The Sultan's Admiral (15 page)

Only one galley, the crack of the whip sounding over the rowers’ backs, turned away in the confusion and managed to escape. Hotly pursued by some of the galleots, she made her way to Ibiza. She found safety at Salina, that cape where the flat white salt pans blaze under the sun. The other seven galleys of Spain surrendered one after another. The whole action was a perfect example of the fact that it is not the size and weight of armament that necessarily wins battles, but efficient armament efficiently handled. Morale was then—as it is still—the prime requisite for success.

Almost unbelievably, Aydin Rais, Salah Rais, and their Turks, had turned what should have been a certain defeat into an incredible victory. They released their fellow countrymen and coreligionists from their chains, and then turned back into the long sandy bay of Formentera to collect their Morisco passengers. The latter, who had been nervously watching the whole action, prepared to flee towards the heights of the island if the Spaniards had won, came down and were re-embarked. Aydin and his lieutenants now spent several days in the anchorage, making their arrangements for the officering of the captured ships, for the distribution of passengers, and for the immediate repair of planks, oars, and rigging that had been damaged in the action.

It was an astounding action. British histories, for instance, which make much of the successes of Francis Drake against the Spaniards (such as his capture of the great San Felipe off the Azores in 1587) never mention the day when a captain of Barbarbarossa’s fleet took on eight large war galleys of Spain in an engagement which, by all the rules of war, should have gone the other way, and defeated them.

But then whoever—-in any country in the world—has history truly presented to him? The English try to be objective, but are far from successful. The Spaniards have considerable honesty, but a strong religious bias. The Italians use their charm like a smoke screen. The French (so soon after this particular episode to become allied with the Turks) merely lie. The Americans and the Russians often pretend that any history prior to their own is somewhat irrelevant. But the history of the Mediterranean is important, because the whole of Western culture stems from this sea and the land surrounding it. To see the culture and the technical achievements of the Mediterranean basin as totally European is as stupid as maintaining that there is positive in electricity but no negative. The whole story of the cultures that have arisen in this part of the world stems from the fact that it is here that the interrelation between East and West is most acutely felt.

Aydin Rais and Salah Rais returned to Algiers, and to a most deserved triumph. Behind them they had in tow, or under their command, seven of Spain’s great galleys and, among them, the flagship of the Spanish Mediterranean fleet. General Portundo, the commander of the squadron, had been killed, but his son was among the prisoners—together with six other noble captains. Scions of many of the most highly connected families in Spain were among the captives (all of them certain for valuable ransoms), and hundreds of Christians could soon be offered for sale. As an additional bonus, Aydin and his men had freed a number of Moriscos, all eager to become good citizens of Algeria. They had captured a large quantity of marketable treasure and had freed dozens of Moslems from the oar benches of the Spaniards. Fifteen twenty-nine was a year to remember.

Kheir-ed-Din is described by one commentator as “having envied his old crony the honour and reputation he had acquired by having the sole direction of that so-much-talked-of exploit.” This is possible, but Barbarossa was far too intelligent to have let it be evident, and his relationship with Aydin Rais remained as friendly as ever. In any case, during the time that the galleots had been away at sea, Kheir-ed-Din had managed to make useful alliances with the Zouaves and with another local ruler, Beni Abbas. This was just as important to the new Turkish state of Algeria as any successes upon the high seas. Barbarossa had also come to the conclusion that he was now so powerful that he could no longer tolerate the Spanish garrison on the Penon of Algiers. True, it was not important enough to exert any real influence upon the coastline, but it was still a great inconvenience, preventing him from using the inner port of the harbour for the security of his galleys. He had long followed his brother’s theory that—given Algiers and local power—he had only to wait until the right time, and the Spanish fortress would fall like a ripe plum into his hand. The time was now. The Spaniards were discouraged, and the King of Spain was away being crowned Emperor by the Pope.

Kheir-ed-Din “knew the Spaniards dreaded him almost everywhere and was quite scandalised to find himself driven by them to many incommodities, by a scurvy fort, which they needs would maintain, just in his teeth . . The success of Aydin Rais further confirmed him in his opinion that, having reinforced his own city, he could now get rid of the Spaniards without much trouble.

He needed the full advantages of the harbour, especially now that he had so many galleys and galleots under his command. So, in the spring of 1530, he set himself to remove the obdurate Spanish garrison. He had ordered several large siege guns from Constantinople, and had started an armoury of his own in Algiers. In any case, he had sufficient equipment to feel that he could batter the garrison into submission without having to hazard a landing-craft assault upon it—something that might well have cost him a considerable number of his best Turkish troops.

The Governor of the fort was Don Martin de Vargas. He was the type of Spanish nobleman who has gone down in history as being not only well-born, but also as accepting all the responsibilities which in those days were a requirement for belonging to the privileged classes.
Noblesse oblige
was far from being a meaningless catch phrase. It did, indeed, mean what it said— that, if you were of the nobility you would discharge your obligations according to the high and hard standards that were demanded. Of course, only too often, the well-bred cheated and escaped their responsibilities, but in general—and this was particularly true of the Spaniards—they felt that they would rather die than suffer the shame of not living up to the ideals set for their class. Don Martin’s reply to Kheir-ed-Din Barbarossa’s offer of safe conduct, if he and his men surrendered, was classic: “I am astonished to hear a person of such worth, and so good a soldier as the Pasha of Algiers, making such an inglorious and scandalous proposal to one who is of no less worth, and no worse a soldier either. Such a suggestion might be acceptable to people who little value their honour. But I would remind you that you are dealing with Spaniards, in whose breasts your vain and fruitless menaces can cause neither dread, nor any apprehension.”

Barbarossa can have had no doubt that this was the reply he would get and, indeed, had all his siege guns ready to open fire as soon as this formality was over. On May 6, 1530, the siege of the Penon of Algiers was opened. It continued for a full fifteen days, naval guns firing their iron cannon balls at the crumbling walls and a great murlaccio hurling huge stone shot from its cavernous mouth. It is a tribute to Spanish courage that the garrison of no more than two hundred men held out for so long in the face of such an implacable assault. Perhaps they hoped for some relief ships from Spain (which were shortly due), but no relief came. On the sixteenth day, the main Turkish attack was launched through a huge breach in the walls. Only fifty-three men and the commander, Martin de Vargas, were found alive. They were sent to the slave quarters to join their fellow Spaniards captured in Aydin’s recent raid.

According to one version, Barbarossa offered Don Martin his freedom if he would become a Moslem, adding that, in honour of his courage, he would be happy to appoint him captain of his personal guard. The Spaniard’s reply to this suggestion is said to have been so haughty and insulting (referring to the Moslem faith as “a false and ridiculous sect”) that Barbarossa had him executed on the spot. But another account states that Don Martin was sent to Shershell along with other important Spanish captives, and was killed there by the Turks for trying to assist the Spaniards during their raid on Shershell in the following year. There is, in fact, no reliable evidence as to the gallant commander’s fate.