The World Was Going Our Way (97 page)
Read The World Was Going Our Way Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
86
. ‘Comrade Alyoshin’s [Kryuchkov’s] instructions on planning the work of sections of the Service and organization abroad in 1984’, 2 November 1983; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 16-22.
. ‘Comrade Alyoshin’s [Kryuchkov’s] instructions on planning the work of sections of the Service and organization abroad in 1984’, 2 November 1983; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 16-22.
87
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 207-8.
. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 207-8.
88
. ‘Work on China’, FCD directive no. 11781/X, 7 May 1985; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 208-10.
. ‘Work on China’, FCD directive no. 11781/X, 7 May 1985; text in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),
Instructions from the Centre
, pp. 208-10.
89
. Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
. Leonov, Fediakova and Fermandois, ‘El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP’.
90
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 21.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, ch. 21.
91
. The budget for the Beijing residency in 1979 of 4,500 hard-currency rubles puts it in approximately the same league as Athens (4,200) and Tehran (5,000), but well below New York (29,400), Washington (26,000), Rome (15,000), Bonn (11,300), Tokyo (10,400), Paris (10,100) and London (7,100); vol. 6, ch. 9. For further comparative statistics, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 634 n. 63.
. The budget for the Beijing residency in 1979 of 4,500 hard-currency rubles puts it in approximately the same league as Athens (4,200) and Tehran (5,000), but well below New York (29,400), Washington (26,000), Rome (15,000), Bonn (11,300), Tokyo (10,400), Paris (10,100) and London (7,100); vol. 6, ch. 9. For further comparative statistics, see Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 634 n. 63.
92
. Mitrokhin noted only the subject of the file; k-20, 124. Though Mitrokhin did not note the date, neighbouring files in the k-20 series refer to the early to mid-1970s.
. Mitrokhin noted only the subject of the file; k-20, 124. Though Mitrokhin did not note the date, neighbouring files in the k-20 series refer to the early to mid-1970s.
93
. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Kahn, ‘Soviet Comint in the Cold War’, p. 10.
. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Kahn, ‘Soviet Comint in the Cold War’, p. 10.
Japan
1
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 93, 94-5, 281-2; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 189-92, 250-52, 281-2; Whymant,
Stalin’s Spy
.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 93, 94-5, 281-2; Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB
, pp. 189-92, 250-52, 281-2; Whymant,
Stalin’s Spy
.
2
. See below, pp. 304-5.
. See below, pp. 304-5.
3
. Text of 1951 US-Japanese Security Treaty in Buckley,
Japan Today
, app. 3.
. Text of 1951 US-Japanese Security Treaty in Buckley,
Japan Today
, app. 3.
4
. Though frequently referred to as one of the four islands, the Habomais were technically an island group.
. Though frequently referred to as one of the four islands, the Habomais were technically an island group.
5
. Text of 1960 US-Japanese ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ in Buckley,
Japan Today
, app. 4.
. Text of 1960 US-Japanese ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ in Buckley,
Japan Today
, app. 4.
6
. Scalapino,
The Japanese Communist Movement
, pp. 114-15; Packard,
Protest in Tokyo
.
. Scalapino,
The Japanese Communist Movement
, pp. 114-15; Packard,
Protest in Tokyo
.
7
. k-8, 599.
. k-8, 599.
8
. Ambrose,
Eisenhower
, vol. 2, pp. 581-2. Scalapino,
The Japanese Communist Movement
, p. 115 n. 25. There was, however, little personal hostility during the protest movement to US citizens in Japan.
. Ambrose,
Eisenhower
, vol. 2, pp. 581-2. Scalapino,
The Japanese Communist Movement
, p. 115 n. 25. There was, however, little personal hostility during the protest movement to US citizens in Japan.
9
. k-8, 599.
. k-8, 599.
10
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
11
. Scalapino,
The Japanese Communist Movement
, pp. 115, 314.
. Scalapino,
The Japanese Communist Movement
, pp. 115, 314.
12
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 364-5.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 364-5.
13
. k-8, 248.
. k-8, 248.
14
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
15
. k-8, 251.
. k-8, 251.
16
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 374.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 374.
17
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, pp. 176-7. Mitrokhin’s notes on plans for operation VULKAN do not indicate whether or not it was ever implemented. NOMOTO was a Japanese citizen who had emigrated to Russia to work in the Kamchatka fisheries before being recruited as a KGB illegal agent. He was deployed to Japan in 1963 after the closing of the JIMMY residency; k-16, 434.
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, pp. 176-7. Mitrokhin’s notes on plans for operation VULKAN do not indicate whether or not it was ever implemented. NOMOTO was a Japanese citizen who had emigrated to Russia to work in the Kamchatka fisheries before being recruited as a KGB illegal agent. He was deployed to Japan in 1963 after the closing of the JIMMY residency; k-16, 434.
18
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, p. 177. The compromise of KGB sabotage planning after the defection in 1971 of the Line F officer in London, Oleg Lyalin, led to the withdrawal of Line F officers from most Western residencies (Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 383 ). It is likely that the Line F officer was also withdrawn from Tokyo. Though Mitrokhin noted a number of plans for ‘special actions’ in Japan drawn up in 1970, he saw none prepared in later years.
. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, p. 177. The compromise of KGB sabotage planning after the defection in 1971 of the Line F officer in London, Oleg Lyalin, led to the withdrawal of Line F officers from most Western residencies (Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, p. 383 ). It is likely that the Line F officer was also withdrawn from Tokyo. Though Mitrokhin noted a number of plans for ‘special actions’ in Japan drawn up in 1970, he saw none prepared in later years.
19
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 383.
. Andrew and Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield
, pp. 383.
20
. Scalapino,
The Japanese Communist Movement
, pp. 174-8. In May 1964 two prominent JCP members, the deputy Yosio Shiga and his close associate Ichizo Suzuki, were expelled by the Central Committee on charges of ‘engaging in conspiratorial activities, such as secretly contacting the Soviet Union, deceiving and betraying our party’. Later in the year Shiga founded a new pro-Soviet breakaway Communist Party, the JCP (Voice of Japan), which survived mainly on handouts from Moscow and never became a significant threat to the JCP. Braddick,
Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance
, pp. 206, 210-11.
. Scalapino,
The Japanese Communist Movement
, pp. 174-8. In May 1964 two prominent JCP members, the deputy Yosio Shiga and his close associate Ichizo Suzuki, were expelled by the Central Committee on charges of ‘engaging in conspiratorial activities, such as secretly contacting the Soviet Union, deceiving and betraying our party’. Later in the year Shiga founded a new pro-Soviet breakaway Communist Party, the JCP (Voice of Japan), which survived mainly on handouts from Moscow and never became a significant threat to the JCP. Braddick,
Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance
, pp. 206, 210-11.
21
. Braddick,
Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance
, p. 204.
. Braddick,
Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance
, p. 204.
22
. In the wake of the JCP’s decision to side with Beijing after the Sino-Soviet split, many of its intellectual supporters broke with the Party or were expelled, significantly reducing its influence on public opinion; ibid., p. 267. In 1969 the JCP made an uncompromising denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and demanded the return of the Habomais and Shikotan.
. In the wake of the JCP’s decision to side with Beijing after the Sino-Soviet split, many of its intellectual supporters broke with the Party or were expelled, significantly reducing its influence on public opinion; ibid., p. 267. In 1969 the JCP made an uncompromising denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and demanded the return of the Habomais and Shikotan.
23
. One of the illegals in the JIMMY residence, VASILIEV, an ethnic Chinese Soviet citizen, who was operating under cover as a university student, refused to return from Tokyo, apparently because of his wish to marry a Japanese woman; k-12, 416; k-16, 238; k-27, 35.
. One of the illegals in the JIMMY residence, VASILIEV, an ethnic Chinese Soviet citizen, who was operating under cover as a university student, refused to return from Tokyo, apparently because of his wish to marry a Japanese woman; k-12, 416; k-16, 238; k-27, 35.
24
. k-27,360. KOCHI was recruited in 1962. There is no indication in Mitrokhin’s brief notes on his file that he was able to provide classified documents. According to KOCHI’s file, the quality of his intelligence declined significantly after 1967. In 1975, a year after he gave up most of his journalism, he was removed from the agent network.
. k-27,360. KOCHI was recruited in 1962. There is no indication in Mitrokhin’s brief notes on his file that he was able to provide classified documents. According to KOCHI’s file, the quality of his intelligence declined significantly after 1967. In 1975, a year after he gave up most of his journalism, he was removed from the agent network.
25
. t-7, 247.
. t-7, 247.
26
. t-7, 248.
. t-7, 248.
27
. Of the 100,000 convertible rubles allocated to the JSP in 1972, 60,000 went to individuals to assist their careers in the Diet and elsewhere, and to promote their roles as agents of influence; 10,000 to strengthen links between the JSP and the CPSU; 20,000 for active measures to damage Japan’s relations with the USA and PRC; 10,000 for active measures to prevent any alignment of the JSP with the other main opposition parties, the Clean Government Party (Komeito) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). t-7, 250-51.
. Of the 100,000 convertible rubles allocated to the JSP in 1972, 60,000 went to individuals to assist their careers in the Diet and elsewhere, and to promote their roles as agents of influence; 10,000 to strengthen links between the JSP and the CPSU; 20,000 for active measures to damage Japan’s relations with the USA and PRC; 10,000 for active measures to prevent any alignment of the JSP with the other main opposition parties, the Clean Government Party (Komeito) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). t-7, 250-51.
28
. t-7, 248; k-23, 58. GAVR, whose real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, has been identified by Levchenko as Seiichi Katsumata; Barron,
KGB Today
, p. 174. The payment recorded in Mitrokhin’s brief note of his file was doubtless not an isolated one. GAVR was regarded by the KGB as the leader of the centrist faction in the JSP; k-23, 58.
. t-7, 248; k-23, 58. GAVR, whose real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, has been identified by Levchenko as Seiichi Katsumata; Barron,
KGB Today
, p. 174. The payment recorded in Mitrokhin’s brief note of his file was doubtless not an isolated one. GAVR was regarded by the KGB as the leader of the centrist faction in the JSP; k-23, 58.
29
. t-7, 249, 260. ATOS, whose real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, has been identified by Levchenko as Tamotsu Sato; Barron,
KGB Today
, p. 174. Mitrokhin’s brief note of his file records a payment to Sato of 400,000 yen, apparently in October 1973, for the publication of articles in JSP periodicals; t-7, 260. There were doubtless other payments.
. t-7, 249, 260. ATOS, whose real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, has been identified by Levchenko as Tamotsu Sato; Barron,
KGB Today
, p. 174. Mitrokhin’s brief note of his file records a payment to Sato of 400,000 yen, apparently in October 1973, for the publication of articles in JSP periodicals; t-7, 260. There were doubtless other payments.
30
. t-7, 249, 260. Mitrokhin noted another payment to ALFONS (doubtless one of a number) of 150,000 yen for the publication of material in
Shakai Shimpo
; t-7, 260.
. t-7, 249, 260. Mitrokhin noted another payment to ALFONS (doubtless one of a number) of 150,000 yen for the publication of material in
Shakai Shimpo
; t-7, 260.
31
. t-7, 249; k-23, 60.
. t-7, 249; k-23, 60.
32
. t-7, 249.
. t-7, 249.
33
. JACK (DZHEK in Cyrillic) was recruited in 1973; k-23, 57.
. JACK (DZHEK in Cyrillic) was recruited in 1973; k-23, 57.
34
. GRACE was probably recruited in 1975; k-8, 600. Though his real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, he has been identified by Levchenko as Shigeru Ito. Levchenko also refers to two other JSP agents, RAMSES and TIBR, not mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes (at least by these codenames) on whom no other information is available. Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 173-4; Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 110.
. GRACE was probably recruited in 1975; k-8, 600. Though his real name is not included in Mitrokhin’s notes, he has been identified by Levchenko as Shigeru Ito. Levchenko also refers to two other JSP agents, RAMSES and TIBR, not mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes (at least by these codenames) on whom no other information is available. Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 173-4; Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 110.
35
. k-23, 29.
. k-23, 29.
36
. Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 99-105.
. Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 99-105.
37
. k-23, 56.
. k-23, 56.
38
. k-8, 600; k-23, 29.
. k-8, 600; k-23, 29.
39
. k-23, 20.
. k-23, 20.
40
. The JSP deputy and KGB confidential contact KERK also had a leading role in the Association; k-23, 56.
. The JSP deputy and KGB confidential contact KERK also had a leading role in the Association; k-23, 56.
41
. k-8, 600; k-23, 54. Hara,
Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945
, p. 131. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 89-90; Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 79-80, 120.
. k-8, 600; k-23, 54. Hara,
Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945
, p. 131. Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 89-90; Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 79-80, 120.
42
.
Asahi Shimbun
, 4 Sept. 1973; Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 89-90; Barron,
KGB: The Hidden Hand
, pp. 79-80.
.
Asahi Shimbun
, 4 Sept. 1973; Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 89-90; Barron,
KGB: The Hidden Hand
, pp. 79-80.
43
. Date of Ishida’s recruitment in k-8, 600; k-23, 54. Levchenko identifies Pronnikov as his recruiter;
On the Wrong Side
, p. 90; Barron,
KGB Today
, p. 79.
. Date of Ishida’s recruitment in k-8, 600; k-23, 54. Levchenko identifies Pronnikov as his recruiter;
On the Wrong Side
, p. 90; Barron,
KGB Today
, p. 79.
44
. The budget for Seventh Department residencies in 1973, in convertible rubles, was as follows: Japan: 203,100; India: 204,600; Pakistan: 54,800; Laos: 19,000; Thailand: 32,500; Cambodia: 26,700; Singapore: 22,600; Malaysia: 23,600; Indonesia: 72,800; Burma: 35,300; Nepal: 12,200; Sri Lanka: 30,600; Bangladesh: 52,900; Reserve: 3,000 (k-18, 65). India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka and Nepal later became the responsibility of a new Seventeenth Department; Laos and Cambodia were moved to the Sixth Department. See Appendix D.
. The budget for Seventh Department residencies in 1973, in convertible rubles, was as follows: Japan: 203,100; India: 204,600; Pakistan: 54,800; Laos: 19,000; Thailand: 32,500; Cambodia: 26,700; Singapore: 22,600; Malaysia: 23,600; Indonesia: 72,800; Burma: 35,300; Nepal: 12,200; Sri Lanka: 30,600; Bangladesh: 52,900; Reserve: 3,000 (k-18, 65). India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka and Nepal later became the responsibility of a new Seventeenth Department; Laos and Cambodia were moved to the Sixth Department. See Appendix D.
45
. Politburo resolution No. P 100/U1 of 16 Aug. 1973; t-7, 200.
. Politburo resolution No. P 100/U1 of 16 Aug. 1973; t-7, 200.
46
. t-7, 200.
. t-7, 200.
47
. On Tanaka’s visit to Moscow, see Hara,
Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945
, ch. 3.
. On Tanaka’s visit to Moscow, see Hara,
Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945
, ch. 3.
48
. k-18, 90.
. k-18, 90.
49
. When Mitrokhin saw FEN’s file in either 1974 or 1975, his cultivation, which had begun in 1972, was still continuing but had made sufficient progress for plans to be made for his recruitment in 1975; k-8, 260. FEN is almost certainly identical with the fully recruited LDP agent identified by Levchenko after his defection in 1979 as FEN-FOKING; Barron,
KGB Today
, p. 174.
. When Mitrokhin saw FEN’s file in either 1974 or 1975, his cultivation, which had begun in 1972, was still continuing but had made sufficient progress for plans to be made for his recruitment in 1975; k-8, 260. FEN is almost certainly identical with the fully recruited LDP agent identified by Levchenko after his defection in 1979 as FEN-FOKING; Barron,
KGB Today
, p. 174.
50
. k-23, 16.
. k-23, 16.
51
. McCargo,
Contemporary Japan
, pp. 106-9; Buckley,
Japan Today
, pp. 37-9.
. McCargo,
Contemporary Japan
, pp. 106-9; Buckley,
Japan Today
, pp. 37-9.
52
. k-5, 74.
. k-5, 74.
53
. k-14, 208.
. k-14, 208.
54
. k-6, 159.
. k-6, 159.
55
. k-27, 454.
. k-27, 454.
56
. k-23, 55.
. k-23, 55.
57
. k-23, 24. It seems likely, though not certain, that ROY was the agent later identified by Levchenko as ARES (Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 119-27, 154-5). ROY, like ARES, was a journalist recruited in the mid-1960s, run for a time by Line KR, who worked solely for money and had important intelligence connections but was less productive in the mid-1970s after the suspicions of Japanese counter-intelligence had been aroused. Discrepancies between Mitrokhin’s notes on ROY and Levchenko’s recollection of ARES are probably due chiefly to the fact that Mitrokhin did not see his file after 1977. Levchenko recalls that, from approximately that moment, ARES ‘became productive again’.
. k-23, 24. It seems likely, though not certain, that ROY was the agent later identified by Levchenko as ARES (Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, pp. 119-27, 154-5). ROY, like ARES, was a journalist recruited in the mid-1960s, run for a time by Line KR, who worked solely for money and had important intelligence connections but was less productive in the mid-1970s after the suspicions of Japanese counter-intelligence had been aroused. Discrepancies between Mitrokhin’s notes on ROY and Levchenko’s recollection of ARES are probably due chiefly to the fact that Mitrokhin did not see his file after 1977. Levchenko recalls that, from approximately that moment, ARES ‘became productive again’.
58
. k-14, 208. Mitrokhin’s notes identify a further journalist agent, FET (or FOT), but give no additional information; k-18, 87.
. k-14, 208. Mitrokhin’s notes identify a further journalist agent, FET (or FOT), but give no additional information; k-18, 87.
59
. The print journalists working as KGB agents in 1979 identified by Levchenko were KANT and DAVEY of the
Sankei Shimbun
, KAMUS of the
Tokyo Shimbun
and VASSIN, a former JCP member who ran a newsletter (Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 174-5; Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 111). It is possible that two of these agents may be among those identified in files noted by Mitrokhin under different codenames.
. The print journalists working as KGB agents in 1979 identified by Levchenko were KANT and DAVEY of the
Sankei Shimbun
, KAMUS of the
Tokyo Shimbun
and VASSIN, a former JCP member who ran a newsletter (Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 174-5; Levchenko,
On the Wrong Side
, p. 111). It is possible that two of these agents may be among those identified in files noted by Mitrokhin under different codenames.
60
. Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 139-42, 174; Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, p. 165.
. Barron,
KGB Today
, pp. 139-42, 174; Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, p. 165.
61
. Recollection of a retired Western intelligence officer stationed in Japan in the 1970s.
. Recollection of a retired Western intelligence officer stationed in Japan in the 1970s.
62
. Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, pp. 143-57; Berton, ‘Two Decades of Soviet Diplomacy and Andrei Gromyko’, pp. 79-81.
. Glaubitz,
Between Tokyo and Moscow
, pp. 143-57; Berton, ‘Two Decades of Soviet Diplomacy and Andrei Gromyko’, pp. 79-81.
63
. k-27, 27.
. k-27, 27.
64
. Braddick,
Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance
, p. 237.
. Braddick,
Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance
, p. 237.
65
. Hasegawa, ‘Japanese Perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia in the Postwar Period’, pp. 274-86.
. Hasegawa, ‘Japanese Perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia in the Postwar Period’, pp. 274-86.
66
. k-16, 523; k-2, 319, 320; k-18, 88; k-14, 484.
. k-16, 523; k-2, 319, 320; k-18, 88; k-14, 484.
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