The Long Game (11 page)

When describing his strategy, Obama explicitly stressed the attributes of balance, precision, and sustainability. In his December 2009 speech at West Point where he outlined the new policy—the same venue where Bush had announced his “preemption doctrine” seven years earlier—Obama made clear that his Af-Pak decisions were taken in the context of addressing other priorities at home and abroad, especially the financial crisis. Quoting Eisenhower's adage about national security decisions, Obama said that “each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.”

This weighing of ends and means, calibrating an approach within the context of the totality of American interests, is the essence of grand strategy. The military aspects could not be open-ended or considered in isolation. Since America's prosperity was the foundation of its power, the president explained, and because this new strategy would be so costly, it needed to be limited. Obama was blunt. “The country I am most interested in nation-building is my own,” he said.

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N TERMS OF
US commitment, effort, and resources, this new strategy aimed to put Af-Pak on the same escalate-to-exit trajectory as the other war that had, in Obama's view, consumed too many American assets up to that point. What Obama set out to achieve with
Iraq, of course, was a different kind of “resurge”—one whereby American military forces left the country, positioning the US to deal more effectively with its other interests.

For six years, Iraq had been the most defining, and divisive, issue in American politics. Questions about the war had consumed a generation of politicians and, in 2004 and 2008, dominated the presidential campaigns. Obama's decisive electoral victory effectively defused the debate. The question therefore was not whether the United States should get out of Iraq, but how—and what we would leave behind.

Although Iraq had been one of the central issues of Obama's campaign, the template for the withdrawal of the roughly 130,000 US troops had been established by George W. Bush. In November 2008, after the election but before Obama took office, the Bush administration concluded an agreement with Iraqis that set a deadline for the withdrawal of US troops. According to its terms, American military forces were to be out of Iraq's cities by July 2009 and out of Iraq by the end of 2011.

This kind of agreement—known as a “Status of Forces Agreement,” or SOFA—is what the United States uses with partners around the world to establish the rules that govern its military presence, defining everything from what American forces are allowed to do to what happens when something goes wrong. Bush was determined to complete such a deal before he left the White House (unfortunately, the December 2008 ceremony in Baghdad to sign the SOFA will forever be remembered less for the accomplishment than for the fact that an Iraqi had stood up and hurled a shoe at Bush, nearly hitting him).

During the campaign, Obama had pledged to implement a “responsible” departure from Iraq by drawing down troops at a steady clip of one to two combat brigades per month (approximately 5,000–10,000 troops), for a complete withdrawal in sixteen months. Having all troops out a year and a half before the Bush timeline was a much
faster pace than military leaders had advised, and they feared that doing so would threaten the hard-fought security gains of the surge and undercut US leverage to influence Iraqi politics.

Obama accepted this counsel, settling on a compromise that allowed him to stay true to his campaign commitments. Instead of having all troops out by the end of August 2010, he would use that date as the milestone to end the American “combat mission” in Iraq, which would mean fewer troops and a smaller footprint. But importantly, until the end of 2011 the US would maintain a “transitional presence” of as many as 50,000 troops to help advise and assist the Iraqis, especially on counter-terrorism. Then, by January 1, 2012, the American military mission would be over.

The president unveiled this decision in a February 2009 speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (throughout his presidency, almost all these kinds of decisions were unveiled before military audiences). The announcement was well-received. And with it, the Iraq issue almost instantly evaporated from American politics. Democrats were satisfied that the United States was on its way out, despite grumbling from some that the pace was still too slow. Republicans were happy not to relitigate the Bush administration's decisions and handling of the war. Congress lost interest, and so did the press. And the American people were more than ready to move on to other things.

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UT THE ADMINISTRATION
did not wash its hands of Iraq. Believing that pluralistic, inclusive politics were key to Iraq's long-term stability, the Obama team maintained a steady focus on events there. Although the president scaled back his involvement in the day-today policymaking on Iraq, he made Vice President Biden the chief troubleshooter. As one of the most experienced and well-known American leaders on Iraq and a relentless advocate, Biden dove into the work, making numerous trips to Iraq, chairing countless meetings and videoconferences, and working the phones constantly.

Alongside these efforts to shape Iraqi politics were the preparations to establish an enduring relationship with Baghdad. While the US military withdrew, the relationship had to evolve into one between two sovereign states. As a practical matter, this meant preparing for a difficult transition from military-led to civilian-led efforts in Iraq.

For years, the State Department had survived in Iraq thanks to the logistical and security support of the US military. Now it had to be ready to stand on its own. This would be among the most complicated and ambitious US diplomatic undertakings ever, including building the largest and most expensive embassy in the world, securing nearly 17,000 civilian personnel, many of whom would be private contractors, and allocating a massive influx of resources. Getting this transition right was a central focus for Secretary Clinton, who charged her key deputy Jack Lew (who would later become Obama's chief of staff and treasury secretary) with overseeing the effort.

The withdrawal of the US military raised another practical issue: Washington had less leverage and capacity to influence Iraqi decision-making. Even the best American diplomats would never have the same tools and resources the generals had to wield influence. Simply put, with the military gone, the Iraqis would rely on us less. Our relationship with Iraq would have to become more “normal”—relying on the same tools we use with other countries, such as political persuasion, economic and development assistance, and security cooperation. The implications of this became clear when the administration had to confront the issue of what kind of military relationship it would have with Baghdad—and whether any US forces should stay in Iraq—after the Bush SOFA expired in December 2011.

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A
UGUST
2010, the administration welcomed the completion of the combat mission in Iraq and pledged to continue the steady withdrawal of troops. But as the end of 2011 approached, Obama
indicated he was willing to leave a small number of forces (around 5,000) behind to continue to assist the Iraqis with their security needs. While the administration had always envisioned having a robust defense assistance relationship with Iraq through such mechanisms as arms sales, it was ready to invest more. The question was whether the Iraqis wanted American forces to stay in their country, and if so, under what kind of legal framework.

It was the Iraqi leadership's choice, and they were conflicted. They frequently said they wanted the Americans to stay. Yet then they would turn around and say the opposite, celebrating each stage of US withdrawal as the departure of the infidels. It often seemed that the Iraqis told Washington officials (especially visiting congressional delegations) only what they thought the officials wanted to hear. As Chris Hill, one of Obama's ambassadors to Baghdad, recalled, “I'm not sure the Iraqis were entirely committed or entirely honest about saying whether they wanted troops or not.”
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Whether they were driven by ambivalence, indecision, or duplicity, such uncertainty made it very hard to negotiate a new agreement to allow an enduring American military presence. This was especially important when it came to the thorny issue of legal protections for US personnel.

No one wanted to see an American soldier accused of wrongdoing and dragged into an Iraqi jail. For this reason, the Obama team insisted on having a legally-binding document with the political approval of Iraq's parliament. While the Iraqis had insisted on putting the Bush SOFA before their parliament, in 2011 they were wary of exposing the issue of an enduring American presence to Iraqi politics. Instead, they wanted the United States to agree to something that would not go through parliament and therefore not have the same legal guarantees—in other words, they wanted us to trust them. At best, it seemed they wanted the benefits of an American presence without paying the political costs.

The administration understood the strategic value of keeping some troops in Iraq. Even a small presence could help keep tabs on the nascent Iraqi Security Forces and assist with counter-terrorism efforts. But Obama did not want to force the issue and try to convince the Iraqis that the US military needed to stay. After all, Iraq was a sovereign country. In the end, Washington and Baghdad were unable to agree to a new deal. US troops left as planned in December 2011. From that point, less than 200 Defense Department personnel remained in Baghdad as part of the US embassy to administer the military relationship.

Was this a mistake? At the time, some administration officials argued that Obama needed to try harder; that he should have engaged in the negotiations directly; or that the administration should have used greater leverage against Baghdad by threatening support if they did not let the US stay. Yet what mattered most to the president was that he had a partner in the country he could trust and work with, and who truly wanted US help.

In Iraq in 2011, there was little evidence to convince him that was the case. As Michael Gordon of the
New York Times
and Marine Lt. General Bernard Trainor, two of the most sober chroniclers of the US tangle with Iraq since the first Gulf War, observed, “given the vicissitudes of Iraqi politics…a continuing if minimal American troop presence might have proven impossible under the best of circumstances.”
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And these weren't the best of circumstances. Both sides may have preferred for some troops to stay, but neither wanted to try very hard or sacrifice much to make it happen. So even if this was a “mistake,” it was one made by both sides.

Given America's exhaustion with Iraq at the time, these decisions were hardly noted. After all, the vast majority of Americans wanted us out. However, we found ourselves rethinking these decisions less than three years later, when the Islamic State captured vast swaths of Iraq and threatened the country's future, and American troops headed back in.

FROM THE LONG WAR TO THE LONG GAME

Bookshelves are already bulging with detailed accounts of the Obama team's decision-making behind the “resurge” into Af-Pak and withdrawal from Iraq. Reflecting back on the consequences of these debates, their implications extend beyond the specific policy challenges they posed at time. The deliberations during Obama's first two years taught lessons that colored his approach to future problems. They also shaped enduring perceptions many have about the making of his foreign policy, as Obama tried to shift the organizing principle from the “long war” to the Long Game.

Three implications stand out. The first concerns Obama and the military, both in terms of his perspective on the place of military power in US foreign policy and his relationship with senior American military leaders.

Despite Obama's decisions to surge troops in Afghanistan and not leave precipitately from Iraq, his repeated admonition that there is “no military solution” to the problems of Iraq and Afghanistan or that he wanted to “end wars” was often heard as a sign that he wanted to withdraw completely and was unwilling to use force. Of course, the president's decisions to use American military power in Afghanistan—and later in Libya, Syria, Iraq and elsewhere—showed he was hardly averse to, as the military would say, “going kinetic.”

Obama saw war for what it is: often necessary, but always tragic. In his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize speech, which was Obama's most important statement on the use of force, he made clear that the “instruments of war” are indispensable to the preservation of peace. But at the same time, he often said that he did not want “killing people” to be his only lasting legacy. And he did not believe the military should always be the primary instrument of American power.

Once more, this is about how one defines strength. As Obama explained in late 2015: “American strength and American exceptionalism
is not just a matter of us bombing somebody.” He was often frustrated that military might was seen as the only metric of strength and leadership. For Obama, more often being “strong” is a “matter of us convening, setting the agenda, pointing other nations in a direction that's good for everybody and good for US interests, engaging in painstaking diplomacy, leading by example.”
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