The Road to Berlin (153 page)

Diplomatic histories

Israelyan, V.L.,
Diplomaticheskaya istoriya VOV
, ch. IV (6), ‘Polski vopros v 1944 godu …’, a general review reiterating the Soviet position, also emphasizing the reactionary attitudes and policies of the London Polish government, pp. 215–24.

Rozek, Edward J.,
Allied Wartime Diplomacy. A Pattern in Poland
, ch. 6, ‘The Soviets transform the Lublin Committee into the Provisional Government of Poland …’, detailed discussion with extensive documentation (plus personal interview material) on Polish problem, January–21 July 1944, pp. 183–235.

Woodward, Sir Llewellyn,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
(London: HMSO 1962, single volume), ch. XII, question of Soviet–Polish frontier, Soviet attitude to London Polish government and Polish Underground, British attempts to persuade Polish government to accept Soviet demands (to December 1943) (pp. 249–55); ch. XIV, Anglo–Russian relations to September 1944, further British attempts to secure settlement of Soviet–Polish frontier dispute, Churchill to Stalin January 28 and February 21, Soviet allegations against Polish underground (pp. 278–85); Stalin’s refusal to accept settlement, Mikolajczyk to United States, secret Soviet–Polish talks in London, Soviet demands increase (to June 1944) (pp. 285–90).

Woodward, Sir L.,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
(London: HMSO 1971, multi–volume series). See vol. II (1971), Ch. XXXV (vi), on British attempts to secure Soviet–Polish understanding, Polish
aide–mémoire
30 Dec. 1943, pp. 652–7. See also additional note ‘The Curzon Line’, pp. 657–62. See vol. Ill (1971), ch. XXXIV (1) Polish and Soviet statements, January 1944 (pp. 154–60); (11) British attempts to secure settlement, Churchill to Stalin 28 January 1944, Stalin’s reply Feb. 2, discussions with Polish ministers 6–20 February 1944 (pp. 161–74); (111) Churchill to Stalin Feb. 21, Stalin’s rejection of proposals, Stalin’s letter March 23 (pp. 174–83); (IV) draft reply to Stalin, War Cabinet decision to delay reply, discussions over replacement of General Sosnkowski, Soviet progress in building up Polish Army in USSR, Grabski–Lebedev meetings in London, Mikolajczyk to Washington (pp. 174–91); (V) Polish–Soviet talks in London collapse, proposal for Mikolajczyk to visit Moscow, Foreign Office view that Roosevelt dangerously vague and optimistic, Churchill emphasizes that Poles must give up Vilna and Lvov, further exchanges with Stalin, Polish ministers to Moscow (June–August 1944) (pp. 191–202).

Select Polish materials

Jurgeliewicz, W.,
Organizacja Ludowego Wojska Polskiego
(22.7. 1944–9.5.1945) (Warsaw: MON 1968), pt 1, ch. 2: ‘political circumstances’ and creation of the Polish Army (in USSR: AP w ZSRR), merger with
Armia Ludowa (AL)
, pp. 41–61.

Margules, J. (ed.), Z.
zagadnień rozwoju Ludowego Wojska Polskiego
(Warsaw: MON 1964). See F. Zbiniewicz, ‘Z zagadnień politycznych Armii Polskiej w ZSRR’,
KRN
delegation to Polish Army in USSR, proposals for merger with
AL
, material from archives and contemporary press (e.g.
Wolna Polska)
, pp. 7–32.

Przygoński, A., Z
zagadnień strategii frontu narodowego PRR
, pp. 278–96, delegation of
KRN
to Moscow 16 May, visit to Polish military units in Ukraine, creation of Provisional Government, exchanges with Stalin, acceptance of Curzon line for frontier, establishment of
Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego (PKWN)
. (Przygonski draws extensively on Polish Party archives, much unpublished material.)

Rawski, T.,
et al., Wojna wyzwoleńcza narodu polskiego w latach 1939–1945
(Warsaw: MON 1966), section IV, pp. 555–65, position of Polish Army in USSR, proposals of KRN to fuse AL with Polish Army; organization, command appointments.

Wojewódzki, M.,
Akcja V-1, V-2
(Warsaw: PAX, 2nd edn 1972). Polish underground/ intelligence and detection of V-l/V-2 weapons, German ‘flying-bomb’/ballistic missile:
(Vergeltungswaffen)
.

The Warsaw Rising and the Red Army pp.
274
–
290

Churchill, Winston S.,
The Second World War
, Vol. 6:
Triumph and Tragedy
, See ch. IX, ‘The Martyrdom of Warsaw’, heavily documented, indispensable, pp. 116–29.

Lukas, Richard C.,
Eagles East. The Army Air Forces and the Soviet Union, 1941–1943
(Florida State UP, Tallahassee, 1970), ch. XIII, (B), ‘The AAF and the Warsaw Uprising’, on attempts to fly in supplies to Warsaw, American and British diplomatic pressures, Soviet obstruction, pp. 201–7.

Reitlinger, Gerald,
The SS. Alibi of a Nation 1922–1945
, London, Heinemann, 1956. Ch. 13(3), on Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, Dirlewanger penal brigade, SS Kaminski Brigade, Himmler’s Posen speech (Aug. 3) praising Kaminski and Dirlewanger, Fegelein reports Kaminski atrocities, death of Kaminski, pp. 372–7.

Diplomatic histories/diplomatic documents

Woodward, Sir Llewellyn,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
(1962, single volume), pp. 301–6. Soviet refusal to assist Poles, Mikolajczyk request to Stalin, Churchill–Stalin (Aug. 4), Stalin on Polish ‘exaggeration’, Mikolajczyk plea to Stalin (Aug. 9), Stalin’s promise but no aid forthcoming, Anglo–American pressure, problems of air–lift, final Soviet ‘climb–down’ but also denunciation of ‘Warsaw adventure’.

Woodward, Sir L.,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
, vol. III, ch. XXXIX(VI), the Polish rising in Warsaw, rising
not
an unplanned outbreak, British Chiefs of Staff emphasized need for agreement and co-operation with Russians, Moscow broadcast
July 29
calling for ‘direct, active struggle’ in Warsaw, Stalin’s view that rising premature (pp. 202–4); Stalin–Churchill Aug. 5, lack of armament in
AK
, German check to Soviet advance on Warsaw (German claim Aug. 6), Eden on lack of information ‘about rising, Stalin promises Mikolajczyk help (Aug. 9), Kalugin’s message passed to Stalin (Aug. 5), Polish appeal to Churchill and Roosevelt, little chance of favourable Soviet response, Clark Kerr and Harriman see Vyshinskii who denounced rising, Clark Kerr and Harriman see Molotov (Aug. 17), Stalin–Churchill (Aug. 17) dissociating Soviet command from ‘Warsaw adventure’, Eden–Gusev talk with Gusev also disclaiming responsibility (Aug. 18), joint Churchill–Roosevelt message to Stalin (Aug. 20), Stalin reply (Aug. 22) again denouncing Warsaw rising, problem of air lift to Poland and Soviet bases (pp. 204–12); difficulties of air lift, impossibility of sending expedition, Mikolajczyk amends programme for reconstituted Polish Government, problem of the frontiers (pp. 212–15); possibility of ‘gate–crashing’ on Soviet airfields, Mikolajczyk threatens resignation, Sosnkowki’s assertions that no help from Russia and only inadequate help from the West (pp. 215–17). Chapter XL: Soviet ‘climb–down’ (Sept. 9), agreement to drop supplies on Warsaw, discussions for ‘shuttle service’ of aircraft, Polish Army under Berling forces Vistula but obliged to withdraw, Eden intimates that Sosnkowski must be dismissed, Bor-Komorowski to replace him, situation in Warsaw desperate, Soviet refusal for further US air operation, Polish surrender in Warsaw (5 am, Oct. 4), Mikolajczyk once again invited to Moscow (pp. 218–23).

Documents on Polish–Soviet Relations 1939–1945
, vol. 2, on the Warsaw rising: No. 173, Sir Orme Sargent-Raczynski, impossible to send Parachute Brigade or fighter squadrons to Poland, July 28, pp. 303–4; No. 175, Stalin–Churchill, émigré government alienated from democratic trends, July 28, p. 305; No. 177, Mikolajczyk–Molotov, demand for agreement between London government and Polish Committee of National Liberation, July 31, pp. 306–8; No. 180, Mikolajczyk–Stalin, on Polish frontiers and future, Aug. 3, pp. 309–22; No. 182, Churchill–Stalin, appeal for aid to Warsaw, Aug. 4, p. 323; No. 183, Stalin–Churchill, disparaging Polish rising, Aug. 5, p. 324; No. 186, Mikolajczyk–Bierut–Molotov on working to agreement with Committee of National Liberation, Aug. 8, pp. 325–33; No. 187, Stalin–Churchill, report on Mikolajczyk, Aug. 8, p. 333; No. 188, General Chruściel to Rokossovskii, requesting aid, Capt. Kalugin, in Warsaw, Aug. 8, p. 334; No. 189, Stalin–Mikolajczyk, further attempts at Polish understanding, Aug. 9, pp. 334–9; No. 192, TASS on responsibility of ‘London Poles’ for rising, pp. 340–41; No. 193, Churchill–Stalin, urgent plea for Soviet help, Aug. 12, p. 341; No. 194, Mikolajczyk–Stalin, pleading for air support, parachuted supplies, Aug. 13, p. 342; No. 198, Stalin–Mikolajczyk, rising ‘a reckless adventure’, cannot assume responsibility for ‘Warsaw affair’, Aug. 16, pp. 346–7; No. 201, Mikolajczyk–Stalin, request for US aircraft to use Soviet bases, Aug. 18, pp. 351–2; No. 203, Churchill and Roosevelt to Stalin, plea for aid to Warsaw, Aug. 20, p. 353; No. 204, Mikolajczyk–Eden
et al
., ineffectiveness of Anglo–American intervention, Aug. 21, pp. 354–6; No. 205, Stalin message, mentions new large Soviet offensive, Aug. 22, p. 356; No. 232, Churchill–Mikolajczyk
et al
., developments in Warsaw, dismissal of Sosnkowski as C–in-C, Sept. 29, pp. 395–8; No. 234, Churchill–Mikolajczyk, air-lift to be discontinued unless Soviet bases arranged, Oct. 7, p. 399.

Select Soviet materials

IVOVSS
, 4, ch. 8(1), on the politics of the
Krajowa Rada Narodowa (KRN)
, planning for
Burza
(‘Tempest’), quotations from Bor-Komorowski,
The Secret Army
, supplementary secret plan for struggle by
AK
against Red Army forces on Polish soil (pp. 228–37); (2) decision for rising by
AK
taken 24 July, aim to establish Polish ‘political and administrative authority’ before arrival of Soviet troops, Mikolajczyk in Moscow demands 80 per cent of seats for the
émigré
government in any future government and also affirmation of the ‘Fascist constitution’ of 1935, the rising badly planned and prepared—only 16 heavy mortars, 47 machineguns, 2,629 rifles, 44,000 grenades, ammunition for only two/three days—only 40 per cent of
AK
committed at beginning of rising, heavy losses due to lack of experience and supporting weapons, Soviet denunciation of this ‘adventure’, Soviet troops checked before Warsaw, urgent need to redeploy Soviet aircraft to forward bases, heavy losses (500 tanks) in 2nd Tank Army, Soviet offensive operation (47th Army, 1st Belorussian Front) captures Praga, 3rd Polish Infantry Division assault crossing of Vistula, 16–19 Sept. six battalions of 3rd and 2nd Polish Infantry Divisions in action, pulled back 23 Sept. to eastern bank of Vistula, Soviet airdrops (p. 246),
Monter
(General Chruściel, commander of Warsaw district/
AK)
refuses to discuss the co-ordination of
AK
operations with the Red Army, Soviet command finally suggests
AK
breaking out to the Vistula under cover of Soviet air and artillery support, this refused, final Polish capitulation (pp. 242–6).

IVMV
, 9, pp. 70–2, Warsaw rising, plans not disclosed to Soviet or Polish Army command, Bor-Komorowski counted on panic in German forces with approach of Red Army, inferior armament
of
insurgents, Stalin’s instructions to Zhukov for forcing Vistula with Berling’s Polish troops, repulse of Polish troops, Soviet airdrops over Warsaw.

Collective authorship,
16-ya vozdushnaya
(16th Air Army). See pp. 204–37, aid to Warsaw, air cover for Soviet bridgeheads, air combat over Warsaw, co-operation with 1st Aviation Division (Polish armed forces), logistics problems, 2
AK
emissaries to Soviet command (Sept. 17), Soviet air-drops (figures of supplies, p. 223), 16th Air total of 13,034 sorties in September, air support for Soviet ground operations.

Radzievskii, General A., ‘Na puti k Varshave’,
VIZ
, 1971 (10), pp. 68–77. Operations of 2nd Tank Army, Brest–Lublin, July 1944: Radzievskii, Chief of Staff 2nd Tank Army, assumed command when Bogdanov wounded.

Rokossovskii, K.K.,
A Soldier’s Duty
, pp. 254–63. Under ‘Warsaw’, no information about rising, 48th and 65th Armies still 100km E and NE Warsaw, 2nd Tank Army bogged down, no contact with
AK
insurgents, internal disputes among insurgents followed by appeal to Soviet command, Flying Fortress supply-drop largely useless, no
AK
attempt to capture bridges over Vistula, further Soviet attack towards Narew, German attempts to destroy Soviet bridgeheads on Vistula and Narew, Soviet troops take Praga (this the point at which rising should have begun), in report to Stalin Rokossovskii emphasizes that offensive impossible, Soviet air drops (4,821 sorties, 2,535 to drop supplies), 1st Polish Army’s assault crossing of Vistula (Sept. 16), withdrawn (Sept. 23).