The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (30 page)

The CIA documents validating the president’s speech addressed other passages that were likewise unsupported by the CIA’s cited cables. For example, the speech included an inaccurate claim regarding KSM that had been part of the CIA’s representations on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques since 2003. The speech stated:

“Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody—a terrorist named Majid Khan. KSM revealed that [Majid] Khan had been told to deliver $50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambali, the leader of al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian affiliate known as ‘J-I.’ CIA officers confronted Khan with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had been delivered to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical description and contact number for this operative. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that helped lead to the capture of Hambali.”
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As support for this passage, the CIA cited a June 2003 cable describing a CIA interrogation of Majid Khan in which Majid Khan discussed Zubair.
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The CIA “validation” document did not include cable citations from March 2003 that would have revealed that Majid Khan provided this information while in foreign government custody, prior to the reporting from KSM.
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On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered the speech based on the CIA-vetted information.
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On September 8, 2006, the chief of the
████████
Department in CTC,
██████████
, who had participated in the CIA’s validation of the speech, distributed the “final validation document” for possible updates or changes. In an email, ██████ urged the recipients to “[p]lease look very carefully, as this is going to be a very important document.”
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On September 11, 2006, a CIA officer responded, questioning the passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM, as well as the relevance of the CIA cables cited in the validation document to support the passage. The CIA officer questioned whether a CIA cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s identification of “Ammar” supported the claim that bin al-Shibh’s reporting helped lead to the capture of KSM. The officer wrote:

“I presume the information in this cable that supports the statement is Ramzi’s admission regarding Ammar?? Did that actually help lead us to KSM?? not sure who did this section, but we may want to double-check this and provide additional cables on how this actually ‘assisted us’. This also seems to be a point critics in the press seem to be picking on, I will do some digging on my own as well.”
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There are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA officer’s comments about the inadequate sourcing were further addressed. As described in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, there are no CIA records to support the passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM.

After the speech, press accounts challenging aspects of the speech became the subject of internal discussion among some CIA officers. On September 7, 2006, the chief of the ██████ Department in CTC,
█████████
, sent an email stating: “The NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President’s speech.” Defending the passage in the speech asserting that, after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided information “that helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh,” █████ explained:

“. . . we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 beforeAZ was captured; however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added into other information—helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh.”
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███████’s statement, that Abu Zubaydah provided “information on [bin al-Shibh’s] recent activities” that “helped [CIA] track him,” was not supported by the cables cited in the CIA’s “validation” document, or any other CIA record. ███████’s email did not address the other representation in the president’s speech—that Abu Zubaydah “identified” Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
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The
New York Times
article also challenged the representation in the speech that Abu Zubaydah “disclosed” that KSM was the “mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias ‘Mukhtar,’ ” and that “[t]his was a vital picce of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM.” As the
New York Times
article noted, the 9/11 Commission had pointed to a cable from August 2001 that identified KSM as “Mukhtar.” In her email, ██████ acknowledged the August 2001 report identifying KSM as “Mukhtar” and provided additional information on the drafting of the speech:

“[O]n 28 August, 2001, in fact, [CIA’s] ████ [database] does show a report from [a source] stating that Mohammad Rahim’s brother Zadran told him that KSM was now being called ‘Mukhtar.’ Moreover, we were suspicious that KSM might have been behind 9/11 as early as 12 Sept 2001, and we had some reporting indicating he was the mastermind. We explained this latter fact to the White House, although the 28 August report escaped our notice.”
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In her email, █████ stated that “[t]he fact that the 9/11 commission, with 20-20 hindsight, thinks we should have known this in August 2001 does not alter the fact that we didn’t.”
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In addition to the
New York Times
article, the CIA was concerned about an article by Ron Suskind in
Time Magazine
that also challenged the assertions in the speech about the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM.
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In a September 11, 2006, email, the chief of the ███████ Department in CTC, ██████████, wrote “[w]e are not claiming [Abu Zubaydah] provided exact locational information, merely that he provided us with information that helped in our targeting efforts.” █████’s email did not address the representations in the president’s speech that Abu Zubaydah “identified” Ramzi bin al-Shibh and that the information from Abu Zubaydah “helped lead to the capture” of bin al-Shibh. With regard to the capture of KSM, █████’s email acknowledged that Suskind’s assertion that “the key was a cooperative source” was “correct as far as it goes, but the priority with which we pursued KSM changed once AZ conclusively identified him as the mastermind of 9/11.”
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██████’s email did not address the representation in the president’s speech that Abu Zubaydah, along with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, “helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.” ██████’s statements about the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM are not supported by CIA records.
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The president’s September 6, 2006, speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, was the first detailed, formal public representation about the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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The inaccurate representations in the speech have been repeated in numerous articles, books, and broadcasts. The speech was also relied upon by the OLC in its July 20, 2007, memorandum on the legality of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically to support the premise that the use of the techniques was effective in “producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence.”
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D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness o
f
Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees

While the CIA made numerous general representations about the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA representations on specific detainees focused almost exclusively on two CIA detainees, Abu Zubaydah, detained on March 28, 2002, and KSM, detained on March 1, 2003.
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1. Abu Zubaydah

As described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA provided significant information to policymakers and the Department of Justice on the CIA’s decision to use the newly developed CIA “enhanced interrogation techniques” on Abu Zubaydah and the effects of doing so. These representations were provided by the CIA to the CIA OIG,
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the White House,
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the Department of Justice,
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Congress,
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and the American public.
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The representations include that: (1) Abu Zubaydah told the CIA he believed “the general US population was ‘weak,’ lacked resilience, and would be unable to ‘do what was necessary’ ”;
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(2) Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with U.S. government personnel using traditional interrogation techniques;
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(3) Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation team believed the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques would result in critical information on terrorist operatives and plotting;
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and (4) the use of CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in eliciting critical intelligence from Abu Zubaydah.
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These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.

The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah “expressed [his] belief that the general US population was ‘weak,’ lacked resilience, and would be unable to ‘do what was necessary’ to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals” is not supported by CIA records.
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On August 30, 2006, a CIA officer from the CIA’s al-Qa’ida Plans and Organization Group wrote: “we have no records that ‘he declared that America was weak, and lacking in resilience and that our society did not have the will to ‘do what was necessary’ to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals.’ ”
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In a CIA Sametime communication that same day, a CIA ALEC Station officer wrote, “I can find no reference to AZ being deifant [
sic
] and declaring America weak . . . in fact everything I have read indicated he used a non deifiant [
sic
] resistance strategy.” In response, the chief of the
█████
Department in CTC,
████████
, wrote: “I’ve certainly heard that said of AZ for years, but don’t know why . . .” The CIA ALEC Station officer replied, “probably a combo of [deputy chief of ALEC Station, ███████] and [████] . . . I’ll leave it at that.” The chief of the █████ Department completed the exchange, writing “yes, believe so . . . and agree, we shall pass over in silence.”
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The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with debriefers using traditional interrogation techniques is also not supported by CIA records.
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In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah’s interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled ███ “as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to matters ████,” as well as to discuss “the endgame” for Abu Zubaydah ████ with officers from CIA Headquarters.
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As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002, and all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they immediately used the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard.
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Prior to this isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa’ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.
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Abu Zubaydah provided the same type of information prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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Abu Zubaydah’s inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States—and operatives in the United States—provided the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was “uncooperative,” as well as for the CIA’s determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to become “compliant” and reveal the information that CIA Headquarters believed he was withholding. The CIA further stated that Abu Zubaydah could stop the application of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, like the waterboard, by providing the names of operatives in the United States or information to stop the next attack.
1198
At no point during or after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information.
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The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation team believed the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques would result in new information on operatives in the United States and terrorist plotting is also incongruent with CIA records. While Abu Zubaydah was in isolation in July 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice and White House officials that Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation team believed Abu Zubaydah possessed information on terrorist threats to, and al-Qa’ida operatives in, the United States.
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The CIA officials further represented that the interrogation team had concluded that the use of more aggressive methods “is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the critical information needed to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women, and children within the United States and abroad,” and warned “countless more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows.”
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However, according to CIA cables, the interrogation team at the detention site had not determined that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Abu Zubaydah to provide such threat information. Rather, the interrogation team wrote “[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided.”
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