The Patriarch (96 page)

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O
n September 26, two weeks after the Houston speech, Senator Kennedy met Vice President Nixon in Chicago for their (and the nation’s) first live televised debate. Since 1952, Joe Kennedy had preached the importance of television as a campaign vehicle and prepared his son well for this moment before the cameras. In this and the succeeding four televised debates, John Fitzgerald Kennedy did his father proud. He spoke directly to the camera and looked relaxed, comfortable, “calm and nerveless,” as author Theodore White later described him.
⁴⁴

On his way out of the television studio, Senator Kennedy, seeing a pay phone on the wall, asked Ted Sorensen for change (he never carried any money with him) to call his father.

“‘Dad, what did you think?’ were his first words,” Sorensen recalled in his memoirs. “A long period of listening ensued, while I stepped a few feet away. ‘Thanks, Dad, I’ve got to go to Ohio,’ he concluded, and hung up the phone. ‘I still don’t know how I did,’ he said, turning to me. ‘If just now I had slipped and fallen flat on the floor, my dad would have said: “The way you picked yourself up was terrific!”’”
⁴⁵

The second debate was held on October 8 and focused on foreign policy. From this point on, questions about missile gaps, the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, two islands off the shore of China, and the loss of Cuba would occupy the candidates. Although Senator Kennedy had always insisted that his ideas on foreign policy were very different from his father’s, a reading of his statements counterpoised with those of his father’s reveals remarkable similarities. It would be wrong to say that Jack simply parroted his father’s positions. On the contrary, Jack’s analyses in his Harvard thesis of the conditions that led Great Britain to Munich and on to World War II had had a significant effect in sharpening his father’s thinking on these issues. The “Kennedy” position on foreign policy was as much a joint effort as one imposed on father by son.

In his warnings about missile gaps and the Eisenhower administration’s failure to keep the military strong, as in his calls for increased military spending, John Kennedy had been updating the argument that his father had made in the 1930s and 1940s about the Nazis and, more recently, about the Soviets and that he had made in
Why England Slept.
The best defense against aggression was a mighty military. The stronger that military, the more likely one’s enemy would be forced to negotiate—and on favorable terms. For father and son, negotiations with the enemy were always preferable to confrontations. Joseph Kennedy had been criticized for suggesting in 1950 that the United States open negotiations with the Soviets. Ten years later, when Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev pulled out of the Paris four-power summit, angrily denouncing President Eisenhower for allowing a U-2 spy plane to penetrate Soviet territory, Senator Kennedy declared that Eisenhower should express his regrets over the incident, if this was what it took to get the talks restarted. He later issued his own call “for an early summit meeting between the next President and Premier Khrushchev” and declared that he would, as president, suspend all spy flights. His position on the paramount need to lay the groundwork for reopening negotiations had been promptly criticized by Lyndon Johnson, at the time his undeclared rival for the nomination, who made it clear to a cheering audience that he would neither apologize nor “send regrets to Mr. Khrushchev.”
⁴⁶

Like his father, Jack Kennedy espoused an approach to foreign policy that he considered realistic, pragmatic, and nonideological. Just as his father had criticized President Truman for pouring “arms and men into the Quixotic military adventure” to defend Berlin and for entering into alliances that, under the guise of collective security, guaranteed nations across the globe that America would defend them, with arms if necessary, from potential Communist aggression, so did Senator Kennedy criticize Republican efforts to defend Quemoy and Matsu from Communist China.

In the second debate, Edward P. Morgan of ABC asked Senator Kennedy to elaborate on his statement “that Quemoy and Matsu were unwise places to draw our defense line in the Far East. . . . Couldn’t a pull-back from those islands be interpreted as appeasement?” Senator Kennedy, ignoring the accusation of appeasement, echoed what his father had said ten years earlier. He declared that it was pure folly for the United States to allow itself to be drawn into a war over the defense of two indefensible islands four or five miles from Communist China’s shores. Nixon disagreed. “These two islands are in the area of freedom. . . . We should not force our Nationalist allies to get off of them and give them to the Communists. If we do that we start a chain reaction.”
⁴⁷

That Senator Kennedy should take a position on Cuba opposite that on Quemoy and Matsu was also consistent with the “realistic” approach to the Cold War his father had outlined in earlier articles and speeches. It might be impossible, Joseph P. Kennedy had argued in 1950, to contain the spread of communism in Asia and Europe, but it was possible—and necessary—to “keep Russia, if she chooses to march, on the other sides of the Atlantic and Pacific.” The Republicans, Jack Kennedy argued in 1960, had done the opposite. They had poured resources into fighting communism abroad, while leaving the western hemisphere vulnerable to Communist influence. “Their short-sighted policies in recent years have helped make communism’s first island base, the island of Cuba.” Senator Kennedy insisted that the priority for American foreign policy should be the defense of the Americas and that unless something was done in that regard, “the same grievances, the same poverty, the same discontent, the same distrust of America, on which Castro rode to power,” would spread through the rest of the western hemisphere.
⁴⁸

There is always a distance, of course, between what a candidate promises and the policies he pursues once elected. This would be the case with President John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Under the pressure of events, he would move in directions he had not envisioned during the campaign. It is important, nonetheless, to note that his starting point in foreign policy was much closer to his father’s than we had previously recognized.

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J
oseph Kennedy spent the fall sequestered at Hyannis Port. He did not grant interviews or answer questions or allow himself to be photographed. He went out less than usual but kept working the telephones on behalf of his son. Frank Stanton, at the time the president of CBS, recalled in his oral history getting a call from Hyannis Port. “I had just come into the house around noon and the phone was ringing and I picked it up and it was Joe Kennedy: he was very abusive because we had the practice, which I didn’t initiate but which I certainly supported, of switching our correspondents in the middle of a campaign. . . . That turnover took place when Jack Kennedy was campaigning in Minnesota. . . . He was demanding that we keep the correspondents that we had with Jack Kennedy with Jack Kennedy. And I explained the policy and the reason for it. It made no difference to him. He wanted what he wanted and that’s all there was to it. And threatened me. Threatened my job.”
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O
n October 22, two weeks before election day, the religious issue, which had been submerged during the debates, was brought to the surface again, this time not by the organized Protestant opposition, but by the Catholic bishops in Puerto Rico, who issued a pastoral leader forbidding Catholics to vote for Governor Luis Muñoz Marín’s Popular Democratic Party and implying that they should vote for the newly formed Christian Action Party instead. Cardinal Cushing declared immediately that what had occurred in Puerto Rico was an anomaly, that “ecclesiastical authority here would not attempt to dictate the political voting of citizens.” Cardinal Spellman did not criticize the bishops or their letter, but he remarked that Catholic voters who did not obey the bishops’ directive would not be committing a sin.
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“Senator Kennedy,” Sorensen recalled, “knew he had been hurt.” His only hope, he told Sorensen, was that American voters would not “realize that Puerto Rico is American soil.” If they did, he feared, “this election is lost.”
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“The Ambassador,” Ken O’Donnell and Dave Powers recalled in their memoir, “said that he was thinking of joining the Jewish religion. ‘The Jews are giving us more help than we’re getting from the Catholics.’”
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On November 3, two months and two days after its first article on the issue, the
New York Times
reported in a front-page article,
SHIFT TO KENNEDY BY JEWS,
that the attacks on the Catholic candidate by Protestant organizations, especially Norman Vincent Peale’s, had produced “a backfire of sympathy for Mr. Kennedy.” Republicans continued to circulate pamphlets “attacking former Ambassador Kennedy as a ‘notorious appeaser of Hitler,’” but they were “not having much effect” on Jewish voters. “The fear that the elder Kennedy’s views might have ‘rubbed off’ on Mr. Kennedy was ‘slowly being whittled away.’”

Senator Kennedy had succeeded in convincing Jewish voters that he was the type of liberal they wanted in the White House. The shift toward Senator Kennedy did not mean that they had rejected the charges that Joseph P. Kennedy had been a Nazi sympathizer and anti-Semite, but that they refused to hold the sins of the father against the son.

Thirty-nine

“H
E
B
ELONGS TO THE
C
OUNTRY
”

O
n election day 1960, the Kennedys gathered at Hyannis Port. “People filtered in throughout the afternoon and evening,” Ted recalled in his memoirs, “the candidate and his wife, Bobby and Ethel, Sarge and Eunice, Pat and Peter, Jean and Steve, Joan and myself. The Gargans [Joey and Ann, Rose’s nephew and niece, who had virtually grown up with the Kennedys] were there. Dad had invited some of his eclectic friends,” Father Cavanaugh, Arthur Houghton, Carroll Rosenbloom, and Morton Downey. “We dined on Maryland crabs and then found comfortable places for viewing the returns, most of us at Bobby’s house next door,” which, Ken O’Donnell and Dave Powers later wrote, had been converted into “a communications and vote analysis center. Downstairs on the big enclosed porch there were telephones, staffed by fourteen girl operators, to be used for calling party leaders and poll watchers all over the country. In the dining room, there was a tabulating machine, more telephones connected to direct lines from various Democratic headquarters, and news service teletype machines.” Lou Harris, the pollster, had taken over “the children’s large bedroom, where the cribs and playpens had been cleared away to make room for tables full of data sheets and past election records.”
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It was going to be a long night. The early returns—from the Northeast—were positive. But as the votes were recorded in the Midwest and border states, it became clear that Jack Kennedy was not going to do as well as he had thought he would. “For once,” Rose remembered, “there wasn’t much kidding or much gaiety. The race was extremely close, and there was tension in the air. Now and then people came over to our house for a sandwich or a drink or a change of scene. Jack would come in to tell his father about a new development. And Joe and I would be wandering in and out of Bobby’s house. He and I had very little conversation that evening. He was trying to get the latest exact figures and to project from them how the counts in critical districts were likely to develop. I didn’t want to interrupt his train of thought.”
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They watched and listened and analyzed the votes as they came in. By eleven or twelve, “everyone knew that it would be an all-night thing.” Jackie, who was eight months pregnant, was, she later remembered, “sent up to bed. . . . Jack came up and sort of kissed me goodnight—and then all the Kennedy girls came up, and one by one we just sort of hugged each other, and they were all going to wait up all night.” At three
A.M.
a haggard-looking Richard Nixon appeared on television to say it appeared that Kennedy was going to win. Still he refused to concede. At about four, Jack went to bed. Bobby stayed up. We don’t know when or if his father went to sleep that evening or if he was awake when, just after six
A.M.
, a detail of sixteen Secret Service agents quietly formed a cordon around the three Kennedy houses.
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The president-elect was awakened at about nine thirty and told that he had carried Minnesota and won the election. There was no concession from Nixon. After breakfast with his wife and daughter, Jack Kennedy took Caroline to his parents’ house. She spent part of the morning riding with her grandfather. At about one
P.M.
, the Kennedys reassembled to watch Nixon’s press secretary concede the election. Jack’s photographer had tried desperately but failed to get the group to sit for a family portrait. He now appealed “to the Ambassador, the patriarch Joe Kennedy. . . . He agreed it would be the only chance and announced that a photograph was to be taken prior to the trip to the Armory,” where the president-elect was to hold his first press conference. Everyone was herded into the library except for Jackie, who had gone for a long walk by herself. Jack went down to the beach to get her. “When Jackie, having changed clothes, finally arrived at the door . . . the entire family rose and applauded.”
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Kennedy helped position his family for the photograph. Jack was placed, standing, in the middle; his father sat next to him, on the arm of Rose’s chair, dressed in a dark suit, his tie perfectly tied, his white handkerchief in his pocket. He smiled wanly, more exhausted than joyful. After the photographs were taken, they all moved outside, where the cars had assembled to take them to the armory. “We all got into the caravan of cars in the circle in front of the house,” Pat recalled, “everybody but Dad, who was on the front porch, back a little in the shadows, looking very happy. . . . He had decided to stay at home out of the range of photographers and reporters. Jack suddenly realized what was happening. He got out of the car, went back up to the porch, and told Dad to come along and hear his speech. Jack insisted on it. And finally he talked Daddy into getting into our car.”
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Arriving at the armory, Kennedy trailed behind his son, daughter-in-law, and wife, hanging back a step, just out of the cameramen’s range. He looked near enervated, shrunken, frail. As the family took its place on the “bunting-draped stage,” he positioned himself on the outside of the row of wooden folding chairs set up on either side of the podium. When the president-elect’s brief speech was concluded and the family posed for photos, Kennedy hung back again.

The reporters who covered the president-elect’s acceptance speech at the armory were struck by the fact that the “Kennedys showed no evidence of jubilation. All wore expressions of solemnity. Mr. Kennedy’s margin of victory was too slender to stir much elation.” The president-elect, when pressed to comment on the size of his victory, had nothing to say. Neither did his wife. When asked how she had felt watching the returns, she responded only that it had been “the longest night in history.”
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Kennedy, who had expected his son to win easily, would never quite recover from the ordeal of waiting for the returns to come in, then waiting for Nixon to concede. When his son Ted joked that he had been so sure of his brother’s victory that he had “placed a Las Vegas bet on it . . . [his father] hit the roof. ‘This is just—this just makes no sense!’ he fulminated,” his anger out of all proportion to the crime. “‘Foolish! I’m appalled that you’d get into this kind of thing!’ . . . He really went after me tooth and nail.”
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A month after the election, he was still troubled by the results. “I didn’t think it would be that close,” he confessed to Hugh Sidey in an interview for
Life
magazine. “I was wrong on two things. First, I thought he would get a bigger Catholic vote than he did. Second, I did not think so many would vote against him because of his religion.”
⁸

“All of us,” Ted Sorensen recalled, “predicted his proportion of the two-party popular vote would be in the 53–57 percent range.” This was indeed what the University of Michigan political scientists tracking the campaign (with the most sophisticated techniques then available) had also predicted. That prediction was remarkably accurate with respect to the congressional vote, which broke 54.7 percent for Democratic candidates. John F. Kennedy’s vote for the president was 49.8 percent, a full 5 percent below the vote for other Democratic candidates.
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The conclusion Joseph P. Kennedy reached, which was also that of the professionals and the academics, was that despite his son’s performance in Protestant West Virginia, despite the speeches and the interviews and the press conferences and the reassurances he gave over and over that he was not the Catholic candidate and would not think or act as a Catholic president, huge numbers of Protestant voters refused to believe him. “There can be little doubt,” the University of Michigan political scientists concluded, “that the religious issue was the strongest single factor overlaid on basic partisan loyalties in the 1960 election.” They calculated that John Fitzgerald Kennedy had lost 6.5 percent of the national vote of Protestant Democrats and independents and 17.2 percent of the southern vote because he was a Catholic. He was the first president elected with a minority of Protestant votes. That their defection had not cost the election was due to the fact that Jewish and black voters supported him in larger than expected numbers.
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The vote was so close, especially in Illinois and Texas, that Nixon supporters across the country and Senator Thurston Morton of Kentucky, the Republican National Committee chairman, urged legal action. Nixon remained silent on the issue, but Kennedy, fearful that he might change his mind, called Herbert Hoover to ask him to arrange a meeting between his son and Nixon, which he hoped would put the matter of contesting the election to rest forever. Jack Kennedy flew to Key Biscayne, where Nixon was vacationing, “The meeting,” Chris Matthews has written, “accomplished just what the Kennedys intended: providing a photo op to showcase the image of loser meeting winner. . . . The results had been validated by the face-to-face meeting on Nixon’s own turf.”
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The questions about Chicago would not go away as easily, even though Jack Kennedy would still have won the election even if he’d lost Illinois to Nixon. In the years to come, those who would try to tie Joe Kennedy to organized crime would cite the Chicago vote as an example of how Mob-controlled unions swung the election to his son. Statistical analysis of the actual vote demonstrates, on the contrary, that labor-union members in Chicago, suburban wards, and those districts and states that were supposedly Mob-influenced did not vote “unusually heavily Democratic in the 1960 presidential election.”
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J
oseph Kennedy was, at one and the same time, overjoyed that his son had won the election, bitterly disappointed that so many Democratic Protestants had voted against his son, and infuriated by the absence of the Catholic landslide he had hoped would compensate for it. His son had polled 80 percent of the Catholic vote, but that was only slightly more than Democratic congressional candidates, most of them non-Catholic, had polled in 1958 or than Lyndon Johnson would poll in 1964. Kennedy understood that Cardinal Francis Spellman, the most influential Catholic in the country, was much more conservative and anti-Communist than he or his son. Still, he had hoped that Spellman’s ties to the Kennedy family and the millions of dollars the foundation had contributed to his favorite projects in New York City and in Italy would hold sway. As the campaign proceeded, there had been abundant opportunity for Spellman to do the right thing or at least to dispel the notion that he favored Nixon. But he had not.

On January 6, almost two months after election day, Kennedy wrote Enrico Galeazzi, the only person to whom he could express his anger with Spellman and the church. “I have a very strong feeling that the time for friends to be together is when you need them the most. I have never asked for many things, but I needed all the help I could get in this campaign. I don’t think he [Spellman] gave the help he should have and I think we did as badly in New York amongst the Catholics as we did anywhere in the country. He was asked to do two or three things and he just didn’t deliver. In my book we are all even for past services and I haven’t any interest in the future. . . . As far as I am concerned, I am through working for them or with them, with the exception of Cushing in Boston. For him I will do anything and for anybody else, I am not interested. . . . Don’t think that I am irrational or too mad about the situation. I am just fed up with the whole crowd.”
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Galeazzi was close to Spellman and could not bear the thought of any permanent estrangement between Kennedy and the cardinal or Kennedy and the church. He tried to mend fences, but he failed, in large part because Spellman, having attempted (Kennedy believed) to sabotage Jack’s candidacy, now set out to undermine his presidency. On January 17, three days before the inauguration, the cardinal “assailed” a proposal by President-Elect John F. Kennedy’s “task force on education” to provide federal aid for public but not parochial schools. The cardinal, the
New York Times
reported in a front-page story on January 18, had “rarely . . . taken so strong a stand on a legislative proposal.”

The president-elect had no comment to make, nor did his father dare say anything publicly. Only to Galeazzi did he let down his guard in what would be his last word on the subject. “And now I am going to write you once more about our friend, and I will not write you ever again about it. . . . I was shocked by his attitude in the Presidential campaign. I was shocked at the reception Jack got at the Al Smith dinner, and with many other incidents about which I have written you. That last fit of temper in which he came out publicly against the Task Force Report on Education, and on which report the President had not expressed any opinion whatsoever, and considering that Eisenhower has personally made this recommendation for the last five years, and our friend has never opened his mouth, I consider it another exhibition of the judgment of a man who should know better. As far as I am concerned, I am disgusted, and I prefer not to have any further contacts. . . . If we can continue our friendship without any further mention of your friend, there is nothing in God’s world I would like better. But if my attitude makes you unhappy, I will quite understand it, and my friendship for you will never die.”
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Galeazzi did not give up. He invited Kennedy to Rome and to meet the new pope, John XXIII, but to no avail. “I know that I shall not go back to Rome much any more. I will leave that to Rose and the children.” As to further relations with Spellman or other members of the church hierarchy, in America or the Vatican, “I am sorry to say,” he wrote Galeazzi in late October 1961, “I am less in the mood than ever to ‘straighten the matter.’ I am not like my older son who makes up to the people who attack him. When I have a bad experience, I remember it forever. It is very bad, I realize, and I know that I should be more charitable in my old age, but I seem to get worse instead of better.”
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