The Way of the Knife (46 page)

making use of groups like Delta Force:
Graham, 585.

You don’t need to put your troops:
Ibid.

the CIA had the authorities:
Thomas W. O’Connell, “9/11 Commission Recommendation for Consolidated Paramilitary Activities,” August 30, 2004.

the CIA was set up to grade its own work:
Stephen A. Cambone, “Memorandum for Secretary of Defense,” September 30, 2004.

meant for only him to see:
Author interview with Edward Gnehm.

CHAPTER 5: THE ANGRY BIRD

but insisted that they fire weapons:
The deployment of American troops to Yemen was authorized in an “Execute Order” signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs chairman General Richard Myers. The EXORD is discussed in a classified CENTCOM chronology of operations September 11, 2001–July 10, 2002, obtained by the author.

the first place outside of Afghanistan:
Account of meeting with Saleh comes from former senior American official.

al-Harethi was always careful:
James Bamford, “He’s in the Backseat!”
The Atlantic
(April 2006).

the surveillance net got its first big catch:
Rowan Scarborough,
Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004): 25 and Michael Smith,
Killer Elite
(Great Britain: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2006): 237.

the CIA was now authorized:
Bamford, “He’s in the Backseat!”

found at the scene:
“U.S. Missile Strike Kills al Qaeda Chief,”
CNN World
(November 5, 2002).

“bloody struggle”:
“Intelligence Policy,” National Commission on Terrorism Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 7 (2004).

he would have refused a direct order:
Ibid. The commission’s staff statement states only that “a former CTC chief” told the commission he would have refused the order to kill bin Laden. A member of the commission staff identified the CTC chief as Geoff O’Connell.

“You know”:
“The 9-11 Commission Report: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” (2004).

insufficient for White House approval:
Author interview with Richard Clarke.

various options for spying:
Ibid., and author interview with former senior CIA official.

a crude e-mail link:
Public remarks by R. James Woolsey at George Mason University, September 13, 2012.

the CIA’s war in Afghanistan during the 1980s:
Ibid.

the photo was upside down:
Author interview with Curt Hawes.

whom al Qaeda would end up killing:
See Henry Crumpton,
The Art of Intelligence,
and Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
to get fuller accounts of Blee’s trip to Afghanistan in 1999. In both books he is identified only as “Rich.”

the direction of clandestine operations:
James Risen, “David H. Blee, 83, CIA Spy Who Revised Defector Policy,”
The New York Times
(August 17, 2000).

“There’s no POW issue here”:
Author interview with Richard Clarke.

a satellite company with transponder space to rent:
Author interview with White House official during the Clinton administration.

Sandy Berger and his staff:
Crumpton,
The Art of Intelligence,
154.

an abandoned church building:
Author interview with Curt Hawes.

hit a target tank in its path:
Richard Whittle, “Predator’s Big Safari,” Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Paper 7 (August 2011).

as he controlled the Predator joystick and fired a missile:
Author interview with Curt Hawes.

spinning the turret thirty degrees:
Air Force Press Release, February 27, 2001. Available at www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/docs/man-ipc-predator-010228.htm.

“the United States is very clearly”:
Jane Mayer, “The Predator War,”
The New Yorker,
October 26, 2009.

no authority to fire a Hellfire missile:
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “9-11 Commission Report,” (2004).

the spy agency was now hawking images:
Author interview with Ross Newland.

he demanded that American spies:
Author interview with former senior American official.

CHAPTER 6: A TRUE PASHTUN

He asked one of his lieutenants:
Zahid Hussain,
The Scorpion’s Tail
(New York: Free Press, 2010): 73.

just like the Soviets had years earlier:
Shaukat Qadir, “Understanding the Insurgency in FATA.” Available at http://shaukatqadir.info/pdfs/FATA.pdf.

the illiterate youth:
Muhammad I. Khan, “Nek Muhammad Wazir,”
The Herald
(September 16, 2005).

even when his commanders:
Syed Saleem Shahzad, “The Legacy of Nek Mohammed,”
Asia Times Online
(July 20, 2004).

American firebases across the border:
Christine C. Fair and Seth Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within,”
Survival
51, no. 6 (December 2009–January 2010): 168.

not only his clothes but his pillow covers:
Ibid., 169.

some parents refused to accept:
Hussain,
The Scorpion’s Tail
, 71.

The crowd cheered wildly:
“Making Deals with the Militants,” part 4 of
Return of the Taliban
, PBS
Frontline
, October 3, 2006.

“Whatever happened”:
Ibid.

“That should make it clear”:
Iqbal Khattak, “I Did Not Surrender to the Military,”
Friday Times
(April 30–May 6, 2004).

“If [Pakistani troops]”:
Author interview with Asad Munir.

“There is no al Qaeda here”:
Dilawar K. Wazir, “Top Militant Vows to Continue Jihad,”
Dawn
(April 26, 2004).

“Nek Muhammad really pissed off”:
Author interview with former CIA station chief in Islamabad.

mountain camps where Kashmiri:
Author interview with senior American intelligence official.

HE LIVED AND DIED LIKE A TRUE PASHTUN
: Hussain,
The Scorpion’s Tail
, 73.

preventing the simmering dispute:
Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Rise of Pakistan’s Quiet Man,”
BBC News
(June 17, 2009).

where he would shop for suits and ties:
Author interview with former CIA official.

“the price of Soviet presence in Afghanistan”:
Major Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, “Strengths and Weaknesses of the Afghan Resistance Movement.” Thesis paper for Kayani’s Masters of Military Art and Science at the Command and General Staff, Fort Leavenworth, 1988.

years more of bloody conflict:
The final passage from Kayani’s thesis, a section under the heading “Political Settlement,” is particularly illuminating if you were to consider substituting “Americans” for “Soviets,” and “Washington” for “Moscow”: “It is not likely that the Soviets will be willing to negotiate about Afghanistan itself but their presence there could be a bargaining chip or a point of leverage to bargain for concessions in some other areas as part of a package deal. If that happens, the central problem for Moscow will be the inability of the Afghan regime to survive in the absence of Soviet troops. Logically the Soviets will trade for concessions which ensure the continuation of their influence in the Afghan government. The most that they could be expected to accommodate is the ARM sharing power with the Kabul regime but as a weaker partner.”

CHAPTER 7: CONVERGENCE

There was about to be:
Four former CIA officers described the events surrounding the al Qaeda meeting and planning for a military operation in Pakistan.

riding around the mountain villages:
Peter L. Bergen,
Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden—from 9/11 to Abbottabad
(New York: Crown, 2012): 160.

“This is a really bad idea, Stan”:
Author interview with former CIA station chief in Islamabad.

had used the technique:
Memorandum for John Rizzo from Stephen Bradbury, May 30, 2005.

“unauthorized, improvised, inhumane”:
CIA Inspector General, “Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003),” May 7, 2004, 102.

The waterboards were bought locally:
David Johnston and Mark Mazzetti, “A Window into CIA’s Embrace of Secret Jails,”
The New York Times
(August 12, 2009).

The entertainment was taken away:
Ibid.

were the political winds to shift:
Author interview with senior Bush administration official.

“the U.S. government will not stand behind them”:
CIA Inspector General, “Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003),” 101.

the plans had been temporarily shelved:
Author interview with two retired CIA officers.

he had played a leading role:
Henry A. Crumpton,
The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service
(New York: Penguin, 2012): 173.

to sell programs back to the government:
Details about Blackwater’s role in the assassination program comes from three former CIA officials. See also Adam Ciralsky, “Tycoon, Contractor, Soldier, Spy,”
Vanity Fair
(January 2010).