The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (127 page)

2492.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Memorandum for the Record, “CIA Briefing on Detention Program” March 8, 2006 (DTS #2006-1182).

2493.
By the time of the briefing, press disclosures had resulted in widespread public discussion about some of the CIA’s reported enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard. Goss was thus asked by a member of the Committee whether the CIA had undertaken a “technique by technique” analysis of the effectiveness of the program. Goss responded that the problem with such an analysis is that the techniques were used “in combination.” Asked by the member for a comparison of “waterboarding versus sleep deprivation,” Goss responded that “waterboarding is not used in conjunction with anything else.” As detailed elsewhere, this testimony was inaccurate. Goss then referred to sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, and “environment control” as “alleged techniques.”
See
transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006- 1308).

2494.
Director Goss stated: “I’ve had to seriously consider whether passage of the McCain amendment was a congressional disapproval of the CIA use of EITs. I don’t think it was, and I don’t think that was the message you sent me. But I have to at least get that assurance, that that’s not what you were saying to me.”
See
transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

2495.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

2496.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

2497.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

2498.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

2499.
Letter from Vice Chairman Rockefeller to Director Goss, containing Questions for the Record, May 10, 2006 (DTS #2006-1949); Letter from Chairman Roberts to Director Goss, May 4, 2006 (DTS #2006-1876).

2500.
Classified Annex to Report No. S. 109-259, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (DTS #2006-2208). Compartmented annex (DTS #2006-2209).

2501.
Hayden stated that
Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld
had effectively prohibited the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. He then described an “action” that would define Common Article 3 according to the Detainee Treatment Act, which was in turn “anchored” in the Convention Against Torture to “which the Senate express[ed] reservation.” As described, two months later, the President sought Congressional approval of the Military Commissions Act. Based on handwritten notes by the Committee minority staff director.

2502.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336).

2503.
As described above, the CIA had sought the Department of Justice’s opinion on the application of the Detainee Treatment Act to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The draft memorandum was withdrawn after the U.S. Supreme Court case in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.

2504.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS#2007-1336). The transcript includes the following exchange: Senator Feingold: “. . . you make it tougher on me and the members of the Committee by the decision to not allow staff access to a briefing like this. Was it your recommendation to deny staff access to this hearing?” CIA Director Hayden: “It was.”

2505.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2506.
Email from: ████████████; to ██████████████; cc: ████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████████; [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Briefing for Senator John S. McCain (R-AZ); date: September 11, 2006, at 5:51 PM.

2507.
Letter from Senator Feinstein to Director Hayden, September 27, 2006 (DTS #2006-3717).

2508.
Letter from Senator Feingold to Director Hayden, May 1, 2007 (DTS #2007-1858); Letter from Senators Feinstein, Wyden and Hagel to Director Hayden, May 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-2102).

2509.
As in the September 6, 2006, briefing, only two staff members were permitted to attend.

2510.
Director Hayden testified that detainees were never provided fewer than 1,000 calories a day. This is inaccurate. There were no calorie requirements until May 2004, and draft OMS guidelines from March 2003 indicated that “[b]rief periods in which food is withheld (1-2 days), as an adjunct to interrogations are acceptable.” (
See
OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE RENDITION, INTERROGATION, AND DETENTION, May 17, 2004; OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, First Draft, March 7, 2003.) Director Hayden testified that detainees were “not paraded [nude] in front of anyone,” whereas a CIA interrogator told the inspector general that nude detainees were “kept in a center area outside the interrogation room,” and were “‘walked around’ by
guards.” (
See
Interview Report, ████████████.
April 14, 2003.)
██
██████████
testified that standing sleep deprivation is discontinued when swelling or “any abnormality” appears. This was inaccurate. For example, KSM’s standing sleep deprivation continued, notwithstanding pedal edema and abrasions on his ankles, shins and wrists, as well as the back of his head. (
See
█████████
10916 (210845Z MAR 03); 10909
██████
(201918Z MAR 03).) Director Hayden testified that “mental conditions that would be of normal concern do not present themselves until a person has experienced more than 100 hours of sleep deprivation,” however at least three detainees experienced hallucinations after being subjected to fewer than 96 hours of sleep deprivation.
See
███████████████ 1393
(201006Z OCT 03);
██
█████████████ 48122 ████████████; █████████ 1299 (███████ JAN 04); █████████ 1312 (████████ JAN 04); ████████ 1530 (█████████ 04); ███████████████ 3221 ████████████; █████████████████ 3241 (██████████ 04).

2511.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, November 16, 2006 (DTS #2007-1422).

2512.
This testimony included inaccurate information. For example,
██████████
testified that KSM “identified sleeper cells inside the U.S., [and] the information allowed the FBI to identify that and take action.” She further testified that KSM “identified the second wave of attacks against the U.S. that were planned after 9/11,” that Abu Zubaydah “really pointed us towards [KSM] and how to find him,” and that Abu Zubaydah “led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh.”
See
transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). Additional information on the testimony is included in the full Committee Study.

2513.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337).

2514.
DIRECTOR
███████
(152227Z MAR 07).

2515.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).

2516.
For example, the Statement for the Record claimed that Abu Zubaydah was “an up-and-coming lieutenant of Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) who had intimate knowledge of al-Qa’ida’s current operations, personnel and plans.” It also stated that “[a]fter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most important sources of intelligence on al-Qa’ida, and he himself has stated that he would not have been responsive or told us all he did had he not gone through these techniques.” The Statement claimed that CIA interrogators were “carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity,” and that “they must complete more than 250 hours of specialized training before they are allowed to come face-to-face with a terrorist.” Claims made in the Statement refuting the abuses identified by the ICRC were repeated by Director Hayden during the hearing, and are described in an appendix to this summary. The Statement for the Record also included inaccurate information about past congressional oversight, claiming that “[a]s CIA’s efforts to implement [new interrogation] authorities got underway in 2002, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the speaker and the minority leader of the House, and the chairs and ranking members of the intelligence committees were fully briefed on the interrogation program.” See Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).

2517.
The Statement for the Record included claims of effectiveness similar to those made in other contexts by the CIA, related to the captures of Hambali (on which Director Hayden elaborated during the hearing), Issa al-Hindi (“KSM also provided the first lead to an operative known as ‘Issa al-Hindi’”), Sajid Badat (“[l]eads provided by KSM in November 2003 led directly to the arrest of [Badat]”), Jose Padilla (“Abu Zubaydah provided information leading to the identification of alleged al-Qa’ida operative Jose Padilla”), and Iyman Faris (“[s]oon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-based truck driver whom the FBI identified as Iyman Faris, already under suspicion for his contacts with al-Qa’ida operative Majid Khan”). The statement also described the “thwarting” and “disrupting” of the “West Coast Airliner Plot” (aka, the Second Wave plotting), the “Heathrow Airport plot,” the “Karachi plots,” and “Plots in the Saudi Peninsula.”
See
Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).

2518.
Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).

2519.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).

2520.
The Committee had asked for specifics related to the assertion in Director Hayden’s written statement that the CIA program was effective in gaining intelligence after detainees successfully resisted interrogation under U.S. military detention. The CIA’s response referenced only one detainee, Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi, stating that he was “unwilling to become fully cooperative given the limitations of the U.S. military’s interrogation and detention regulations.” The CIA’s response to Committee questions then asserted that “[i]t was not until Abu Jaf’ar was subjected to EITS that he provided detailed information [about] his personal meetings with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and Zarqawi’s advisors,” and that “[i]n addition, Abu Jaf’ar provided information on al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) finances, travel, and associated facilitation activities.” The provided information was inaccurate. CIA records indicate that, while still in U.S. military custody, Abu Ja’far described multiple meetings with al-Zarqawi, other members of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, and individuals who were to serve as al-Zarqawi’s connection to senior al-Qa’ida leadership. Abu Ja’far also provided insights into al-Zarqawi’s beliefs and plans.
See
███████ 32732 (█████ OCT 05); ██████ 32707 (████ OCT 05); ██████ 32726 (█████ OCT 05); ██████ 32810 (█████ OCT 05); ██████ 32944 (█████ OCT 05).

2521.
CIA Response to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record, June 18, 2007 (DTS #2007-2564).

2522.
For example, the director of CTC, ████████████, testified that detainees “are given ample opportunity to provide the information without the use of EITs” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, August 2, 2007 (DTS #2007-3641). As detailed in this Study, numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques immediately upon being questioned.

2523.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, August 2, 2007 (DTS #2007-3641).

2524.
Transcript, Committee of Conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 5, 2007 (DTS #2009-1279).

2525.
“C.I.A. Destroyed Tapes of Interrogations,”
The New York Times
, December 6, 2007 (published in the December 7, 2007, edition of the newspaper).

2526.
Press Release, entitled, “Chairman Rockefeller Says Intel Committee Has Begun Investigation Into CIA Detainee Tapes; Senator Expresses Concern that CIA Continues to Withhold Key Information,” Office of Senator Rockefeller, December 7, 2007.

2527.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, November 16, 2006 (DTS #2007-1422). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states only that “[w]e acknowledge that DCIA did not volunteer past information on CIA’s process of videotaping the interrogation sessions or of the destruction of the tapes . . . .” The Committee review found that in testimony to the Committee in November 2006, CIA witnesses responded to questions about videotaping in terms of current practice, while avoiding any reference to past practice. This was similar to what was conveyed in June 2003, to David Addington of the Office of the Vice President, by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller. In June 2003, the CIA’s General Counsel Scott Muller traveled to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the Vice President’s counsel David Addington, Department of Defense General Counsel Jim Haynes, Patrick Philbin from the Department of Justice, and NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger. According to CIA records, during the trip, White House officials asked CIA General Counsel Muller about the CIA Inspector General’s concerns regarding the waterboard technique and whether the CIA videotaped interrogations, as David Addington had heard tapes existed of the CIA’s interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. In an email to CIA colleagues providing details on the trip, Muller wrote: “(David Addington, by the way, asked me if were [sic] taping interrogations and said he had heard that there were tapes of the Zubaydah interrogations. I told him that tapes were not being made).”
See
email from: Scott Muller; to: John Rizzo, ███████████, and █████████; subject: Report from Gitmo trip (Not proofread as usual); date: June █, 2003, at 5:47 PM.