The Theory and Practice of Hell (64 page)

Soon after the liberation of Lublin, a huge stream of evacuees from the eastern camps to the interior of Germany began to take place. Camp after camp was evacuated by the SS. The surviving inmates were driven westward on foot whenever transport facilities in the general exodus had become inadequate. As much of the physical evidence of atrocities as possible was blown up. Prisoners of so-called “ German blood” were issued arms to keep their foreign fellow prisoners in check, for of course the SS staffs were the first to take flight by rail and car, and the remaining SS troops were as a rule inadequate to keep under proper control the thousands of concentration-camp prisoners to be set in motion.

In endless columns the wretched host rolled over the coun tryside, day after day, often for weeks, without food or adequate clothing. Those who could go no farther were shot down by the SS or their armed prisoner minions, or simply left by the wayside. Many fled and hid but were picked up by the German military police or by fanatics among the population, to be detained elsewhere or executed, as the case might be. Others made their way into Germany or Poland or behind the Russian lines. More centrally located camps had to make room for thousands upon thousands of evacuees who reported stories of unrelieved terror. The picture was one of chaotic disintegration, studded with harrowing incidents. One had only to look at the wretched figures pouring into the narrowing interior from every side to believe them.

Orders had meanwhile been issued in the west, as well, to

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withdraw subsidiary camps and outside details. Construction brigades were the first to be withdrawn, from the Atlantic coast to eastern Belgium. During the summer of 1944, together with the inmates o f the western camps, they retired behind the right bank of the Rhine. In the winter and spring they drew back farther, step by step, until they collided with the evacuees from the east at Dachau, Sachsenhausen, Neuengamme, Buchenwald, Flossenbiirg, Mauthausen.

Beginning in February and March 1945, the situation in every concentration camp grew increasingly tense. Wherever appropriate preparations had been made, the political prisoners were now at long last able to reap the fruits of years of effort. The story of the end of the Buchenwald con centration camp may serve as the best example, since Buchen wald was more unequivocally under the rule of the political

prisoners than any other. |

The defense formations at Buchenwald have already been discussed in the preceding chapter. Steps to procure a supply of arms began to be taken during the air raid of August 24, 1944. Advantage was taken of the general confusion that reigned, and as many rifles, pistols, carbines and hand grenades as possible were removed from the SS divisional replacement depot. The weapons were carefully concealed in camp. Some of them were buried, others walled up, and the locations were known to but a few key people. Insofar as was possible, these supplies were steadily augmented. This aspect of the preparatory work alone would have been impossible unless the internal organization had functioned smoothly, all questionable and treacherous elements having been systematically purged as the result of a sustained campaign.

The possession of arms for the first time created a sense of security. At least the prisoners would not have to die without putting up a fight. They could no longer be simply butchered. This was reassuring, though there could be no illusions as to the extraordinary difficulties of the situation. On the one hand the fight was against the SS, but almost equally, at the crucial moment, it would have to be waged against weaklings, cowards and the inevitable panic.

When the first large shipments from evacuated camps reached Buchenwald, a curious intermediate state of affairs arose. The SS, sensing the beginning of the end, was afraid of

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the anonymous masses of tens of thousands of prisoners. The masses of the prisoners were afraid of the SS. During this period the surrounding population, especially the people of Weimar, feared the camp like the plague.

Unquestionably the group which worried most were the civilians employed in the SS plants—who often enough had behaved abominably. They feared they would be slaughtered outright when “ the day” came. Among the political prisoners there was an unbridled thirst for vengeance, especially against the city of Weimar to which money and benefits of every kind had flowed through hundreds of channels from the Buchen wald charnel house and where no one had shown any sym pathy or pity, let alone any active help. But the forces of order in Buchenwald were concerned with their own political reputation and sought to prevent the camp from becoming a focal point of chaos, for the sake of the country and the future. Efforts were intensified to retain control during the impending events.

Months before the actual end, when the situation matured more and more, the question arose whether to organize an armed uprising or to pursue a further policy of waiting. After considerable controversy it was decided to continue avoiding all provocation. Resistance was to be offered only when the situation really grew critical. Preparations were still further intensified, to the accompaniment of constant difficulties, not only with respect to the SS but also to the masses of prisoners who were not in on the plans. Trustworthy representatives of the various nationality groups were placed in every barracks. The defense formations were elaborated. Everything finally pointed to the one great question: what orders will Himmler issue? For it had long since been made certain that the SS units in the camps would no longer take action on their own.

There were two groups in camp which, independently of each other, were preparing a definite plan for taking over the camp after the defeat of the SS and the entry of the Allies: the Communist party, and a non-Communist group under the leadership of the British Captain Burney. As developed after the liberation, the plans did not differ very much, for both were based on the same camp background. The main dif ference was that the Communist party, proceeding from the fact of its actual control of power in camp, for un

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derstandable reasons of secrecy and from old habit, had slated only its own men for the seizure; while the other group proceeded purely on the basis of individual qualifications, assigning no less than a good third of the proposed new func tionaries to the Communists. Both groups worked on an in ternational basis.

As early as mid-March 1945, it was beyond doubt that the western Allies would reach central Germany. Hope in camp was primarily centered on aid from the air when worst came to worst. In the event of an aerial landing operation on the plains north of Buchenwald, active intervention on the part of the camp was decided on, no matter how difficult the situation might grow. Everyone expected, however, that the SS would first attempt an evacuation. Early in April, preparations pointing to such a plan were in evidence. The SS divisional replacement installations were evacuated. A com plete state of alertness had been ordered among the prisoners, though the situation had not yet developed to the point where an unequivocal solution was possible.

We knew that the Commandant, SS Colonel Pister, was a bureaucrat by nature, who would do nothing on his own initiative and was fond of procrastinating. Through SS Major Ding-Schuler we learned that on April 2, Himmler, in a telephone conversation brought about by the Weimar police chief, SS Colonel Schmidt, had left it up to the “ discretion” of SS Captain Oldeburhuis, Commandant of the Ohrdruf camp, to liquidate his convicts and political prisoners re garded as “ especially dangerous.”

Himmler, however, expressly ordered that nothing should happen to the Jews—a paradox that can be explained only by the curious expectations entertained by the top leadership of the SS on the international level. The remaining Ohrdruf prisoners were to be evacuated. This death march of 12,000 Ohrdruf inmates to Buchenwald actually took place, thou sands being shot down en route. On April 5, on the last brief leg from Weimar to Buchenwald alone, seventy-four prisoners wallowed in their own blood. Hundreds had been indiscriminately shot down before by fanatical Hitler Youth and even by women. The victims at Ohrdruf itself ran to more than 1,500.

There were now 47,000 men herded behind the barbed wire

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of Buchenwald, their food supply doubtful, their misery passing all bounds. The thunder of cannon could be heard from west of Erfurt, where American armor was waiting to complete its deployment. These were days of extreme nervous tension.

On the afternoon of April 4, all the Jews in camp had been suddenly ordered to assemble. Not one appeared in the roll-call area. Nothing like this had ever before happened in a con centration camp. It was unimaginable that the SS should no longer dare enforce its orders by brute violence. Yet all it did was to announce that the Jews were to be transferred to an ex change camp for shipment abroad, about which Himmler was negotiating. No one believed a word of this. It ran directly counter to the SS mentality. (Later it developed that there was an element of truth in the story after all. In his pathological belief in “ Jewish world power,” Himmler had put out certain feelers in Sweden as to whether some “ deal” involving the lives of the Jews could not be concluded!)

The hesitation on the part of the SS brought a valuable night’s respite, during which hundreds of “ Old Guard” Jewish prisoners were afforded a chance to submerge. Names, numbers, markings, details were swapped, barracks assign ments exchanged. The next morning the SS lined up the camp inmates by barracks and ordered: “ Jews, front and center!” Some of the Jews complied, but the rest had to be picked by the SS “ by sight,” for since the bombardment of Buchenwald there were no longer complete records. There were chaotic scenes. The Buchenwald noncoms proceeded indiscriminately. Some butchers from Auschwitz went to the Little Camp and, armed with clubs, picked out men as they pleased. But it was impossible to do the work without the Camp Police, which did nothing to aid in the proceedings. Men who were nimble enough to act on their own initiative simply disappeared into formations that had already been combed out. In the end some 1,500 of the 6,000 Jews in camp were assembled, their number to be swelled by the Hungarian Jews arriving from Ohrdruf the next day.