The Theory and Practice of Hell (65 page)

On April 5, a warning was received from an SS source that there was a plan to liquidate the eighteen Britons and two Americans in camp. A few trustworthy men at once helped the four officers among them, Southgate and Burney in the lead,

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to submerge. They were secreted in a space two feet high under Building 56, in the Little Camp.

To relieve the extremely tense situation, four important per sonalities among the non-Germans in camp had been per suaded as early as April 3, to address a letter to the Com mandant. They were the Belgian cabinet member Soudain, the French under-secretary of state, Marie,1 Captain Burney and the Dutch naval officer, Cool. The letter, in clever fashion, certified the Commandant’s loyal and correct behavior and expressed the hope that the four signers, once they had re turned to their countries, might find the opportunity to call this to public attention. The Commandant’s barber transmitted the letter, which had its effect. Pister took it to be a safe-conduct for himself and his family. “ One can always delay carrying out an order!” he remarked. Neither side, of course, actually called things by their proper names.

Pister hesitated—that was the main thing. The sounds of battle could be heard and American planes were circling the countryside. Time was being gained. Had it been known that another eight days would have to pass before liberation, these delaying tactics would probably not have prevailed, especially since the Commandant by no means adopted an attitude unequivocally favorable to the prisoners, but, on the con trary, vacillated further in the direction of the SS.

The crucial test came on April 5. During the preceding days the SS officers had destroyed the most important records left in camp. SS Major Ding-Schuler returned to camp once more and told me he had learned from Dr. Schiedlausky that the Weimar Gestapo had issued orders to execute forty-six political prisoners the next morning before the camp was evacuated. There was to be another Ohrdruf! Ding-Schuler knew only four of the names—the Hospital Capo and his deputy, the Capo of Ward 46, and myself. The warning was of inestimable value, for it afforded almost eight hours’ leeway. The entire internal camp organization was instantly alerted. It was decided to meet the issue head on, to refuse to surrender the forty-six, at the risk of an open fight. But who were they—in addition to those already known?

That night the list reached the Orderly Room from the Roll

1To become for a short time Premier of France after the war.— 7r.

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Call Officer. It required the men named to report to the gatehouse the next morning. It was a rather uneven list. Im portant names were not included, while others, of no im portance, were. It was a typical Gestapo measure, and its ob vious source was a denunciation already known in camp. Months ago a certain Duda who had joined the Dirlewanger group had squealed. It now developed that he had reported all the names that seemed important to him, partly with justification, partly without. In all likelihood his list had been augmented by the Camp Medical Officer Schiedlausky, who two days before had been observed giving a hand-written letter to the Weimar Gestapo chief at the gatehouse. And Schiedlausky had been Ding-Schuler’s informant! The fact that almost none of the newer underground leaders were on the list shows at least that secrecy had been rather well main tained.

That same night all the men on the list, except the French

manufacturer Bloch whose inclusion baffled everyone, slipped into safe hiding places. When the men were summoned the next morning only Bloch appeared at the gatehouse. He was sent away after a while, probably for tactical reasons, to lull the suspicions of his fellows. Following this second challenge, the Commandant summoned the Senior Camp In mate and demanded that the Camp Police locate the missing men. The Senior Camp Inmate proceeded with an eight-hour “ search,” of course without finding a single one of the men who had submerged.

The danger of a general roll call now loomed. The un derground leaders decided that such a formation would be boycotted, if called. A concentration camp without roll call! This meant that the most important SS control measure had vanished. Henceforth no one any longer reported to the gatehouse when danger was anticipated. It was an open declaration of war. When night fell, the SS dared enter the camp only under heavy arms. They realized that the political prisoners were determined to fight.

The responsible men in camp had no illusions about their prospects of success in the event of an armed clash between the SS and the prisoners. Within a few hours at the most, the fight would necessarily end in favor of the SS. But they took into account the impending arrival of the liberating troops,

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expected almost hourly. To check the danger of a last-minute evacuation, it was decided to smuggle an emissary out of camp who should head for the Allied lines from Weimar in case the Americans by-passed the strategically important Et-tersberg where the concentration camp was located. He was to address an immediate message to the Buchenwald Com mandant. The police radio had reported—and the camp in telligence service had passed on the news—that in the preceding night forty parachutists in civilian clothes had been dropped on either side of the motor highway south of Weimar without being captured. The letter to the Commandant was to be attributed to one of these parachutists. It read:

Commandant!

Shipments are leaving Buchenwald—death shipments like thatfrom Ohrdruf!

The ghastly tragedy o f Ohrdruf must not be repeated.

We have seen with our own eyes the victims o f the escort units and o f the incited populace.

Woe unto those who are responsible! Woe unto

Thuringia, if such a thing is repeated! We understand that you—like the whole country—are in difficulties, which you believe you can master only by sending thousands on their way. An end to it! An immediate end! Our armored commanders are approaching to settle your account. You have one more chance!

J
a m e s
M
c
L
e o d
, M
a j o r
,

W
a r
O
f f i c e
, L
o n d o n

On April 6, more than three thousand Jews were scheduled to leave Buchenwald on foot. At this juncture the camp emissary could make good his escape in but one way, since no one could leave camp except with the shipments. This was by way of Building 50 and Dr. Ding-Schuler. I therefore emerged from my hiding place, though SS patrols were searching the camp, met Dr. Ding-Schuler who had been notified by SS Sergeant Feld, already mentioned in this report as a courier, and made arrangements for the hazardous undertaking. The next day, April 8, the Weimar police was to send a truck to

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pick up valuable instruments and serum for SS Colonel Schmidt’s combat group. I was to squat in one of the boxes, to be taken to the Weimar home of Ding-Schuler.

The Commandant had ordered another shipment of 14,000 men from Buchenwald for April 7. After protracted delay, the SS was furnished 1,500 prisoners, and when 200 heavily armed SS men with machine-guns marched into camp, another 4,500, in order to facilitate the impending battle. For among the greatest difficulties were the food situation and the masses of men in camp—convicts, asocials and others—who might menace the rear of the fighting ranks or otherwise im pede them. There was no other way. The two shipments departed, for an unknown destination.

We have learned meanwhile what happened to them, and the story, typical of those days, is here briefly reported. The smaller shipment was scheduled for the Flossenbiirg con centration camp, but only about 170 men arrived there. The rest succumbed to the hardships en routs, were shot down or escaped. The larger shipment set out for Dachau, but by way of Saxony! Provisions for but one day were taken along. The forty railroad cars with 100 to 120 prisoners each were shut tled over rail lines that were not yet destroyed or had been hastily repaired. They got as far as Czechoslovakia, and thence by way of the Bavarian Forest to the vicinity of Passau, where they got stuck in the little village of Nam-mering which had extensive rail sidings because of the local stone industry.

There is a report by Johann Bergmann, a minister of Aicha vor dem Wald, who between April 19 and 23, with great courage and Christian charity, looked after these half-starved Buchenwald prisoners. Among other things he went out among the farmers in his district, who were horrified at the turn of events, and immediately collected some twenty tons of potatoes and several tons of bread and other food, and saw to it that the food actually reached the prisoners. According to the minister, some 270 bodies of men who had perished were inadequately cremated by means of a wood fire kindled under a makeshift grating of rails. The bodies of 700 others who had starved to death or had been shot were thrown into a ravine. SS First Lieutenant Merbach of Buchenwald, an escort of ficer, began to shudder at his own handiwork and made little