The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (15 page)

4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed as “Sir” and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain

CIA records indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE questioning Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware of the intelligence bin al-Shibh provided in foreign government custody, even though
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and the intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by the CIA. On multiple occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that contained information previously disseminated from interrogations of bin al-Shibh while he was in foreign government custody, under the faulty understanding that bin al-Shibh was providing new information.
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Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA interrogators used the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques for behavior adjustment purposes, in response to perceived disrespect, and on several occasions, before bin al-Shibh had an opportunity to respond to an interrogator’s questions or before a question was asked. The CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were applied when bin al-Shibh failed to address an interrogator as “sir,” when interrogators noted bin al-Shibh had a “blank stare” on his face, and when bin al-Shibh complained of stomach pain.
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Further, despite CIA policy at the time to keep detainees under constant light for security purposes, bin al-Shibh was kept in total darkness to heighten his sense of fear.”
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CIA psychological assessments of bin al-Shibh were slow to recognize the onset of psychological problems brought about, according to later CIA assessments, by bin al-Shibh’s long-term social isolation and his anxiety that the CIA would return to using its enhanced interrogation techniques against him. The symptoms included visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm.
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In April 2005, a CIA psychologist stated that bin al-Shibh “has remained in social isolation” for as long as two and half years and the isolation was having a “clear and escalating effect on his psychological functioning.” The officer continued, “in [bin al-Shibh’s] case, it is important to keep in mind that he was previously a relatively high-functioning individual, making his deterioration over the past several months more alarming.”
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The psychologist wrote, “significant alterations to RBS’[s] detention environment must occur soon to prevent further and more serious psychological disturbance.”
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On September 5, 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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After his arrival, bin al-Shibh was placed on anti-psychotic medications.
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The CIA disseminated 109 intelligence reports from the CIA interrogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
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A CIA assessment, which included intelligence from his time in foreign government custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and after being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques,
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concluded that:

“Much of [bin al-Shibh’s] statements on the 11 September attacks have been speculative, and many of the details could be found in media accounts of the attacks that appeared before he was detained. In the few instances where his reporting was unique and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the information . . . he has been sketchy on some aspects of the 9/11 plot, perhaps in order to downplay his role in the plot. His information on individuals is non-specific; he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a role . . . The overall quality of his reporting has steadily declined since 2003.”
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G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

1. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

The capture of KSM was attributable to a single CIA source who first came to the CIA’s attention in the spring of 2001.
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The source ██████████████ led the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani custody from the time of his capture on March 1, 2003, to March █, 2003, and was interrogated by CIA officers and Pakistani officials. According to CIA records, while in Pakistani custody, KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive interrogation techniques being used.
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While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the locations of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,
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he did provide limited information on various al-Qa’ida leaders and operatives who had already been captured. KSM’s willingness to discuss operatives when confronted with information about their capture—behavior noted by CIA officers on-site in Pakistan—was a recurring theme throughout KSM’s subsequent detention and interrogation in CIA custody.
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Less than two hours after KSM’s capture, anticipating KSM’s arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, the chief of interrogations,
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, sent an email to CIA Headquarters with the subject line, “Let’s roll with the new guy.” The email requested permission to “press [KSM] for threat info right away.”
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Later that day, CIA Headquarters authorized █████ to use a number of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM. The cable from CIA Headquarters did not require that non-coercive interrogation techniques be used first.
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On March █, 2003, two days before KSM’s arrival at the detention site, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan for KSM.
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According to CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT a “few minutes” after the questioning of KSM began. KSM was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress positions, standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or above head level), nudity, and water dousing.
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Chief of Interrogations
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also ordered the rectal rehydration of KSM without a determination of medical need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations would later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator’s “total control over the detainee.”
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At the end of the day, the psychologist on-site concluded that the interrogation team would likely have more success by “avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into battles of will with the interrogator.”
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KSM’s reporting during his first day in CIA custody included an accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having been provided during the initial “‘throwaway’ stage” of information collection when the CIA believed detainees provided false or worthless information.
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On March 5, 2003, and March 6, 2003, while he was still at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM was subjected to nudity and sleep deprivation. On March 5, 2003, KSM was also subjected to additional rectal rehydration,
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which
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OMS,
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, described as helping to “clear a person’s head” and effective in getting KSM to talk.”
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On March 6, 2003, █████ adopted a “‘softer Mr. Rogers’ persona” after the interrogation team concluded that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques had caused KSM to “clam up.”
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During this session KSM was described as “more cooperative,” and the day’s interrogation was deemed the “best session held to date” by the interrogation team.
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During this period KSM fabricated information on an individual whom he described as the protector of his children.
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That information resulted in the capture and CIA detention of two innocent individuals.
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2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard Prior to His Arrival

Within hours of KSM’s capture, ALEC Station successfully argued that CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR should take over the interrogation of KSM upon KSM’s arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE.
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On March 3, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan indicating that KSM “will be subjected to immediate interrogation techniques,” and that “the interrogation techniques will increase in intensity from standard to enhanced techniques commensurate with [KSM’s] level of resistance, until he indicates initial cooperation.”
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On March █, 2003, the day of KSM’s arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the on-site medical officer described the use of the waterboard on KSM as inevitable:

“[T]he team here apparently looks to use the water board in two different contexts. One is as a tool of regression and control in which it is used up front and aggressively. The second is to vet information on an as needed basis. Given the various pressures from home vs what is happening on the ground, I think the team’s expectation is that [KSM] will [be] getting treatment somewhere in between. I don’t think they believe that it will be possible to entirely avoid the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and allied interests. It is an interesting dynamic because they are well aware of the toll it will take on the team vs. the detainee. The requirements coming from home are really unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail.”
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Meanwhile, OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation technique. These guidelines were sent to the medical personnel at the detention site. The guidelines included a warning that the risk of the waterboard was “directly related to number of exposures and may well accelerate as exposures increase,” that concerns about cumulative effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total number of waterboard exposures, “perhaps 20 in a week.” CIA records indicate that, as of the day of KSM’s arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the interrogation team had not reviewed the draft OMS guidelines.”
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KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approximately 6:00 PM local time on March █, 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep deprivation position.
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At 6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared KSM for the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters’ approval to begin the interrogation process.
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The detention site received the approvals at 7:18 PM,
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at which point the interrogators began using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM.
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Between March █, 2003 and March 9, 2003, contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA interrogator, █████████, used the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and walling.
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There were no debriefers present. According to the CIA interrogator, during KSM’s first day at DETENTION SITE BLUE, SWIGERT and DUNBAR first began threatening KSM’s children.
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CTC Legal,
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, later told the inspector general that these threats were legal so long as the threats were “conditional.”
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On March 9, 2003, KSM fabricated information indicating that Jaffar al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together
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because, as he explained on April 23, 2003, he “felt some pressure to produce information about operations in the United States in the initial phases of his interrogation.”
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On March ██, 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station ███████████, and a second ALEC Station officer, ██████████, arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE to serve as debriefers. The detention site also reportedly received a phone call from CIA Headquarters conveying the views of the CIA’s Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt on the interrogation of KSM.
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Pavitt later told the inspector general that he “did not recall specifically ordering that a detainee be waterboarded right away,” but he “did not discount that possibility.” According to records of the interview, “Pavitt did recall saying, ‘I want to know what he knows, and I want to know it fast.’”
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The on-site medical officer later wrote in an email that the CIA interrogators “felt that the [waterboard] was the big stick and that HQ was more or less demanding that it be used early and often.”
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3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM’s Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated Information

On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of his 15 separate waterboarding sessions. The first waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10 more than anticipated in the Office of Legal Counsel’s August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed by the use of a horizontal stress position that had not previously been approved by CIA Headquarters.
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The chief of Base, worried about the legal implications, prohibited the on-site medical officer from reporting on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of official CIA cable traffic.
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On March 12, 2003, KSM provided information on the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting. KSM stated that he showed a sketch in his notebook of a building in Canary Wharf (a major business district in London) to Ammar al-Baluchi.
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He also provided statements about directing prospective pilots to study at flight schools,
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and stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar was involved in the Heathrow Plot.
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KSM retracted all of this information later in his detention.
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There are no CIA records indicating that these and other retractions were assessed to be false.