Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
The Sword And The Olive (27 page)
Although the decision to focus on military targets made the raids “increasingly complicated and difficult,”
28
IDF morale, which had been threatened by years of cruel and useless skirmishes with
mistanenim
, suddenly soared.
29
Previously even some of Sharon’s own men had been wondering whether the poor villagers whom they were raiding really constituted “the enemy”;
30
now, they were able to mount an impressive display of captured weapons for the benefit of visiting foreigners.
31
Israel’s paratroopers found themselves basking in public adulation similar to that which in France during the same years was giving rise to the so-called para myth.
32
As Shimon Peres was to later write, “Children want to emulate them, mothers pray for their safety, rural settlers admire their achievements, and youth regards them as the embodiment of all its own virtues.”
33
28
IDF morale, which had been threatened by years of cruel and useless skirmishes with
mistanenim
, suddenly soared.
29
Previously even some of Sharon’s own men had been wondering whether the poor villagers whom they were raiding really constituted “the enemy”;
30
now, they were able to mount an impressive display of captured weapons for the benefit of visiting foreigners.
31
Israel’s paratroopers found themselves basking in public adulation similar to that which in France during the same years was giving rise to the so-called para myth.
32
As Shimon Peres was to later write, “Children want to emulate them, mothers pray for their safety, rural settlers admire their achievements, and youth regards them as the embodiment of all its own virtues.”
33
Whereas ground forces were made to wear heavy, black, hobnailed boots, paratroopers were given comfortable, red, American-style combat boots with rubber soles. Whereas other troops were still burdened by cumbersome, World War I-vintage bolt-action rifles, the paratroopers sported the new homemade Uzi submachine gun (named after its inventor but also happening to mean, in Hebrew, my strength). Not only was the Uzi well suited for the heroics of close combat, but with its short temper (when falling or being hit it tended to fire bursts without anyone pressing the trigger) it almost acted as a metaphor for the IDF. The original paratrooper force of one battalion was expanded three times over until it reached a full brigade. Their previous commander, Lt. Col. Yehuda Harari, was sacked; Sharon took over as commanding officer, and some of his more prominent subordinates became battalion chiefs. To ensure that the message got through, Dayan ordered all senior officers to take a jump course. As of this writing that practice remains in force even though it has been thirty years since any Israeli soldier leaped into enemy territory from an airplane.
Meanwhile the attention of Israel’s security establishment was shifting away from the border with Jordan—troublesome, but owing to the kingdom’s weakness never any danger to Israel’s basic security—toward the Egyptian border. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rise to power in 1952-1953 had been closely watched by the Israeli government. Gingerly, attempts were made to see whether the new Egyptian president would be more inclined than his predecessors to conclude peace with Israel.
34
Although these led nowhere, the Egyptians’ prime concern during those years was to rid the country of the British troops still occupying the Suez Canal Zone. Isolated from the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict by the Sinai Desert, Egypt was much less affected by the border incidents that took place than were Israel and Jordan. Moreover, except for the Gaza Strip, it did not have to harbor large numbers of Palestinian refugees. The Gaza Strip constituted administered territory, and throughout the nineteen years of occupation (until 1967) its inhabitants were kept under military rule and systematically prevented from maintaining too much contact with Egypt proper.
34
Although these led nowhere, the Egyptians’ prime concern during those years was to rid the country of the British troops still occupying the Suez Canal Zone. Isolated from the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict by the Sinai Desert, Egypt was much less affected by the border incidents that took place than were Israel and Jordan. Moreover, except for the Gaza Strip, it did not have to harbor large numbers of Palestinian refugees. The Gaza Strip constituted administered territory, and throughout the nineteen years of occupation (until 1967) its inhabitants were kept under military rule and systematically prevented from maintaining too much contact with Egypt proper.
In the middle of 1954 this troubled but essentially stable relationship was disturbed by the Lavon affair (
essek bish
, or unfortunate business).
35
As far back as 1951, Israeli military intelligence had set up an espionage network in Egypt. The approaching British evacuation of the Canal Zone caused the chief of intelligence, Benjamin Gibli, to fear the future; with the British gone, Nasser’s hands might be untied. The network was activated, and small quantities of incendiaries (contained inside eyeglass cases!) were set off against British and American targets in Cairo and Alexandria, the objective being to sow discord and postpone or prevent the evacuation. In the event the explosions caused some minor physical damage but no casualties.
essek bish
, or unfortunate business).
35
As far back as 1951, Israeli military intelligence had set up an espionage network in Egypt. The approaching British evacuation of the Canal Zone caused the chief of intelligence, Benjamin Gibli, to fear the future; with the British gone, Nasser’s hands might be untied. The network was activated, and small quantities of incendiaries (contained inside eyeglass cases!) were set off against British and American targets in Cairo and Alexandria, the objective being to sow discord and postpone or prevent the evacuation. In the event the explosions caused some minor physical damage but no casualties.
Shortly thereafter the ringleader, a dubious character named Evri Elad, who had been selected on the basis of his ability to pose as a German businessman, apparently betrayed the remaining members to Egyptian counterintelligence. Having stood trial, on January 31 several were executed. Inevitably, inside Israel a search for scapegoats got under way, and a commission of investigation was established. To cover his tracks Gibli had his secretary, a nineteen-year-old female soldier named Dalia Carmel, retype some documents to point the finger at Lavon as the perpetrator. Though Lavon vehemently denied that he had ordered the action, the investigating commission, misled by Gibli’s testimony and the documentary “evidence” that he produced, failed to clear the minister of defense. With Sharet still in power, Lavon was forced to resign, his replacement being—who else—Ben Gurion.
No sooner had Ben Gurion come back to the ministry of defense than an opportunity for action presented itself. One, possibly two teams, working for Egyptian military intelligence, entered Israel from the Gaza Strip and broke into a secret installation—reputed to be an institute for biological warfare—in Nes Tsiona, south of Tel Aviv. On their way back they also killed a civilian cyclist. Retaliation against the Egyptians was inevitable. When it came it far exceeded anybody’s expectations, including those of Sharet, who had warned against “large-scale bloodshed.”
36
In the event Sharon’s paratroopers killed one Palestinian civilian and no fewer than thirty-nine Egyptian soldiers. Some died when their base was stormed, others when they rushed to their comrades’ aid and were ambushed.
36
In the event Sharon’s paratroopers killed one Palestinian civilian and no fewer than thirty-nine Egyptian soldiers. Some died when their base was stormed, others when they rushed to their comrades’ aid and were ambushed.
Though the Egyptian border had never been quiet, matters now escalated. Teams of
mistanenim
crossed the border incessantly, mining and waylaying and destroying and killing. In response, highly placed Israeli officials, including some of Sharet’s close advisers, suggested that the IDF occupy all or part of the Gaza Strip.
37
Though that advice was rejected, the paratroopers were sent in. Repeatedly they attacked targets along the border (not just in the Gaza Strip), inflicting dozens of casualties. From time to time things went out of control, and the two sides battled with few holds barred, including artillery (May 30) and aircraft (September 1). Previously most clashes had been the product of local initiatives. Now Egyptian intelligence organized a battalion of
fedayeen
(heroic fighters), many of them Palestinian jailbirds released on condition they take part in the murderous raids into Israel. Hostilities spread to the border with Syria, where several small demilitarized zones were left over from 1949 and where Israel engaged in a “forward” policy, insisting on its right to cultivate the fields “right to the border line,” as the official line stated. They culminated in December 1955, when an IDF force demolished a chain of Syrian strongholds east of the Sea of Galilee, killing fifty-four (including six civilians) and taking thirty prisoners at the cost of six dead and fourteen wounded.
mistanenim
crossed the border incessantly, mining and waylaying and destroying and killing. In response, highly placed Israeli officials, including some of Sharet’s close advisers, suggested that the IDF occupy all or part of the Gaza Strip.
37
Though that advice was rejected, the paratroopers were sent in. Repeatedly they attacked targets along the border (not just in the Gaza Strip), inflicting dozens of casualties. From time to time things went out of control, and the two sides battled with few holds barred, including artillery (May 30) and aircraft (September 1). Previously most clashes had been the product of local initiatives. Now Egyptian intelligence organized a battalion of
fedayeen
(heroic fighters), many of them Palestinian jailbirds released on condition they take part in the murderous raids into Israel. Hostilities spread to the border with Syria, where several small demilitarized zones were left over from 1949 and where Israel engaged in a “forward” policy, insisting on its right to cultivate the fields “right to the border line,” as the official line stated. They culminated in December 1955, when an IDF force demolished a chain of Syrian strongholds east of the Sea of Galilee, killing fifty-four (including six civilians) and taking thirty prisoners at the cost of six dead and fourteen wounded.
During this period, the IDF was not a tame instrument in the government’s hands. At a minimum, lower-level commanders such as Sharon—who commanded the raid against Syria from a boat—systematically exceeded their instructions.
38
Claiming to have met with unexpected opposition or the need to extricate their own men, time after time they killed far more enemy troops and wrought far more damage than Sharet thought advisable or they themselves had forecasted when submitting plans. They were backed up by Dayan, who would receive each returning force with congratulations and alcohol; neither then nor later did he leave any doubt about his sympathies.
39
From January 1955 on he in turn was supported by the formidable figure of Ben Gurion. By the time of “Operation Sea of Galilee,” the latter was back in the driver’s seat, having ousted Sharet the previous month and reoccupied his prime minister’s post.
38
Claiming to have met with unexpected opposition or the need to extricate their own men, time after time they killed far more enemy troops and wrought far more damage than Sharet thought advisable or they themselves had forecasted when submitting plans. They were backed up by Dayan, who would receive each returning force with congratulations and alcohol; neither then nor later did he leave any doubt about his sympathies.
39
From January 1955 on he in turn was supported by the formidable figure of Ben Gurion. By the time of “Operation Sea of Galilee,” the latter was back in the driver’s seat, having ousted Sharet the previous month and reoccupied his prime minister’s post.
As their high casualty lists indicate, the Egyptian armed forces at this time were no match for Sharon’s men who repeatedly stormed their bases. As for training and motivation, they showed little progress since 1948-1949; their equipment was antiquated, much of it dating to World War II. To this was added the fact that both Britain and the United States refused to sell Nasser large quantities of new weapons—even if he could have afforded them. In summer 1955 the stalemate was broken when Western intelligence agencies got wind of a new arms deal between Egypt and Soviet-dominated Czechoslovakia. Israeli intelligence estimated that the deal involved 90-100 MIG-15 jet fighters (famous for their success during the Korean War); 48 twin-engine Ilyushin-28 light bombers; 230 tanks (including T-34s and the heavier Joseph Stalin III models); 440 field guns of various calibers; 34 heavy antiaircraft guns; and two destroyers, four minesweepers, twelve torpedo boats, and six submarines. Israel itself at the time had fewer than 50 jet fighters—British Meteors and French Ouragans, both models markedly inferior to the Soviet MIGs—and 130 tanks, including 100 World War II Shermans and 30 light, French-built AMX-13s.
40
Compared with this the deal constituted a revolution, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
40
Compared with this the deal constituted a revolution, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
As in 1967, Nasser’s intentions as to his new might may never be known—though cynics could add that on both occasions his intentions remained unknown solely because he was preempted by the IDF.
41
Clearly news of the deal sent the Israel’s government, armed forces, media, and public into something very close to a panic. Having spent time in London during the Blitz, Ben Gurion himself was particularly worried about the damage bombers might do to Israel. Previously there had been occasional talk about a preventive war;
42
now launching such a war became the persistent demand of the General Staff under Dayan.
43
The hawkish COS worked on the assumption that six to eight months would be needed by the Egyptian army to absorb the new arms. Thus each passing month diminished the Israeli superiority on which he had relied.
41
Clearly news of the deal sent the Israel’s government, armed forces, media, and public into something very close to a panic. Having spent time in London during the Blitz, Ben Gurion himself was particularly worried about the damage bombers might do to Israel. Previously there had been occasional talk about a preventive war;
42
now launching such a war became the persistent demand of the General Staff under Dayan.
43
The hawkish COS worked on the assumption that six to eight months would be needed by the Egyptian army to absorb the new arms. Thus each passing month diminished the Israeli superiority on which he had relied.
From early 1956 on, Israeli preparations for an eventual war against Egypt started in earnest. However, large parts of public opinion—including the left-wing parties on which Ben Gurion’s coalition depended—refused to catch on to the idea that the General Staff was planning an
offensive
campaign. Instead they reverted to old ideas about territorial defense, insisting that the border settlements be prepared for such defense.
44
Against its will the IDF was forced to divert resources, conducting a survey to identify the 150 most critical settlements, providing them with weapons and training, as well as earmarking regular forces for protecting them.
45
Fortifications were built, antitank ditches dug, fields of fires prepared, and mines sown. Much of this huge effort was financed and mounted not by the IDF, whose plans were entirely different, but by civilian organizations that volunteered labor and contributed money. Much of it was wasteful and some of it bordered on the ridiculous, as when the craftsmen’s association “purchased” a jet fighter (by donating its equivalent in money according to the official, government-published price list) and the employees of one bank purchased a tank.
46
On the positive side, it certainly showed the extent to which the people identified with their state.
offensive
campaign. Instead they reverted to old ideas about territorial defense, insisting that the border settlements be prepared for such defense.
44
Against its will the IDF was forced to divert resources, conducting a survey to identify the 150 most critical settlements, providing them with weapons and training, as well as earmarking regular forces for protecting them.
45
Fortifications were built, antitank ditches dug, fields of fires prepared, and mines sown. Much of this huge effort was financed and mounted not by the IDF, whose plans were entirely different, but by civilian organizations that volunteered labor and contributed money. Much of it was wasteful and some of it bordered on the ridiculous, as when the craftsmen’s association “purchased” a jet fighter (by donating its equivalent in money according to the official, government-published price list) and the employees of one bank purchased a tank.
46
On the positive side, it certainly showed the extent to which the people identified with their state.
By way of a more purposeful response to the Czech arms deal, the defense budget was almost doubled—from 126 million to 246 million Israeli pounds; additional sums were spent on civil defense, roads, and the like.
47
In late 1955 an acquisition list, including forty-eight F-86 Saber jet fighters and sixty M-48 Patton tanks, was presented to the U.S. government. Then and later, however, the State Department feared overt support of Israel would drive the Arabs into the arms of the USSR. Accordingly it led the Israelis by the nose; having taken several months to consider the matter, in March 1956 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles formally refused the most important items.
48
Washington ended up delivering no more than five helicopters, twenty-five half-tracks, and 110 heavy machine guns.
47
In late 1955 an acquisition list, including forty-eight F-86 Saber jet fighters and sixty M-48 Patton tanks, was presented to the U.S. government. Then and later, however, the State Department feared overt support of Israel would drive the Arabs into the arms of the USSR. Accordingly it led the Israelis by the nose; having taken several months to consider the matter, in March 1956 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles formally refused the most important items.
48
Washington ended up delivering no more than five helicopters, twenty-five half-tracks, and 110 heavy machine guns.
Meanwhile the main Israeli procurement effort had already switched to France, where there existed a certain sympathy for Israel in connection with the unfolding Algerian war. Negotiations were conducted by Shimon Peres, the thirty-two-year-old director general of the ministry of defense who on this and subsequent occasions proved himself a master of secret diplomacy. They led to the conclusion of an agreement whereby the French agreed to supply another sixty AMX-13 tanks, 400 Sherman tanks, 500 bazooka (antitank) launchers with 10,000 rockets, as well as 1,000 SS-10 (also antitank) missiles;
49
these arms, plus 200 6x6 lorries, were used to equip a total of fourteen ground combat brigades. The only element still needed by the IDF to launch its offensive campaign was new jet aircraft to counter the Egyptian MIG-15s. These came in the form of seventy-two French Mystère IV fighters, of which only 37 reached Israel prior to the outbreak of the campaign.
50
Flown across the Mediterranean by way of Brindisi, the first batch found the prime minister and half the government waiting in typical Israeli fashion when it landed.
51
49
these arms, plus 200 6x6 lorries, were used to equip a total of fourteen ground combat brigades. The only element still needed by the IDF to launch its offensive campaign was new jet aircraft to counter the Egyptian MIG-15s. These came in the form of seventy-two French Mystère IV fighters, of which only 37 reached Israel prior to the outbreak of the campaign.
50
Flown across the Mediterranean by way of Brindisi, the first batch found the prime minister and half the government waiting in typical Israeli fashion when it landed.
51
The story of the negotiations that led Israel, France, and Britain to a tripartite agreement to take offensive action against Egypt is well known.
52
Throughout the first half of 1956, tentative talks were held between intelligence officers on all sides, and a measure of cooperation was established.
53
Then, on July 26, 1956, Nasser provided the much-sought-after casus belli, proclaiming the nationalization of the Suez Canal before 100,000 people gathered to celebrate the revolution’s third anniversary. Visiting Paris in early August, the chief of the IDF General Staff Division, Brig. Gen. Meir Amit, was asked quite bluntly whether Israel would agree to cooperate in case they (i.e., the French) and the British launched military operations against Egypt. While Washington advised caution,
54
Shimon Peres and Gibli’s successor as chief of intelligence, Brig. Gen. Yehoshaphat Harkavi, were put in charge of the preliminary negotiations.
52
Throughout the first half of 1956, tentative talks were held between intelligence officers on all sides, and a measure of cooperation was established.
53
Then, on July 26, 1956, Nasser provided the much-sought-after casus belli, proclaiming the nationalization of the Suez Canal before 100,000 people gathered to celebrate the revolution’s third anniversary. Visiting Paris in early August, the chief of the IDF General Staff Division, Brig. Gen. Meir Amit, was asked quite bluntly whether Israel would agree to cooperate in case they (i.e., the French) and the British launched military operations against Egypt. While Washington advised caution,
54
Shimon Peres and Gibli’s successor as chief of intelligence, Brig. Gen. Yehoshaphat Harkavi, were put in charge of the preliminary negotiations.
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