Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
The Sword And The Olive (53 page)
Long before, in fact, Israel had started work on the development of surface-to-surface missiles.
34
From the late fifties on, RAFAEL was designing and building a solid-fuel, two-stage meteorological rocket capable of carrying a five-pound (two-kg) payload to an altitude of sixty-five miles. A test-firing took place in July 1961, the timing dictated by the need to forestall the Egyptians displaying
their
missiles (which did not work) on Revolution Day. Observers outside Israel were left to speculate on what would happen if the Israelis succeeded in marrying their rocket to a nuclear warhead. In fact the subsequent fate of Shavit (Comet) 2, as the rocket was known, is not clear (published accounts of its development end with the test launch). It cannot have been judged a great success, or else Shimon Peres in September 1962 would scarcely have signed a contract with the French company Dassault to develop a 280-mile-range, two-stage surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying a 750-kg warhead.
34
From the late fifties on, RAFAEL was designing and building a solid-fuel, two-stage meteorological rocket capable of carrying a five-pound (two-kg) payload to an altitude of sixty-five miles. A test-firing took place in July 1961, the timing dictated by the need to forestall the Egyptians displaying
their
missiles (which did not work) on Revolution Day. Observers outside Israel were left to speculate on what would happen if the Israelis succeeded in marrying their rocket to a nuclear warhead. In fact the subsequent fate of Shavit (Comet) 2, as the rocket was known, is not clear (published accounts of its development end with the test launch). It cannot have been judged a great success, or else Shimon Peres in September 1962 would scarcely have signed a contract with the French company Dassault to develop a 280-mile-range, two-stage surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying a 750-kg warhead.
According to journalist Seymour Hersh, work on the missiles’ underground storage tubes was approaching completion in December 1967 when Dayan gave orders for Yigal Allon to be allowed to visit them—the idea being to convert the minister who previously had been among the bomb’s staunchest opponents.
35
A recent Dassault publication claims that when de Gaulle imposed his embargo in January 1969, only prototypes and parts were ready and were subsequently delivered to Israel in spite of the French president’s orders.
36
At the time the October War broke out, some of the missiles may or may not have been operational,
37
but for our purpose it matters little. The main point is that if foreign sources may be believed, at some moment during the seventies Israel’s efforts led to the deployment at Chirbet Zachariya, a remote area in the Judean foothills, of nuclear-tipped surface-to-surface missiles. They had the range to reach the capitals of each neighbor (although, in the case of Cairo, with little to spare).
35
A recent Dassault publication claims that when de Gaulle imposed his embargo in January 1969, only prototypes and parts were ready and were subsequently delivered to Israel in spite of the French president’s orders.
36
At the time the October War broke out, some of the missiles may or may not have been operational,
37
but for our purpose it matters little. The main point is that if foreign sources may be believed, at some moment during the seventies Israel’s efforts led to the deployment at Chirbet Zachariya, a remote area in the Judean foothills, of nuclear-tipped surface-to-surface missiles. They had the range to reach the capitals of each neighbor (although, in the case of Cairo, with little to spare).
Against this background, the entire character of the Arab-Israeli conflict began to change. Already in the early sixties some Arab commentators had concluded that stalemate would ensue should Israel obtain nuclear weapons; any hope of wiping the Zionist entity off the map would vanish forever. Faced with the need to recover lost territory, between 1967 and 1973 the Egyptians in particular did their best to close their eyes to the strong probability that an Israeli bomb already existed, going so far as to insist that any reports on the matter were merely part of an Israeli psychological warfare campaign. In the wake of the October War, however, such an attitude became more and more difficult to sustain. What is more, if it
had
been sustained it would have begged the real question: Why did the “victorious” Arabs not husband all their resources and launch another war modeled on the 1973 one (as was demanded, for example, by the former Egyptian chief of staff, Saad Shazly)?
had
been sustained it would have begged the real question: Why did the “victorious” Arabs not husband all their resources and launch another war modeled on the 1973 one (as was demanded, for example, by the former Egyptian chief of staff, Saad Shazly)?
For its part, Israel during these years maintained its official line and continued to insist that it would not be the first to introduce the bomb into the Middle East. Nevertheless, from time to time hints concerning Israel’s nuclear capability were dropped as if by accident. Thus, in December 1974 Pres. Efrayim Katsir—a founder of TAAS and former member of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission—answered a question concerning the existence of nuclear weapons by saying that civilian and nuclear energy were inseparable.
38
In March 1976 a story concerning a state of nuclear alert that Israel had allegedly proclaimed during the October War surfaced in
Time
and was reprinted word for word on the front page of Israel’s daily (itself a remarkable occurrence since the IDF censor has the power to prevent such publication and often used it in the past). On both occasions relations with Syria happened to be particularly tense, and the IDF mobilized its reserves. I leave it to the reader to guess whether there are grounds for assuming these facts are connected.
38
In March 1976 a story concerning a state of nuclear alert that Israel had allegedly proclaimed during the October War surfaced in
Time
and was reprinted word for word on the front page of Israel’s daily (itself a remarkable occurrence since the IDF censor has the power to prevent such publication and often used it in the past). On both occasions relations with Syria happened to be particularly tense, and the IDF mobilized its reserves. I leave it to the reader to guess whether there are grounds for assuming these facts are connected.
According to two Israeli specialists who have studied the matter, “The period between 1977 and 1986 [the Vanunu revelations] was characterized above all by the elimination of any doubt in the Arab world as to the existence of an Israeli bomb and the possibility that Israel might use it in case of an existential threat.”
39
In fact, references to the question began to multiply almost immediately after the October War; thus the editor of Egypt’s
Al Aharam
(and Nasser’s former minister of information), Muhamad Heikal, wrote that Israel’s “defeat” in that conflict would cause it to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
40
Writing in a Lebanese newspaper toward the middle of 1974, a retired Syrian intelligence officer, Mohammed Ayubi, presented a similar line of thought. In his opinion the October War had shattered Tel Aviv’s belief in the superiority of its conventional arms. Accordingly, should there be another clash it might well resort to the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
41
39
In fact, references to the question began to multiply almost immediately after the October War; thus the editor of Egypt’s
Al Aharam
(and Nasser’s former minister of information), Muhamad Heikal, wrote that Israel’s “defeat” in that conflict would cause it to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
40
Writing in a Lebanese newspaper toward the middle of 1974, a retired Syrian intelligence officer, Mohammed Ayubi, presented a similar line of thought. In his opinion the October War had shattered Tel Aviv’s belief in the superiority of its conventional arms. Accordingly, should there be another clash it might well resort to the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
41
Although spokesmen in both Cairo and Damascus thus agreed on the danger of launching another 1973-style attack on Israel, the conclusions they drew differed. In the case of Egypt, the near certainties that an Israeli bomb existed and that its use could not be ruled out seem to have played important roles in the events that led to the Camp David Accords (even though this could never be acknowledged since it would make peace look very much like a surrender).
42
The position of Syria was more difficult. Rabin’s government had shown itself prepared to move toward peace with Egypt by relinquishing part of the Sinai. However, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was a representative of the Jordan Valley settlements; coming from Ginossar on the shore of Lake Galilee, he vehemently opposed any return of the Golan Heights. Besides, the Israelis reserved special hatred for the Syrians, regarded as the most implacable of their enemies. Had not Israeli prisoners taken during the fifties been savagely tortured and finally returned as madmen? Begin, who took over from Rabin in 1977, was even more determined to retain the Golan Heights. In 1980 he passed a law through the Knesset, formally annexing it to Israel.
42
The position of Syria was more difficult. Rabin’s government had shown itself prepared to move toward peace with Egypt by relinquishing part of the Sinai. However, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was a representative of the Jordan Valley settlements; coming from Ginossar on the shore of Lake Galilee, he vehemently opposed any return of the Golan Heights. Besides, the Israelis reserved special hatred for the Syrians, regarded as the most implacable of their enemies. Had not Israeli prisoners taken during the fifties been savagely tortured and finally returned as madmen? Begin, who took over from Rabin in 1977, was even more determined to retain the Golan Heights. In 1980 he passed a law through the Knesset, formally annexing it to Israel.
Thus, since Israel’s attachment to the Golan was stronger than to the Sinai, even had the Syrians wanted to—which was and remains doubtful—they would have found the road to peace more difficult than for the Egyptians. While Sadat was taking that road, Assad on various occasions still talked about the need for a military solution that, he claimed, was being prepared. To do so he had to convince himself and his audience that a way existed to implement such a solution without risking nuclear war. A careful reading of his statements between the mid-seventies and late eighties shows him toying with several possibilities.
43
At times he returned to the pre-1967 notion of a popular war, using Algeria, Vietnam, “and other countries which I do not wish to mention” as analogous cases.
44
At times he insisted that since Israel was such a small country it would not be able to use any nuclear weapons it had.
45
At other times he referred to something called “strategic parity,” either announcing that the Arabs too would acquire nuclear weapons or appearing to put his trust in chemical warfare as a means for offsetting the Israeli nuclear threat.
46
Finally, in 1985 he seems to have tried to obtain a nuclear guarantee from the Soviet Union.
47
Judging by the fact that new hostilities have not broken out a quartercentury after the 1973 October War, none of these “solutions” seems to have been satisfactory. Moreover, there is no reason to think that the Arabs are more capable of finding their way out of the nuclear predicament than were the superpowers during the Cold War.
43
At times he returned to the pre-1967 notion of a popular war, using Algeria, Vietnam, “and other countries which I do not wish to mention” as analogous cases.
44
At times he insisted that since Israel was such a small country it would not be able to use any nuclear weapons it had.
45
At other times he referred to something called “strategic parity,” either announcing that the Arabs too would acquire nuclear weapons or appearing to put his trust in chemical warfare as a means for offsetting the Israeli nuclear threat.
46
Finally, in 1985 he seems to have tried to obtain a nuclear guarantee from the Soviet Union.
47
Judging by the fact that new hostilities have not broken out a quartercentury after the 1973 October War, none of these “solutions” seems to have been satisfactory. Moreover, there is no reason to think that the Arabs are more capable of finding their way out of the nuclear predicament than were the superpowers during the Cold War.
Partly because of the looming if unacknowledged nuclear factor, partly for other reasons, in the late seventies Israel’s strategic position was becoming “completely different” (in the words of Ezer Weizman).
48
First came the peace talks with Egypt, which were crowned by the Camp David Accords. Following the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the peninsula was demilitarized and the pre-1967 situation restored in many respects. The Israelis no longer confronted the Egyptians eyeball-to-eyeball; instead more than one hundred miles of desert terrain and a small UN force separated the former enemies in the south. Last but not least, Israel was able to retain the Gaza Strip. Consequently it no longer had Egypt’s army standing within fifty miles of Tel Aviv.
48
First came the peace talks with Egypt, which were crowned by the Camp David Accords. Following the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the peninsula was demilitarized and the pre-1967 situation restored in many respects. The Israelis no longer confronted the Egyptians eyeball-to-eyeball; instead more than one hundred miles of desert terrain and a small UN force separated the former enemies in the south. Last but not least, Israel was able to retain the Gaza Strip. Consequently it no longer had Egypt’s army standing within fifty miles of Tel Aviv.
To replace the two modern airfields that the IAF had to return to Egypt (not allowed to be used for military purposes) the United States financed and helped build two better ones inside the Negev Desert. Though Sharm al-Sheikh had to be surrendered, so long as peace lasted the opening of the Suez Canal enabled Israel’s navy to transfer warships between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea for the first time. Militarily Egypt was now more or less out of the picture; although its army remains strong in regional terms, it is difficult to imagine it engaging in major hostilities against Israel without the support of a superpower, which, of course, it no longer has. To be sure, it was still necessary to take some precautions. But when the Israelis invaded Lebanon, Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubaraq, did not stir.
On the eastern front, the same was true of Iraq. Its nuclear potential aside, throughout the seventies its growing conventional power had bothered the IDF. The latter did not forget how Iraqi expeditionary forces had participated in most wars from 1948 through 1973. Some IDF commanders even argued that it had been the Iraqi expeditionary force that had stopped the drive toward Damascus in 1973,
49
although how so few (one brigade) could have achieved so much against so many (two divisions) remains unclear. Be this as it may, in 1980 Saddam Hussein engaged in a murderous war against Iran and for several years thereafter appeared to be on the brink of defeat. Israel for its part did not conceal its delight: Chief of Staff Eytan at one point said that “both sides are so stubborn—may they go on [fighting each other].” This left Syria and, at a pinch, Jordan with whose king Begin was unable to establish the kind of rapport that Rabin and Allon had enjoyed.
50
However, by 1979, Israel was outspending both countries combined by a ratio of 3:2;
51
measured in terms of accumulation of military capital, the ratio was 1.46:1.
52
49
although how so few (one brigade) could have achieved so much against so many (two divisions) remains unclear. Be this as it may, in 1980 Saddam Hussein engaged in a murderous war against Iran and for several years thereafter appeared to be on the brink of defeat. Israel for its part did not conceal its delight: Chief of Staff Eytan at one point said that “both sides are so stubborn—may they go on [fighting each other].” This left Syria and, at a pinch, Jordan with whose king Begin was unable to establish the kind of rapport that Rabin and Allon had enjoyed.
50
However, by 1979, Israel was outspending both countries combined by a ratio of 3:2;
51
measured in terms of accumulation of military capital, the ratio was 1.46:1.
52
Traditionally Israel had regarded itself, not without justification, as a small island amid an Arab sea. Whatever the underlying “strategic” realities, its public can be excused for regarding itself as subject to destruction at the hands of pitiless Arab hordes bent not only on eliminating the state but also on physically killing its people. In 1948 this feeling motivated the young Rabin when he had made “an inner resolution to devote my life so that never again will Israel be caught unprepared for war which may be forced on us, but will be prepared to fight back with well-trained soldiers and the best available weapons.”
53
The feeling of imminent disaster prevailed during the horrible weeks preceding the 1967 Six Day War and again during April-May 1970 (when there were ominous signs that the USSR might intervene in the War of Attrition while the West, judging by its record in Czechoslovakia in 1968, would do nothing). The climax came during and immediately after the 1973 October War, when there was much talk of the Holocaust syndrome and the Masada complex.
53
The feeling of imminent disaster prevailed during the horrible weeks preceding the 1967 Six Day War and again during April-May 1970 (when there were ominous signs that the USSR might intervene in the War of Attrition while the West, judging by its record in Czechoslovakia in 1968, would do nothing). The climax came during and immediately after the 1973 October War, when there was much talk of the Holocaust syndrome and the Masada complex.
But during the years under discussion, this feeling began to fade away. Some, among them Bar Lev and Weizman, felt that the seemingly unending cycle of wars was finally about to be broken.
54
Others, such as Ariel Sharon, were less optimistic but basked in the IDF’s newly found power; during his tenure as minister of defense he stated that Israel was capable of overrunning the entire Arab Middle East from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf.
55
Always tending to be stout, by now he had developed almost preternatural girth. The minister of defense appeared to personify the new IDF; perhaps no longer lean, it was definitely mean. However, in this case as in so many others the outcome of hubris was tragedy. In June 1982 the mighty military machine Israel had built was destined to be thrown away in the one country, and against the one opponent, where it stood no chance and was foredoomed to defeat.
54
Others, such as Ariel Sharon, were less optimistic but basked in the IDF’s newly found power; during his tenure as minister of defense he stated that Israel was capable of overrunning the entire Arab Middle East from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf.
55
Always tending to be stout, by now he had developed almost preternatural girth. The minister of defense appeared to personify the new IDF; perhaps no longer lean, it was definitely mean. However, in this case as in so many others the outcome of hubris was tragedy. In June 1982 the mighty military machine Israel had built was destined to be thrown away in the one country, and against the one opponent, where it stood no chance and was foredoomed to defeat.
“The Lebanese Morass”: “I went to Beirut a-Hunting Arabs.”
CHAPTER 17
“THE LEBANESE MORASS”
U
NTIL 1968 the Israel-Lebanon border had been the most peaceful. Indeed Israeli politicians often said that Lebanon would be the second Arab country to conclude peace with Israel, presumably after a larger neighbor showed the way. In that year, however, the quiet was interrupted when the Palestine Liberation Organization started using the country’s southern districts—including in particular the difficult terrain on the foothills of Mount Chermon—as a base for terrorist operations against Israel. Over the next year or two a dreary pattern emerged.
1
Various Arab guerrilla organizations such as al Fatach, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Syrian-supported al Saiqa would rocket and infiltrate and ambush and plant mines. Not then or later did they achieve any strategic gains, but they did inflict military and civilian casualties.
NTIL 1968 the Israel-Lebanon border had been the most peaceful. Indeed Israeli politicians often said that Lebanon would be the second Arab country to conclude peace with Israel, presumably after a larger neighbor showed the way. In that year, however, the quiet was interrupted when the Palestine Liberation Organization started using the country’s southern districts—including in particular the difficult terrain on the foothills of Mount Chermon—as a base for terrorist operations against Israel. Over the next year or two a dreary pattern emerged.
1
Various Arab guerrilla organizations such as al Fatach, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Syrian-supported al Saiqa would rocket and infiltrate and ambush and plant mines. Not then or later did they achieve any strategic gains, but they did inflict military and civilian casualties.
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