Their Finest Hour (59 page)

* * * * *

I was in such close agreement with the Secretary of State for War, and felt so much the need of having our views put forward on the spot, instead of through endless telegrams, that I now asked him whether he would not make a personal inspection of the Middle East. He was delighted, and started immediately. He made a thorough tour of the whole theatre. In his absence I took over the War Office.

I also at this time laid the whole military situation as I saw it before the Chiefs of Staff.

Prime Minister to General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee.

13.X.40.

1. First in urgency is the reinforcement of Malta –

(1) by further Hurricane aircraft flown there as can best be managed;

(2) by the convoy now being prepared, which should carry the largest anti-aircraft outfit possible, as well as the battalions and the battery – I understand another M.T. ship can be made available;

(3) by one or, better still, two more battalions released from police duty on the Canal or in Palestine, and carried to Malta when next the Fleet moves thither from Alexandria. General Dobbie’s latest appreciation bears out the grievous need of strengthening the garrison. Every effort should be made to meet his needs, observing that once Malta becomes a thorn in the Italian side, the enemy’s force may be turned upon it. The movement of these reinforcements should therefore precede any marked activity from Malta.

(4) Even three infantry tanks at Malta would be important, not only in actual defence, but as a deterrent if it were known that they were there. Some mock-up tanks also might be exhibited where they would be detected from the air.

2. The movement of the Fleet to Malta must await this strengthening of the air defences. It is, however, a most needful and profoundly advantageous step. I welcome the possibility of basing even light forces upon Malta, as they immediately increase its security. I understand it is intended they shall sally forth by day and only lie in harbour as a rule at night. It must be observed that a strong ship like the
Valiant
can far better withstand a hit from a bomb than light craft, and in addition she carries a battery of twenty very high-class A.A. guns. Apart from the stake being higher, it is not seen why, if light forces can be exposed in Malta Harbour, well-armoured and well-armed ships cannot use it too. The multiple aerial mine U.P. weapon gives considerable security against dive-bombing.

I should be glad to be more fully informed by the Admiralty about this.

Occasional visits by the whole Battle Fleet would be an immense deterrent on hostile attack, and also a threat to the [enemy] Libyan communications while they last.

Let me have the number of A.A. guns now in position, and the whole maximum content [of them in] the new convoy, together with estimated dates for their being mounted.

3. Relations with Vichy. We cannot accept the position that we must yield to the wishes of Vichy out of fear lest they make air raids upon Gibraltar, for there would be no end to that. We must reassert our blockade of the Straits, dealing with vessels whether escorted or unescorted, though without violating Spanish territorial waters. We should assemble a sufficient force at Gibraltar for this purpose at the earliest date possible. Meanwhile, we must maintain as good a blockade of Dakar as possible, and protect Duala, etc., from a counter-stroke by the French cruisers in Dakar. The conversations with Vichy, if they take place, may reach a
modus vivendi
falling somewhat short of these desiderata. Of course, if we could be assured that Vichy, or part of Vichy, was genuinely moving in our direction, we could ease up on them to a very large extent. It seems probable that they will be increasingly inclined to move as we desire, and I personally do not believe that hard pressure from us will prevent this favourable movement. It is becoming more difficult every day for Vichy to lead France into war with us. We must not be too much afraid of checking this process, because the tide in our favour will master and overwhelm the disturbing eddies of the blockade and possible sea incidents. I do not believe that any trouble will arise with the French which will prevent the impending movement of our convoy to Malta. The chance is there, but it is remote and must be faced.

4. The greatest prize open to Bomber Command is the disabling of
Bismarck
and
Tirpitz.
If
Bismarck
could be set back for three or four months, the
King George V
could go to the Eastern Mediterranean to work up, and could therefore play a decisive part in the occupation of Malta by the Fleet. This would speedily transform the strategic situation in the Mediterranean.

5. Should October pass without invasion, we should begin the reinforcement of the Middle East by the Cape route to the utmost extent our shipping permits, sending, as arranged, the armoured units, the Australians and New Zealanders, in November, another British division before Christmas, and at least four more during January, February, and March. All this would be in addition to the necessary drafts. Let me know how far your present programme of sailings conforms to this.

6. The time has also come for a further strong reinforcement of the Middle East by bombers and by fighters. I should be glad to know how far the Chiefs of the Staff would be prepared to go, observing that, though the risk is very great, so also is the need.

7. Let me see the programme for reinforcing the Mediterranean Fleet during the next six months. It should be possible by the end of the year to send three flotillas of destroyers to the Eastern Mediterranean, and one additional to Gibraltar. If
King George V
must be kept to watch
Bismarck, Nelson
or
Rodney
should go to Alexandria, and either
Barham
or
Queen Elizabeth.
What cruiser reinforcements are contemplated? Will it be possible to send
Formidabl
e [an aircraft-carrier] thither also, and when?

8. Agreeably to the despatch of divisions to the Middle East, the Home Army and the Home Guard will be developed to fill the gap. A minimum of twelve mobile divisions must lie in reserve [at home], apart from the troops on the beaches, at any time.

9. It should be possible also to provide by the end of July a striking force for amphibious warfare of six divisions, of which two should be armoured. The various alternative plans for the employment of such a force are being studied.

* * * * *

Meanwhile, Mr. Eden was on his journey. He “was deeply impressed with the rapid progress in recent work on the defences of Gibraltar,” which he said had “been driven forward with energy, determination, and ingenuity.” The morale of the troops was high and the garrison confident. He was more anxious about the position at Malta, and pressed for at least another battalion and a battery of twenty-five-pounders, together, of course, with continued air reinforcements. The Governor, General Dobbie, thought it important that an offensive policy which would provoke retaliation should be avoided at Malta until April, 1941, by which time the various programmes of reinforcement in aircraft and anti-aircraft guns would be fulfilled.

On the 15th, Mr. Eden reached Cairo. He held searching discussions with Generals Wavell and Maitland-Wilson, who commanded the Desert Army. There was good confidence about repelling an Italian offensive. General Wilson estimated that the maximum strength the Italians could deploy against Matruh was three divisions, the limiting factors being maintenance, particularly water, and communications. Against this he had the 7th Armoured Division, with its newly arrived tank regiments, the 4th Indian Division, the Matruh garrison of five rifle battalions, a machine-gun battalion, and eight or nine batteries. The 16th British Brigade Group and the New Zealand Brigade Group had arrived from Palestine. An Australian Brigade Group lay west of Alexandria; a second Australian brigade was moving thither. There was also a Polish brigade. The concentration of these forces, wrote Eden, was considered by General Wilson to be sufficient to meet the threat of the enemy and to enable him to defeat it, provided he was assured of adequate air support. Eden added that inundations for which I had asked had been carried out and anti-tank obstacles created. He sent a lengthy list of requirements, particularly aircraft. This last was easier asked for than given at the time when the bombing of London was rising to its peak. He urged that a company of “I” tanks should be included in the November convoy, destination Port Soudan, in order to take the offensive against the Italian threat from Kassala on the Blue Nile.

Eden also raised at Cairo a pertinent question: What action would be taken by our forces, supposing the Italian attack did not take place? Upon this the generals first spoke of their own offensive hopes. Eden cabled:

It has emerged from our discussion this morning that infantry tanks [Matildas] can play a much more important role in the fighting in this theatre than we had thought. General Wavell would much like a second battalion of “I” tanks, and a Brigade Recovery Section, especially important to maintain full serviceability.

Although no reference had been made in the Secretary of State for War’s telegram to our taking the offensive, I was very glad to learn all the good news, and urged him to continue his inspection.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

16.X.40.

I have read all your telegrams with deepest interest and realisation of the value of your visit. We are considering how to meet your needs. Meanwhile, continue to master the local situation. Do not hurry your return.

Eden further arranged for a Turkish Mission to join our Army, and proposed to General Smuts a meeting at Khartoum to discuss the whole situation, and particularly our Soudan offensive project, and my complaints about the overcrowding in Kenya. This meeting was fixed for October 28, a date which later acquired significance. I need scarcely add that requests for all kinds of equipment, including ten thousand rifles to aid the rebellion in Abyssinia, and above all for anti-tank guns, anti-tank rifles, anti-aircraft batteries and air reinforcements, flowed to us in a broadening stream. We did our utmost to meet these needs at the expense of home defence at this time. There was not half enough for everybody, and whatever was given to one man had to be denied or taken from another also in danger. Mr. Eden proposed to fly back by Lagos immediately after his conference at Khartoum, preferring to make a full verbal report of all he had seen and done. I was so much encouraged by the picture as to become hungry for a turn to the offensive in the Western Desert. I therefore telegraphed to him:

26.X.40.

Before leaving, you should consider searchingly with your Generals possibilities of a forestalling offensive. I cannot form any opinion about it from here, but if any other course was open it would not be sound strategy to await the concentration and deployment of overwhelming forces. I thought the existing plans for repelling an attack by a defensive battle and counter-stroke very good, but what happens if the enemy do not venture until the Germans arrive in strength? Do not send any answer to this, but examine it thoroughly and discuss it on return.

Please examine in detail the field state of the Middle Eastern Army in order to secure the largest proportion of fighting men and units for the great numbers on our ration strength. Study improvisation from White details for the Canal Zone and internal security. All British battalions should be mobile and capable of taking part in battle. I fear that the proportion of fighting compared to ration strength is worse in the Middle East than anywhere else. Please do not be content with the stock answers. Even Army Ordnance and Service Corps depots and other technical details can all help in keeping order where they are, and should be organised for use in an emergency. Not only the best, but the second and third best, must be made to play their part.

Thus on the main issue our minds at home and on the spot were moving forward in harmony.

Unity with France
—
American and Canadian Contacts with Vichy — Difficulties of General de Gaulle
—
My Broadcast to the French People, October
21
— Its Lasting Effect — Need to Insist upon Essentials
—
The Toulon Fleet
—
President Roosevelt’s Intervention
—
Admiralty Anxieties
—
Correspondence with the President, November
—
A Firm Policy About the French Battleships — Telegram to General de Gaulle — Pétain’s Assurances to the President
—
Britain and Spain — Sir Samuel Hoare Appointed Ambassador
—
General Franco’s Policy
—
Dangers of Spanish Hostility — Algeciras Bay and the Neutral Ground — Artful Diplomacy of the Spanish Government Towards Hitler — Franco’s Dilatory Tactics
—
Suñer’s Mission
—
Ribbentrop’s Visit to Rome, September
19
— Increasing Spanish Claims
—
Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass, October
4 —
Hitler and Franco at Hendaye,
October
23
— Hitler and Pétain at Montoire, October
24
— Collaboration Against Britain
—
My Personal Views, November
14
— Pétain Breaks with Laval
—
Hitler’s Disappointment with Spain
—
Franco’s Duplicity and Ingratitude Both to Hitler and Mussolini
—
My Telegram to Sir Samuel Hoare — And to the President.

I
N
SPITE
OF
THE
A
RMISTICE
and Oran and the ending of our diplomatic relations with Vichy, I never ceased to feel a unity with France. People who have not been subjected to the personal stresses which fell upon prominent Frenchmen in the awful ruin of their country should be careful in their judgments of individuals. It is beyond the scope of this story to enter the maze of French politics. But I felt sure that the French nation would do its best for the common cause according to the facts presented to it. When they were told that their only salvation lay in following the advice of the illustrious Marshal Pétain, and that England, which had given them so little help, would soon be conquered or give in, very little choice was offered to the masses. But I was sure they wanted us to win, and that nothing would give them more joy than to see us continue the struggle with vigour. It was our first duty to give loyal support to General de Gaulle in his valiant constancy. On August 7, I signed a military agreement with him which dealt with practical needs. His stirring addresses were made known to France and the world by the British broadcasts. The sentence of death which the Pétain Government passed upon him glorified his name. We did everything in our power to aid him and magnify his movement.

At the same time it was necessary to keep in touch not only with France, but even with Vichy. I therefore always tried to make the best of them. I was very glad when at the end of the year the United States sent an Ambassador to Vichy of so much influence and character as Admiral Leahy, who was himself so close to the President. I repeatedly encouraged Mr. Mackenzie King to keep his representative, the skilful and accomplished M. Dupuy, at Vichy. Here at least was a window upon a courtyard to which we had no other access. On July 25, I sent a Minute to the Foreign Secretary in which I said:

I want to promote a kind of collusive conspiracy in the Vichy Government whereby certain members of that Government, perhaps with the consent of those who remain, will levant to North Africa in order to make a better bargain for France from the North African shore and from a position of independence. For this purpose I would use both food and other inducements, as well as the obvious arguments.

It was in this spirit that I was to receive in October a certain M. Rougier, who represented himself as acting on the personal instructions of Marshal Pétain. This was not because I or my colleagues had any respect for Marshal Pétain, but only because no road that led to France should be incontinently barred. Our consistent policy was to make the Vichy Government and its members feel that, so far as we were concerned, it was never too late to mend. Whatever had happened in the past, France was our comrade in tribulation, and nothing but actual war between us should prevent her being our partner in victory.

This mood was hard upon de Gaulle, who had risked all and kept the flag flying, but whose handful of followers outside France could never claim to be an effective alternative French Government. Nevertheless, we did our utmost to increase his influence, authority, and power. He for his part naturally resented any kind of truck on our part with Vichy, and thought we ought to be exclusively loyal to him. He also felt it to be essential to his position before the French people that he should maintain a proud and haughty demeanour towards “perfidious Albion,” although an exile dependent upon our protection and dwelling in our midst. He had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet. He certainly carried out this policy with perseverance. He even one day explained this technique to me, and I fully comprehended the extraordinary difficulties of his problem. I always admired his massive strength.

* * * * *

On October 21, I made an appeal by radio to the French people. I took great pains to prepare this short address, as it had to be given in French. I was not satisfied with the literal translation at first provided, which did not give the spirit of what I could say in English and could feel in French, but M. Dejean, one of the Free French Staff in London, made a far better rendering, which I rehearsed several times and delivered from the basement of the Annexe, amid the crashes of an air raid.

Frenchmen!

For more than thirty years in peace and war I have marched with you, and I am marching still along the same road. To-night I speak to you at your firesides wherever you may be, or whatever your fortunes are. I repeat the prayer around the
louis d’or, “Dieu protége la France.”
Here at home in England, under the fire of the Boche, we do not forget the ties and links that unite us to France, and we are persevering steadfastly and in good heart in the cause of European freedom and fair dealing for the common people of all countries, for which, with you, we drew the sword. When good people get into trouble because they are attacked and heavily smitten by the vile and wicked, they must be very careful not to get at loggerheads with one another. The common enemy is always trying to bring this about, and, of course, in bad luck a lot of things happen which play into the enemy’s hands. We must just make the best of things as they come along.

Here in London, which Herr Hitler says he will reduce to ashes, and which his aeroplanes are now bombarding, our people are bearing up unflinchingly. Our air force has more than held its own. We are waiting for the long-promised invasion. So are the fishes. But, of course, this for us is only the beginning. Now in 1940, in spite of occasional losses, we have, as ever, command of the seas. In 1941 we shall have the command of the air. Remember what that means. Herr Hitler with his tanks and other mechanical weapons, and also by Fifth Column intrigue with traitors, has managed to subjugate for the time being most of the finest races in Europe, and his little Italian accomplice is trotting along hopefully and hungrily, but rather wearily and very timidly, at his side. They both wish to carve up France and her Empire as if it were a fowl: to one a leg, to another a wing or perhaps part of the breast. Not only the French Empire will be devoured by these two ugly customers, but Alsace-Lorraine will go once again under the German yoke, and Nice, Savoy and Corsica – Napoleon’s Corsica – will be torn from the fair realm of France. But Herr Hitler is not thinking only of stealing other people’s territories, or flinging gobbets of them to his little confederate. I tell you truly what you must believe when I say this evil man, this monstrous abortion of hatred and defeat, is resolved on nothing less than the complete wiping out of the French nation, and the disintegration of its whole life and future. By all kinds of sly and savage means, he is plotting and working to quench for ever the fountain of characteristic French culture and of French inspiration to the world. All Europe, if he has his way, will be reduced to one uniform Bocheland, to be exploited, pillaged, and bullied by his Nazi gangsters. You will excuse my speaking frankly because this is not a time to mince words. It is not defeat that France will now be made to suffer at German hands, but the doom of complete obliteration. Army, Navy, Air Force, religion, law, language, culture, institutions, literature, history, tradition, all are to be effaced by the brute strength of a triumphant army and the scientific low-cunning of a ruthless Police Force.

Frenchmen – re-arm your spirits before it is too late. Remember how Napoleon said before one of his battles: “These same Prussians who are so boastful to-day were three to one at Jena, and six to one at Montmirail.” Never will I believe that the soul of France is dead! Never will I believe that her place amongst the greatest nations of the world has been lost for ever! All these schemes and crimes of Herr Hitler’s are bringing upon him and upon all who belong to his system a retribution which many of us will live to see. The story is not yet finished, but it will not be so long. We are on his track, and so are our friends across the Atlantic Ocean, and your friends across the Atlantic Ocean. If he cannot destroy us, we will surely destroy him and all his gang, and all their works. Therefore have hope and faith, for all will come right.

Now what is it we British ask of you in this present hard and bitter time? What we ask at this moment in our struggle to win the victory which we will share with you, is that if you cannot help us, at least you will not hinder us. Presently you will be able to weight the arm that strikes for you, and you ought to do so. But even now we believe that Frenchmen wherever they may be, feel their hearts warm and a proud blood tingle in their veins when we have some success in the air or on the sea, or presently – for that will come – upon the land.

Remember, we shall never stop, never weary, and never give in, and that our whole people and Empire have vowed themselves to the task of cleansing Europe from the Nazi pestilence and saving the world from the new Dark Ages. Do not imagine, as the German-controlled wireless tells you, that we English seek to take your ships and colonies. We seek to beat the life and soul out of Hitler and Hitlerism. That alone, that all the time, that to the end. We do not covet anything from any nation except their respect. Those Frenchmen who are in the French Empire, and those who are in so-called Unoccupied France, may see their way from time to time to useful action. I will not go into details. Hostile ears are listening. As for those, to whom English hearts go out in full, because they see them under the sharp discipline, oppression, and spying of the Hun – as to those Frenchmen in the occupied regions, to them I say, when they think of the future let them remember the words which Gambetta, that great Frenchman, uttered after 1870 about the future of France and what was to come: “Think of it always: speak of it never.”

Good night, then. Sleep to gather strength for the morning. For the morning will come. Brightly will it shine on the brave and true, kindly upon all who suffer for the cause, glorious upon the tombs of heroes. Thus will shine the dawn.
Vive la France!
Long live also the forward march of the common people in all the lands towards their just and true inheritance, and towards the broader and fuller age.

There is no doubt that this appeal went home to the hearts of millions of Frenchmen, and to this day I am reminded of it by men and women of all classes in France, who always treat me with the utmost kindness in spite of the hard things I had to do – sometimes to them – for our common salvation.

* * * * *

Indeed it was necessary to insist upon essentials. We could not relax the blockade of Europe, and particularly of France, while they remained under Hitler’s domination. Although from time to time to meet American wishes we allowed a few specified ships with medical stores to pass into Unoccupied France, we did not hesitate to stop and search all other ships seeking or coming out of French ports. Whatever Vichy might do for good or ill, we would not abandon de Gaulle or discourage accessions to his growing colonial domain. Above all we would not allow any portion of the French Fleet,’ now immobilised in French colonial harbours, to return to France. There were times when the Admiralty were deeply concerned lest France should declare war and thus add to their many cares. I always believed that once we had proved our resolve and ability to fight on indefinitely the spirit of the French people would never allow the Vichy Government to take so unnatural a step. Indeed, there was by now a strong enthusiasm and comradeship for Britain, and French hopes grew as the months passed. This was recognised even by M. Laval when he presently became Foreign Minister to Marshal Pétain.