The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (107 page)

C
HAPTER 9
S
LEEPY
H
OLLOW

1.
Message for Major General Tixier, “Iranian Air Tactics” (211600Z), May 1984; statement of Colin Eglington, May 8, 1997,
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The United States of America)
, International Court of
Justice, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim Submitted by the United States of America, Exhibit 31, Annex, Volume 2, June 23, 1997.

2.
Christen Feyer Puntervold letter, “Re: Attacks Recorded Against Neutral Shipping During Hostilities Between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf,” Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, January 6, 1989; Statement of Captain Christen Feyer Puntervold,
Case Concerning Oil Platforms
, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, Exhibit 11, Annex, Volume 1, June 23, 1997.

3.
While the United States did not accept the legality of the zone, it abided by it and avoided entering the Iranian exclusion zone. General Robert Herres letter to General George Crist, October 28, 1987.

4.
Iran and Japan were in negotiations to renew a contract for daily oil shipments to Tokyo. This escalation may have been intended to discourage Japan from buying Iranian oil.

5.
Martin Navias and E. R. Hooton,
Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980–1988
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 74–76; Sreedhar and Kapil Kaul,
Tanker War: Aspects of Iran-Iraq War
(New Delhi, India: ABC Publishing House, 1989), pp. 89–90. A U.S. warship nearly found itself on the receiving end of an Iraqi missile when an Iraqi pilot failed to make the Farsi hook and turn east before releasing his Exocet. The missile struck a hapless tug only a few miles from an American warship steaming in the northern Gulf. The U.S. government warned Iraq to keep its aircraft at least five miles from American warships or risk being shot down, and Weinberger approved a change to the rules of engagement for the U.S. naval flotilla in the Gulf based in Bahrain, Middle East Force, that authorized the use of force against any ship laying mines in international waters or when faced with an approaching jet intent on launching a missile in their direction. At the outbreak of hostilities in September 1980, Defense Secretary Harold Brown had issued rules of engagement that required his approval for U.S. combatants to respond to any attack on neutral ships. If such authorization occurred, the American ships could not enter the territorial waters of either Iran or Iraq. Weinberger reaffirmed this guidance when he came to office. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “ROE for Protecting Third Country Shipping in the Persian Gulf,” September 29, 1980, p. 2; Captain David Grieve, USN (Ret.), interviews with author, May 11, 1995, and August 14, 1995.

6.
CIA message, “Iran-Iraq: Lull in the Gulf Anti-Shipping War,” June 17, 1987.

7.
Resolution 552, United Nations Security Council, Document S/RES/552, June 1, 1984.

8.
Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop,
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980–1988
(Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2000), p. 172.

9.
Charles Horner, interview with the author, July 28, 1995; Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner,
Lessons of Modern War: Volume III
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), p. 214, footnote 7.

10.
Caspar Weinberger memorandum to Robert McFarlane, “Crisis Planning Notice—Persian Gulf Situation,” February 27, 1984.

11.
Weinberger did concede that Iran might try to attack one of the five American warships stationed in the Persian Gulf. He ordered handheld Stinger missiles placed on the warships in case of a suicide plane, and the U.S. government issued a notice for planes and boats not to come within five miles of an American warship or risk being fired upon. The legal basis of these keep-out zones was dubious and likely violated international law of the right of freedom of navigation. Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Notice for Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman” (210100Z), January 1984.

12.
One that Tom Twetten, the head of CIA’s clandestine service as director of operations, remembered involved establishing a logistics base in the Persian Gulf from which U.S. military transport aircraft would fly over Afghanistan and airdrop military equipment directly to the mujahideen. When challenged with the facts—that the Soviets had a large air force and would likely shoot the transports down, which could lead to World War III—Iklé thought for a moment and remarked, “Well, maybe that wouldn’t be such a bad thing.” Twetten interview; also interview with retired CIA officer.

13.
Fred Iklé memorandum for Caspar Weinberger, “Iran-Iraq War and Gulf Threats,” April 10, 1984.

14.
Sandy Charles, “Talking Points for Breakfast Meeting with Secretary Shultz, April 11, 1984,” April 10, 1984.

15.
These were National Security Decision Directives 139 and 141.

16.
General John Vessey memorandum to Weinberger, “Status of DOD Actions from NSDD 139,” May 29, 1984.

17.
Major General Samuel Swart, USAF (Ret.), interview with author, May 25, 1995.

18.
Major General Donald Penzler, USA (Ret.), interview with author, December 14, 1994. While Penzler removed the deadweight, General Crist focused on building his intelligence capabilities. He tasked his able intelligence director, Army Brigadier General Cloyd Pfister, to build CENTCOM into “the premier source of intelligence” for the Middle East. Pfister worked to develop an independent intelligence capability primarily by bringing all the three-letter intelligence agencies—CIA, NSA, and DIA—into a coordinated “intelligence fusion” effort against both the Soviets and Iran. In June 1986, Crist directed Pfister to put together a closely held study group called the Afghan Fusion Cell. It brought together intelligence from all over the community to examine the Soviet military in Afghanistan with an eye to what this portended about that military should the two superpowers come to blows in Europe or the Middle East. By 1988, the group had produced nine monographs examining all aspects of military operations, including diverse topics ranging from the morale and motivation of the Soviet soldier to nighttime helicopter operations. Only the DIA remained lukewarm to CENTCOM’s initiative. An entrenched bureaucracy resented the growing CENTCOM intelligence directorate and viewed it with suspicion, questioning its analysts’ competence. General Crist, interview for “End of Tour Report,” CENTCOM History Office, 1988, p. 11.

19.
In April 1986, Crist wrote to Weinberger a pessimistic assessment of the progress of the war, noting that “more sophisticated operational techniques and brutal population repression are taking their toll on the Mujajedin [mujahideen] resistance.”

20.
George Crist interview with Department of Defense media pool, Gallant Eagle 86, August 10, 1986.

21.
CENTCOM, “A Brief History of Russian and Soviet Expansion toward the South,” June 30, 1985, p. v.

22.
Crist interview; Armitage interview.

23.
U.S. Marine Corps,
Lessons Learned:
The Iran-Iraq War
, volume 1, Department of the Navy, 1990, pp. 17–19; Kenneth Pollack,
Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 217–18.

24.
General Council of British Shipping,
Iran/Iraq: The Situation in the Gulf, Guidance Notes for Shipping
, February 1988, pp. 70–73.

25.
General George Crist message to Admiral William Crowe, “Increased Threat in the Persian Gulf” (242130Z), September 1986.

26.
Bernard Gwertzman, “Iran’s Navy Stops U.S. Ship in Search near Persian Gulf,”
New York Times
, January 13, 1986.; also Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Says Halting of Vessels by Iran May Be Justified,”
New York Times
, January 14, 1986.

27.
Secretary of State message to American Embassy, Bern, “Message to Iran on Naval Seizures” (DTG 012225Z), February 1986, p. 1.

28.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Démarche to Iran,” October 1985, p. 1.

29.
USCINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “MIDEASTFOR Operating Restrictions” (132130Z), January 1986; Middle East Force,
Command History, 1986
. Whereas previously two warships came each from the East Coast and West Coast, PACOM would be tasked to exclusively provide the additional combat augmentee. While remaining a part of the Pacific Fleet, this fifth combatant was under the operational control of Middle East Force. The first ship assigned was the USS
Jack Williams
, commanded by David Grieve. For both the ship and Grieve, this was just the beginning of a long affiliation with the Gulf.

30.
CINCPAC message, “Promulgation of Visit and Search” (190432Z), March 1986. The Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance to CENTCOM emphasized that it was to monitor only U.S.-flagged ships and keep track of their locations, but this authority did not constitute an escort of those merchants. If it did, U.S. warships would have had to accompany the merchant ships throughout their transit and would have necessitated additional ships to be dispatched to Middle East Force; this was not well received by the navy, which complained that it was expensive and diverted ships away from the Pacific. Military Sealift Command ships were required to monitor the common U.S. military frequency of the Middle East Force ships; the U.S. commercial merchant ships maintained communication over the international distress frequency, channel 16. John Poindexter memorandum for Major General Colin Powell, “Visit and Search of U.S.-Flagged Vessels in the Persian Gulf,” August 7, 1984.

31.
CINCPAC message, “Visit and Search of U.S.-Flagged Vessels in the Persian Gulf” (DTG 290411Z), May 1985, pp. 3–4.

32.
CENTCOM briefing, “Invoke Resolve Decision Brief,” February 6, 1987, pp. 3–9.

33.
In a somewhat controversial move, Crist recommended they knock out the main gas power plant at Bandar Abbas, which provided the power to run Iran’s military operation, but also served as the main power source for the city.

34.
Crist memorandum to Weinberger, “Central Command Update,” undated [February 1986], pp. 1–2.

35.
Secretary Weinberger approved the New Splendor initiative. “I applaud your efforts,” he wrote Crist, “to develop campaign plans that also incorporate recent bilateral initiatives with a number of Gulf states and some rather significant intelligence enhancements as well. I wholly agree that each of these concerns is vital to the success and survivability of our CENTCOM forces.” Secretary Weinberger letter to General Crist, February 2, 1987. CENTCOM also quietly obtained important support from most of the Gulf states. In the event of conflict with Iran, Oman granted permission to use their airfields. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman had all agreed to allow CENTCOM to station F-16 attack aircraft in one of their countries should there be a protracted air war with Iran.

36.
Crist interview, “End of Tour Report,” p. 4.

37.
Major General Cloyd Pfister, USA (Ret.), interview with author, November 22, 1994.

38.
Pearson became particularly good friends with the Bahraini defense minister and crown prince, Sheik Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, who was already favorably disposed to the United States.

39.
Bahraini and U.S. planners focused on three likely Iranian scenarios: 1) an Iranian air attack on Bahrain proper; 2) naval or Revolutionary Guard attacks on shipping bound for the island; and 3) Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, in which Bahrain’s primary role would be to provide basing for U.S. aircraft. Both sides hoped to deter Iranian aggression, conducting a number of highly visible joint exercises (the first began in January 1988) and expanded naval and air patrols around the island. A few years later, Pearson had the satisfaction of using Bahraini facilities when, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Bahraini airfield Sheik Isa served as the main base for the marine air wing. Brigadier General Jeremiah Pearson memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S./Bahraini Military Planning Initiatives,” October 27, 1987; Lieutenant Colonel Edward Robeson memorandum, “Agenda for New Splendor Update Briefing,” June 10, 1987, pp. 1–2; Joint Chiefs of Staff information briefing, “New Splendor Planning Update,” July 8, 1987, pp. 2–13.

40.
Penzler interview.

41.
Russell Violett, interview with author, November 13, 2007.

42.
Admiral William Crowe, USN (Ret.), interview with author, April 11, 2001.

43.
There are a large number of books and articles written about the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (the Goldwater-Nichols Act). The best was written by the chief staff writer of the legislation, James R. Locher III,
Victory on the Potomac
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). Also James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,”
Joint Force Quarterly
, Autumn 1986, pp. 10–16; Gordon Lederman,
Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999). The reorganization also established procedures for officer promotion that required a joint assignment before making general or admiral. This forced the services to send their quality officers to joint assignments such as Central Command.