February 7, 2000.
Putin, then prime minister and acting president, signs the “Regulations for FSB Directorates in the Armed Forces,” in which the functions of military counterintelligence are expanded to detect possible threats to the regime in the rank and file.
March 26, 2000.
Putin is elected Russia’s president.
January 22, 2001.
The FSB is put in charge of the counterterrorist operation in Chechnya.
April 24, 2001.
Nikolai Patrushev expands the rules for FSB officers attached to state structures, organizations, and companies.
October 23, 2002.
A theater on Dubrovka Street in Moscow is captured by Chechens. The tragedy, known as the Nord-Ost hostage crisis, lasts for three days. On October 26 the theater is stormed by FSB special troops and 130 people are killed, most poisoned by fentanyl, the gas used by the special forces.
March 11, 2003.
President Putin abolishes the Electronic Intelligence (FAPSI) and Border Service as independent agencies. The border troops are absorbed by the FSB; FAPSI is divided between the FSB and the Federal Protective Service. On the same day, the Aviation Directorate of the FSB is created.
June 30, 2003.
An amendment to the “Law on the Organs of the Federal Security Service” is signed, stipulating that the FSB will have a special body for foreign intelligence.
July 4, 2003.
The leadership of the Regional Operations staff to conduct counterterrorist operations in Chechnya is handed over from the FSB to the Interior Ministry.
July 11, 2004.
Putin makes structural changes to the FSB. The number of deputy directors is reduced, and the departments are renamed as services.
September 1-3, 2004.
A school in Beslan, North Ossetia, is captured by Chechens; 334 people are killed.
July 12, 2005.
By presidential decree, all FSB prisons, including Lefortovo, are ordered to be transferred to the Ministry of Justice. The move is completed in January 2006.
March 6, 2006.
The “Law on Counteraction of Terrorism” is signed by Putin. According to the law, the FSB is named as the chief body to combat terrorism and the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAK) is established. A high-level interdepartmental agency headed by the FSB director, the NAK is tasked with coordinating the security services’ antiterrorist activities.
July 5 and 7, 2006.
The FSB is given the right to eliminate terrorists abroad.
August 28, 2006.
Putin changes the color of the uniforms of the FSB, the Federal Protective Service, the Service of Special Facilities, and Foreign Intelligence from army green to black.
January 31, 2007.
Putin announces a significant increase in financing for the FSB, but no figures are presented.
May 12, 2008.
Alexander Bortnikov is named director of the FSB. Nikolai Patrushev is appointed a secretary of the Security Council of Russia.
March 29, 2010.
Terrorism returns to Moscow: Two female suicide bombers almost simultaneously detonate explosives on packed metro trains in Moscow. Forty people are killed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
THIS BOOK WAS written in several months, but it is based on ten years’ experience covering the Russian secret services. Every year sources disappear, and people inside have become increasingly unwilling to talk.
We began gathering information when we launched our Web site, Agentura.ru, in September 2000. During those years many friends encouraged us to keep up our coverage. This book could not have been written without their support.
We will never forget the rainy night in November 2002 we spent at the tiny cafe on Stariy Arbat Street near the
Versiya
office, while our offices there were being raided by FSB agents because of our reportage of the Nord-Ost siege. At the time, nobody knew what the FSB planned to do, so our editor, Rustam Arifdjanov, fearing our arrest, had asked us to stay out of the office. As we sat waiting at the cafe, suddenly a gaggle of journalists we had worked with at the investigative section of
Segodnya
newspaper arrived, headed by Fedor Gladkih, who turned the cafe into a sort of a temporary press office. It is hardly a coincidence that we had stood alongside Fedor in the apartment building facing the Dubrovka theater during the siege in 2002, and again in 2004 found ourselves alongside him in an abandoned hotel during the Beslan crisis, and had shared a car with him in Beirut in July 2006.
Marina Latysheva, our best friend for many years and a member of the Agentura.ru team, has always supported us across the board.
Alexei Shvachkin, a Moscow lawyer, accompanied Soldatov to interrogations at the FSB’s Lefortovo prison and has offered his support and friendship in the subsequent years. Lena Bereznitskaya-Bruni, an editor of
Newsru.com
, helped to organize constant public pressure, reporting every interrogation of the authors and finally succeeding in forcing the FSB to drop its charges.
We are also indebted to Michael Shevelev, our deputy editor at
Moskovskie Novosti
, who continued to encourage us even when the publication was closed down. Oleg Panfilov, the director of the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, supported us when we found ourselves in an uncertain transition period—when
Moskovskie Novosti
had closed and before we joined
Novaya Gazeta
.
Our special thanks goes to Valery Shiryaev, a man with a peculiar fate
—
a KGB officer in the 1980s who became director of
Novaya Gazeta
in the 2000s and was involved in the decision to hire us. We stayed on at
Noyava Gazeta
for three years.
We are grateful to Olga Pashkova, the courageous and flamboyant director of
Ezhednevny Journal
, who invited us to write for the journal—the last media willing to accept our ideas. And we thank Yevgenia Albats, who proposed the idea of a series of stories about the KGB’s resurrection for the
Ezhednevny Journal
, which laid the groundwork for this book.
We are also indebted to Yuri Gervis, FSB officer turned lawyer, who represented Valentin Moiseev, a diplomat accused of spying for South Korea, and his friend Andrei (whose surname cannot be revealed for reasons of privacy).
Thanks goes to the prominent Soviet dissident Sergei Grigoriants—head of the Glasnost organization and spearhead of a series of conferences, “KGB Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow,” in the 1990s—for providing his insights on Soviet state security’s legacy to the authors.
We would like to thank the officers of the FSB, Foreign Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the Interior Ministry, who shared their knowledge and opinions with us, but who, for obvious reasons, cannot be named here.
A very special thanks goes to Nick Fielding, a brilliant investigative British journalist. From our first meeting in 2000 he was very supportive of the Agentura .ru idea. His book
Defending the Realm: Inside MI5 and the War on Terrorism
in many ways guided our approach to covering the Russian secret services. Nick was always ready to offer insights and provide practical help, no matter where he was, and he was the first person we consulted on our most controversial investigations. When he learned we were going to write a book, he immediately offered his help, which has proved invaluable to the project.
John Kampfner, chief executive at the Index on Censorship, was enthusiastic about this project from the beginning, and we are very grateful for his thoughts on the final stage of the writing. Stephen Aftergood, head of the Secrecy Project at the Federation of American Scientists, the source of inspiration for creation of Agentura.ru, encouraged our work. Mark Urban, a BBC journalist and author of
Big Boys’ Rules
, a book about SAS operations in Northern Ireland, shared his thoughts for the chapter about the tactics of the secret services in the North Caucasus. Peter Gill, professor of politics and security at Liverpool John Moores University, provided the important research perspective for some chapters.
Our friend Sian Glaessner, a producer for the BBC, polished our English and was always ready to help with her gentle advice.
To Mark Franchetti at the
Sunday Times
, the most experienced Moscow foreign correspondent, we owe enormous thanks. His support after we were fired from the
Novaya Gazeta
was invaluable, and our meeting at a cafe on Pokrovka Street was the first in the long chain of events that led to this book. Ilana Ozernoy offered crucial encouragement, having proposed the very idea of writing the book in English for an American audience. But this book would not have been possible without Mort Rosenblum, who convinced Clive Priddle at PublicAffairs to take an interest in the project. We are deeply indebted to Clive for his trust in the idea. Our thanks go to all people at PublicAffairs who were involved in the project.
Special appreciation is also due to David Hoffman, a contributing editor at the
Washington Post
, who spent two very hard weeks with us in Moscow’s cold winter helping to frame and edit the manuscript. We are greatly indebted to our editor, Morgen Van Vorst.
And we are deeply grateful to Robert Guinsler, our agent at Sterling Lord Literistic, Inc.
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1
The estimates about the size of the FSB are drawn from our research over many years contained at the Web site agentura.ru and updated regularly.
2
Komsomolskaya Pravda
, “Direktor Federalnoi sluzhbi bezopasnosti Rossii Nikolai Patrushev: Esli mi slomaemsya i uydem s Kavkaza-nachnetsya razval strain” [FSB director Nikolai Patrushev: If we break ourselves now and leave the Caucasus, the collapse of the country is imminent], December 20, 2000.
3
On the black uniforms, see Decree of the President, Russian Federation, no. 921, August 28, 2006.
4
Our findings for
Ezhednevny Zhurnal
are posted on the Web site agentura .ru.
CHAPTER 1
1
For further reading, see Yevgenia Albats,
The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia: Past, Present, and Future
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1994).
2
A. I. Kokurin and I. V. Petrov,
Lubyanka. Organi VchK-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB 1917-1991
[Lubyanka organs: VChK-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB 1917-1991] (Moscow: Fond Demokratia, 2003).
3
Author interviews with former KGB officers. Also see Timothy Colton,
Yeltsin: A Life
(New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 258-259.
4
In 1993 Sergei Grigoriants, a famous Soviet dissident, organized a series of conferences titled “KGB: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow.” The conferences were attended by officials from the secret services, who had to answer questions in public. As Alexei Kandaurov, chief of the FSK Center for Public Communications in 1993-1994, acknowledged to Andrei Soldatov in December 2006, the only reason he took part in these meetings was the fear that the dismantling of the secret service was a real possibility, given the example of what had been done to the Stasi, the East German secret police.
5
Author interview, November 2009.
6
Author interview, July 2008.
7
In Russian, the
Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti
. To be referred to as the FSB throughout this book. It was not a coincidence that at first the agency was named the FSK, in which K meant
Kontrrazvedka—
counterintelligence. Only in 1995 was the FSK renamed the FSB, replacing
Kontrrazvedka
with the much wider term
Bezopasnost
—security.
8
The Foreign Intelligence Service is the
Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki
, or SVR, in the remainder of this work.
9
Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information,
Federalnoye Agentstvo Pravitelstvennoy Svyazi I Informacii
, or FAPSI.
10
Author interviews with FAPSI officers, 1997-1999.
11
See the dossier on General Georgi Rogozin at agentura.ru, based on reports in
Moscow News
issues of April 23 and April 29, 1995.
12
Human Rights Watch, “Russia: The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodnyi Region,” May 1996, New York, p. 86.
13
See “The War in Chechnya: Necessity of Holding the International Tribunal,” VI roundtable, Fund Glasnost, July 15, 1995, Moscow. See also Memorial,
Rossia-Chechnya: Cep oshibok I prestupleniy
[Russia-Chechnya: Chain of mistakes and crimes] (Moscow: Zvenia, 1998).