The World Was Going Our Way (98 page)
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Authors: Christopher Andrew
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67
. k-27, 284.
. k-27, 284.
68
. MISHA was recruited after a quarrel with LANDYSH (of which no details are given in Mitrokhin’s notes) threatened to compromise him; k-2, 321. The probability is that MISHA subsequently worked for money.
. MISHA was recruited after a quarrel with LANDYSH (of which no details are given in Mitrokhin’s notes) threatened to compromise him; k-2, 321. The probability is that MISHA subsequently worked for money.
69
. In an interview with Christopher Andrew in Washington in November 1987, Stanislav Levchenko confirmed that NAZAR had been recruited in the 1970s. Since the interview took place eight years before Andrew first saw the Mitrokhin archive, however, it was impossible during the interview to discuss other evidence which tends to identify MISHA as NAZAR.
. In an interview with Christopher Andrew in Washington in November 1987, Stanislav Levchenko confirmed that NAZAR had been recruited in the 1970s. Since the interview took place eight years before Andrew first saw the Mitrokhin archive, however, it was impossible during the interview to discuss other evidence which tends to identify MISHA as NAZAR.
70
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 150; Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 158-9.
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 150; Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 158-9.
71
. Two other Foreign Ministry recruitments during the 1970s identified in files noted by Mitrokhin are the diplomat MARCEL and an assistant military attaché, codenamed KONUS, recruited with MARCEL’s assistance; k-2, 317-18.
. Two other Foreign Ministry recruitments during the 1970s identified in files noted by Mitrokhin are the diplomat MARCEL and an assistant military attaché, codenamed KONUS, recruited with MARCEL’s assistance; k-2, 317-18.
72
. Buckley,
Japan Today
, ch. 3.
. Buckley,
Japan Today
, ch. 3.
73
. Ibid.; McCargo,
Contemporary Japan
, ch. 3.
. Ibid.; McCargo,
Contemporary Japan
, ch. 3.
74
. t-2, 77.
. t-2, 77.
75
. TANI’s file records that his S&T met the requirements of the foremost authorities (
instantsii
), in effect the Politburo, one of the highest accolades. In addition to his S&T on semi-conductors, he provided important intelligence on integrated circuits for military radar systems; k-2, 82.
. TANI’s file records that his S&T met the requirements of the foremost authorities (
instantsii
), in effect the Politburo, one of the highest accolades. In addition to his S&T on semi-conductors, he provided important intelligence on integrated circuits for military radar systems; k-2, 82.
76
. k-2, 363.
. k-2, 363.
77
. The other thirteen Line X agents in senior positions identified in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files together with their main S&T fields were: ARAM (radio-physics, k-2, 419); ARGUS (radio engineering, k-14, 754); BRAT (scientific research at Tokyo University, t-2, 105); EYR (aerospace R&D, k-14, 755); KANDI (microbiology, k-14, 101); KARI (university physicist, t-2, 80); KISI (university aerospace research, k-14, 477); RIONI (Hitachi, t-2, 79); SAK (Mitsubishi, k-6, 159); SOT (technology exports, k-12, 363); TAIR (infra-red spectroscopy, k-19, 452); TONI (electronic engineering, t-2, 82); and UTI (nuclear physics, k-18, 224).
. The other thirteen Line X agents in senior positions identified in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files together with their main S&T fields were: ARAM (radio-physics, k-2, 419); ARGUS (radio engineering, k-14, 754); BRAT (scientific research at Tokyo University, t-2, 105); EYR (aerospace R&D, k-14, 755); KANDI (microbiology, k-14, 101); KARI (university physicist, t-2, 80); KISI (university aerospace research, k-14, 477); RIONI (Hitachi, t-2, 79); SAK (Mitsubishi, k-6, 159); SOT (technology exports, k-12, 363); TAIR (infra-red spectroscopy, k-19, 452); TONI (electronic engineering, t-2, 82); and UTI (nuclear physics, k-18, 224).
78
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 104.
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 104.
79
. Ibid., p. 105.
. Ibid., p. 105.
80
. On S&T operations against the United States, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 186-9, 215-20.
. On S&T operations against the United States, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 186-9, 215-20.
81
. In 1980 a total of 3,396 Soviet R&D projects were assisted by S&T. Ibid., pp. 215-20; Brook-Shepherd,
The Storm Birds
, p. 260; Hanson
, Soviet Industrial Espionage
; US Government,
Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update
.
. In 1980 a total of 3,396 Soviet R&D projects were assisted by S&T. Ibid., pp. 215-20; Brook-Shepherd,
The Storm Birds
, p. 260; Hanson
, Soviet Industrial Espionage
; US Government,
Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update
.
82
. k-8, 338.
. k-8, 338.
83
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 102; Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, pp. 186-7.
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 102; Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, pp. 186-7.
84
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 104.
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 104.
85
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 216; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 622.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 216; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 622.
86
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 556-8.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 556-8.
87
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 157-65.
. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 157-65.
88
. The only two cases of agents put on ice as a result of Levchenko’s defection which were noted by Mitrokhin were those of DENIS (k-23, 29) and YAMAMOTO (k-23, 20), neither of whom had been personally handled by Levchenko. There were undoubtedly a substantial number of similar cases not noted by Mitrokhin. It is clear from the accounts of Levchenko’s career in Tokyo by himself and John Barron that he knew the names or identifying details of at least a score of KGB agents. The damage-limitation exercise would necessarily have been implemented on the cautious assumption that his knowledge might have been even more extensive. There is, for example, no evidence that Levchenko knew the existence of DENIS, with whom the KGB none the less broke contact.
. The only two cases of agents put on ice as a result of Levchenko’s defection which were noted by Mitrokhin were those of DENIS (k-23, 29) and YAMAMOTO (k-23, 20), neither of whom had been personally handled by Levchenko. There were undoubtedly a substantial number of similar cases not noted by Mitrokhin. It is clear from the accounts of Levchenko’s career in Tokyo by himself and John Barron that he knew the names or identifying details of at least a score of KGB agents. The damage-limitation exercise would necessarily have been implemented on the cautious assumption that his knowledge might have been even more extensive. There is, for example, no evidence that Levchenko knew the existence of DENIS, with whom the KGB none the less broke contact.
89
. k-27, 27.
. k-27, 27.
90
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
91
. Kimura, ‘Japanese-Soviet Political Relations from 1976-1983’, p. 97.
. Kimura, ‘Japanese-Soviet Political Relations from 1976-1983’, p. 97.
92
. Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, p. 88.
. Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, p. 88.
93
. Haslam, ‘The Pattern of Soviet-Japanese Relations since World War II’, p. 35. On Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo, see Hara,
Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945
, ch. 4.
. Haslam, ‘The Pattern of Soviet-Japanese Relations since World War II’, p. 35. On Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo, see Hara,
Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945
, ch. 4.
94
.
Asahi Evening News
, 11 Dec. 1982; Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, pp. 164-5.
.
Asahi Evening News
, 11 Dec. 1982; Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, pp. 164-5.
95
. See above, pp. 131-2.
. See above, pp. 131-2.
96
. Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, pp. 188-9.
. Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, pp. 188-9.
97
. Ibid., p. 198.
. Ibid., p. 198.
98
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 17, 20-21.
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 17, 20-21.
99
. Chernyaev,
My Six Years with Gorbachev
, p. 28.
. Chernyaev,
My Six Years with Gorbachev
, p. 28.
100
. Haslam, ‘The Pattern of Soviet-Japanese Relations since World War II’, p. 3.
. Haslam, ‘The Pattern of Soviet-Japanese Relations since World War II’, p. 3.
101
. Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, p. 78; Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 102-3.
. Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, p. 78; Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 102-3.
The Special Relationship with India Part 1
1
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 504.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, p. 504.
2
. Gorev,
Jawaharlal Nehru
, pp. 48-9, 54.
. Gorev,
Jawaharlal Nehru
, pp. 48-9, 54.
3
. Mullik,
The Chinese Betrayal
, p. 110.
. Mullik,
The Chinese Betrayal
, p. 110.
4
. Mullik,
My Years with Nehru
, pp. 60-61. During Khrushchev’s visit to India late in 1955, Nehru made clear in private talks that he was aware of ‘personal links’ between leading Indian Communists and Soviet officials (though he did not mention the KGB by name). These links do not, however, seem to have diminished the warm official welcome given to the Soviet leader. Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, p. 909 n. 7.
. Mullik,
My Years with Nehru
, pp. 60-61. During Khrushchev’s visit to India late in 1955, Nehru made clear in private talks that he was aware of ‘personal links’ between leading Indian Communists and Soviet officials (though he did not mention the KGB by name). These links do not, however, seem to have diminished the warm official welcome given to the Soviet leader. Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, p. 909 n. 7.
5
. vol. 4 ind., app. 1, item 11.
. vol. 4 ind., app. 1, item 11.
6
. Ibid., item 13; there is no indication in Mitrokhin’s notes of the nature of the intelligence provided by RADAR.
. Ibid., item 13; there is no indication in Mitrokhin’s notes of the nature of the intelligence provided by RADAR.
7
. Ibid., item 12.
. Ibid., item 12.
8
. Decrypts were filed in the archives of the KGB Eighth (and later the Sixteenth) Directorate, to which Mitrokhin did not have access.
. Decrypts were filed in the archives of the KGB Eighth (and later the Sixteenth) Directorate, to which Mitrokhin did not have access.
9
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 12. There is no independent corroboration for the KGB conclusion that Promode Das Gupta was an IB agent. In 1964 he became a leading member of the hard-line breakaway CPI (M).
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 12. There is no independent corroboration for the KGB conclusion that Promode Das Gupta was an IB agent. In 1964 he became a leading member of the hard-line breakaway CPI (M).
10
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, para. 12.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, para. 12.
11
. See below, p. 321.
. See below, p. 321.
12
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 6, p. 37.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 6, p. 37.
13
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 13.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 13.
14
. Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, pp. 72-5. Khrushchev’s trip, on which he was accompanied by Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, also took in Burma and Afghanistan. He also proposed that decorations and possible salary increases be given to the pilots who had flown him on his travels.
. Fursenko (ed.),
Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964
, pp. 72-5. Khrushchev’s trip, on which he was accompanied by Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, also took in Burma and Afghanistan. He also proposed that decorations and possible salary increases be given to the pilots who had flown him on his travels.
15
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 504-5.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 504-5.
16
. Gromyko,
Memories
, p. 243.
. Gromyko,
Memories
, p. 243.
17
. CPSU Central Committee resolution No. ST 23/26-s of 16 May 1962; vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
. CPSU Central Committee resolution No. ST 23/26-s of 16 May 1962; vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
18
. Arora,
Krishna Menon
, pp. 210-11.
. Arora,
Krishna Menon
, pp. 210-11.
19
. CPSU Central Committee resolution of 15 Nov. 1962; vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
. CPSU Central Committee resolution of 15 Nov. 1962; vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
20
. The KGB paid Menon’s election expenses totalling 733,000 rupees. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
. The KGB paid Menon’s election expenses totalling 733,000 rupees. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 28.
21
. Ibid., p. 29.
. Ibid., p. 29.
22
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
23
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 265-6; Arora,
Krishna Menon
, pp. 273-5.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 265-6; Arora,
Krishna Menon
, pp. 273-5.
24
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 29.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 29.
25
. Frank,
Indira
, p. 290. Mrs Gandhi’s KGB codename is given in vol. 4, ch. 5, p. 30.
. Frank,
Indira
, p. 290. Mrs Gandhi’s KGB codename is given in vol. 4, ch. 5, p. 30.
26
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
27
. Gandhi (ed.),
Two Alone, Two Together
, pp. 592-4.
. Gandhi (ed.),
Two Alone, Two Together
, pp. 592-4.
28
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 238-9.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 238-9.
29
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 93.
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 93.
30
. Mallick,
Indian Communism
, p. 92.
. Mallick,
Indian Communism
, p. 92.
31
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 29; k-24, 239. Shebarshin describes Mishra in his memoirs as ‘extremely influential’, though not of course identifying him as a Soviet agent;
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 82. See below, pp. 322-3.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 29; k-24, 239. Shebarshin describes Mishra in his memoirs as ‘extremely influential’, though not of course identifying him as a Soviet agent;
Ruka Moskvy
, p. 82. See below, pp. 322-3.
32
. k-8, 121.
. k-8, 121.
33
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
34
. Press reports of speech to parliament by Home Minister Y. B. Chavan on 13 Dec. 1967, revealing Modin’s part in publicizing the forgeries. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 505-6.
. Press reports of speech to parliament by Home Minister Y. B. Chavan on 13 Dec. 1967, revealing Modin’s part in publicizing the forgeries. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 505-6.
35
. Barron,
KGB
, p. 237.
. Barron,
KGB
, p. 237.
36
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, p. 30.
37
. Frank,
Indira
, p. 308. Kamaraj had returned to parliament after winning a by-election; though he remained head of the Syndicate, he was no longer Congress President.
. Frank,
Indira
, p. 308. Kamaraj had returned to parliament after winning a by-election; though he remained head of the Syndicate, he was no longer Congress President.
38
. Mallick,
Indian Communism
, pp. 123-4, 147. Congress Forum for Social Action codename in vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 16.
. Mallick,
Indian Communism
, pp. 123-4, 147. Congress Forum for Social Action codename in vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 16.
39
. Frank,
Indira
, p. 317.
. Frank,
Indira
, p. 317.
40
. Ibid., pp. 313-15. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), which had hitherto run both internal and foreign intelligence, was divided in two: the IB, which remained in charge of internal intelligence, and the newly formed Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which ran foreign intelligence. Revenue Intelligence, hitherto part of the Finance Ministry, was also brought under the direct control of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, headed by Haksar. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 125.
. Ibid., pp. 313-15. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), which had hitherto run both internal and foreign intelligence, was divided in two: the IB, which remained in charge of internal intelligence, and the newly formed Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which ran foreign intelligence. Revenue Intelligence, hitherto part of the Finance Ministry, was also brought under the direct control of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, headed by Haksar. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 125.
41
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 313, 320.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 313, 320.
42
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 126.
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, p. 126.
43
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 327-9; Mallick,
Indian Communism
, pp. 122-3, 147-8.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 327-9; Mallick,
Indian Communism
, pp. 122-3, 147-8.
44
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 25-6. Mitrokhin’s probably incomplete notes on the sums paid to RERO record payments of 100,000 rupees in 1971, 1974 and 1977, and a payment of 60,000 rupees in 1976.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 25-6. Mitrokhin’s probably incomplete notes on the sums paid to RERO record payments of 100,000 rupees in 1971, 1974 and 1977, and a payment of 60,000 rupees in 1976.
45
. Kaul,
Reminiscences
, p. 255.
. Kaul,
Reminiscences
, p. 255.
46
. Gromyko,
Memories
, pp. 244-5.
. Gromyko,
Memories
, pp. 244-5.
47
. Shebarshin identifies his source only as a ‘well-informed acquaintance’ who was banned from maintaining unofficial contacts with foreigners because of his official position. The source must thus have had the status of a KGB ‘confidential contact’ even if he was not a fully recruited agent. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 72-5.
. Shebarshin identifies his source only as a ‘well-informed acquaintance’ who was banned from maintaining unofficial contacts with foreigners because of his official position. The source must thus have had the status of a KGB ‘confidential contact’ even if he was not a fully recruited agent. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 72-5.
48
. Ibid., pp. 75-6.
. Ibid., pp. 75-6.
49
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 89-96; Horn,
Soviet-Indian Relations
, p. 73.
. Singh,
The Yogi and the Bear
, pp. 89-96; Horn,
Soviet-Indian Relations
, p. 73.
50
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 509-10.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 509-10.
51
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 1, p. 1.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 1, p. 1.
52
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 126-7. In 1974 Kalugin became the youngest general in the First Chief Directorate.
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 126-7. In 1974 Kalugin became the youngest general in the First Chief Directorate.
53
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 1, p. 5. KGB agents in Indian intelligence in 1978 included GOPAL (who worked in the Chinese department), PROTON (US department), ZINGER (US department), AVAR, KROT and SARDAR; vol. 4 ind., app. 1, items 34-8, 42.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 1, p. 5. KGB agents in Indian intelligence in 1978 included GOPAL (who worked in the Chinese department), PROTON (US department), ZINGER (US department), AVAR, KROT and SARDAR; vol. 4 ind., app. 1, items 34-8, 42.
54
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 126-7.
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, pp. 126-7.
55
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, pp. 143ff.
. Malhotra,
Indira Gandhi
, pp. 143ff.
56
. k-24, 239; see above, p. 317.
. k-24, 239; see above, p. 317.
57
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, pp. 30-31; Shebarshin’s codename is given in vol. 3 misc., p. 112.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 5, pp. 30-31; Shebarshin’s codename is given in vol. 3 misc., p. 112.
58
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 350-52, 368.
. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 350-52, 368.
59
. k-24, 239. Mishra’s widow doubtless did not realize this was KGB money.
. k-24, 239. Mishra’s widow doubtless did not realize this was KGB money.
60
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, p. 126.
. Kalugin,
Spymaster
, p. 126.
61
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 6, p. 38.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 6, p. 38.
62
. The only detailed figures noted by Mitrokhin for the funds channelled to the CPI via the KGB cover the period August 1975 to June 1976 and the early months of 1977. They are as follows: August 1975: three separate payments of 404,157, 136,010 and 440,476 rupees; September 1975: 473,010 rupees; October 1975: 876,486 rupees; November 1975: 444,118 rupees; January 1976: 668,824 rupees; March 1976: 300,000 rupees; April 1976: 666,176 rupees; May 1976: 200,000 rupees; June 1976: two payments of 400,000 and 769,120 rupees; January 1977: two payments of 90,676 and 1,354,015 rupees; February 1977: two payments of 441,176 and 600,000 rupees (vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 15).
. The only detailed figures noted by Mitrokhin for the funds channelled to the CPI via the KGB cover the period August 1975 to June 1976 and the early months of 1977. They are as follows: August 1975: three separate payments of 404,157, 136,010 and 440,476 rupees; September 1975: 473,010 rupees; October 1975: 876,486 rupees; November 1975: 444,118 rupees; January 1976: 668,824 rupees; March 1976: 300,000 rupees; April 1976: 666,176 rupees; May 1976: 200,000 rupees; June 1976: two payments of 400,000 and 769,120 rupees; January 1977: two payments of 90,676 and 1,354,015 rupees; February 1977: two payments of 441,176 and 600,000 rupees (vol. 4 ind., ch. 3, p. 15).
63
. Ibid. Mitrokhin did not record the date of the fishing trip. The member of the CPI National Council chosen to receive money from the KGB changed in 1975-76 but kept the codename BANKIR; pp. 14-15.
. Ibid. Mitrokhin did not record the date of the fishing trip. The member of the CPI National Council chosen to receive money from the KGB changed in 1975-76 but kept the codename BANKIR; pp. 14-15.
64
. Rao was also briefly CPI general secretary in the early 1950s. In 1977 the All-Indian Congress of Trade Unions received 10,000 Swiss francs and 43,750 US dollars; ibid., p. 14. Its leader, S. A. Dange, then CPI chairman and a committed supporter of the Indira Gandhi regime, was a controversial figure. In 1978 he was expelled from the CPI and founded his own All-India Communist Party after the Party abandoned support for Mrs Gandhi; Mallick,
Indian Communism
, p. 152.
. Rao was also briefly CPI general secretary in the early 1950s. In 1977 the All-Indian Congress of Trade Unions received 10,000 Swiss francs and 43,750 US dollars; ibid., p. 14. Its leader, S. A. Dange, then CPI chairman and a committed supporter of the Indira Gandhi regime, was a controversial figure. In 1978 he was expelled from the CPI and founded his own All-India Communist Party after the Party abandoned support for Mrs Gandhi; Mallick,
Indian Communism
, p. 152.
65
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, p. 19; vol. 4, ch. 4, p. 16. A file of 1976 identifies as under KGB control one press agency (TREST), two daily newspapers (RAZUM and VOLNA), eight weekly newspapers (BRIZ, IDEYA, KURYER, PRIBOY, PRILIV, SIGNAL, SVET and ZNANIYE) and four magazines (OVAL, SPEKTR, TRIBUNA and one other). All are identified by name in Mitrokhin’s notes; vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 16-17.
. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, p. 19; vol. 4, ch. 4, p. 16. A file of 1976 identifies as under KGB control one press agency (TREST), two daily newspapers (RAZUM and VOLNA), eight weekly newspapers (BRIZ, IDEYA, KURYER, PRIBOY, PRILIV, SIGNAL, SVET and ZNANIYE) and four magazines (OVAL, SPEKTR, TRIBUNA and one other). All are identified by name in Mitrokhin’s notes; vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, pp. 16-17.
66
. vol. 7 ind., ch. 7, p. 51; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, p. 19. In 1973 the KGB also claimed to have published twenty-eight books and pamphlets in India; Mitrokhin noted no statistics for later years. It is, of course, possible that some journalists extracted money from the KGB for anti-American articles they would have written anyway.
. vol. 7 ind., ch. 7, p. 51; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, p. 19. In 1973 the KGB also claimed to have published twenty-eight books and pamphlets in India; Mitrokhin noted no statistics for later years. It is, of course, possible that some journalists extracted money from the KGB for anti-American articles they would have written anyway.
67
. In Italy, for example, according to KGB statistics, it planted forty-eight press articles in 1975 and sixty-three in 1976; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The The Sword and the Shield
, p. 659 n. 172 .
. In Italy, for example, according to KGB statistics, it planted forty-eight press articles in 1975 and sixty-three in 1976; Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The The Sword and the Shield
, p. 659 n. 172 .
68
. k-12, 388; vol. 4 ind., app. 1, items 45, 117. During the late 1940s, Indira Gandhi’s husband Feroze had been director of the
National Herald
; Rau later complained of his ‘ignorance, inexperience and adventurism’. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 201-2. Rau’s books include
India: Portrait of a People
(published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1981),
History of Indian Journalism
,
The Press in India
and
Nehru for Children
.
. k-12, 388; vol. 4 ind., app. 1, items 45, 117. During the late 1940s, Indira Gandhi’s husband Feroze had been director of the
National Herald
; Rau later complained of his ‘ignorance, inexperience and adventurism’. Frank,
Indira
, pp. 201-2. Rau’s books include
India: Portrait of a People
(published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1981),
History of Indian Journalism
,
The Press in India
and
Nehru for Children
.
69
. Dhar,
Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy
, p. 235.
. Dhar,
Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy
, p. 235.
70
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 506-7.
. Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 506-7.
71
. Volkogonov,
The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire
, p. 281. In 1973 (the only year for which Mitrokhin noted the statistics) the KGB claimed to have organized five demonstrations in India; vol. 3 pak., ch. 1, para. 104.
. Volkogonov,
The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire
, p. 281. In 1973 (the only year for which Mitrokhin noted the statistics) the KGB claimed to have organized five demonstrations in India; vol. 3 pak., ch. 1, para. 104.
72
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 17.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 4, p. 17.
73
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
74
. Cf. above, pp. 17, 21, 94.
. Cf. above, pp. 17, 21, 94.
75
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 91-3.
. Shebarshin,
Ruka Moskvy
, pp. 91-3.
76
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
. vol. 4 ind., ch. 8, p. 72.
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