Theodore Rex (45 page)

When Roosevelt spoke of the Western Hemisphere, this was how he saw it—not the left half of a map counterbalanced by kingdoms and empires, but one whole face of the earth, centered on the United States. And here, microscopically small in the power center of this center, was himself sitting down to work.

There was nothing much he could do right now about the Caribbean theater, except wait for an opportunity to invoke the Monroe Doctrine there, once and for all. President Cleveland had attempted to do so definitively against Britain in 1895—also in a matter regarding Venezuela—but Lord Salisbury’s government had backed down too soon for any American show of force. Roosevelt held that only “power, and the willingness and readiness to use it” would make Germany understand the Monroe Doctrine fully. If he could send such a forceful message, it would “round out” Cleveland’s policy nicely.

Few among the President’s callers that morning saw his new globe as anything other than a piece of furniture.
Congress was back in town—not the newly elected Fifty-eighth but the same old Fifty-seventh, reconvening for its last winter session. Senators and Representatives paid their usual respects, and declared their usual keen interest in the Message he would be sending them later in the day.

For two and a half hours, Roosevelt pumped hands and exchanged pleasantries. Toward noon, his flow of visitors slackened, as Congressmen and correspondents headed for Capitol Hill. The White House grew quiet. Even Edith and Alice took a carriage to watch the opening ceremonies. Roosevelt remained at his desk. Behind him as he worked, the USS
Mayflower
dropped down the bright river.

FOR THE NEXT WEEK
, he remained closeted in the White House, giving no hint of anxiety about Venezuela.
By 4 December, Secretary Moody had authorized a c
oncentration of fifty-three warships—the largest such deployment the Navy had ever seen—compared with twenty-nine Allied vessels. The imbalance signified nothing, of course, since neither armada was contending. Still, Roosevelt had real strength available if he needed it. He knew the historic propensity of blockades toward invasion.

On 7 December, Germany and Britain informed President Castro that they were closing their consulates in Caracas and initiating “pacific” measures to satisfy their claims against him. Admiral Dewey simultaneously took command of the fleet off Culebra, under orders to be ready to move south at an hour’s notice. He began an immediate program of dummy landings along stretches of the Puerto Rican shore that resembled Venezuela’s.

As if toughening himself for the crisis to come, Roosevelt intensified his latest exercise routine, “singlesticks.” Every evening in the residence, he and Leonard Wood donned padded helmets and chest protectors and beat each other like carpets. “
We look like Tweedledum and Tweedledee,” the President joked.

General Wood noted in his diary that Roosevelt was too excitable a stick-fighter to remember the rules. “It is almost impossible to get him to come to a guard after having been hit or delivering a blow.” Despite bruised shoulders and swollen wrists, the two old Rough Riders soon graduated to heavy ash rods.

Speak softly and carry a big stick
was a West African proverb Roosevelt had tried out once, as Vice President, and memorized as a personal mantra. Perhaps the current situation would enable him to test its effectiveness, starting with the soft speech. “If a man continually blusters, if he lacks civility, a big stick will not save him from trouble; but neither will speaking softly avail, if back of the softness there does not lie strength, power.”

ON 8 DECEMBER
, the German Ambassador, Theodor von Holleben, visited the Executive Office with a party of his compatriots. The appointment was ceremonial. However, it gave Roosevelt a chance to talk to the Ambassador privately, without attracting the attention of reporters. He was adept at drawing callers aside on such occasions, and hissing something forceful through smiling teeth.

The reason for his circumspection was that he had to deal, through von Holleben, with
the most dangerous man in the world. Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany, loomed clear in his imagination—clearer, perhaps, than if they had actually met. (Roosevelt was too good-natured to be a perceptive judge of people in the flesh.) For several years, even before becoming Vice President, he had been receiving apprehensive reports about the Kaiser from mutual acquaintances.
Cecil Spring Rice, for one, saw Wilhelm as an economic and military expansionist, with a “definite plan” to consolidate German interests in South America.
General Wood, just back from observing the German Army maneuvers at Potsdam, did not know what to be more impressed with: the Kaiser’s bewitching personality, or his domination of an inhumanly efficient military machine.

Roosevelt the Germanist admired Wilhelm’s finer Teutonic qualities, as he did those of Helmuth Karl von Moltke and Albrecht von Roon. He was also aware of
some beguiling similarities between the Kaiser and himself.
Only three months separated their respective dates of birth, Wilhelm being the younger man. Physically, they were alike in their burly, grinning virility, their hunting prowess, and their conquest of juvenile disability—in the Kaiser’s case, a withered left arm. They had the same quick nerves, charm, explosive speech, and weakness for moralizing. They were catholic in intellect, encyclopedic in memory. They shared a passion for things military, identifying particularly with sea power.

However, as Roosevelt pointed out, superficial similarities between men or nations accentuate their serious differences. In contrast to his own steely sense of direction, he saw a brilliant waywardness in Wilhelm, as of running mercury. The Kaiser was vain, coarse, romantic, and often foolish. He was xenophobic in general and anti-Semitic in particular, given to hoarse shouts of “
Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Gott!”
His fits of rage were so violent as to make onlookers sick.

What made Roosevelt most wary was Wilhelm’s inclination toward bejeweled fantasy. “He writes to me pretending that he is a descendant of Frederick the Great! I know better and feel inclined to tell him so.” The Kaiser liked to dress up as Frederick; when he posed for photographs in his hero’s thigh-boots he revealed rather wide hips. Roosevelt, alive to any hint of effeminacy, understood that in negotiating with Wilhelm he must at all times remember the importance of show. It would be foolhardy to humiliate him in the Caribbean. The Kaiser was enough of a man to stand a tough, confidential message—and enough of a woman, presumably, to retreat if it could be made to look glamorous.

ACCORDING TO ROOSEVELT’S
later testimony, he spoke to Ambassador von Holleben “with extreme emphasis,” and told him

The tactfulness of this warning was lost on von Holleben, who doggedly repeated Germany’s official position. His Majesty had no intention to take “permanent” possession of Venezuelan territory. With a touch of sarcasm, Roosevelt said that he was sure Wilhelm felt the same about Kiaochow, which was “merely held by a ninety-nine years lease.”

Again von Holleben failed to react. Roosevelt politely informed him that he would wait ten days for a total disclaimer from Berlin. If none was forthcoming, Admiral Dewey would be ordered south “to observe matters along Venezuela.”

The Ambassador escorted his party out. “You gave that Dutchman something to think about,” said William Loeb, who was doing secretarial duty. But Loeb wondered if von Holleben had the courage to transmit an ultimatum. “I don’t think he will give the Kaiser a correct picture of your attitude.”

THE “PACIFIC” BLOCKADE
turned violent the next morning, 9 December. Four Venezuelan gunboats were seized by the Allies, and three of them destroyed by Germany. President Castro, in a panic, proposed that all claims against his country be arbitrated, and asked the United States to intercede for him.

John Hay relayed Castro’s proposal to London and Berlin, while Roosevelt considered the implications of his secret ultimatum to the Kaiser. The sinking of the gunboats struck him as “an act of brutality and useless revenge.” If
Der Allmachtige
was this willing to lay violent hands on Venezuelan shipping, what price Venezuelan real estate? More than ever, Roosevelt suspected that Germany wanted to establish “a strongly fortified place of arms” near the future Isthmian Canal. He himself was pledged to violence now—unless von Holleben brought him a peaceable message in the nine days remaining.

MORE THAN EIGHT
thousand miles away, the only detached units of the United States Navy steamed to a routine rendezvous at Manila. Neither the Pacific nor the Far Eastern Squadron was needed for Caribbean duty. But Roosevelt had never forgotten that, in 1898, it had taken the battleship
Oregon
sixty-four days to rush from San Francisco to Florida via Cape Horn.