The World Was Going Our Way (92 page)
Read The World Was Going Our Way Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
74
. Finklestone,
Anwar Sadat
, p. 16.
. Finklestone,
Anwar Sadat
, p. 16.
75
. k-18, 486; vol. 6, ch. 8.
. k-18, 486; vol. 6, ch. 8.
76
. vol. 6, ch. 8.
. vol. 6, ch. 8.
77
. vol. 6, ch. 9, app. 3.
. vol. 6, ch. 9, app. 3.
78
. Ismael and El-Sa‘id,
The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988
, pp. 132-3. The fraternal messages to the CPSU and Arab Communist parties were handed by an emissary of the Communist leader Khaled Mohieddin to the Soviet ambassador for onward transmission; k-26, 83.
. Ismael and El-Sa‘id,
The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988
, pp. 132-3. The fraternal messages to the CPSU and Arab Communist parties were handed by an emissary of the Communist leader Khaled Mohieddin to the Soviet ambassador for onward transmission; k-26, 83.
79
. k-18, 373.
. k-18, 373.
80
. The NPUP began in 1976 as an alternative, officially permitted, policy platform within the ruling ASU and became an independent party in the following year.
. The NPUP began in 1976 as an alternative, officially permitted, policy platform within the ruling ASU and became an independent party in the following year.
81
. These amounts were handed to Mohieddin on 5 June 1976; k-26, 11, 15.
. These amounts were handed to Mohieddin on 5 June 1976; k-26, 11, 15.
82
. k-14, 562. Mitrokhin noted, after reading a 1974 file relating to the Cairo residency, ‘The recruitment of intelligence officers and contacts as KGB agents was permitted in exceptional circumstances and with special permission from the leadership of the Centre’ (k-18, 49). The submission by Kryuchkov and Dushin was presumably drafted in the light of this provision. Mitrokhin’s notes, however, contain no example of such ‘special permission’ being given between 1974 and Sadat’s assassination in 1981.
. k-14, 562. Mitrokhin noted, after reading a 1974 file relating to the Cairo residency, ‘The recruitment of intelligence officers and contacts as KGB agents was permitted in exceptional circumstances and with special permission from the leadership of the Centre’ (k-18, 49). The submission by Kryuchkov and Dushin was presumably drafted in the light of this provision. Mitrokhin’s notes, however, contain no example of such ‘special permission’ being given between 1974 and Sadat’s assassination in 1981.
83
. k-14, 530.
. k-14, 530.
84
. k-5, 176. Among others who showed declining enthusiasm for contact with the KGB was KHALIL, an Egyptian ambassador who, while a counsellor at the embassy in Moscow, had been seduced by a KGB swallow codenamed VIKHROVA. In 1973-74, with KGB assistance, he made three secret journeys without a visa from the foreign capital in which he was based to renew contact with VIKHROVA. On one of these visits KHALIL concluded a bigamous marriage with her, which was subsequently dissolved. Since he was based outside Egypt, he retained his agent status. KHALIL’s file records, however, that though expressing gratitude ‘from the bottom of his heart’ in 1975 for the understanding shown by the KGB during his affair and marriage with, as well as divorce from, VIKHROVA, he refused to supply classified information (k-24, 300).
. k-5, 176. Among others who showed declining enthusiasm for contact with the KGB was KHALIL, an Egyptian ambassador who, while a counsellor at the embassy in Moscow, had been seduced by a KGB swallow codenamed VIKHROVA. In 1973-74, with KGB assistance, he made three secret journeys without a visa from the foreign capital in which he was based to renew contact with VIKHROVA. On one of these visits KHALIL concluded a bigamous marriage with her, which was subsequently dissolved. Since he was based outside Egypt, he retained his agent status. KHALIL’s file records, however, that though expressing gratitude ‘from the bottom of his heart’ in 1975 for the understanding shown by the KGB during his affair and marriage with, as well as divorce from, VIKHROVA, he refused to supply classified information (k-24, 300).
85
. k-14, 339.
. k-14, 339.
86
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
More Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 82-5; k-12, 394.
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
More Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 82-5; k-12, 394.
87
. Report on the activities of the Cairo residency in 1972-76 by FCD Directorate R (Operational Planning and Analysis); k-18, 485.
. Report on the activities of the Cairo residency in 1972-76 by FCD Directorate R (Operational Planning and Analysis); k-18, 485.
88
. Baker,
Sadat and After
, pp. 118-25.
. Baker,
Sadat and After
, pp. 118-25.
89
. k-26, 78.
. k-26, 78.
90
. k-26, 14.
. k-26, 14.
91
. k-26, 16.
. k-26, 16.
92
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1980
, vol. 2, pp. 607-8.
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1980
, vol. 2, pp. 607-8.
93
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 546-7.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 546-7.
94
. Finklestone,
Anwar Sadat
, ch. 23.
. Finklestone,
Anwar Sadat
, ch. 23.
95
. k-13, 241.
. k-13, 241.
96
. Baker,
Sadat and After
, pp. 159-61.
. Baker,
Sadat and After
, pp. 159-61.
97
. The allocation for the Egyptian Communist Party in 1978 was $100,000 (k-26, 17); the Cairo residency requested and probably received an additional $20,000 in December (k-26, 19). In 1979 the allocation was again $100,000 (k-26, 21), raised to $120,000 in 1980 (k-26, 22). Mitrokhin’s notes give few details of the allocations to the NPUP.
. The allocation for the Egyptian Communist Party in 1978 was $100,000 (k-26, 17); the Cairo residency requested and probably received an additional $20,000 in December (k-26, 19). In 1979 the allocation was again $100,000 (k-26, 21), raised to $120,000 in 1980 (k-26, 22). Mitrokhin’s notes give few details of the allocations to the NPUP.
98
. k-26, 18.
. k-26, 18.
99
. k-13, 241. Without the knowledge of Mohieddin and the Egyptian Communist Party, the KGB also made contact in 1980 with Communist splinter groups; k-26, 26.
. k-13, 241. Without the knowledge of Mohieddin and the Egyptian Communist Party, the KGB also made contact in 1980 with Communist splinter groups; k-26, 26.
100
. Kassem,
In the Guise of Democracy
, p. 123.
. Kassem,
In the Guise of Democracy
, p. 123.
101
. k-24, 45. A third target of Syrian intelligence and the PFLP was an adviser of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia.
. k-24, 45. A third target of Syrian intelligence and the PFLP was an adviser of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia.
102
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 547.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 547.
103
. Gromyko,
Memories
, pp. 222-3.
. Gromyko,
Memories
, pp. 222-3.
104
. Kassem,
In the Guise of Democracy
; quotation from p. 107.
. Kassem,
In the Guise of Democracy
; quotation from p. 107.
Iran and Iraq
1
. vol. 2, ch. 1. On the deportation and liquidation of ‘anti-Soviet elements’ across the Soviet border, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 101 - 2.
. vol. 2, ch. 1. On the deportation and liquidation of ‘anti-Soviet elements’ across the Soviet border, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 101 - 2.
2
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 263.
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 263.
3
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 202-6; Roosevelt,
Countercoup
, chs. 12, 13.
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 202-6; Roosevelt,
Countercoup
, chs. 12, 13.
4
. Shlaim,
The Iron Wall
, p. 195.
. Shlaim,
The Iron Wall
, p. 195.
5
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 41.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 41.
6
. The Centre claimed improbably that the Americans blamed the forgery not on the KGB but on the British, who were said to be jealous of the strength of US influence in Iran; vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 41-2. On the Shah’s susceptibility to conspiracy theory, see Pipes,
Hidden Hand
, pp. 78-80.
. The Centre claimed improbably that the Americans blamed the forgery not on the KGB but on the British, who were said to be jealous of the strength of US influence in Iran; vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 41-2. On the Shah’s susceptibility to conspiracy theory, see Pipes,
Hidden Hand
, pp. 78-80.
7
. Shawcross,
The Shah’s Last Ride
, p. 83.
. Shawcross,
The Shah’s Last Ride
, p. 83.
8
. vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 43-4.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 43-4.
9
. vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 18.
. vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 18.
10
. Pahlavi,
An Enduring Love
, pp. 68-9. Tafazoli had no part in the subsequent stages of the Shah’s courtship of Farah Diba, which are described in these memoirs.
. Pahlavi,
An Enduring Love
, pp. 68-9. Tafazoli had no part in the subsequent stages of the Shah’s courtship of Farah Diba, which are described in these memoirs.
11
. Ibid., pp. 66-7. The friend refused to seek the Empress’s help to get her out of jail.
. Ibid., pp. 66-7. The friend refused to seek the Empress’s help to get her out of jail.
12
. vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 18.
. vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 18.
13
. Pahlavi,
An Enduring Love
, p. 67.
. Pahlavi,
An Enduring Love
, p. 67.
14
. Shawcross,
The Shah’s Last Ride
, pp. 97-8.
. Shawcross,
The Shah’s Last Ride
, pp. 97-8.
15
. Ibid., pp. 85, 160-61. The KGB reported that Bakhtiar had ‘displayed exceptional harshness towards communists’. It later claimed that Service A fabrications, brought to the attention of the Shah’s regime in 1969-70, led to his ‘liquidation’; vol. 2 misc., item 14.
. Ibid., pp. 85, 160-61. The KGB reported that Bakhtiar had ‘displayed exceptional harshness towards communists’. It later claimed that Service A fabrications, brought to the attention of the Shah’s regime in 1969-70, led to his ‘liquidation’; vol. 2 misc., item 14.
16
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, pp. 216-18. Mitrokhin’s brief note on Kuzichkin’s defection confirms that he had ‘a lot of information about illegals’ (vol. 2, ch. 1).
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, pp. 216-18. Mitrokhin’s brief note on Kuzichkin’s defection confirms that he had ‘a lot of information about illegals’ (vol. 2, ch. 1).
17
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p.362. After 1962 the Soviet leadership abandoned assassination as a normal instrument of policy outside the Soviet bloc, resorting to it only on rare occasions such as the killing of President Hafizullah Amin of Afghanistan in December 1979; see below, pp. 401-2.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p.362. After 1962 the Soviet leadership abandoned assassination as a normal instrument of policy outside the Soviet bloc, resorting to it only on rare occasions such as the killing of President Hafizullah Amin of Afghanistan in December 1979; see below, pp. 401-2.
18
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp.359-61, 363-5.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp.359-61, 363-5.
19
. vol. 2, ch. 2.
. vol. 2, ch. 2.
20
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 374.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 374.
21
. vol. 2, ch. 2.
. vol. 2, ch. 2.
22
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 382- 3.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 382- 3.
23
. Little, ‘A Fool’s Errand’.
. Little, ‘A Fool’s Errand’.
24
. Milani,
The Persian Sphinx
, pp. 229-30.
. Milani,
The Persian Sphinx
, pp. 229-30.
25
. Shawcross,
The Shah’s Last Ride
, p. 206.
. Shawcross,
The Shah’s Last Ride
, p. 206.
26
. t-7, 140.
. t-7, 140.
27
. t-7, 143.
. t-7, 143.
28
. In November 1971, for example, President Bakr’s National Charter, which proposed a ‘national coalition in which . . . all progressive forces will participate’, was enthusiastically received in Moscow, despite serious reservations by the ICP. Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 114-15.
. In November 1971, for example, President Bakr’s National Charter, which proposed a ‘national coalition in which . . . all progressive forces will participate’, was enthusiastically received in Moscow, despite serious reservations by the ICP. Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 114-15.
29
. Ibid., pp. 114-17.
. Ibid., pp. 114-17.
30
. k-24, 54-7.
. k-24, 54-7.
31
. Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 22, 70-91; Hiro,
Desert Shield to Desert Storm
, p. 51.
. Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 22, 70-91; Hiro,
Desert Shield to Desert Storm
, p. 51.
32
. British Embassy, Baghdad, to FCO, 15 Nov. and 20 Dec. 1969, FCO 17/871, The National Archives, Kew (copies on National Security Archive website).
. British Embassy, Baghdad, to FCO, 15 Nov. and 20 Dec. 1969, FCO 17/871, The National Archives, Kew (copies on National Security Archive website).
33
. Sebag Montefiore, ‘Stalin and Saddam’; Coughlin,
Saddam
, pp. 47-8, 75-6, 174.
. Sebag Montefiore, ‘Stalin and Saddam’; Coughlin,
Saddam
, pp. 47-8, 75-6, 174.
34
. Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 28, 128-9; Karsh and Rautsi,
Saddam Hussein
, pp. 97-8, 131. On the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan, see below, p. 386.
. Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 28, 128-9; Karsh and Rautsi,
Saddam Hussein
, pp. 97-8, 131. On the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan, see below, p. 386.
35
. k-26, 116.
. k-26, 116.
36
. k-13, 221.
. k-13, 221.
37
. k-13, 224.
. k-13, 224.
38
. Dulaymi, ‘Stop the Repressions and Persecution’; Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 129-30, 137, 139-40.
. Dulaymi, ‘Stop the Repressions and Persecution’; Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, pp. 129-30, 137, 139-40.
39
. Mogarebi had been drawn into intelligence work in 1944 by the Soviet agent Lieutenant Colonel Makhmud (codenamed IMAM), leader of a group of Tudeh [Communist] sympathizers within the Iranian army, who acted as his controller. After Makhmud’s death in 1954, Mogarebi was run directly by the Tehran residency; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
. Mogarebi had been drawn into intelligence work in 1944 by the Soviet agent Lieutenant Colonel Makhmud (codenamed IMAM), leader of a group of Tudeh [Communist] sympathizers within the Iranian army, who acted as his controller. After Makhmud’s death in 1954, Mogarebi was run directly by the Tehran residency; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
40
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 198.
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 198.
41
. In 1976 the residency communicated with Mogarebi on eighteen occasions by radio from a residency car, five times by personal meetings and twice by dead letter-box. Mogarebi refused to travel further from his home for personal meetings or to conduct car-to-car radio communications; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
. In 1976 the residency communicated with Mogarebi on eighteen occasions by radio from a residency car, five times by personal meetings and twice by dead letter-box. Mogarebi refused to travel further from his home for personal meetings or to conduct car-to-car radio communications; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
42
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
43
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 196.
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 196.
44
. The radio signals used to communicate with Mogarebi from a residency car were known as the ‘Close Information Link’ system; ibid., pp. 196-7. A KGB damage assessment arrived at four possible explanations for SAVAK’s detection of Mogarebi: (1) inadequate attention by Mogarebi to his security; (2) an intelligence leak which led SAVAK to conclude that the KGB had a source in the General Staff; (3) mistakes by the Tehran residency in making contact with Mogarebi; or (4) Mogarebi’s past association with Iranian Communists and, in particular, with the KGB agent Lieutenant Colonel Makhmud (IMAM); according to Mogarebi’s KGB file, he had been arrested in 1954 but released because of lack of evidence; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
. The radio signals used to communicate with Mogarebi from a residency car were known as the ‘Close Information Link’ system; ibid., pp. 196-7. A KGB damage assessment arrived at four possible explanations for SAVAK’s detection of Mogarebi: (1) inadequate attention by Mogarebi to his security; (2) an intelligence leak which led SAVAK to conclude that the KGB had a source in the General Staff; (3) mistakes by the Tehran residency in making contact with Mogarebi; or (4) Mogarebi’s past association with Iranian Communists and, in particular, with the KGB agent Lieutenant Colonel Makhmud (IMAM); according to Mogarebi’s KGB file, he had been arrested in 1954 but released because of lack of evidence; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 21.
45
. vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 23. The KGB remained in contact with ZHAMAN until August 1982; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 24.
. vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 23. The KGB remained in contact with ZHAMAN until August 1982; vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 24.
46
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 24. Hoveyda saw the report while Court Minister for a month after his resignation as Prime Minister in August 1977. SAVAK seems to have forgotten that its report to the Shah would also be seen by Hoveyda as Court Minister.
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 24. Hoveyda saw the report while Court Minister for a month after his resignation as Prime Minister in August 1977. SAVAK seems to have forgotten that its report to the Shah would also be seen by Hoveyda as Court Minister.
47
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 238.
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 238.
48
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 38.
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 38.
49
. The FCD ‘work plan’ for 1974 had included an operation designed ‘to establish contact with Ayatollah Khomeini, an Iranian émigré in Iraq with a large number of supporters amongst the clergy in Iran and the opposition to the Shah, and to assess his possibilities’. Mitrokhin noted that the operation ‘was not very successful’; vol. 2, ch. 5.
. The FCD ‘work plan’ for 1974 had included an operation designed ‘to establish contact with Ayatollah Khomeini, an Iranian émigré in Iraq with a large number of supporters amongst the clergy in Iran and the opposition to the Shah, and to assess his possibilities’. Mitrokhin noted that the operation ‘was not very successful’; vol. 2, ch. 5.
50
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 438-41.
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 438-41.
51
. Mogarebi was shot in December 1978. The residency’s proposal to help his family was turned down by the Centre as too risky; Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, pp. 196-200.
. Mogarebi was shot in December 1978. The residency’s proposal to help his family was turned down by the Centre as too risky; Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, pp. 196-200.
52
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 24.
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 24.
53
. vol. 2, ch. 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record what retaliation against the Iranian embassy in Moscow actually occurred.
. vol. 2, ch. 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record what retaliation against the Iranian embassy in Moscow actually occurred.
54
. vol. 2, ch. 2.
. vol. 2, ch. 2.
55
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 365, 370 - 2. Though Mitrokhin noted the precise location of the Swiss and some other European caches, he did not record details of the DLB in the Tehran suburbs.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 365, 370 - 2. Though Mitrokhin noted the precise location of the Swiss and some other European caches, he did not record details of the DLB in the Tehran suburbs.
56
. Shawcross,
The Shah’s Last Ride
, p. 275. Mitrokhin’s notes identify Kazakov as a KGB officer operating under diplomatic cover in the consular section of the Tehran residency; vol. 2, app. 2, item 57.
. Shawcross,
The Shah’s Last Ride
, p. 275. Mitrokhin’s notes identify Kazakov as a KGB officer operating under diplomatic cover in the consular section of the Tehran residency; vol. 2, app. 2, item 57.
57
. Taheri,
The Unknown Life of the Shah
, pp. 242, 262.
. Taheri,
The Unknown Life of the Shah
, pp. 242, 262.
58
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 230.
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 230.
59
. vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 49-50; Fadeykin’s career is summarized in vol. 2, app. 2, item 43.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 49-50; Fadeykin’s career is summarized in vol. 2, app. 2, item 43.
60
. Rafizadeh,
Witness
, p. 264.
. Rafizadeh,
Witness
, p. 264.
61
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 49.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 49.
62
. Pipes,
Hidden Hand
, pp. 80 - 81.
. Pipes,
Hidden Hand
, pp. 80 - 81.
63
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 38.
. vol. 2, ch. 5, p. 38.
64
. Taheri,
The Unknown Life of the Shah
, p. 244.
. Taheri,
The Unknown Life of the Shah
, p. 244.
65
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 440-41.
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, pp. 440-41.
66
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, pp. 256-7.
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, pp. 256-7.
67
. Milani,
The Persian Sphinx
, pp. 338-40.
. Milani,
The Persian Sphinx
, pp. 338-40.
68
. vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 24.
. vol. 2, ch. 3, p. 24.
69
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 54.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 54.
70
. Pipes,
Hidden Hand
, pp. 81-2; Moin,
Khomeini
, p. 204.
. Pipes,
Hidden Hand
, pp. 81-2; Moin,
Khomeini
, p. 204.
71
. vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 52-3.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 52-3.
72
. Shebarshin had become resident following the death in office of Fadeykin; vol. 2, app. 2, items 43, 53. Less than a decade later, Shebarshin, who had already served as resident in New Delhi, was to become head of the FCD.
. Shebarshin had become resident following the death in office of Fadeykin; vol. 2, app. 2, items 43, 53. Less than a decade later, Shebarshin, who had already served as resident in New Delhi, was to become head of the FCD.
73
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 127-8.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 127-8.
74
. Wright,
In the Name of God
, p. 96.
. Wright,
In the Name of God
, p. 96.
75
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 53.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 53.
76
. Unusually, Mitrokhin did not record KOLCHIN’s real name.
. Unusually, Mitrokhin did not record KOLCHIN’s real name.
77
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 54.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 54.
78
. The Tehran residency believed that Qotbzadeh’s hostility to the Soviet Union went back to his years as a student in the United States when he had been briefly recruited as a GRU agent but had quarrelled with his controller. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, pp. 302-3; Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, p. 233.
. The Tehran residency believed that Qotbzadeh’s hostility to the Soviet Union went back to his years as a student in the United States when he had been briefly recruited as a GRU agent but had quarrelled with his controller. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, pp. 302-3; Smolansky and Smolansky,
The USSR and Iraq
, p. 233.
79
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 56.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 56.
80
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 304.
. Kuzichkin,
Inside the KGB
, p. 304.
81
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 53.
. vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 53.
82
. Moin,
Khomeini
, pp. 252-3.
. Moin,
Khomeini
, pp. 252-3.
83
. Abrahamian,
Tortured Confessions
, pp. 129-31.
. Abrahamian,
Tortured Confessions
, pp. 129-31.
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