The Spanish Civil War (131 page)

1.
GD,
p. 339.

2.
Ibid.,
p. 366.

3.
Azcárate, p. 80. In a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on 25 June, Chamberlain, making his first speech as Prime Minister, described Germany’s behaviour over the
Leipzig
‘as showing a degree of restraint that we ought to recognize’. On non-intervention, he said: ‘Each side is being deprived of supplies of material of which it feels itself in urgent need’ (
Parliamentary Debates,
vol. 325, col. 1586).

4.
NIS
(c), fifty-fifth and fifty-sixth meetings.

5.
Azaña, vol. IV, p. 654, gives a report by Negrín of this journey.

1.
NIS
(c), fifty-seventh meeting.

2.
Nenni, p. 83.

1.
B. Klein,
Germany’s Economic Preparations for War
(Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 41, discusses this. See also Harper, p. 65. Germany’s total iron ore imports in 1936 were 9.2 million tons. Germany needed these imports to sustain her steel industry. She had imported ore from Spain before; for example, in the 1920s Spanish imports accounted for one quarter of German imports. But a great deal of German imports from Spain in 1937 and 1938 were vegetables, fruit and wine (more, in fact, in terms of marks than minerals).

2.
GD,
p. 413. See Harper, p. 52f.

3.
GD,
p. 417.

4.
Ibid.,
p. 421.

5.
Ibid.,
p. 410.

1.
NIS,
twenty-fourth meeting.

2.
Ibid.

3.
USD,
1937, vol. I, p. 360. This remark was made at a lunch at which the new British ambassador in Paris, Sir Eric Phipps, and William Bullitt were present.

4.
Ibid.
, p. 366.

1.
Ciano,
Diplomatic Papers,
p. 132; Churchill,
Gathering Storm,
p. 189; Eden, p. 445. The letter was written without Eden’s knowledge. The Spanish government seemed to ignore this change. Azaña, who had regarded the British as a malign influence over Spanish affairs, was assured by Azcárate on 16 August that the British government did not know what it wanted. ‘There is nobody in the political world of these countries who makes plans on a long distance.’ ‘It would cost me a lot of work to believe that the British Empire is governed by fools,’ Azaña replied (Azaña,
op. cit.,
p. 738).

2.
USD,
1937, vol. I, p. 369. This was no doubt a hasty aside by Eden, for the Foreign Secretary was generally sympathetic at this period to the republic. That at least is his own account, confirmed by a hostile witness like Hoare in
Nine Troubled Years.

3.
NIS
(c), sixty-second meeting.

4.
NIS
(c), sixty-third meeting.

5.
Cervera, p. 111.

6.
GD,
p. 432.

7.
This visit occurred on 4 August (
ibid.,
p. 433).

1.
Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1936.
The Italian navy was generally strong in comparison with France, having 6 battleships to France’s 7, 29 cruisers to 16, 64 destroyers and flotilla leaders to France’s 60. (British figures for comparable craft were 15, 52 and 175, with 57 submarines, plus 5 aircraft carriers.)

2.
Eden, p. 457. The British had apparently also broken the Italian naval cypher.

3.
Ciano,
Diaries 1937–8,
pp. 7–8.

1.
See Alcofar Nassaes,
CTV,
p. 150. Italy had also sold the nationalists six old destroyers and an old cruiser, the
Taranto.

2.
Eden, p. 461.

3.
Ciano,
Diaries 1937–8,
p. 9. The blockade was nearly successful as it was. Whatever credence one can give to the incomplete figures reported by the German military attaché at Ankara, he clearly
reflects
the truth when he reports no Russian material reaching Spain at all during September by the sea route. On the other hand, substantial supplies did get through in August. See Azaña,
op. cit.,
p. 733. Stalin had pointed out to the Spanish ambassador to Moscow, Pascua, the advantages of the domestic manufacture of armaments in order to save the ruinous costs, which, after all, could not be endless: the gold might not last.

4.
Ibid.,
p. 11.

1.
Churchill, p. 191.

2.
Eden, p. 465. See minutes of this meeting in
FD,
vol. VI, p. 730f.

1.
Baldwin used the metaphor in 1936 (Keith Middlemas and John Barnes,
Baldwin,
London, 1969, p. 967).

2.
FD,
vol. VI, pp. 824–5.

3.
Azaña, vol. IV, p. 805. The republicans failed, as they had wished, to get Spain reelected as a member of the League’s Council. Chile offered to arrange enough votes to ensure that, provided the asylees in the embassies were released. This idea was rejected with contempt.

4.
Documents secrets du ministère des affaires étrangères d’Allemagne, 1936–43,
vol. III, p. 22 (Moscow, 1946).

1.
Ciano,
Diaries 1937–8,
p. 15.

2.
But Dahl returned to America in 1940.

3.
Ciano,
Diaries 1937–8,
p. 18.

1.
Ibid.,
p. 26.

2.
USD,
1937, vol. I, p. 420. Here, as so often, the best source for French policy is in these reports by the American ambassador in Paris.

3.
Azaña, vol. IV, p. 823.

4.
Watkins, p. 186.

5.
NIS,
twenty-eighth meeting;
NIS
(c), sixty-fourth to seventieth meetings.

6.
Azcárate, p. 122.

1.
Les Événements survenus en France,
p. 219.

2.
Azcárate, pp. 129–30.

3.
Oliver Harvey,
Diplomatic Diaries
(London, 1970), p. 49. Cf. also B. H. Liddell Hart,
Memoirs
(London, 1965), vol. II, p. 136.

4.
This was the celebrated ‘Hossbach Memorandum’ (
Nuremberg Trials,
vol. XXV, pp. 403–14). It was also the time when the Germans in Spain were becoming excited over the Spanish mining project—see p. 765. For discussion as to its validity, see A.J.P. Taylor,
The Origins of the Second World War
(London, 1961), p. 131, and Alan Bullock, ‘Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War’,
Proceedings of the British Academy,
1967.

1.
A. Orlov,
The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes
(New York, 1953), pp. 241–2. Orlov names this soldier ‘General N’. Can one trust Orlov’s testimony? Where it coincides with, or does not contradict, other evidence, it seems acceptable. Araquistain made the same point in
La Prensa
(Buenos Aires), 12 July 1939: Stalin did not wish to win the war because that would have exasperated Hitler, nor to lose it because, once it was over, Hitler would have more freedom to carry on his aggression in East Europe and against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Spain for Russia was a secondary affair compared to her friendship with Britain and France, as Azaña and Pascua realized (Azaña, vol. IV, p. 734).

2.
CAB,
35(37), 27 September 1937. At a subsequent meeting Chamberlain had said that it did ‘not matter to us which side won, so long as it was a Spanish and not a German or Italian victory’ (
CAB,
37[37], of 13 October 1937). Louis Fischer also described how a certain Colonel Clark of the war office asked him: ‘In your opinion would it be better if Franco won quickly or if Spain remained an open wound through which the poisons of Europe could escape?’ (
op. cit.,
p. 457).

3.
GD,
p. 550.

1.
Azcárate, p. 120.

1.
Dionisio Ridruejo,
Escrito en España
(Buenos Aires, 1962), p. 34. This young poet and orator, briefly provincial chief of Valladolid but coming from Segovia, who denounced Franco for arresting Hedilla, became director-general of propaganda under Serrano, his mentor, in early 1938. Why was he not detained for his
démarche
before Franco? The answer must be that his youth, eloquence, sincerity, promise and charm ensured him the protection both of General Monasterio, head of the united militias, and of Serrano, whom he met in a tertulia of Pilar Primo de Rivera.

1.
I benefited from discussion with Justino de Azcárate (Caracas, 1973).

2.
Prieto,
Palabras,
pp. 235–6. Prieto was perhaps misinformed by ‘Luis Pagés Guix’, who put out a version of the events of Salamanca under the title of
La Traición de los Franco.
For commentary see Southworth,
Antifalange,
and De la Cierva,
Historia ilustrada,
vol. II, p. 293.

1.
From an unpublished series of notes for a life of Prince Xavier de Bourbon-Parme in the Carlist Archives at Seville.

2.
Serrano Súñer, p. 136. It is also a little doubtful whether all Englishmen liked his style of not getting to his office till eleven in the morning. That offended Sir Philip Chetwode (see below, p. 831).

3.
Suances had known Franco since their childhood at El Ferrol. Both had wanted to be naval officers, but only Suances was accepted. Suances later became director of a partly British-owned company engaged in building ships for the Spanish navy. He resigned in 1934 because he was unable to bring about the nationalization of the British share. He escaped from Madrid after the start of the civil war. He was the master of Spanish governmental domination of industry till the 1960s.

1.
He had held this post since April 1937. For a discussion of Beigbeder’s astute rule see Charles Halstead, ‘A somewhat Machiavellian face’,
The Historian,
November 1974.

2.
Serrano Súñer, p. 123.

3.
For two nights, Queipo had changed to 10:30
P.M
. This was, he told his hearers, because a delegation of Sevillian girls had complained that his broadcasts at ten o’clock gave them only half an hour at their window with their
novios.
So Queipo changed his time, thereby disrupting nationalist radio programmes: for all stations were linked with Seville Radio for Queipo.

1.
There is a good study of Queipo as propagandist in Dundas,
Behind the Spanish Mask,
p. 59f.

1.
For Martínez Anido, see Cabanellas, vol. II, p. 945.

2.
Most prominent bullfighters of the time (Marcial Lalanda, ‘Manolo’ Bienvida) were with the nationalists. The great Manolete was in the nationalist army on the Córdoba front, though he began to draw attention during the season of 1938. For a discussion see Rafael Abella, ‘Toros en la Guerra Civil’,
Historia y vida,
January 1975. Some corridas were held in the republic, mostly as benefits for hospitals or schools, despite the opposition of the anarchists.

1.
Ansaldo, p. 74.

2.
J. Salas, pp. 458, 459 and 462–3.

1.
Catecismo patriótico español
(Salamanca, no date).

2.
See De la Cierva in Carr,
The Republic,
p. 200.

1.
See Jesús Salas, p. 339.

2.
The SIFNE of Bertrán y Musitú in Barcelona was merged with the SIPM in February 1938.

3.
Cf. J. M. Fontana,
Los Catalanes en la guerra de España
(Madrid, 1951), pp. 161–2 for the spy rings of Luis Canos, José María Velat, Manolo Bustenga and Carlos Carranceja; pp. 336–7 for the story of Clariana, the double spy, shot in Irún.

1.
See Palacio Atard,
La quinta columna,
p. 261f.; ‘El Campesino’ alleges Rokossovsky’s role, otherwise undocumented.

2.
Abella, p. 134.

3.
Ibid.,
p. 268.

1.
Pujol,
Cuando Israel Manda,
in
ABC de Sevilla,
20 December 1936, qu.
Catalunya sota el règim franquista,
vol. I (Paris, 1973), p. 136;
Domingo
(San Sebastián), 21 March 1937.

2.
The origins of the labour charter are discussed in Payne,
Falange,
pp. 186–7. The author was González Bueno, with help from Ridruejo and other young falangists.

1.
Abella, pp. 308–9.

2.
Qu. Abella, p. 325.

1.
El clero vasco,
vol. II, p. 293.

2.
Abella, pp. 291–2.

3.
Ciano,
Diaries 1937–8,
p. 22.

4.
Ibid.,
p. 32.

5.
Ibid.,
p. 37.

6.
GD,
pp. 512–16.

7.
Ciano,
Diplomatic Papers,
p. 144.

1.
Stohrer, a professional diplomat, had been intended as ambassador in Madrid in early 1936. He had served there before, as a secretary during the First World War, busy sabotaging allied interests. He was a brilliant linguist, a tall commanding figure ‘with a remarkable knowledge of Spain’ (Hoare, p. 44).

1.
For all the above see
GD,
pp. 496–503 and 541–2.

2.
The British mission was unpopular. ‘It was assumed’, Sir Robert Hodgson said, ‘that we were against the movement and “
España, una, grande, libre
”. This was proved by our obstinate denial of belligerent rights and by the continued description in the British press of the nationalists as insurgents.’ Hodgson did not have an interview with Franco till 1 February 1938 (Sir Robert Hodgson,
Spain Resurgent,
London, 1953, pp. 84–5).

3.
CAB,
12(37). Hodgson’s mission had been suggested first in March.

4.
The French government did not establish even these limited relations with nationalist Spain. All they did, as
L’Action française
ironically commented, was to restore the
Sud Express,
the main daily train from Paris to Hendaye. But Charles Maurras was received in Salamanca ‘not even as a diplomat, but as a Head of State’.

5.
News Chronicle,
30 March 1938, qu. Watkins, p. 68.

1.
GD,
p. 522.

2.
Ciano,
Diaries 1937–8,
p. 62.

3.
GD,
p. 553.

4.
Ciano,
Diaries 1937–8,
pp. 64–5. By then the republicans had captured Teruel. See below, p. 771.

1.
GD,
p. 470.

2.
Drieu la Rochelle,
Gilles
(Paris, 1967), p. 490.

3.
Such as Captains Fitzpatrick, Nangle and Peter Kemp, whose
Mine Were of Trouble
(London, 1957) is an excellent picture of life in the Legion.

4.
Priscilla Scott-Ellis,
The Chances of Death
(Norwich, 1995). A wonderful account. Another British nurse with Franco was Gabriel Herbert.