The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (125 page)

2423.
Following al-Hawsawi’s first interrogation session, Chief of Interrogations █████████ asked CIA Headquarters for information on what al-Hawsawi actually “knows,” saying: “he does not appear to the [sic] be a person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts with which to confront [al-Hawsawi]. What we need at this point is substantive information vice supposition.”
See
█████████████████ 34757 (101742Z MAR 03).

2424.
Although CIA records include no requests or approval cables, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation. He was released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be.
See
WASHINGTON DC ████████████ █████████T; ██████████ 51303 █████████████████.

2425.
CIA Headquarters initially resisted approving Arsala Khan’s capture because of a lack of information confirming that he was a “continuing threat.” (
See
███████████████ 169986 ████████████; email from: ███████████; to: ███████████, ████████████████, and [REDACTED]; subject: Denial of Approval to Capture Arsala Khan; date: ██████████). Despite doubts that Arsala Khan was the individual sought by the CIA, interrogators subjected him to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques “to make a better assessment regarding [his] willingness to start talking, or assess if our subject is, in fact the man we are looking for.”
See
█████████████████████ 1373 ██████████████.

2426.
The true names of these detainees have been replaced with the capitalized pseudonyms AL-MAGREBI and AL-TURKI. At the time the two detainees were rendered to CIA custody, the CIA was aware that they were then working for a foreign partner government. (
See
ALEC ██████ [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 43773 [REDACTED].) They were subjected to sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation until the CIA confirmed that the detainees had been trying to contact the CIA for weeks to inform the CIA of what they believed were pending al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks. (
See
███████████████████ 22227 [REDACTED]; ██████████████████T 2233 [REDACTED] ████████████████ 2185[REDACTED]; HEADQUARTERS ████ [REDACTED] ██████████████ 2232 [REDACTED].) After the CIA had determined that AL-MAGREBI and AL-TURKI should not be in CIA custody, the two detainees were held for █████████ additional months before they were released.
See
[REDACTED] 2025 [REDACTED].

2427.
The case of Janat Gul is described above in the context of OLC advice in 2004 and afterwards. As Gul’s interrogators noted, “Team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information, however team will continue to press [Gul] for that during each session.”
See
██████████ 1574 (███████████ 04).

2428.
The CIA’s assessment of Ghailani’s knowledge of terrorist threats was speculative. As one official noted, “[al]though Ghailani’s role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa’ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the United States homeland, and the operatives involved.”
See
email from: █████████, CTC/UBLD ██████████ (formerly ALEC ████████████); to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza Rabi’a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004.

2429.
As noted above, the credibility of the source implicating Sharif al-Masri, Janat Gul, and Ghailani’s connections to a pre-election plot was questioned by CIA officials prior to the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against them. The source was later determined to have fabricated the information.

2430.
Five days after interrogators began using enhanced interrogation techniques against Sayyid Ibrahim, interrogators cabled CIA Headquarters requesting information that would “definitely link [Ibrahim] to nefarious activity or knowledge by [Ibrahim] of known nefarious activities of al-Qa’ida members, if this is possible.” (
See
████████ 1324 ██████ FEB 04). Without receiving a response, they continued to subject Ibrahim to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA Headquarters, which rejected an assessment from two debriefers that Ibrahim was, “at best . . . a low-level facilitator,” would later indicate that it was “uncertain” he would meet the requirements for U.S. military or ██████ detention.
See
HEADQUARTERS ██████ ████████████; HEADQUARTERS ██████ ████████████.

2431.
The OLC further stated that “enhanced techniques would be used only as less harsh techniques fail or as interrogators ran out of time in the face of an imminent threat, so that it would be unlikely that a detainee would be subjected to more duress than is reasonably necessary to elicit the information sought.”
See
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2432.
See
Volume III for additional details.

2433.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2434.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2435.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2436.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2437.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2438.
This is a reference to the CIA’s representation that KSM, “as a result of EITs,” provided critical and unique reporting on Iyman Faris and Majid Khan. As described briefly in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, Iyman Faris was already under investigation, and Majid Khan was already in custody, before KSM mentioned them. Khan himself revealed a discussion about poisoning reservoirs prior to his rendition to CIA custody. (
See
ALEC ███████ (210015Z MAR 03).) When Faris, who was likewise not in CIA custody, discussed a plot against the Brooklyn Bridge, the former chief of CTC’s Bin Ladin Unit described it as “half-baked,” and “more of a nuisnance [sic] than a threat.”
See
WHDC ██████ (242226Z MAR 03) and email from: ████████████; to: ████████████, ███████████, █████████████, ████████████, [REDACTED]; subject: attacks in conus; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:19:18 AM).

2439.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2440.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2441.
Email from: ███████████; to ██████████ ████; cc: ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████████; [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Briefing for Senator John S. McCain (R-AZ); date: September 11, 2006, at 5:51 PM (“[Senator McCain] asked if I thought ‘sleep deprivation’ was torture. I responded that I did not and he then added that he had talked with a Marine Colonel friend of his and the Colonel had indicated it was and he believed his friend”). In another exchange, the officer who briefed Senator McCain was asked about the Senator’s position. CIA officer ████████████: “so, is the senator onboard? . . .” CIA officer ██████████: “not totally.” ██████████: “if he’s moved in our direction at all, you are a miracle worker . . . was it painful?” ██████████: ”Very much so.” ██████████: “is the issue the ElTs still?” █████████: “Yep.” (
See
Sametime communication between █████████████ and ████████████, 11/Sep/06, 15:47:27 to 18:43:29.) The OLC specifically cited statements from Senator McCain that the Military Commissions Act “will allow the CIA to continue interrogating prisoners within the boundaries established in the bill.” Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14). The OLC did not mention that McCain had specifically objected to the use of sleep deprivation.

2442.
Letter from Senator Dianne Feinstein to Director Hayden, September 27, 2006 (DTS #2006-3717).

2443.
Transcript of hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336).

2444.
Letter from Senator Russ Feingold to Director Hayden, May 1, 2007 (DTS #2007-1858).

2445.
Letter from Senators Chuck Hagel, Dianne Feinstein and Ron Wyden, May 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-2102).

2446.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff briefing, November 13, 2001 (DTS #2002-0629).

2447.
“We’re not going to engage in torture. But, that said, how do I deal with somebody I know may know right now that there is a nuclear weapon somewhere in the United States that is going to be detonated tomorrow, and I’ve got the guy who I know built it and hid it? I don’t know the answer to that.” (
See
transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence MON briefing, November 7, 2001 (DTS #2002-0611);
See also
transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff briefing, December 11, 2001 (DTS #2002-0615).

2448.
Email from: ████████████, SSCI Staff; to: ████ Cleared SSCI staff; subject: Meeting yesterday with CIA lawyers on ██████████; date February 26, 2002 (DTS #2002-0925).

2449.
CIA responses to Questions for the Record (hearing, March 6, 2002), April 18, 2002 (DTS #2002-1800).

2450.
Email from: ███████████; to: █████████; subject: Issues for SSCI and HPSCI biweekly update on CT; date: April 9, 2002; Transcript of “Update on War on Terrorism,” April 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-1993). Committee notifications of the capture of ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri likewise omitted reference to his location and the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. (
See
Congressional Notification, November 20, 2002 (DTS #2002- 4910).) On November ██, 2002, the CIA notified the Committee of the death of Gul Rahman at a “detention facility in [Country ███████] operated by the [Country ██ government] and funded by CIA.” This description, as well as subsequent representations to the Committee, understated the role of the CIA in managing DETENTION SITE COBALT.
See
Congressional Notification, November ██ 2002 (DTS #2002-5015); Responses to ███████████ Counterterrorism Questions for the Record, Question 3 (DTS #2002-5059).

2451.
Congressional Notification, April 15, 2002 (DTS #2002-1710); CIA responses to Questions for the Record (hearing, March 6, 2002), April 18, 2002 (DTS #2002-1800).

2452.
Transcript of “Update on War on Terrorism,” April 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-1993).

2453.
Email from: John Moseman; to: Stanley Moskowitz, et al.; subject: Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; date: August 3, 2002, at 11:34:13 AM.