Their Finest Hour (56 page)

On the 22d we met again, and a letter was read from the Foreign Secretary to me disclosing a leakage of information. Exactly what this leakage amounted to, no one could tell. The advantage of sea-power used offensively is that when a fleet sails no one can be sure where it is going to strike. The seas are broad and the oceans broader. Tropical kit was a clue no more definite than the Continent of Africa. The wife of a Frenchman in Liverpool, who was suspected of Vichy contacts, was known to be convinced that the Mediterranean was the destination of the troopships which were gathering in the Mersey. Even the word “Dakar,” if bruited carelessly, might be a blind. Such forms of “cover” were carried to remarkable refinements as we became more experienced and wily. I was worried by the delays and beat against them. As to the leakage, none could tell. At any rate, on August 27 the Cabinet gave their final general approval for going ahead. Our target date was then September 19.

* * * * *

At 6.24
P.M
. on September 9, the British Consul-General at Tangier cabled to Admiral North, commanding the Atlantic station, “a shore appointment at Gibraltar,” and repeated to the Foreign Office:

Following received from “Jacques.” French squadron may try to pass the Straits proceeding westward for unknown destination. This attempt may be timed to take place within the next seventy-two hours.

The Admiral was
not
in the Dakar circle, and took no special action. The telegram was repeated from Tangier simultaneously to the Foreign Office and received at 7.50
A.M.
on the 10th. At this time we were under almost continuous bombardment in London. Owing to the recurrent stoppages of work through the air raids, arrears had accumulated in the cipher branch. The message was not marked “Important,” and was deciphered only in its turn. It was not ready for distribution until September 14, when at last it reached the Admiralty.

But we had a second string. At 6
P.M
. on September 10, the British Naval Attaché in Madrid was officially informed by the French Admiralty that three French cruisers, type
Georges Leygues,
and three destroyers, had left Toulon and intended to pass the Straits of Gibraltar on the morning of the 11th. This was the normal procedure accepted at this time by the Vichy Government, and was a measure of prudence taken by them only at the latest moment. The British Naval Attaché reported at once to the Admiralty and also to Admiral North at Gibraltar. The signal was received in the Admiralty at 11.50
P.M
. on September 10. It was deciphered and sent to the Duty Captain; who passed it on to the Director of Operations Division (Foreign). It should have been obvious to this officer, who was himself fully informed of the Dakar expedition, that the message was of decisive importance. He took no instant action on it, but let it go forward in the ordinary way with the First Sea Lord’s telegrams. For this mistake he received in due course the expression of their lordships’ displeasure.

However, the destroyer
Hotspur,
on patrol in the Mediterranean, sighted the French ships at 5.15
A.M
. on September 11, fifty miles to the east of Gibraltar, and reported to Admiral North. Admiral Somerville, who commanded Force “H,” which was based on Gibraltar, had also received a copy of the Naval Attaché’s signal at eight minutes past midnight that same morning. He brought the
Renown
to one hour’s notice for steam at 7
A.M
. and awaited instructions from the Admiralty. In consequence of the error in the Director of Operations Division, and of the delay at the Foreign Office upon the other message from the Consul-General, the First Sea Lord knew nothing about the passage of the French warships till
Hotspur’s
signal was brought to him during the Chiefs of Staff meeting before the Cabinet. He at once telephoned the Admiralty to order
Renown
and her destroyers to raise steam. This had already been done. He then came to the War Cabinet. But through the coincidence of this failure of two separate communications – one from the Consul-General in Tangier and the other from the Naval Attaché in Madrid – and through lack of appreciation in various quarters, all was too late. If the Consul-General had marked the first message
Important,
or if either of the admirals at Gibraltar, even though not in the secret, had so considered it themselves, or if the Foreign Office had been working normally, or if the Director of Operations had given the second message the priority which would have ensured the First Sea Lord’s being woken up to read it immediately, the
Renown
could have stopped and parleyed with the French squadron pending decisive orders, which would certainly have been given by the War Cabinet or, till they could be summoned, by me.

In the event all our network of arrangements broke down, and three French cruisers and three destroyers passed the Straits at full speed (twenty-five knots) at 8.35
A.M
. on the 11th and turned southward down the African coast. The War Cabinet, on being apprised, instantly instructed the First Lord to order the
Renown
to get in touch with the French ships, ask for their destination, and make it clear that they would not be allowed to proceed to any German-occupied ports. If they replied that they were going south, they were to be told they could proceed to Casablanca, and in this case they were to be shadowed. If they tried to go beyond Casablanca to Dakar, they were to be stopped. But the cruisers were never caught. A haze lay over Casablanca on the 12th and 13th. One of the reconnoitring British aircraft was shot down; reports about the presence of additional warships in Casablanca Harbour were conflicting; and the
Renown
and her destroyers waited all day and night south of Casablanca to intercept the French squadron. At 4.20 on the afternoon of the 13th, the
Renown
received an air report that there were no cruisers in Casablanca. In fact, they were already far to the southward, steaming for Dakar at full speed.

There seemed, however, to be still another chance. Our expedition and its powerful escort was by now itself south of Dakar, approaching Freetown. At 12.16
A.M
. on September 14, the Admiralty signalled to Admiral John Cunningham telling him that the French cruisers had left Casablanca at a time unknown and ordering him to prevent them entering Dakar. He was to use every ship available, including the
Cumberland;
and the
Ark Royal
should operate her aircraft without a destroyer screen if this were unavoidable. The cruisers
Devonshire, Australia,
and
Cumberland
and the
Ark Royal
thereupon turned back at maximum speed to establish a patrol line to the north of Dakar. They did not reach their stations until evening on September 14. The French squadron was already anchored in the port with awnings spread.

This chapter of accidents sealed the fate of the Franco-British expedition to Dakar. I had no doubt whatever that the enterprise should be abandoned. The whole scheme of a bloodless landing and occupation by General de Gaulle seemed to me ruined by the arrival of the French squadron, probably carrying reinforcements, good gunners, and bitter-minded Vichy officers, to decide the Governor, to pervert the garrison and man the batteries. It was possible, however, to cancel the plan without any loss of prestige, so important to us at this time, and indeed without anyone knowing anything about it. The expedition could be diverted to Duala and cover General de Gaulle’s operations against the French Cameroons, and thereafter the ships and transports could be dispersed or return home.

Accordingly, at the meeting of the War Cabinet at noon on September 16, after outlining the history of the Dakar operation from its inception, the serious results of the postponement of the date, originally fixed for September 13, the leakage of information from various sources, and the misfortune of the French warships having slipped through the Straits, I declared that the whole situation was altered and that the operation was now out of the question. The Cabinet adopted my advice, and the following orders were despatched to the Dakar force at 2
P.M.
that day:

His Majesty’s Government have decided that presence of French cruisers at Dakar renders the execution of Dakar operation impracticable. Alternative plans have been examined here. Landing at Konakri does not appear to offer any chance of success in view of difficulty of communications to Bomako, the lack of transport with the force, and the probability that forces from Dakar would forestall. Moreover, close blockade of Dakar from seaward is not possible with the naval forces available, and therefore presence of de Gaulle’s force at Bomako would not appreciably influence situation at Dakar. Best plan appears to be for General de Gaulle’s force to land at Duala with the object of consolidating the Cameroons, Equatorial Africa, and Chad, and extending influence of de Gaulle to Libreville. The British portion of the force would remain for the present at Freetown.

Unless General de Gaulle has any strong objections to the latter course, it should be put into operation forthwith.

* * * * *

The expedition arrived at Freetown on September 17. All the leaders reacted vehemently against the idea of abandoning the enterprise. The Admiral and the General argued that until it was known to what extent the arrival of the Vichy cruisers had raised local morale their presence did not materially alter the previous naval situation. At present, they said, the cruisers had awnings spread, and two were so berthed as to be virtually impotent, while presenting excellent bombing targets.

Here was another twist in the situation. It was very rare at this stage in the war for commanders on the spot to press for audacious courses. Usually the pressure to run risks came from home. In this case the General, General Irwin, had carefully put all his misgivings on paper before he started. I was, therefore, agreeably surprised at the evident zeal to put this complicated and semi-political operation to the test. If the men on the spot thought it was a time to do and dare, we should certainly give them a free hand. I therefore sent at 11.52
P.M
. on September 16 the following:

You are fully at liberty to consider the whole situation yourselves and consult de Gaulle, and we shall carefully consider then any advice you may give.

There soon arrived a vehement protest from General de Gaulle, who wished to carry out the plan.

At the very least [he said], should the British Government uphold its new and negative decision concerning direct action upon Dakar by sea, I request immediate co-operation of British naval and air forces here present to support and cover an operation which I personally shall conduct with my own troops against Dakar from the interior.
¹

Our commanders now reported:
²

At meeting today de Gaulle insisted upon necessity for early action at Dakar…. He is advised that substantial support for him is likely to be found in Dakar if agents are sent to foster it, action is not unduly deferred, and a too-British complexion of the operation avoided. His agents are ready at Bathurst and have their instructions. De Gaulle now proposes original plan to enter harbour unopposed should go forward, but that if this fails, Free French troops should attempt landing at Rufisque, supported by naval and air action if necessary, and thence advance on Dakar. British troops only to be landed in support if called upon after bridgehead has been established….

After careful consideration of all factors, we are of the opinion that the presence of these three cruisers has not sufficiently increased the risks, which were always accepted, to justify the abandonment of the enterprise. We accordingly recommend acceptance of de Gaulle’s new proposal, and that, should he fail, landing of British troops should be undertaken to install him as previously contemplated. Increased strength in [our] naval forces is, however, considered essential.

The operation should be carried out four days after decision of His Majesty’s Government is received.

And, finally, from Major-General Irwin to the C.I.G.S.:

As you know, I have already accepted risks in this operation not fully justified on purely military grounds. New information possibly increases those risks, but I consider them worth accepting in view of obvious results of success. De Gaulle has also committed himself to complete co-operation with British troops in case of need, and he has not shirked responsibility for fighting between Frenchmen.

The War Cabinet met for the second time on the 17th at 9
P.M
. Everyone was agreed to let the commanders go ahead as they wished. Final decision was postponed till noon the next day, it being plain that no time was being lost, as there was still nearly a week before the blow could be struck. At the request of the Cabinet, I drafted the following message to the commanders of the Dakar force:

We cannot judge relative advantages of alternative schemes from here. We give you full authority to go ahead and do what you think is best in order to give effect to the original purpose of the expedition. Keep us informed.

This was despatched at 1.20
P.M.
September 18.

There was nothing to do now but await results. On the 19th, the First Sea Lord reported that the French squadron, or parts of it, were leaving Dakar for the south. This made it pretty clear that it had carried Vichy-minded troops, technicians, and authorities to Dakar. The probabilities of a vigorous resistance were increased out of all proportion to the new forces involved. There would certainly be sharp fighting. My colleagues, who were tough, and also nimble to change with circumstances, as is right in war, shared my instinct to let things rip, and the various reports were heard in silence.

On the 20th, Admiral Pound told us that the French cruiser
Primauguet,
intercepted by the
Cornwall
and
Delhi,
had agreed to go to Casablanca and was now being escorted thither. The three French warships sighted by the
Australia
turned out to be the cruisers
Georges Leygues, Montcalm,
and
Gloire.
At noon on the 19th, the
Australia
had been joined by the
Cumberland,
and they continued to shadow the Vichy ships till evening. These now turned to the northward and increased their speed from fifteen to thirty-one knots. A chase ensued. We were not able to overtake them. At 9.0
P.M
., however, the
Gloire
had an engine breakdown and could steam no more than fifteen knots. Her captain agreed to return to Casablanca, escorted by the
Australia.
This pair were due to pass Dakar about midnight, and the captain of the
Australia
told the
Gloire
that if he were attacked by submarines he would at once sink her. She no doubt spoke to Dakar, and all passed off pleasantly. The
Cumberland,
shadowing the other two Vichy warships, lost touch in a heavy rainstorm, and both, though sighted, got back into Dakar without fire being made upon them. The
Poitiers,
when challenged at sea on the 17th, had already scuttled herself.