alliances, deep economic ties, and robust military presence. Asia's transformation has been defining the global order—the region's rise is the most important strategic development since the end of the Cold War. Asia is the center of gravity of twenty-first-century geopolitics: nearly half of the world's population is there; it has many of the world's most dynamic economies, which generate more than one-third of global GDP; it has some of the world's largest and most capable militaries (whose defense spending is increasing); and it is home to the world's two most consequential rising powers, China and India.

The US interest in Asia is compelling. Asia's markets are vital to the American economy, providing important opportunities for investment and trade. American firms need access to Asia's growing markets and cutting-edge technology. The United States also has a stake in helping maintain the region's security, whether that means confronting North Korea's nuclear threat, supporting allies such as South Korea and Japan, or defending freedom of navigation in the
South China Sea (where the Chinese are asserting dubious claims to territorial rights). In these ways, America's future is inextricably entwined with Asia. The idea that the dynamics in Asia will matter most to the United States in the long run is the closest there is to a consensus among foreign policy experts. It is one example of foreign policy conventional wisdom that Obama shares.

Yet when Obama took office, there was a widely held view that that United States had been absent from the strategic transformation in Asia, spending years focused mainly on terrorism and the Middle East. America's regional allies felt that they had been neglected and that China was filling the vacuum. The outgoing Bush team bristled at this assertion—arguing that they in fact deserved more credit for their efforts in the region—but could never shake the perception that they were preoccupied elsewhere.

Intellectually, Obama was sympathetic to the argument that Asia needed more attention. And he was personally predisposed to prioritizing the region, having grown up in Hawaii and Indonesia. His most influential foreign policy advisors who helped shape the policy during the first term—especially Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon—believed that the United States needed to engage more in the region, so much so that many of them wanted to share credit for being the architect of his Asia strategy.

In a speech to the Australian parliament in November 2011, Obama summarized his core goal in Asia: to sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms. To accomplish this, Obama pledged, the United States would be “all-in,” and he directed his team to elevate engagement with Asia in three ways: by raising America's diplomatic game; reshaping its military presence; and advancing the region's economic prosperity, which was also vital to the health of the US economy.

T
HE KEY MOVES
of the diplomatic rebalance were to bolster ties to US treaty allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines; deepen relations with emerging partners such as Vietnam; and open new ties to countries such as Burma. It also meant investing a great deal of capital in developing the relationship with India (here, Obama was building on the work of Presidents Clinton and Bush 43). Obama described the US-India relationship as one of the “defining partnerships” of the twenty-first century. A main objective of his policy was to encourage India—the world's largest democracy with an increasingly vibrant economy and strong military—to “look east” and become a greater player in Asia.

Another vital component of this diplomatic rebalance was for the United States to engage more and seek to reshape the region's diplomatic architecture—the alphabet soup of multilateral institutions such as APEC (Asia-Pacific Cooperation Forum), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the EAS (East Asian Summit), which the United States joined for the first time in 2011. The US also sought to develop more informal, smaller groupings to take on specific challenges. Two examples of such “minilateral” efforts were the Lower Mekong Initiative to encourage cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands Forum to help Island states address common threats such as climate change.

Taken together, such activity added up to one of the most intense periods ever of American diplomatic activity in Asia. With a steady pace of trips, meetings, and events—what Clinton described as “forward deployed diplomacy”—the Obama administration enhanced the US position in Asia. It is often said that the most valuable commodity in Washington is the president's time, and Obama made the priority clear by making nine trips to Asia by the spring of 2016 and by hosting many Asian officials at the White House and at the Sunnylands Estate in California (his first Oval Office visitor was from Japan, and he hosted his first official State visit for the prime minister
of India). This investment of time stood in stark contrast to Bush's intensive interactions with the leaders of Iraq and Afghanistan. The result was a renewed sense of confidence in US leadership in Asia. As Clinton reflected, “We had climbed out of the hole we found ourselves in at the beginning of the administration and reasserted America's presence in the region.”
²

The US military is the backbone of this presence. Under Obama, the Pentagon has deepened military engagement in Asia across the board. In 2012, the Defense Department released a strategy that made clear it would prioritize maintaining a robust military presence in Asia even while considering cuts in the defense budget. By the end of the Obama administration, the United States will have more peacetime military training and partnerships in the region than ever before. And the Pentagon is planning to station a higher proportion of American military assets in the Pacific—by 2020, 60 percent of America's naval and air capabilities will be stationed there.

However, Obama and his team always stressed that the rebalance to Asia was not just about ships and planes. The economic dimension was critical. In fact, the economic approach to Asia was directly tied to the health of the US economy, which needed to tap into new markets and customers.

So under Obama, the United States promoted new trade pacts like the US-Korea Free Trade agreement (which could increase American exports by as much as $10 billion), and used institutions like APEC to reduce economic barriers and bolster investment. The centerpiece of this effort has been the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, which is the most far-reaching free trade agreement in decades, bringing together twelve countries (including the United States) into a single trading community that represents well over $1 trillion in global trade. This achievement is important economically, but it also represents a strategic commitment to Asia for the long haul, tying the region's economies closer to the United States. In 2016, the
question is whether Obama can muster the domestic support to get this trade agreement approved by Congress.

E
NHANCING
A
MERICA
'
S REGIONAL
leadership through such diplomatic, military, and economic moves is a vital part of managing China. Perhaps no country gained more from America's post-9/11 focus on terrorism and the Middle East or its economic woes. The Chinese hard-liners saw the 2008 financial crisis as the opportunity to bet against American power, and to challenge more forcefully for regional position.
³
For Obama, a key reason for the rebalance was to improve America's ability to deal with China's rise—a relationship he believes is the most important for the twenty-first century. This involved a mix of cooperation and confrontation, working on issues of mutual interest and standing up to China where interests collide.

Working with China is rooted in practical necessity. There are few global problems that can be solved without the United States and China acting together. Therefore the Obama team set out to develop a structure of cooperation between the two countries, centered on regular leader visits (Obama met with his Chinese counterpart more often than any previous president), and formal bureaucratic mechanisms such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, an annual gathering co-led by the secretaries of state and treasury which brought together nearly a dozen Cabinet and agency heads to meet with their Chinese counterparts. Such discussions sought to build trust and led to progress in many areas of practical cooperation such as global health, non-proliferation, and climate change.

These efforts unintentionally stirred suspicions among many US friends and allies. As the power gap between the United States and China, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, on the other, increased, some wondered whether this would lead to a new kind of global order led by a “G-2.” This arrangement was never the goal. Nor
was it ever possible because the US–China relationship, while increasingly cooperative on select issues, remained rooted in competition and distrust. As Kurt Campbell, one of the key shapers of the administration's approach to Asia, often observed, the US–China relationship is like water polo. On the surface, it is a rough game with rules where the goal is to achieve a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship,” a mantra recited often by American and Chinese officials. But underwater, the relationship is one of pulling, scratching, and cheap shots, and the objective is to win outright.

Many aspects of China's rise take place in this darker place beneath the surface. It bullies its neighbors. It asserts its sovereign rights in the South China Sea and is effectively militarizing that region. It engages in aggressive mercantilist behavior in Africa and Latin America. It invests significantly in its military modernization, prioritizing capabilities to undermine America's military advantage. Despite all the talk of “win-win” outcomes, the relationship is fundamentally one of competition.

China has its own version of the long game, and plays it quite well, especially when America is distracted and its resources over-leveraged. China seeks a diminished US role in Asia, at the very least forcing Washington to share regional influence. While China does not desire to lead the world—it does not want to shoulder the burden of responsibility—it wants to prevent any other country from standing in its way.