The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (93 page)

The most important reason of all for Austria-Hungary’s dilatoriness was Tisza, who was still not convinced that a hard line towards Serbia was the right one. He feared, as he told the emperor in a letter on 1 July, that war would be damaging whatever the outcome: defeat could lead to loss of much territory or the end of Hungary while victory might see Serbia being annexed and so result in a much too strong South Slav component within the Dual Monarchy.
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On 7 July the Common Ministerial Council, the only body with responsibility for the whole of Austria-Hungary, met in Vienna. Tisza found himself isolated as his fellow ministers discussed how best to crush Serbia and what they should do with it once the war was over. Berchtold and Krobatin, the War Minister, dismissed the Hungarian’s argument that they try first for a diplomatic victory over Serbia. They had enjoyed such successes in the past, said the Chancellor, but Serbia had not changed its ways and had continued to agitate for a Greater Serbia. The only way to deal with it was by force. Stürgkh, the Austrian Prime Minister, who had been a hardliner in the earlier crises in the Balkans, talked of ‘a solution at the point of the sword’. Although the decision was Austria-Hungary’s alone, he said, it was a great comfort to know that Germany stood so faithfully behind it. Conrad joined the meeting even though he was not a government minister to discuss what might happen if Russia came to Serbia’s defence, something he thought likely. Everyone except Tisza agreed that the demands contained in the ultimatum should be designed so that Serbia would have to refuse them, thus giving Austria-Hungary
grounds for war. Tisza accepted that the ultimatum had to be firm but asked to see the terms before it was sent.
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In the next week he was put under severe pressure from his colleagues and, indirectly, from Germany. For Tisza the alliance with Germany, ‘the cornerstone of our entire policy’, was essential for maintaining Austria-Hungary’s great-power status and, to him, even more important, the status of Hungary itself. Nor was he any less hostile to Serbia than his colleagues; he disagreed rather on tactics. He also seems to have persuaded himself that Rumania would stay neutral (King Carol had sent an anodyne letter of reassurance to Franz Joseph) and Bulgaria could be drawn into the Triple Alliance now that Berlin had promised it a loan. On 14 July at a meeting with Berchtold he gave way and agreed that a severe ultimatum should be sent to Serbia with a deadline of forty-eight hours. If Serbia failed to comply with the conditions war would follow. The one concession he managed to get was that Austria-Hungary should make it clear that it did not intend to take Serbia’s territory after the war was over.
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Later that afternoon he had a conversation with the German ambassador which Tschirschky reported back to Berlin. Tisza claimed that, although he had argued for caution in the past, each passing day had strengthened his conviction that the Dual Monarchy now must take action to show that it was still vital and, in Tschirschky’s italics, ‘
to put an end to the intolerable conditions in the southeast
’. Austria-Hungary could no longer tolerate the insolent tone coming from Serbia. The time, Tisza now felt, had come for action. ‘The note is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is
practically excluded
.’ Austria-Hungary’s mobilisation against Serbia would follow as soon as the deadline was reached. As he left, Tisza clasped Tschirschky’s hand and said, ‘Together we shall now look the future calmly and firmly in the face.’ Wilhelm noted approvingly in the margins of the report, ‘Well, a real man at last!’
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The main outlines of the ultimatum were already set by the second week of July. It would include a demand that nationalist officers be dismissed from the Serbian army and nationalist societies be dissolved. The Serbian king would have to issue a public declaration that his country would no longer promote a Greater Serbia. To ensure that Serbia fulfilled these and any other demands, Austria-Hungary would
establish a special agency in Belgrade. The terms were already exceedingly difficult for an independent nation to accept and they were going to become more stringent still as Austria-Hungary’s officials worked on them as well as on a dossier that was meant to prove that Serbia had been plotting against Austria-Hungary for years. To bolster its case the Foreign Ministry sent its legal adviser to Sarajevo to investigate the assassination; unfortunately he was unable to find evidence that the Serbian government was behind it. The dossier in the end proved to be full of errors and was not finished in time to be handed over to the powers along with a copy of the ultimatum. As a result Russia continued to believe the Serbian government when it claimed that it was completely innocent while France and Great Britain found Austria-Hungary had not proved its case.
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While there was intense activity behind the scenes in Vienna, the government did its best to give the impression that it was business as usual. Newspapers in both Vienna and Budapest were asked to tone down their comments on Serbia. Tschirschky reported to Berlin that Berchtold had sent Conrad and the War Minister off for their summer holidays to prevent any unease. (‘Childish!’ noted the Kaiser from his yacht to which he had returned, not suspecting that his own government wanted him out of the way in part for the same reason.)
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Nevertheless rumours started to circulate that Austria-Hungary was planning something unpleasant for Serbia. The German ambassador in Rome told the Italian Foreign Minister about, among other things, the blank cheque and San Giuliano alerted his ambassadors in St Petersburg and Belgrade, not knowing that the Russians had broken Italy’s diplomatic codes.
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In Vienna the Russian ambassador asked what Austria-Hungary intended to do but was sufficiently reassured, being told that it would wait until its investigation was complete, that he left on his own holidays two days before the ultimatum was presented to Serbia.
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On 17 July the British ambassador reported to London: ‘There is only one topic in the Vienna press, even Albania in its throes being almost crowded out – namely, when will the protest against Serbia be put in, and what will it contain? That there will be a protest nobody doubts, and it will probably be coupled with demands intended to humiliate Serbia.’ There was an ‘ominous silence’ from the Foreign Ministry but he had it on good authority that, if Serbia did not cave in
at once, Austria-Hungary would use force and, moreover, that it was sure of Germany’s support. He then added a postscript: ‘I have just had a talk with Berchtold. He was charming, announced himself for a visit to our place in the country next Sunday, invited us to stay with him at Buchlau, the place of the famous interview between Aehrenthal and Izvolsky, told me he had some horses running in some races shortly, but never mentioned general politics or the Serbians.’
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The German government also presented a picture of summer calm, possibly deliberately as historians have later charged in order to lull any suspicions that it was contemplating a war. Jagow returned to Berlin from his honeymoon in the first week of July but the Kaiser toured the North Sea on his usual cruise and most senior civilians and military remained on holiday. The general staff kept to its usual peacetime routine. Waldersee, who was on his father-in-law’s estate, wrote to Jagow on 17 July: ‘I shall remain here, ready to jump; we are all prepared at the General Staff; in the meantime there is nothing to do.’ Nevertheless the main leaders made sure that they were in contact with Berlin. Bethmann in fact had a special telegraph line run through to Hohenfinow.
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The German government also kept a close eye on what was happening in Vienna. Arthur Zimmermann, the tough Deputy Foreign Secretary who felt the time was right for Austria-Hungary to take its revenge on Serbia, remained at his post in Berlin and repeatedly urged Vienna to speed up its slow pace. He had a pretty good idea of what terms Austria-Hungary intended to present to Serbia by 13 July although the German government claimed then and later that it knew nothing about the contents of any ultimatum.
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In Serbia, where the news of the assassination had initially been received with, according to the British chargé d’affaires, ‘a sensation rather of stupefaction than of regret’, the more rabid of the nationalist press hastened to justify the murders. Pašić, who was in the middle of a difficult election campaign, apparently said on hearing the news, ‘It is very bad. It will mean war.’ He ordered all hotels and cafés to close by 10 p.m. as a sign of mourning and sent his condolences to Vienna. In spite of pressure from Austria-Hungary, he refused, however, to hold an investigation and gave a defiant interview to a German newspaper denying that his government had anything to do with the assassination.
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Apprehension about Austria-Hungary’s intentions nevertheless mounted in Serbia and on 10 July was further fuelled by a curious incident in Belgrade. Hartwig, the highly influential Russian ambassador who had done much over the years to fan Serbian ambitions, called in the evening on his counterpart from Austria-Hungary, Baron Wladimir Giesl von Gieslingen. The Russian, who was grossly overweight, was puffing from his exertion. He refused an offer of coffee but pulled out his favourite Russian cigarettes. He wanted to clear up, he said, the unfortunate rumour that he had held a bridge party the night of the assassination and refused to fly the legation’s flags at half-mast. Giesl said he considered the matter settled. Hartwig then turned to the main purpose of his visit. ‘I ask you’, he said, ‘in the name of our earnest friendship to answer as fully as you can: what will Austria-Hungary do with Serbia and what has been decided in Vienna?’ Giesl followed his government’s line: ‘I can definitely assure you that the sovereignty of Serbia will not be infringed and that with the good will of the Serbian government, this crisis can find a solution that will please both parties.’ Hartwig thanked him profusely and was struggling to his feet when he suddenly collapsed on to the floor and a few moments later died. His family at once blamed Giesl for poisoning him and even wilder rumours went around Belgrade that the Austrians had brought a special electrified chair from Vienna which could kill without leaving a trace. The matter did little to improve relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, which were already deteriorating. More seriously still, Hartwig’s death removed the one man who might have prevailed on the Serbian government to accept even the most outrageous of the demands in the ultimatum.
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Although he was by now very worried about what was likely to come, Pašić sent a message on 18 July to all Serbian embassies to say that Serbia would resist any demands from Austria-Hungary which infringed on its sovereignty.
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His worries would have become still more acute if he had been aware of a secret meeting that took place in Vienna the following day. Arriving in unmarked cars at Berchtold’s house, Austria-Hungary’s most powerful men took the decision they knew could lead to a general European war. Berchtold distributed a copy of the ultimatum which he and his officials in the Foreign Ministry had drawn up. Later that year
when most of Europe was at war, Berchtold’s wife apparently told a friend ‘poor Leopold could not sleep on the day when he wrote his ultimatum to the Serbs, as he was so worried that they might accept it. Several times during the night he got up and altered or added some clause, to reduce the risk.’
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Those present assumed that Serbia would reject the terms and most of the discussion was about Austria-Hungary’s mobilisation and other necessary military measures. Conrad said the sooner action came the better and showed no concern at the prospect of Russia’s intervention. Tisza insisted, as he had always done, that there should be no annexation of Serbian territory. The meeting agreed but Conrad said cynically to Krobatin, the War Minister, as they left, ‘We will see.’
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Tisza wrote shortly afterwards to his niece that he still hoped war could be avoided but he now put his trust in God. His own mood, he told her, was ‘serious but not anxious or restless, because I am like the man on the street corner who could be hit over the head at any moment, but who is always prepared to make the big journey’.
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On 20 July, the day following the meeting, Berchtold sent copies of the ultimatum and a covering note to his embassies throughout Europe. The ambassador in Belgrade was to deliver his copy to the Serbian government on the evening of Thursday 23 July while the rest waited until the morning of 24 July. To the annoyance of the Germans, their ally did not get round to giving them a copy of the ultimatum until 22 July.
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Nevertheless they were prepared to keep their promise of support. On 19 July the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
, which was generally seen as representing the views of the government, published a brief notice to the effect that Austria-Hungary was justified in wanting to set its relations with Serbia in order. Serbia, it went on, should give way and the other European powers should stay out so that any conflict between the two antagonists could remain localised. On 21 July Bethmann sent a telegram to his ambassadors in London, Paris, and St Petersburg asking them to make the same points to their host governments. The following day Jules Cambon, the French ambassador in Berlin, asked Jagow for details of what was in the ultimatum. Jagow replied that he had no idea. ‘I was all the more astonished at this’, Cambon reported mordantly to Paris, ‘since Germany is about to take her stand at Austria’s side with particular vigour.’
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