Thermopylae (32 page)
Mardonius and the whole army showed the deepest distress at Masistius’ death - a man more highly thought of, both by the king and his subjects, than anyone else in the Persian army except Mardonius himself; they shaved their heads, cut the manes of their horses and mules, and abandoned themselves to such cries of grief that the whole of Boeotia was loud with the noise of them.
The Greeks, naturally enough, were overjoyed at having killed one of Persia’s most famous men. (It was somewhat as if the British attempt to capture Rommel in the desert in the Second World War had succeeded.) They had repulsed a heavy attack by Persia’s most formidable arm, her horsemen - a great boost to their morale - and now they hoisted the dead Masistius on to a cart and paraded his body through the ranks. ‘It was certainly worth looking at, for Masistius was a tall and splendidly handsome man… Such is war.
Pausanias now decided to re-deploy his forces, coming down from the foothills and moving westwards towards the now-deserted city of Plateaea. His object was two-fold: first, he had a good water-supply from springs that flowed into the Asopus; secondly, he had a better position for his hoplites ‘in flat country rising here and there in low hills’. The generalship of the Spartan, trained since a boy in the military art, cannot be faulted. There can be little doubt that so experienced a soldier moved most of his troops along the foothills at night, for he would have been foolish indeed to come down into the open plain where the enemy cavalry could have so easily attacked him in daylight hours. He would also have left his right flank exposed. Although the whole army could not possibly have effected the movement during darkness, the hillocks of the Asopus ridge would have largely concealed them in any case. The spring known as Garagaphia (possibly to be equated with what is now known as Rhetsi) would seem to have formed the point for his right wing, where the Spartans, since their leader Pausanias was commander-in-chief, automatically held the post of honour. Next to them came the small contingent from Tegea (about 1500 men), as compared with 10,000 from Lacedaemon of whom 5000 were Spartiates. The right centre was held by the Corinthians with 5000 men and seven smaller states, making a total of over 11,000 men. The left centre, to which Megara made the major contribution of 3000 men, consisted of 7000, and the left wing where 8000 Athenians were stationed was augmented by 600 from little Plataea. The total Greek forces, then, amounted to something like 38,000 men (the figures are taken from Herodotus). Burn notes that in the composition of the battlefront noted enemies such as Corinth and Sicyon were separated from one another by the interposition of another unit (in this case 600 men from Orchomenus in Arcadia). These figures, so far as one can gather, refer only to hoplites, for Herodotus goes on to mention that for every Spartiate there were seven lightly armed Helots, making a Spartan contribution, therefore, of 35,000. Remembering always that, with the large shield on the left arm and the sword or spear in the right hand, the right wing was the attacking wing and, therefore, the Athenians on the left were in the most exposed position. Against them Mardonius opposed an army that would seem to have been somewhat similar in numbers but, if one takes into account the pro-Persian Greeks, a good deal larger.
Between the enemies lay the Asopus river, shallow enough in summertime nowadays but possibly deeper then; in any case a water-barrier to the hoplite, while of little consequence to cavalry. The Persian horsemen, who were also bowmen, had a considerable advantage. They could carry out lightning raids on the Athenians on the left, and did finally manage to deprive them of using the waters of the Asopus. For over a week the Greeks and the Persians faced one another - like boxers waiting for the first false move. Each had different problems. Pausanias was waiting for the arrival of further reserves, while Mardonius was concerned about his commissariat. Although he had friendly (and terrified) Thebes at his back, it was difficult to maintain adequate supplies for so many men. The army, which had largely relied on a great fleet in the previous year, now had no store-ships or grain-vessels. Their ships lay inactive at Samos, demoralised, and blocked by the larger Greek fleet at Delos. The Thebans and the other pro-Persian lands behind Mardonius could not for ever keep coping with his demands. Pausanias, on the other hand, had the resources of the Peloponnese behind him.
It was high midsummer; the ‘lion sun’ of the Mediterranean beat down; a time when, even under the best of circumstances, men’s nerves get frayed and heat-exhaustion can take its toll. It was during this period of waiting that Aristeides discovered a plot among his fellow Athenians to ‘subvert the democracy’. As might be expected they were all members of his own class, ‘men of leading families’. They met together secretly in a house in Plataea and were clearly prepared to ‘sell out’ to the Persians, so long as they could have an oligarchic constitution ensured at Athens. The fleet was far away; men like Themistocles were not present; and the democratic navy party might now be defeated in their absence. Out of a large number of suspects Aristeides had eight arrested, the two ringleaders ‘contriving’ to escape. What Aristeides - to his great credit - did, was to break up a dangerous cabal which, like so many others in the various states of Greece, was prepared to do anything so long as their own class and their own friends could hold the reins of power. The genius of spirit that was later to give Athens her golden fifty years was partly seeded by such idiosyncratic behaviour. One may, perhaps, feel that the disciplined Lacedaemonians (and particularly the Spartiate upper caste) were nobler in many respects than the landowners of Athens.
In this waiting game it was the Persians who were forced to make the opening move. Pausanias, having re-established his troops in a defensible position, could afford to sit and wait. Mardonius was now to find out the truth of the observation of Xerxes’ uncle Artabanus that his other great enemy was the land itself. Plutarch says that the priests on both sides agreed on one point - that Pausanias and Mardonius ‘would win a victory if they remained on the defensive, but would be defeated if they attacked’. However, after a stalemate lasting over a week, Mardonius, acting on the advice of a Theban named Timagenidas, decided to use his cavalry on a large scale to raid the northern end of the Dryoscephalae Pass.
There can be no doubt that Theban patrols had detected how reinforcements and provisions were regularly reaching the army of Pausanias by this route.
The movement was not without success; a train of five hundred mules bringing food from the Peloponnese for the army was caught, together with the men in charge, just as it was coming down from the hills. The Persian cavalrymen showed no mercy; they killed beasts and men indiscriminately, and drove the remnant, when they were sick of slaughter, back to Mardonius within their own lines.
Two more days went by, and no further action took place. Neither side was willing to begin the general engagement. The Persians provoked the Greek forces to attack by advancing right up to the river, but neither of them ventured actually to cross.
The Persian cavalry, however, seem to have kept up their harassing tactics, making the Greek supply-lines difficult to maintain. Nevertheless it seems that they could not prevent a steady stream of reinforcements getting through to swell the Greek army. At this point the strange two-faced Alexander of Macedon is said to have paid a visit to the Greek lines by night. He brought the information that Mardonius was also having supply problems and that it had even been suggested that the army should withdraw inside the walls at Thebes. Artabazus, apparently, was the advocate of this scheme, but Mardonius had rejected it and was eager for a trial of strength on the field.
Alexander, of course, was as usual sitting on the fence, and Aristeides can have been in little doubt of that. He was hardly likely to trust Alexander on the basis of his record, and he insisted that Pausanias should be informed of this unexpected visit. Aristeides had no intention of being party to any information that was not also immediately divulged to the Spartan commander-in-chief. This was now the night of the eleventh day since the two armies had faced each other across the little Asopus and, if Alexander was to be believed, it was the intention of Mardonius to attack on the following morning. It has sometimes been suggested that Alexander was sent across to spy out the land and to give the Greek leaders deliberate misinformation. This does not seem to square with the events, as the Persians did attack on the next day, although with their cavalry and not their foot-soldiers. One can but guess that Alexander, wily and astute as he was, had sensed a lack of morale among the Persians and, in order to secure his own position if the Greeks did in fact win, gave them the real information. If the Persians won, on the other hand, his secret visit to the Greeks would never be known. Like the dark horse that he was, he disappeared again into the night. Whatever the outcome of events Alexander of Macedon was doing his best to ensure that he was on the winning side.
If one is to believe Herodotus and Plutarch, Pausanias shifted the Spartans from the right wing over to the left, replacing them with the Athenians, who had more experience than the Spartans at fighting against Persians. Mardonius, accordingly, shuffled his pack of cards and moved his best Iranian troops back to face the Spartans. The story, although given by both authorities, seems unlikely. The Athenians were rightly proud of their history at Marathon, but even they would probably have conceded that the finest foot-soldiers in all of Greece were their allies - men who had been trained to fight, and nothing else, since they were boys. In any case, it matters little since, according to this version, both sides then moved their troops back again into their original position. Queer things happen in war, and generals often change their minds, but it seems somewhat unlikely that, at so late a moment, both sides should have embarked upon a major reorganisation of their positions. They had had days staring at one another, trying to assess the situation on the board. But still, even chess-masters with plenty of time on their hands do sometimes embark upon a flurry of movements that surprise the simple onlooker.
It was not in any case to be a day for the infantry. Mardonius decided to hold them back and, instead, to send over wave after wave of cavalry. He probably felt that he had the measure of the defence now and, so long as he kept his men away from the limited company of Athenian archers, they could inflict a great deal of damage on the foot-soldiers. His aim was to get the hoplites down off that ridge, for he knew well enough that, brave though they were, his Iranian infantry were not a match for the heavily armoured Greeks - especially if compelled to advance up a slope. ‘The Persian cavalry, being armed with the bow, were not easy to come to grips with; so when they moved forward, they harried all the Greek line with their arrows and javelins… .’ At the same time a detachment was sent round behind the Greek lines and ‘choked up and spoilt the spring of Garagaphia’, the Greeks’ principal source of water. One finds it difficult to imagine that in so short a time they can have done anything more with stones and rubbish than inconvenience their enemy for a limited time. It is comparatively difficult (or was in those days) to totally block and befoul a spring. In any case, in this first major engagement, there could be no doubt that the position of the Greeks was highly threatened. Unlike Thermopylae, whose narrow pass had precluded the use of horses, the mounted bowmen and horsemen with throwing javelins had a distinct advantage over the hoplite.
A conference of war was held at Pausanias’ headquarters on one of the knolls that form the Asopus ridge. The situation was very serious indeed. It was not only that their water supply had been threatened, if not temporarily destroyed, but they were down to one day’s ration of food. It seems incredible that Pausanias had let the Persian cavalry cut off their food-supplies to such an extent, and the Spartans were normally considered past-masters at army-supply. They were, however, unused to cavalry tactics, and accustomed to fighting fellow Greeks in situations in the Peloponnese where they always had their own main base behind them. Furthermore, Pausanias, like any other Greek general of his time, was not accustomed to handling large numbers of men. The Persians of Xerxes’ time were capable of thinking in hundreds of thousands, but to the average Greek city-state general 10,000 was a good-sized army. For them the art of logistics was in its infancy - one reason why Herodotus makes such a play with what he considers to have been the immense and arrogant designs of Xerxes.
There could be no question of withdrawal during those daylight hours, for the cavalry would have cut them to pieces, and any sign of retreat would undoubtedly have brought the Persian army swarming forward across the river. This was clearly what Mardonius hoped for, and one cannot help wondering whether Alexander of Macedon (if he was acting for the Persians and not for himself alone) had reported back that the Greeks were short on rations. It is not difficult for an experienced soldier to recognise the look, and the very atmosphere, of hungry troops.
It was generally agreed that they could not hold their current position for another day. The answer for them was to fall back overnight to an area a little east of Plataea which was known as ‘the Island’ because it lay between two arms of the Oeroe river. The area was far too small to accommodate all the army, but it would form a central base with a left wing spread out towards Plataea, and a right wing extended towards the Garagaphian spring. The plan was sensible enough: by moving westwards the army would be able to cover the descent of their supplies down the Dryoscephalae Pass while they would also have adequate water-supplies. Quite apart from necessity, there was another good reason for this withdrawal to the west. The Persian horsemen had had a good day, and it is possible that Mardonius now felt that he had a demoralised army against him. To withdraw is often - though not always - to show some semblance of defeat. Perhaps, as at Salamis, the Persians might be lured into a major assault?
