The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (14 page)

In October 2004, 21 months after the final documented use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract interrogator DUNBAR and another CIA interrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided “essentially no actionable information,” and that “the probability that he has much more to contribute is low.”
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Over the course of al-Nashiri’s detention and interrogation by the CIA, the CIA disseminated 145 intelligence reports based on his debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided information on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots, details on completed operations, and background on al-Qa’ida’s structure and methods of operation.
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Al-Nashiri did not provide the information that the CIA’s ALEC Station sought and believed al-Nashiri possessed, specifically “perishable threat information to help [CIA] thwart future attacks and capture additional operatives.”
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E. Tensions with Country ██ Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees

According to CIA records, three weeks after
██████████████
and political leadership of Country ██ agreed to host a CIA detention facility, the CIA informed the U.S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a cable, by not doing so, the CIA was “risking that he hear of this initiative” from Country ██ officials.
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As was the case in other host countries, the ambassador in Country ██ was told by the CIA not to speak with any other State Department official about the arrangement.
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Prior to the opening of the CIA detention facility in Country ██,
███████
CTC Legal,
██████████
, warned of possible legal actions against CIA employees in countries that “take a different view of the detention and interrogation practices employed by [the CIA].”
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He further recommended the establishment of CIA facilities in countries that
███████████████████████████████████
.
378
███████
’s advice was not heeded and, in December 2002, the two individuals then being detained by the CIA in Country ██ (Abu Zubaydah and ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) were transferred to Country ██.
379

The agreement to host a CIA detention facility in Country ██ created multiple, ongoing difficulties between Country ██ and the CIA. Country
██
’s
███████
proposed a written “Memorandum of Understanding” covering the relative roles and responsibilities of the CIA and
██████████
, which the CIA ultimately refused to sign.
380
Four months after the detention site began hosting CIA detainees, Country ██ rejected the transfer of
████████████
, which included Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. The decision was reversed only after the U.S. ambassador intervened with the political leadership of Country ██ on the CIA’s behalf.
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The following month, the CIA provided $██ million to Country ██’s
█████████
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after which
████████
officials, speaking for ██████ Country
██
political leadership, indicated that Country
██
was now flexible with regard to the number of CIA detainees at the facility and when the facility would eventually be closed.
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The facility, which was described by the CIA as “over capacity,” was nonetheless closed, as had been previously agreed, in ███████ [the fall o
f
] 2003.
384

According to CIA cables, years later, █████████ officials in Country █ reacted with “deep shock and regret”
█████████████████████
which they acknowledged was “
█████████████████████
.”
385
█████████████████████
[Country ██] officials were “extremely upset”
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at the CIA’s inability to keep secrets and were “deeply disappointed” in not having had more warning of President Bush’s September 2006 public acknowledgment of the CIA program.
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The CIA Station, for its part, described the
█████████████████
as a “serious blow” to the bilateral relationship.
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F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition to CIA Custody

As early as September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was assessed by the CIA to be a facilitator for the September 11, 2001, attacks and an associate of the 9/11 hijackers.
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While targeting another terrorist, Hassan Ghul, ██████ Pakistani officials unexpectedly captured bin al-Shibh during raids in Pakistan on September 11, 2002.
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On September ██, 2002, bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government, ███████.
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Approximately five months later, on February █, 2003, bin al-Shibh was rendered from the custody of
███████
to CIA custody, becoming the 41st CIA detainee.
392

As with Abu Zubaydah and ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, personnel at CIA Headquarters—often in ALEC Station—overestimated the information bin al-Shibh would have access to within al-Qa’ida, writing that bin al-Shibh “likely has critical information on upcoming attacks and locations of senior al-Qa’ida operatives.”
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Later, after bin al-Shibh was interrogated using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques for an estimated 34 days, the CIA’s ALEC Station concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior member of al-Qa’ida and was not in a position to know details about al-Qa’ida’s plans for future attacks.
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In another parallel, officers at CIA Headquarters requested and directed the continued use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh when CIA detention site personnel recommended ending such measures.
395

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was initially interrogated by a foreign government.
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While officers at CIA Headquarters were dissatisfied with the intelligence production from his five months of detention in foreign government custody, CIA officers in that country were satisfied with bin al-Shibh’s reporting.
397
Those CIA officers wrote that bin al-Shibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential future threats, to include a potential attack on London’s Heathrow Airport and al-Nashiri’s planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The CIA officers █████ [in-country] also noted that they found bin al-Shibh’s information to be generally accurate and that they “found few cases where he openly/clearly misstated facts.”
398
In a cable to CIA Headquarters, the CIA officers in ███████ [the country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was being held] concluded, “overall, he provided what was needed.” The same cable stated that bin al-Shibh’s interrogation was similar to other interrogations they had participated in, and that the most effective interrogation tool was having information available to confront him when he tried to mislead or provide incomplete information.
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Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005 that the most significant intelligence derived from bin al-Shibh was obtained during his detention in foreign government custody, which was prior to his rendition to CIA custody and the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees

Despite the aforementioned assessments from CIA officers in ███████ concerning bin al-Shibh’s cooperation, officers at CIA Headquarters decided the CIA should obtain ████ custody of bin al-Shibh and render him to DETENTION SITE BLUE in Country ██.
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On February █, 2003, in anticipation of bin al-Shibh’s arrival, interrogators at the detention site, led by the CIA’s chief interrogator, █████████, prepared an interrogation plan for bin al-Shibh.
402
The plan became a template, and subsequent requests to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against other detainees relied upon near identical language.
403

The interrogation plan proposed that immediately following the psychological and medical assessments conducted upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be subjected to “sensory dislocation.”
404
The proposed sensory dislocation included shaving bin al-Shibh’s head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white lights, keeping him “unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures,” and shackling him “hand and foot with arms outstretched over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed to support his weight with his arms).”
405
Contrary to CIA representations made later to the Committee that detainees were always offered the opportunity to cooperate before being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan stated that bin al-Shibh would be shackled nude with his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discussion with interrogators or any assessment of his level of cooperation.
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According to a cable, only after the interrogators determined that his “initial resistance level [had] been diminished by the conditions” would the questioning and interrogation phase begin.
407

The interrogation phase described in the plan included near constant interrogations, as well as continued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep deprivation. In addition, the interrogation plan stated that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques would be used, including the “attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap . . . the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh’s] level of resistance.”
408

Based on versions of this interrogation plan, at least six detainees were stripped and shackled nude, placed in the standing position for sleep deprivation, or subjected to other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an interrogator in 2003.
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Five of these detainees were shackled naked in the standing position with their hands above their head immediately after their medical check.
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These interrogation plans typically made no reference to the information the interrogators sought and why the detainee was believed to possess the information.
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3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite Interrogators’ Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was Cooperative

When CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE assessed that bin al-Shibh was cooperative and did not have additional knowledge of future attacks,
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CIA Headquarters disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, which failed to elicit the information sought by CIA Headquarters.
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On February 11, 2003, interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for questions that ALEC Station was “85 percent certain [bin al-Shibh] will be able to answer,” in order to verify bin al-Shibh’s level of cooperation.
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The interrogators stated that information from Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri suggested that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new assignment or trusted with significant information given his high-profile links to the September 11, 2001, attacks.
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They further stated that bin al-Shibh had “achieved substantial notoriety after 11 September,” but was still unproven in al-Qa’ida circles and may have “been privy to information more as a bystander than as an active participant.”
416

The CIA’s ALEC Station disagreed with the assessment of the detention site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered by Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin al-Shibh must have actionable information due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Headquarters’ belief that bin al-Shibh had a history of withholding information from interrogators. ALEC Station wrote:

“As base [DETENTION SITE BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long been deliberately withholding and/or providing misleading information to his interrogators in [a foreign government] . . . From our optic, it is imperative to focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: 1) What are the next attacks planned for the US and 2) Who and where are the operatives inside the United States.”
417

The ALEC Station cable stated that bin al-Shibh had ‘‘spent extensive time with [KSM],” and “must have heard discussions of other targets.” The cable added that “HQS strongly believes that Binalshibh was involved in efforts on behalf of KSM to identify and place operatives in the West.” The February 13, 2003, cable concluded:

“We think Binalshibh is uniquely positioned to give us much needed critical information to help us thwart large-scale attacks inside the United States, and we want to do our utmost to get it as soon as possible. Good luck.”
418

CIA officers at DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore continued to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately three additional weeks after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling.
419
Bin al-Shibh did not provide the information sought on “operatives inside the United States” or “large-scale attacks inside the United States.”
420