Their Finest Hour (62 page)

* * * * *

Marshal Pétain became increasingly resentful of Laval’s prodding him along the road which would lead to war with Britain and German occupation of the North African Colonies. On December 13, Laval arrived at Vichy with the proposal that Pétain should come to Paris to be present at the ceremonial transfer of the ashes of Napoleon’s son, the Duke of Reichstadt (“L’Aiglon”), to the Invalides. This was Hitler’s flowery idea of a solemn consecration of the
entente
reached at Montoire.

Pétain was not, however, attracted by a parade where the victor of Verdun would be exhibited on French soil with German guards of honour before the tomb of the Emperor Napoleon. He was, moreover, both wearied and fearful of Laval’s methods and aims. Members of Pétain’s staff, therefore, arranged the arrest of Laval. Energetic German intervention procured his release, but Pétain refused to accept him back as Minister. Laval retired in wrath to German-occupied Paris. I was glad that M. Flandin took his place as Foreign Minister. These events marked a change at Vichy. It seemed that the limits of collaboration had at last been reached. There were at this moment hopes of better French relations with Britain and of more sympathetic understanding for Vichy from the United States.

* * * * *

It is convenient to carry the Spanish story forward at this point. Franco, now convinced of a long war and of the Spanish abhorrence of any more war, and by no means sure of a German victory, used every device of exasperating delay and exorbitant demands. He was by this time so sure of Suñer that on October 18 he made him Foreign Minister, representing the removal of Beigbeder as a proof of his devotion to the Axis. In November, Suñer was summoned to Berchtes-gaden, and Hitler expressed his impatience with Spain’s delay in coming into the war. By now the Battle of Britain had been lost by the German Air Force. Italy was already involved in Greece and in North Africa. Serrano Suñer did not respond as was wished. He dwelt lengthily instead upon the economic difficulties of the Peninsula. Three weeks later, Admiral Canaris, Chief of the German Secret Service, was sent to Madrid to arrange the details of Spain’s entry into the war. He suggested that the German troops should pass the Spanish frontier on January 10, in preparation for an attack on Gibraltar on January 30. The Admiral was surprised when Franco told him that it was impossible for Spain to enter the war on the date mentioned. It seemed that the Caudillo feared the loss of Atlantic islands and Spanish colonies to the British Navy. He also emphasised the lack of food and the inability of Spain to stand a protracted war. As the German landing in England seemed indefinitely postponed, Franco introduced a new condition. He would not move, at any rate,
until Suez was in Axis hands,
since not till then would he feel sure that Spain would not be involved in long-drawn-out hostilities.

On February 6, 1941, Hitler wrote a letter to Franco, appealing in strong and urgent terms that he should play the man without further delay. Franco replied, expressing his undying loyalty. He urged that preparations for the attack on Gibraltar should be continued with renewed vigour. As another new point he declared that only Spanish troops with German equipment must be used for this enterprise. Even if all this was arranged, Spain could not enter the war for economic reasons. Ribbentrop thereupon reported to the Fuehrer that Franco had no intention of making war. Hitler was scandalised, but, being now set upon the invasion of Russia, he did not perhaps like the idea of trying Napoleon’s other unsuccessful enterprise, the invasion of Spain, at the same time. Considerable Spanish forces were now gathered along the Pyrenees, and he felt it was wiser to stick to his method with nations, “One by One.” Thus by subtlety and trickery and blandishments of all kinds Franco succeeded in tiding things over and keeping Spain out of the war, to the inestimable advantage of Britain when she was all alone.

We could not count upon this at the time, and I urged the President to do all in his power to help forward the policy of conciliation.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

23.XI.40.

Our accounts show that situation in Spain is deteriorating and that the Peninsula is not far from starvation point. An offer by you of food month by month so long as they keep out of the war might be decisive. Small things do not count now, and this is a time for very plain talk to them. The occupation by Germany of both sides of the Straits would be a grievous addition to our naval strain, already severe. The Germans would soon have batteries working by radar [i.e., they could aim in the darkness], which would close the Straits both by night and day. With a major campaign developing in the Eastern Mediterranean and the need to reinforce and supply our armies there all round the Cape, we could not contemplate any military action on the mainland at or near the Straits. The Rock of Gibraltar will stand a long siege, but what is the good of that if we cannot use the harbour or pass the Straits? Once in Morocco, the Germans will work southward, and U-boats and aircraft will soon be operating freely from Casablanca and Dakar. I need not, Mr. President, enlarge upon the trouble this will cause to us, or the approach of trouble to the Western Hemisphere. We must gain as much time as possible.

This great danger had in fact passed away, and, though we did not know it, it passed forever. It is fashionable at the present time to dwell on the vices of General Franco, and I am, therefore, glad to place on record this testimony to the duplicity and ingratitude of his dealings with Hitler and Mussolini. I shall presently record even greater services which these evil qualities in General Franco rendered to the Allied cause.

Mussolini’s Decision to Attack Greece
—
His Letter to Hitler of October
19 —
The Florence Conference
—
The Italian Invasion of Greece, October
28, 1940
— Reinforcement of Admiral Cunningham’s Fleet
—
The Arrival of the “Illustrious”
—
Our Obligations
—
Importance of Crete
—
Telegrams to Mr. Eden
—
Air Support for Greece
—
Minute to Chief of the Air Staff, November
2, 1940 —
Wavell-Wilson Plans for an Offensive in Libya
—
Secrecy Causes Misunderstanding
—
Further Telegrams to Mr. Eden
—
Greek Need for the Cretan Division
—
Mr. Eden’s Latest Telegrams
—
His Return
—
He Unfolds “Operation Compass”
—
General Agreement
—
War Cabinet Approves
—
The Fleet Air Arm Attack the Italian Fleet
—
Gallant Exploit at Taranto
—
Half the Italian Fleet Disabled for Six Months
—
Naval Dispositions
—
My Desire for an Amphibious Feature in “Compass”
—
My Telegram to Wavell of November
26 —
Policy Towards Turkey
—
An Improved Situation
—
Shortcomings at Suda Bay
—
Death of Mr. Chamberlain
—
A Tribute to His Memory.

A
FRESH
, though not entirely unexpected outrage by Mussolini, with baffling problems and far-reaching consequences to all our harassed affairs, now broke upon the Mediterranean scene.

The Duce took the final decision to attack Greece on October 15, 1940. That morning a meeting of the Italian war leaders was held in the Palazzo Venezia. He opened the proceedings in the following words:

The object of this meeting is to define the course of action – in general terms – which I have decided to initiate against Greece. In the first instance this action will have aims of both a maritime and territorial character. The territorial aims will be based on the possession of the whole coast of Southern Albania … and the Ionian islands – Zante, Cephalonia, and Corfu – and the occupation of Salonika. When we have attained these objectives, we shall have improved our position
vis-à-vis
England in the Mediterranean. In the second instance … the complete occupation of Greece, in order to put her out of action and to assure that in all circumstances she will remain in our politico-economic sphere.

Having thus defined the question, I have laid down the date – which in my opinion must not be postponed even for an hour – and that is for the 26th of this month. This is an action which I have matured at length for months, before our entry into the war and before the beginning of the conflict…. I would add that I foresee no complications in the north. Yugoslavia has every interest to keep quiet…. I also exclude complications from the side of Turkey, particularly since Germany has established herself in Rumania and since Bulgaria has increased her strength. The latter can play a part in our game, and I shall take the necessary steps so as not to miss the present unique opportunity for achieving her aspirations in Macedonia and for an outlet to the sea….
¹

On October 19, Mussolini wrote to Hitler telling him of the decision to which he had come. Hitler was then on his journey to Hendaye and Montoire. The letter (the text of which has not come to light) seems to have followed him round. When it finally reached him, he at once proposed to Mussolini a meeting to discuss the general political situation in Europe. This meeting took place in Florence on October 28. That morning the Italian attack on Greece had begun.

It seems, however, that Hitler did not choose to make an issue of the Greek adventure. He said politely that Germany was in accord with the Italian action in Greece, and then proceeded to tell the tale of his meetings with Franco and Pétain. There can be no doubt that he did not like what had been done by his associate. A few weeks later, after the Italian attack was checked, he wrote to Mussolini in his letter of November 20: “When I asked you to receive me at Florence I began the journey with the hope of being able to expound my views
before
the threatened action against Greece had been taken, about which I had heard only in general terms.” In the main, however, he accepted the decision of his ally.

* * * * *

Before dawn on October 28, the Italian Minister in Athens presented an ultimatum to General Metaxas, the Premier of Greece. Mussolini demanded that the whole of Greece should be opened to Italian troops. At the same time the Italian army in Albania invaded Greece at various points. The Greek Government, whose forces were by no means unready on the frontier, rejected the ultimatum. They also invoked the guarantee given by Mr. Chamberlain on April 13, 1939. This we were bound to honour. By the advice of the War Cabinet, and from his own heart, His Majesty replied to the King of the Hellenes: “Your cause is our cause; we shall be fighting against a common foe.” I responded to the appeal of General Metaxas: “We will give you all the help in our power. We will fight a common foe and we will share a united victory.” This undertaking was during a long story made good.

* * * * *

Although we were still heavily outnumbered on paper by the Italian Fleet, marked improvements had been made in our Mediterranean strength. During September the
Valiant,
the armoured-deck aircraft-carrier
Illustrious,
and two A.A. cruisers had come safely through the Mediterranean to join Admiral Cunningham at Alexandria. Hitherto his ships had always been observed and usually bombed by the greatly superior Italian Air Force. The
Illustrious,
with her modern fighters and latest radar equipment, by striking down patrols and assailants gave a new secrecy to the movements of our Fleet. This advantage was timely. Apart from a few air squadrons, a British mission and perhaps some token troops, we had nothing to give; and even these trifles were a painful subtraction from ardent projects already lighting in the Libyan theatre. One salient strategic fact leaped out upon us – CRETE! The Italians must not have it. We must get it first – and at once. It was fortunate that at this moment Mr. Eden was in the Middle East, and that I thus had a Ministerial colleague on the spot with whom to deal. He was about to return home after his conference with General Smuts at Khartoum. I telegraphed to him:

29.X.40.

I recognise importance of your conference with Smuts, but hope first Wavell, and thereafter you, will return at earliest to Cairo.

We here are all convinced an effort should be made to establish ourselves in Crete, and that risks should be run for this valuable prize. You will have seen the Service telegrams on this subject.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden [ at Khartoum ] .

29.X.40.

It seems of prime importance to hold the best airfield possible and a naval fuelling base at Suda Bay. Successful defence of Crete is invaluable aid to defence of Egypt. Loss of Crete to [the] Italians [would be a] grievous aggravation [of] all Mediterranean difficulties. So great a prize is worth the risk, and almost equal to [a] successful offensive in Libya. Pray, after an examination of whole problem with Wavell and Smuts, do not hesitate to make proposals for action on large scale at expense of other sectors, and ask for any further aid you require from here, including aircraft and anti-aircraft [batteries]. We are studying how to meet your need. Consider your return to Cairo indispensable.

At the invitation of the Greek Government, Suda Bay, the best harbour in Crete, was occupied by our forces two days later.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

30.X.40.

What steps are we taking to get news from the Greek front? Have we observers there? What is our attaché there doing?

Why do you not send one of your generals from Egypt at the head of a military mission to be at the headquarters of the Greek field army? Let them go and see the fighting and give us some close-up information about the relative merits of the two armies. I expect to have a good wire every day or so, telling us exactly what is happening, as far as the Greeks will allow it.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

30.X.40.

There is no objection to two battalions going to Freetown, pending their relief by the West African Brigade, after which they can go on to Egypt. They are not to leave England until it is agreed that the West African Brigade is to go to West Africa.

Both Crete and Malta come before Freetown in A.A. guns, and I cannot approve of this diversion at the present time. Neither can I agree to the diversion of a fighter squadron [for Freetown] at this stage. The Navy is responsible for preventing any sea-borne expedition attacking our West African colonies. As to the air attack, if the French bomb Freetown or Bathurst, we will bomb Vichy. I do not think this will happen.

Prime Minister to Air Vice-Marshal Longmore. 2

1.XI.40.

[In dispatching a Blenheim squadron to Greece] you have taken a very bold and wise decision. I hope to reinforce you as soon as possible.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.A.S. and for C.O.S. Committee.

1.XI.40.

I should propose to make immediate arrangements to send four additional heavy bomber squadrons (including the one already sent to Malta) to the Middle East at once, and also four Hurricane fighter squadrons. Let me see plans for this movement. I should like to have a report on this today.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

1.XI.40.

Mr. Eden has asked for ten thousand rifles for the Middle East. Can we not supply these out of the American packet, or is there any small parcel of rifles anywhere in the world to be picked up?

Prime Minister to C.A.S.

2.XI.40.

1. I had in mind that the four bomber squadrons would fly to Crete or Greece via Malta. The personnel and ground stores would have to be carried through by cruiser. It is essential to have these squadrons operating at the earliest from bases in Greek territory upon the Italian Fleet at Taranto, and generally against Southern For so vital an operation of war the Navy would have to make special exertions, and you should not assume that a ship will not be forthcoming, at any rate for such ground personnel, stores, etc., as are necessary to come into action at this very critical time. I see more difficulty in the vehicles, but perhaps some could come from Egypt, and the rest be improvised.

2. The fighters are, of course, more difficult, but I should hope that they could fly from a carrier to Malta, as was done last time. If necessary, the
Furious
would have to help the
Ark Royal.
Could they fly from Malta to an aerodrome in Greece? If not, could they fly on to a carrier to refuel, and thence to Greece? In the case of the fighters the same arrangements would have to be made about stores, ground personnel, etc., as with the bombers.

Prime Minister to Mr. Eden [ at G.H.Q., Middle East ].

2.XI.40.

Greek situation must be held to dominate others now. We are well aware of our slender resources. Aid to Greece must be attentively studied lest whole Turkish position is lost through proof that England never tries to keep her guarantees. I invite you to stay in Cairo for at least another week while these questions are being studied and we make sure we have done our best from both ends. Meanwhile, another thirty thousand men are reaching you by November 15, which must affect local situation in Egypt.

During Mr. Eden’s earlier conferences and talks with General Wavell and also with General Wilson, he posed the question, What action was intended if the Italian offensive did not develop? He was told in extreme secrecy that a plan was being made to attack the Italians in the Western Desert instead of waiting for them to open their offensive against Mersa Matruh. Neither he nor Wavell imparted these ideas to me or to the Chiefs of Staff. General Wavell begged the Secretary of State for War not to send any telegram on this subject, but to tell us verbally about it when he got home. Thus for some weeks we remained without knowledge of the way their minds were moving. It is clear from my message of October 26 that any forestalling operation on a large scale in the Western Desert would command my keen support. We were all, however, until Mr. Eden’s return left under the impression that Wavell and Wilson were still wedded to the defensive battle at Mersa Matruh, and would wait there until they were attacked. The only action they seemed to contemplate in this extremely serious crisis was to send a battalion or so to Crete, a few air squadrons to Greece, and make some minor diversions against the Dodecanese and a small though desirable offensive in the Soudan. This seemed by no means good enough employment for the very large forces with which, at great risk, exertion, and cost, we had furnished them.