The Modern Middle East (80 page)

10.
Ibid., pp. 16–17.

11.
Nutting,
Nasser,
p. 263.

12.
Quoted in Hofstadter,
Egypt and Nasser,
p. 109.

13.
Quoted in ibid., p. 106.

14.
Kerr,
Arab Cold War,
p. 35.

15.
Robert W. Stookey,
Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p. 186.

16.
Nutting,
Nasser,
p. 338.

17.
Ali Abdel Rahman Rahmy,
The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World: Intervention in Yemen,
1962–1967
;
Case Study
(Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1983), p. 96.

18.
Tawfiq Y. Hasou,
The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt’s Nasser and the Arab League
(London: KPI, 1985), pp. 138–39.

19.
Rahmy,
Egyptian Policy,
p. 147.

20.
Stookey,
Yemen,
p. 244.

21.
Hasou,
Struggle for the Arab World,
p. 157.

22.
Soon after the Egyptian withdrawal, Yemen’s President Abdullah Salal, who had led the republicans in their fight against the royalists, was overthrown in a military coup and replaced by Said Abdel Rahman Iriani.

23.
Nutting,
Nasser,
p. 285.

24.
The most serious attacks occurred on May 27, 1965, September 5, 1965, April 30, 1966, July 14, 1966, and April 7, 1967.

25.
Edgar O’Ballance,
The Third Arab-Israeli War
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1972), p. 20.

26.
Fred J. Khouri,
The Arab-Israeli Dilemma,
3rd ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 247.

27.
Quoted in Hisham Sharabi, “Prelude to War: The Crisis of May–June 1967,” in
The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June
1967
:
An Arab Perspective,
ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 53.

28.
Khouri,
Arab-Israeli Dilemma,
p. 243.

29.
For details of parliamentary challenges to Eshkol’s premiership, see O’Ballance,
Third Arab-Israeli War,
pp. 32–33.

30.
Ibid., p. 21.

31.
Khouri,
Arab-Israeli Dilemma,
p. 258.

32.
O’Ballance,
Third Arab-Israeli War,
p. 67.

33.
Ibid., pp. 78–79.

34.
Ibid., p. 232.

35.
Ibid., p. 272. The IDF later claimed that 778 Israeli soldiers and 26 civilians had been killed and that another 2,586 soldiers had been wounded along with 195 civilians.

36.
Sharabi, “Prelude to War,” p. 57.

37.
Fouad Ajami,
The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since
1967 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 32–33.

38.
Ibid., p. 30.

39.
Bassam Tibi,
Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security,
2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 83.

40.
Ajami,
Arab Predicament,
p. 41.

41.
O’Ballance,
Third Arab-Israeli War,
p. 142. This proved especially damaging to Egypt’s own progress in the war, as many Egyptian officers, having lost their lines of communication with their commanders, were initially relying on reports by Cairo Radio to make decisions.

42.
Kirk Beattie,
Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 209.

43.
For a text of Nasser’s resignation speech, see “Nasser’s Resignation Broadcast, June 9, 1967,” in
The Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict,
ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, 5th ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 160–65.

44.
Tibi,
Conflict and War,
pp. 90–91.

45.
Beattie,
Egypt during the Nasser Years,
pp. 213–15.

46.
Samih K. Farsoun and Christina E. Zacharia,
Palestine and the Palestinians
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 134.

47.
Quoted in Adnan Abu-Odeh,
Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 184.

48.
“Security Council Resolution on the Middle East, November 22, 1967,” in Laqueur and Rubin,
Israeli-Arab Reader,
pp. 217–18.

49.
For an analysis of the writings and arguments of some of these intellectuals (e.g., Hisham Sharabi, Anwar Abdel Malik, Jalal Amin, and Samir Amin), see Issa Boullata,
Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 87–118.

50.
Rasheed el-Enany,
Naguib Mahfouz: The Pursuit of Meaning
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 26.

51.
Felipe Fernández-Armesto,
Sadat and His Statecraft
(London: Kensal, 1982), p. 48.

52.
Raymond Hinnebusch,
Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 46.

53.
Avi Shlaim,
The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 289.

54.
Anwar el-Sadat,
The Public Diary of Anwar Sadat,
vol. 1,
The Road to War,
ed. Raphael Israeli (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), p. 109.

55.
Because the October 1973 War occurred during Ramadan and Yom Kippur, the Arabs refer to it as the Ramadan War and the Israelis as the Yom Kippur War. More objective observers, however, simply refer to it as the 1973 War.

56.
For the increasing professionalization of Middle Eastern militaries after the 1967 War, see Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,”
Political Science Quarterly
115 (Spring 2000): 67–92.

57.
On crossing the Suez, which the Egyptians did in a matter of hours, Dayan later said: “I had a theory that it would take them all night to set up the bridges . . . and that we would be able to prevent this with our armor.” Quoted in Frank Aker,
October
1973:
The Arab-Israeli War
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985), p. 23.

58.
Ibid., p. 21.

59.
Tibi,
Conflict and War,
pp. 109–10. The airlift is said to have included some seven hundred to eight hundred tons of military equipment daily. Peter Allen,
The Yom Kippur War
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982), pp. 208–9.

60.
Aker,
October
1973, p. 57.

61.
Kamal Salibi,
The Modern History of Jordan
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 254–55.

62.
Quoted in Joseph Lorenz,
Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 47.

63.
Tibi,
Conflict and War,
p. 116.

64.
Quoted in Hassan el Badri, Taha el Magdoub, and Mohammed Dia el Din Zohdy,
The Ramadan War,
1973 (Dunn Loring, VA: T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1978), p. 201.

65.
Ibid., p. 202. This book was originally published in Arabic in Cairo under the title
Harb Ramadan.

66.
Aker,
October
1973, p. 58.

67.
Ajami,
Arab Predicament,
p. 116.

68.
Hinnebusch,
Egyptian Politics under Sadat,
pp. 56–57.

69.
“My main concern in this connection,” he wrote, “is whether Israel really and truly wants peace. For my part I really want peace and have proved it beyond a shadow of doubt.” Anwar el-Sadat,
In Search of Identity: An Autobiography
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 306.

70.
Khouri,
Arab-Israeli Dilemma,
p. 414.

71.
John Waterbury,
The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 240.

72.
Ibid., p. 370.

73.
Howard Sachar,
A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time,
2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), p. 801.

74.
Ibid., p. 805.

75.
Shlaim,
Iron Wall,
p. 325.

76.
Ibid., p. 801.

77.
Charles D. Smith,
Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,
4th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), p. 329.

78.
Shlaim,
Iron Wall,
p. 328.

79.
Khalil Nakhleh, “The Political Effects of the October War on Israeli Society,” in
Middle East Crucible: Studies on the Arab-Israeli War of October
1973, ed. Nasser Aruri (Wilmette, IL: Medina University Press International, 1975), p. 167.

80.
Ibid.

81.
King Hussein of Jordan, “Disengagement from the West Bank (July 31, 1988),” in Laqueur and Rubin,
Israeli-Arab Reader,
p. 340.

82.
Tareq Ismael,
International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 104–5.

83.
Joe Stork, “The Oil Weapon,” in Aruri,
Middle East Crucible,
p. 352.

84.
Giacomo Luciani, “Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East,” in
International Relations of the Middle East,
ed. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 89.

85.
Ibid; emphasis added.

86.
Ibid.

5. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

1.
There is a rich theoretical literature on revolutions; some of the more notable works are Peter Calvert,
Revolution and Counter-revolution
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Jack Goldstone, ed.,
Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies,
2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994); and Theda Skocpol,
States and Social Revolutions
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and
Social Revolutions in the Modern World
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For my own writings on the subject, see Mehran Kamrava,
Revolutionary Politics
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), and “Revolution Revisited: Revolutionary Types and the Structuralist vs. Voluntarist Debate,”
Canadian Journal of Political Science
32 (June 1999): 1–29.

2.
As the Iran-Iraq War is covered in detail in the next chapter, the only references to that event here are in passing.

3.
Approximately 60 percent of Iran’s population of about sixty-six million is thought to have been born after the revolution. Because of concerted efforts by the government, however, the fertility rate declined from 7 children per woman in 1986 to 3.5 in 1993. Fariba Adelkhah,
Being Modern in Iran,
trans. Jonathan Derrick (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 156.

4.
Richard Cottam,
Nationalism in Iran
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), pp. 60–61.

5.
Shahrough Akhavi,
Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1980), p. 59.

6.
For an insightful, succinct analysis of the causes of the collapse of the Azerbaijan rebellion, see Homa Katouzian,
The Political Economy of Modern Iran,
1926–1979 (New York: NYU Press, 1981), pp. 150–53.

7.
Fakhreddin Azimi,
Iran: The Crisis of Democracy
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 340.

8.
James Goode,
The United States and Iran,
1946–51:
The Diplomacy of Neglect
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 10.

9.
Peter Avery,
Modern Iran
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 405.

10.
Sepehr Zabih,
The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution
(Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), p. 111.

11.
For obvious reasons, the precise role of the CIA in the coup that overthrew Musaddiq is shrouded in mystery. Nevertheless, on the eve of the 1978–79 revolution, the CIA’s principal organizer of the coup, Kermit Roosevelt, wrote what remains a unique, if not thorough, account of the CIA’s efforts. See his
Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Equally interesting, and more thorough and objective, are a series of CIA reports and other documents related to the coup compiled by the
New York Times,
James Risen’s “Secrets of History: The CIA and Iran,” 2000,
www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html
.

12.
Cottam,
Nationalism in Iran,
pp. 226–27. This is not to imply that everyone who took part in anti-Musaddiq demonstrations had been paid to do so. As Cottam correctly notes (on p. 229), “Regardless of foreign participation, Mossadeq could not have been overthrown if significant elements of the population had not lost faith in his leadership.”

13.
Shahrough Akhavi, “The Role of the Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949–1954,” in
Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil,
ed. James A. Bill and William Roger Louis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), p. 92.