The War Within (22 page)

PowerPoint packet of slides, code-named Polo Step, which had been handed out during the briefing.

"You won't be needing that," Rumsfeld said, reaching across the table to snatch the sensitive packet from the national security adviser. He didn't want it left aroundóeven in the White Houseóadding, "This is highly secret and classified."

"Well," the president said sarcastically, "I think it's pretty safe around here, but I'll let you two work it out." He turned and walked out. Rice didn't leave with a copy of the slides.

Later that day, Frank Miller, his immediate boss and the senior director for defense policy on the NSC staff, called Greenwood to his office.

"Hey," said Miller, a 22-year veteran of sensitive Pentagon posts, "come over here and see me."

"You're going to tell me to go over to the Pentagon," Greenwood said, "and get those slides that they refused to leave over here."

Exactly right, Miller said.

Greenwood, who normally wore a civilian suit at the White House, changed into his Marine uniform to improve his chances. He also had an official courier identification and a briefcase. He didn't rate a car and driver, so he took the underground Metro subway. At the Pentagon, he went to the office of a friend on the Joint Staff. It was way too risky to approach the several people he knew well on the civilian sideóRumsfeld's staff. They would surely feel compelled to inform Rumsfeld.

"I need a favor," Greenwood said. "Isn't it a crazy world?"

The friend complied, knowing it would be reciprocated, most likely in the form of a briefing from Miller or Greenwood on what happened in NSC meetings. A formal "summary of conclusions"óa classified document that outlined the decisions or conclusions from a meetingówas circulated after the meetings but could take days or weeks to make its way to the Pentagon. Even then, they were often bleached-out versions of what had happened, making them bland and hardly useful.

To Greenwood, the subterfuge was symbolic of an administration infected with distrust.

Several months later, just before Christmas 2002, Greenwood had been in his office and was planning to leave about 1 P.M. to do some holiday shopping, excited about the prospect of time off.

Miller again summoned him. "What are you doing this afternoon?" he asked.

Greenwood's heart sank. It was code for "I've got a really lousy deal coming your way."

"I've got to go Christmas shopping," Greenwood said.

"You're not going to go Christmas shopping for a couple of hours because we've got to go on a little trip."

"Do I need my toothbrush?"

"No, but you need your map of Iraq and you need your brief on war preparations for the invasion. And bring all that stuff. We've got a car meeting us downstairs in 15 minutes." Rice was sending them to brief Secretary of State Colin Powell, Miller finally revealed.

Normally, Greenwood prepared for these briefs and rehearsed all day.

Greenwood gathered his material. Rice's instructions had been clear: "Keep this quiet because I don't think the Pentagon"óread Rumsfeldó"would appreciate my NSC staff going over to brief the secretary of state on war preparations."

A White House driver took Miller and Greenwood the 10 blocks to the State Department. Up on the seventh floor, the halls were quiet and empty. The holiday already had begun. Powell wore a casual windbreaker and was reading a newspaper. His deputy and best friend, Richard Armitage, the outspoken, barrel-chested former naval officer who had served three tours in Vietnam, also was there.

Greenwood pulled out his charts and descriptions of the war plan. They included a major multidivisional southern thrust from Kuwait north into Baghdad. The U.S. 4th Infantry Division was still on ships in the Mediterranean, waiting to strike into Iraq from the north.

"A two-front war would certainly make sense," said Powell, the former Army general. "How are they going to help, being on ships?"

"Well, sir," Greenwood said, "the idea is that they get diplomatic permission to cut in from the north, but that hasn't been achieved yet."

"It's getting late in the game for that," Powell said, turning to Armitage. He was skeptical that Turkey would give permission for a whole U.S. infantry division of 20,000 troops to march through it. Leaving the division on ships was

"a stupid idea." It was important to get the 4th Infantry into the fight. He added, "That's one of a number of problems that I see with this plan."

As the other divisions move to Baghdad, Powell asked, how many U.S. forces will be left behind to stabilize the area and prevent attacks from the rear?

Greenwood said he didn't have a lot of information on that, but it would not be many because the concept was a lightning, blitzkrieg drive to Baghdad to topple Saddam.

That's a hell of a distance, Powell said, looking askance, noting that it was more than 300 miles, with some big cities along the route. "Can you believe what you're hearing here?" Powell said to Armitage. To lighten the moment, the former general started poking fun at Miller and Greenwood for coming up with such a plan.

"Sir," Greenwood said sheepishly, "I can't take full responsibility for this."

Powell made it clear he understood exactly where it had originated, namely, with Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks.

Greenwood had witnessed midlevel battles within the Bush administration, but now he had seen the same dysfunction at the most senior levels. Near-catastrophic voids in cooperation and information flow existed at the top, even on the most basic matters. Given that Bush and his team were on the brink of starting a war, there was nothing comforting about this experience. For Greenwood, it was one of the lowest of lows in his decades as a Marine.

"You hit a home run!" Miller assured Greenwood as they descended in the State Department elevator.

"Frank, I don't feel like I hit a home run. What is a broke-dick colonel like me who works for you at the White House doing briefing the secretary of state on a war plan for which we get information third-hand, through hook and crook?"

Now, years later, he held out hope that his summons for the secret Pentagon group would give him another chance to help turn around a war that he felt had been mismanaged from the beginning.

Chapter 16

O
ne by one, 16 men whose lives had been placed on hold showed up at the Pentagon for their mystery assignment.

Three were Marines, four were from the Army, four from the Navy and five from the Air Force. Some had logged significant time in Iraq or Afghanistan. Most had advanced degrees. But few knew the precise purpose behind their summons to the mother ship on the banks of the Potomac.

It was the last week of September, and they gathered in the National Military Command Center within the Joint Chiefs section of the Pentagonóthe nerve center of worldwide crisis response.

Pace had assembled the brightest military minds to study what had become of Iraq and to examine the United States'

broader global challenges. These were the star thinkers of the military, many of them destined to make up the next generation of admirals and generals. Now this windowless basement space would be their home for the rest of the year.

On September 27 and 28, Pace and the other chiefs, along with JCS staff director Lieutenant General Walter "Skip"

Sharp, outlined the assignment the colonels would tackle for the next three months.

The group was to remain highly confidential. If anyone asked what the colonels were doing, they were to stick to a cover storyóthey were conducting research for a series of war games.

Pace told the men to think broadly and creatively. They had the freedom to follow their intellects, and they need not come to consensus. Dissenting opinions were welcomed, even encouraged, he said. The colonels should try to figure out what decisions America must make in order to win "the long war," he said, the global struggle against terrorism.

Pace and the other chiefs posed a range of questions for the group to consider. Among them: How can the United States best implement all the elements of national power? Does the country have the correct national security strategy? How can it outthink and overmatch its enemies? How can we tackle the Israeli-Palestinian problem? How do we improve the American image throughout the world?

Take a critical look at the way America has waged the global war on terrorism. Analyze the role of CentCom. Study the responsibilities and performance of the JCS. Research historical insurgencies. Bring in experts and critical thinkers. Challenge any and all assumptions. Help the decision makers figure out the fight we're in. Take on the 800-pound gorilla in the roomóIraq.

The group would report directly to Pace and the service chiefs every Friday afternoon, schedules permitting, from 2:30 to 4:30.

* * *

A tangible excitement surrounded the colonels. Greenwood felt his adrenaline rising with the thought of the mission ahead. It seemed weighty and important. Seldom did such a small group of officers get the chance to influence policy at the highest level and perhaps put the countryóand the worldóon a better footing.

The group would get face time with the chairman and the Joint Chiefs each week. The secretary of defense would be looking to them for wisdom, he thought, and perhaps the president would too.

In those first weeks, the colonels immersed themselves in their task like soldiers digging trenches on the front linesómotivated, determined and resolute. There was a sense within the group, a certain idealism, that they were going to fix the Iraq problem.

Half jokingly, they began referring to themselves as the Council of Colonels.

* * *

On September 30, General Casey presented his view on the nature of the enemy to the NSC during a secure videoconference. "The enemyóand the security situationóis much more complex than ever before," he told them. He outlined four major groups that must be confronted: Sunni extremists, Shia extremists, those carrying out resistance attacks on the coalition, and the Iranians, who were covertly undermining stability.

* * *

"We're going to have to do this by the drink," Hadley told Bush, the former heavy drinker. "We're going to have to buy American support for continuing the war by the drink. We're going to have to have a new strategy. We're going to have to show that the new strategy is succeeding. And if we can have a three-month period where we begin to show some success, we can probably buy some support for another three-month period."

The president said that sounded right.

"We're going to have to do this on the installment plan," Hadley went on. They didn't have much time, certainly not the multiyear timelines General Casey was still using. They both knew they were getting hammered from the left and the right, and as Hadley saw it the criticism was basically the same. The Democrats were saying, "It's not working.

Go home." The Republicans were saying, "It's not working. Make it work or get out."

They both also knew that their most immediate vulnerability was from their own party. Lindsey Graham, the South Carolina senator, had told reporters, "We're on the verge of chaos, and the current plan is not working." Virginia Senator George Allen said, "We cannot continue doing the same things and expect different results. We have to adapt our operations, adapt our tactics." Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island and Olympia Snowe of Maine were among the high-profile Republican critics. But they were far from the only Republicans whose loyalty had worn thin.

Hadley and the president realized they would have to convince their colleagues by the drink too.

* * *

On Sunday, October 1, Hadley sent his deputy, J. D. Crouch, to talk with former Navy Captain William J. Luti, the senior director for defense on the NSC staff.

"Would you put together a concept, operational conceptóa planóon a new direction in Iraq?" Crouch asked. "Steve wants you to do this."

Luti, who previously had worked for Cheney and former Speaker Newt Gingrich, was known on the NSC staff for his hard-line views. He had strongly supported the Iraq War. He jumped at the chance to help turn it around.

Hadley knew that other reviews were under way within the governmentóRice's at State, another at the Pentagonónot to mention the Iraq Study Group. But he was unsure whether a surge option would emerge from any of them, and he wanted to make sure it got on the table. He had already concluded that a surge was the way to go, and he knew the president would want it as an option. The Luti assignment was essentially an insurance policy for the surge and a chance to assess the feasibility of adding more troops.

"Give it to me when you're done," Crouch told Luti. Work quickly. Work quietly. Highest classification. No leaks.

The House and Senate elections were only five weeks away.

* * *

In early October, the president set out campaigning for Republicans across the country. In Reno, Nevada, on October 2, he said, "If you listen closely to some of the leaders of the Democrat Party, it sounds like they think the best way to protect the American people is, wait until we're attacked again." But then he added, "What you're seeing is the beginning of a victory against an ideology of extremists." In Arizona, on October 4, he said the nature of warfare had changed since World War II and the Korean War. "This is a different kind of war," he said. "It's a war that depends upon our capacity to find individuals and bring them to justice before they strike again." It was the kind of round-'em-up-and-kill-'em mentality that General Casey felt reflected the president's basic misunderstanding of the war.

* * *

Condi Rice's worries were escalating. She had not been to Iraq for five months. "I'm going out," she told the president and Hadley. "I think I need to have a firsthand look."

Rice arrived unannounced in Baghdad on Thursday evening, October 5. After a brief meeting with Maliki and a 20-minute press conference, Rice met with the Sunni leaders in Ambassador Khalilzad's large, open living room around 8 P.M. The Iraqis lined the chairs and sofas in the room in an almost perfect square around the secretary. Khalilzad and Satterfield also sat in.