The World Was Going Our Way (96 page)
Read The World Was Going Our Way Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
Asia: Introduction
1
. Kim Il Sung’s refusal to defer to Moscow was not accompanied by strident denunciations of Soviet revisionism on the Chinese model. From the early 1960s he found himself courted by both Moscow and Beijing, and generally tried to avoid taking sides. The lowest point in Kim’s relations with the PRC came during the Cultural Revolution when Chinese loudspeakers along the entire length of the Korean border broadcast denunciations of North Korean ‘revisionism’ and there were a number of unpublicized border clashes; Schäfer, ‘Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict’, documents 6, 8.
. Kim Il Sung’s refusal to defer to Moscow was not accompanied by strident denunciations of Soviet revisionism on the Chinese model. From the early 1960s he found himself courted by both Moscow and Beijing, and generally tried to avoid taking sides. The lowest point in Kim’s relations with the PRC came during the Cultural Revolution when Chinese loudspeakers along the entire length of the Korean border broadcast denunciations of North Korean ‘revisionism’ and there were a number of unpublicized border clashes; Schäfer, ‘Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict’, documents 6, 8.
2
. Sebag Montefiore,
Stalin
, pp. 618-20.
. Sebag Montefiore,
Stalin
, pp. 618-20.
3
. Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?”’; Andrew and Elkner, ‘Stalin and Intelligence’, pp. 83-4.
. Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?”’; Andrew and Elkner, ‘Stalin and Intelligence’, pp. 83-4.
4
. See below, pp. 272-3.
. See below, pp. 272-3.
5
. Chin et al., ‘New Central and East European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia’, p. 450.
. Chin et al., ‘New Central and East European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia’, p. 450.
6
. See below, p. 286.
. See below, p. 286.
7
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 535.
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 535.
8
. See below, pp. 298-9.
. See below, pp. 298-9.
9
. k-27, 498.
. k-27, 498.
10
. Gromyko wrote in January 1967 in a memorandum approved by the Politburo, ‘We should go on rendering comprehensive assistance to the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] in consolidating its defence capacity to resist the [US] aggression, without getting directly involved in the war.’ Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, appendix, p. 641.
. Gromyko wrote in January 1967 in a memorandum approved by the Politburo, ‘We should go on rendering comprehensive assistance to the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] in consolidating its defence capacity to resist the [US] aggression, without getting directly involved in the war.’ Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, appendix, p. 641.
11
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 383.
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 383.
12
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, p. 323.
. Andrew,
For the President’s Eyes Only
, p. 323.
13
. Semichastnyi,
Bespokoinoe serdtse
, pp. 331-4. Semichastny ‘categorically denies’ allegations that any US PoW was either sent to the Soviet gulag or interrogated in Moscow during his five years as KGB Chairman.
. Semichastnyi,
Bespokoinoe serdtse
, pp. 331-4. Semichastny ‘categorically denies’ allegations that any US PoW was either sent to the Soviet gulag or interrogated in Moscow during his five years as KGB Chairman.
14
. Gaiduk, ‘The Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations’, p. 252.
. Gaiduk, ‘The Vietnam War and Soviet-American Relations’, p. 252.
15
. k-19, 192.
. k-19, 192.
16
. k-19, 195.
. k-19, 195.
17
. k-12, 323. The fact that Mitrokhin’s notes identify no other agent or confidential contact with access to classified information which compared to that of ISAYEYEV suggests, but does not prove, that KGB sources in Vietnam were generally low-grade. Even ISAYEYEV was categorized as a confidential contact rather than an agent, probably because of the limits which he imposed on his collaboration.
. k-12, 323. The fact that Mitrokhin’s notes identify no other agent or confidential contact with access to classified information which compared to that of ISAYEYEV suggests, but does not prove, that KGB sources in Vietnam were generally low-grade. Even ISAYEYEV was categorized as a confidential contact rather than an agent, probably because of the limits which he imposed on his collaboration.
18
. See below, pp. 313, 321-2.
. See below, pp. 313, 321-2.
19
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 400.
. Gromyko and Ponomarev (eds.),
Soviet Foreign Policy
, vol. 2, p. 400.
20
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 73.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 73.
21
. Rubinstein and Smith (eds.),
Anti-Americanism in the Third World
, p. 138; Hollander,
Anti-Americanism
, p. 346.
. Rubinstein and Smith (eds.),
Anti-Americanism in the Third World
, p. 138; Hollander,
Anti-Americanism
, p. 346.
22
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 79.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 79.
23
. vol. 3 misc., item 501.
. vol. 3 misc., item 501.
24
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 562-3.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 562-3.
25
. UNI report, 4 Aug. 2004.
. UNI report, 4 Aug. 2004.
26
. On KGB policy to the Orthodox Church, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 28.
. On KGB policy to the Orthodox Church, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 28.
27
. See below, ch. 20.
. See below, ch. 20.
28
. See below, pp. 398-402.
. See below, pp. 398-402.
29
. Cherkashin,
Spy Handler
, p. 275.
. Cherkashin,
Spy Handler
, p. 275.
30
. Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’.
. Kuzichkin, ‘Coups and Killings in Kabul’.
31
. See, for example, Leonov,
Likholet’e
.
. See, for example, Leonov,
Likholet’e
.
The People’s Republic of China
1
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 126-7.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 126-7.
2
. McKnight,
Espionage and the Roots of the Cold War
, pp. 118-21; ‘Communist Activities in China, Federated Malay States, etc. (The “Noulens Case”)’, box 4, Record Group 262 (records of the British-dominated Shanghai Municipal Police), National Archives, Washington, D.C.
. McKnight,
Espionage and the Roots of the Cold War
, pp. 118-21; ‘Communist Activities in China, Federated Malay States, etc. (The “Noulens Case”)’, box 4, Record Group 262 (records of the British-dominated Shanghai Municipal Police), National Archives, Washington, D.C.
3
. Byron and Pack,
The Claws of the Dragon
, parts I and II.
. Byron and Pack,
The Claws of the Dragon
, parts I and II.
4
. Salisbury,
The New Emperors
, pp. 217ff.
. Salisbury,
The New Emperors
, pp. 217ff.
5
. Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
. Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
6
. Goncharov, Lewis and Litai,
Uncertain Partners
, p. 74.
. Goncharov, Lewis and Litai,
Uncertain Partners
, p. 74.
7
. Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’; Zubok and Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War
, pp. 61, 297 n. 64.
. Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’; Zubok and Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War
, pp. 61, 297 n. 64.
8
. Goncharov, Lewis and Litai,
Uncertain Partners
, p. 74.
. Goncharov, Lewis and Litai,
Uncertain Partners
, p. 74.
9
.
USSR-China in a Changing World
, p. 74.
.
USSR-China in a Changing World
, p. 74.
10
. Semichastnyi,
Bespokoinoe serdtse
, p. 335.
. Semichastnyi,
Bespokoinoe serdtse
, p. 335.
11
. k-19, 5.
. k-19, 5.
12
. Cradock,
Know Your Enemy
, pp. 164-7.
. Cradock,
Know Your Enemy
, pp. 164-7.
13
. ‘Deng Xiaoping’s Talks with the Soviet Ambassador and Leadership, 1957-1963’, p. 181; Pleshakov, ‘Nikita Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations’, p. 236.
. ‘Deng Xiaoping’s Talks with the Soviet Ambassador and Leadership, 1957-1963’, p. 181; Pleshakov, ‘Nikita Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations’, p. 236.
14
. Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao
, pp. 397-8.
. Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao
, pp. 397-8.
15
. Wu,
Laogai
, p. 26.
. Wu,
Laogai
, p. 26.
16
. Byron and Pack,
The Claws of the Dragon
, pp. 250-53. On Kang Sheng’s return to favour, see ibid., ch. 11, and Salisbury,
The New Emperors
, p. 221.
. Byron and Pack,
The Claws of the Dragon
, pp. 250-53. On Kang Sheng’s return to favour, see ibid., ch. 11, and Salisbury,
The New Emperors
, p. 221.
17
. Cradock,
Know Your Enemy
, p. 167.
. Cradock,
Know Your Enemy
, p. 167.
18
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 494.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 494.
19
. ‘Deng Xiaoping’s Talks with the Soviet Ambassador and Leadership, 1957-1963’, pp. 181-2.
. ‘Deng Xiaoping’s Talks with the Soviet Ambassador and Leadership, 1957-1963’, pp. 181-2.
20
. Byron and Pack,
The Claws of the Dragon
, p. 253.
. Byron and Pack,
The Claws of the Dragon
, p. 253.
21
. Chang,
Friends and Enemies
, pp. 259-61.
. Chang,
Friends and Enemies
, pp. 259-61.
22
. Wolf,
Man without a Face
, p. 256.
. Wolf,
Man without a Face
, p. 256.
23
. Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
. Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
24
. Zubok and Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War
, p. 61.
. Zubok and Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War
, p. 61.
25
. During the 1950s Hartvig was used by both Line PR and Line X at the Helsinki residency. Line K later used him for active-measures operations as well as intelligence collection. Though he retired in 1968, he remained in contact with the residency until his death in 1979 (k-14, 756).
. During the 1950s Hartvig was used by both Line PR and Line X at the Helsinki residency. Line K later used him for active-measures operations as well as intelligence collection. Though he retired in 1968, he remained in contact with the residency until his death in 1979 (k-14, 756).
26
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 494-5.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 494-5.
27
. Semichastnyi,
Bespokoinoe serdtse
, p. 335.
. Semichastnyi,
Bespokoinoe serdtse
, p. 335.
28
. Directive of the head of the FCD, No. 00156, 2 September 1967; k-19, 4.
. Directive of the head of the FCD, No. 00156, 2 September 1967; k-19, 4.
29
. As Beijing’s oldest university, Peking University still keeps its traditional English transliteration.
. As Beijing’s oldest university, Peking University still keeps its traditional English transliteration.
30
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 495-7.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 495-7.
31
. k-19, 1, 8.
. k-19, 1, 8.
32
. ‘Xinjiang, China’s Restive Northwest’; Burles,
Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics
.
. ‘Xinjiang, China’s Restive Northwest’; Burles,
Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics
.
33
. Short,
The Dragon and the Bear
, p. 186; ‘Xinjiang, China’s Restive Northwest’.
. Short,
The Dragon and the Bear
, p. 186; ‘Xinjiang, China’s Restive Northwest’.
34
. k-19, 9. On the persecution of Mongolians in Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution see Sneath,
Changing Inner Mongolia
, ch. 4.
. k-19, 9. On the persecution of Mongolians in Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution see Sneath,
Changing Inner Mongolia
, ch. 4.
35
. k-27, 420.
. k-27, 420.
36
. Politburo resolution No. P122/97, 15 April 1968; k-27, 420.
. Politburo resolution No. P122/97, 15 April 1968; k-27, 420.
37
. ‘Uighhur’ [pseud.], ‘
Sherki Türkestan Evasi
’; Tillett, ‘The National Minorities Factor in the Sino-Soviet Dispute’.
. ‘Uighhur’ [pseud.], ‘
Sherki Türkestan Evasi
’; Tillett, ‘The National Minorities Factor in the Sino-Soviet Dispute’.
38
. Politburo resolution No. P122/97, 15 April 1968; k-27, 420.
. Politburo resolution No. P122/97, 15 April 1968; k-27, 420.
39
. Paine,
Imperial Rivals
, p. 354.
. Paine,
Imperial Rivals
, p. 354.
40
. On the making of the Sino-Soviet frontier, see ibid.
. On the making of the Sino-Soviet frontier, see ibid.
41
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 35-6.
. Gates,
From the Shadows
, pp. 35-6.
42
. Kissinger,
White House Years
, pp. 171-2.
. Kissinger,
White House Years
, pp. 171-2.
43
. Ibid., pp. 174-7.
. Ibid., pp. 174-7.
44
. k-27, 421.
. k-27, 421.
45
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 497; Kissinger,
White House Years
, pp. 183-5.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 497; Kissinger,
White House Years
, pp. 183-5.
46
. Shevchenko,
Breaking with Moscow
, pp. 218-20.
. Shevchenko,
Breaking with Moscow
, pp. 218-20.
47
. Jian and Wilson, “‘All under the Heavens is Great Chaos”’; Jian,
Mao’s China and the Cold War
, pp. 245-9; Burr (ed.),
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 145
, document 3.
. Jian and Wilson, “‘All under the Heavens is Great Chaos”’; Jian,
Mao’s China and the Cold War
, pp. 245-9; Burr (ed.),
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 145
, document 3.
48
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 497; Dittmer,
Sino-Soviet Normalization
, pp. 192-4.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 497; Dittmer,
Sino-Soviet Normalization
, pp. 192-4.
49
. Burr (ed.),
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 145
, document 10.
. Burr (ed.),
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 145
, document 10.
50
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 497-8.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 497-8.
51
. Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao
, chs. 74-5. Mitrokhin did not have the opportunity to note the file on the death of Lin Biao, in which Andropov appears to have taken a personal interest; Volkogonov,
The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire
, p. 338.
. Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao
, chs. 74-5. Mitrokhin did not have the opportunity to note the file on the death of Lin Biao, in which Andropov appears to have taken a personal interest; Volkogonov,
The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire
, p. 338.
52
. Dittmer,
Sino-Soviet Normalization
, p. 192.
. Dittmer,
Sino-Soviet Normalization
, p. 192.
53
. Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao
, p. 546.
. Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao
, p. 546.
54
. vol. 5 isl., app. 2.
. vol. 5 isl., app. 2.
55
. k-19, 2.
. k-19, 2.
56
. k-19, 12.
. k-19, 12.
57
. k-5, 371.
. k-5, 371.
58
. k-2, 414. Mitrokhin’s notes do not specify the reasons for the failure. Other failed deployments included SENIM, another Chinese agent of the KGB, who crossed the border in August 1972 and was never heard of again; k-18, 72.
. k-2, 414. Mitrokhin’s notes do not specify the reasons for the failure. Other failed deployments included SENIM, another Chinese agent of the KGB, who crossed the border in August 1972 and was never heard of again; k-18, 72.
59
. vol. 6, app. 3, p. 791.
. vol. 6, app. 3, p. 791.
60
. k-19, 13.
. k-19, 13.
61
. Chang,
Wild Swans
, p. 441.
. Chang,
Wild Swans
, p. 441.
62
. k-19, 20. These difficulties were probably recounted by the agent after his return from a failed mission.
. k-19, 20. These difficulties were probably recounted by the agent after his return from a failed mission.
63
. k-18, 250.
. k-18, 250.
64
. k-19, 78.
. k-19, 78.
65
. On 8 April 1978 FENIKS went back to North Korea, but agreed to renew contact if he returned to the PRC or had another foreign posting; k-27, 469. He evidently considered it too dangerous to try to establish contact with the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang.
. On 8 April 1978 FENIKS went back to North Korea, but agreed to renew contact if he returned to the PRC or had another foreign posting; k-27, 469. He evidently considered it too dangerous to try to establish contact with the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang.
66
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, p. 184.
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, p. 184.
67
. ‘On certain national-psychological characteristics of the Chinese and their evaluation in the context of intelligence work’, FCD directive no. 822/ PR/62, 12 September 1976; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 185-94.
. ‘On certain national-psychological characteristics of the Chinese and their evaluation in the context of intelligence work’, FCD directive no. 822/ PR/62, 12 September 1976; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 185-94.
68
. Short,
The Dragon and the Bear
, p. 215.
. Short,
The Dragon and the Bear
, p. 215.
69
. k-7, 46.
. k-7, 46.
70
. ‘Plan of requirements on Chinese subjects for 1977’, FCD directive No. 891/PR/52, 14 March 1977; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 196-203.
. ‘Plan of requirements on Chinese subjects for 1977’, FCD directive No. 891/PR/52, 14 March 1977; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 196-203.
71
. Short,
The Dragon and the Bear
, pp. 214-15.
. Short,
The Dragon and the Bear
, pp. 214-15.
72
. ‘Guidance on measures designed to improve the work against China from third countries’, FCD directive No. 16/PR, 12 January 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 204-7.
. ‘Guidance on measures designed to improve the work against China from third countries’, FCD directive No. 16/PR, 12 January 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 204-7.
73
. ‘Basic targets of interest to Line in Hong Kong’, FCD directive No. 1734/PR/62, 20 April 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
More Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 68-78.
. ‘Basic targets of interest to Line in Hong Kong’, FCD directive No. 1734/PR/62, 20 April 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
More Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 68-78.
74
. ‘Guidance on measures designed to improve the work against China from third countries’, FCD directive No. 16/PR, 12 January 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, p. 205.
. ‘Guidance on measures designed to improve the work against China from third countries’, FCD directive No. 16/PR, 12 January 1978; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, p. 205.
75
. vol. 4 sri, ch. 4, p. 134. A retired Western intelligence officer recalls that, ‘Service A clearly made hay with the operational intelligence provided by FENIKS in terms of document format, addresses etc, and I remember some of the forgeries surfacing in Japan in the mid-1970s and being struck by the apparent verisimilitude. (No, we did not swallow them hook, line and sinker!)’
. vol. 4 sri, ch. 4, p. 134. A retired Western intelligence officer recalls that, ‘Service A clearly made hay with the operational intelligence provided by FENIKS in terms of document format, addresses etc, and I remember some of the forgeries surfacing in Japan in the mid-1970s and being struck by the apparent verisimilitude. (No, we did not swallow them hook, line and sinker!)’
76
. vol. 4 sri, ch. 4, p. 134.
. vol. 4 sri, ch. 4, p. 134.
77
. vol. 4 sri, app. 3, p. 153.
. vol. 4 sri, app. 3, p. 153.
78
. k-20, 217. Mitrokhin did not note the file on the implementation of this operation.
. k-20, 217. Mitrokhin did not note the file on the implementation of this operation.
79
. vol. 4 ind., app. 3, p. 118.
. vol. 4 ind., app. 3, p. 118.
80
. Bao and Chelminski,
Prisoner of Mao
, pp. 8-11, 38-9, 99. The book was not, however, a straightforward piece of Soviet propaganda and criticized the insensitivity of Soviet advisers in the PRC during the 1950s. The apparent objectivity of
Prisoner of Mao
subsequently increased Pasqualini’s value as a KGB agent of influence.
. Bao and Chelminski,
Prisoner of Mao
, pp. 8-11, 38-9, 99. The book was not, however, a straightforward piece of Soviet propaganda and criticized the insensitivity of Soviet advisers in the PRC during the 1950s. The apparent objectivity of
Prisoner of Mao
subsequently increased Pasqualini’s value as a KGB agent of influence.
81
. k-14, 19; t-1, 71.
. k-14, 19; t-1, 71.
82
. vol. 9, ch. 6, p. 53; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 471.
. vol. 9, ch. 6, p. 53; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 471.
83
. Pasqualini continued to be an active campaigner against the abuse of human rights in the PRC until his death in 1997. Despite his work as a paid agent of the KGB from 1975 to at least 1979, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of that campaign.
. Pasqualini continued to be an active campaigner against the abuse of human rights in the PRC until his death in 1997. Despite his work as a paid agent of the KGB from 1975 to at least 1979, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of that campaign.
84
. k-14, 27.
. k-14, 27.
85
. ‘Chief Conclusions and Views Adopted at the Meeting of Heads of Service’, FCD directive No. 156/54, 1 February 1984; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 4-14.
. ‘Chief Conclusions and Views Adopted at the Meeting of Heads of Service’, FCD directive No. 156/54, 1 February 1984; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 4-14.
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