Authors: Unknown
Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (51 page)
67
Hillary Nsamba, “Ogoola Names Judges on Anti-Corruption, War Crimes Court,”
The New Vision
, 1 October 2008; available from <
www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/629897/war%20crimes%20court%20Akiiki-%20kiiza
>; accessed 30 September 2008.
68
Christopher Gashirabake, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, interview by author, 4 July 2008, Kampala, Uganda and Hon. Jus. James Ogoola, Principal Justice, High Court and Chairman, Transitional Justice Working Group, interview by author, 25 September 2008, Kampala, Uganda.
69
Author’s interview with MP from northern municipality who requested anonymity, 3 November 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
70
See note 8, above.
71
In fact, complementarity is a subset of the question of admissibility.
72
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 45.
73
See Hovil and Quinn,
Working Paper 17: Peace First, Justice Later
, op. cit.
74
See, for example, Tim Allen,
Trial Justice
(London: Zed Books, 2006).
75
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 27.
76
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 38.
77
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 42.
78
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 48.
79
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 51.
80
Ministry of Finance,
PEAP
, op. cit., p. 113.
81
US Department of State, “Uganda: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008,” 25 February 2009; available from <
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119030.htm
> (accessed 7 February 2010).
82
The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
Child Soldiers Global Report 2004
(report online); available from <
www.child-soldiers.org/document_get.php?id=801
> (accessed 28 April 2007).
83
Amnesty Act 2000
, op. cit., S.12.
84
Hovil and Lomo,
Working Paper 15: Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda
’
s Amnesty Act 2000
, op. cit., p. 7.
85
Erin Baines, Eric Stover, and Marieke Wierda,
War-Affected Children and Youth in Northern Uganda: Toward a Brighter Future: An Assessment Report
(Chicago: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 2006), p. 33.
86
Tim Allen, “A Review of Lessons Learned by Reception Centres on Effective Interventions for Former Abductees in Northern Uganda: A Preliminary Study, UNICEF and USAID, October 2005,” in
War-Affected Children and Youth in Northern Uganda: Toward a Brighter Future: An Assessment Report
, eds Erin Baines, Eric Stover, and Marieke Wierda (Chicago: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 2006), p. 18.
87
Edward Sembidde, Save the Children in Uganda, interview by author, 26 November 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
88
Stephen Charchuk, “An Assessment of the Current Community-Wide System for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda” (MA thesis, Royal Roads University, 2007), p. 39.
89
Refugees International, “Northern Uganda: Child Mothers and Returnees Require Special Care,” 7 November 2002; available from <
www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/827
> (accessed 22 April 2007).
90
Ibid.
91
Tim Allen,
Trial Justice
(London: Zed Books, 2006), pp. 77–78.
92
United Nations High Commission on Human Rights,
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Mission Undertaken by Her Office, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 2000/60, To Assess the Situation on the Ground with Regard to the Abduction of Children from Northern Uganda
, 9 November 2001, E/CN.4/2002/86.
93
Hovil and Quinn,
Peace First, Justice Later
, op. cit., p. 24.
94
Joanna R. Quinn, “Comparing Formal and Informal Mechanisms of Acknowledgement in Uganda,” a paper prepared for presentation on the panel, “Africa as a Subject of International Justice,” at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, 23 March 2006, pp. 23–27.
95
George Kegoro, “The Place of Informal Justice Mechanisms in Post Conflict Peace and Justice Issues,” a paper prepared for presentation at the Headline Seminar on the Rule of Law in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries, at the World Bank, Washington, DC, 21 July 2009. See also Nagy’s chapter in this volume.
96
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 23.
97
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 24.
98
Republic of Uganda,
PRDP
, op. cit., p. 137.
99
There are interesting parallels to be made, in this regard, with Par Engstrom’s chapter in this volume.
12
Colombia: Accountability and DDR in the Pursuit of Peace?
Jemima García-Godos
Introduction
Can transitional justice be applied before the end of conflict? Can it be applied in the absence of political transitions? In Colombia, the explicit inclusion of accountability measures in the negotiations with the paramilitaries, and the subsequent institutionalization of specific transitional justice mechanisms, illustrate one way in which transitional justice can relate to peacebuilding processes. In 2002, peace talks between the Colombian government and paramilitary armed forces led to the demobilization of the umbrella organization
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(AUC). In July 2005, Law 975 (known as the “Law of Justice and Peace”) was passed, with the purpose “to facilitate the peace processes, as well as the individual or collective reincorporation of the members of the illegal armed group back into civilian life, protecting the right to truth, justice and reparation of the victims.”
1
Soon after, the government created specialized bodies, including the National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation (
Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación
—CNRR) and the National Unit for Justice and Peace (
Unidad Nacional de Fiscalías para la Justicia y la Paz
—UNFJP), at the Prosecutor General’s Office, to implement the various tasks envisaged by the law.
2
A complex institutional apparatus has been put in place to implement this legislation. The conflict with the guerrillas, however, continues, and the negotiations with the paramilitaries and the implementation of the Law of Justice and Peace occurred during the two administrations of democratically elected president Álvaro Uribe. In other words, no obvious political transition has occurred. Based on the empirical evidence, the answer to the two opening questions seems to be affirmative. Thus, a third question arises from the Colombia experience: Can accountability and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) be applied at the same time in pursuit of peace?
The ongoing Colombian experience with transitional justice presents a puzzle for political observers, academics, and human rights activists alike. The Colombian process involves a clear link between the demobilization of illegal armed groups and attending to the rights of the victims. Indeed, the process involves both the demobilization of illegal armed groups
and
the implementation of victims’ rights—at the same time and through the same legal instrument.
3
As part of
the process, a complex scheme of measures has been developed encompassing retributive justice, truth-seeking, and individual and collective victim reparations. While the protection and promotion of victims’ rights to truth, justice, and reparation are the main demands of victims’ organizations and many other voices from civil society, the process has been overshadowed by reports of the limited effect of demobilization by the paramilitaries and their reorganization under new structures. The progress achieved by specific transitional justice measures varies greatly indeed, but it is not insignificant. As the Colombian process moves on to a new phase with the approval of the “Victims’ Law,”
4
I will seek to assess the results so far of this particular combination of DDR with transitional justice mechanisms, and specifically to evaluate the effects that these measures may have on the overall objectives of accountability and peacebuilding in Colombia. In this chapter I argue that engaging in transitional justice and DDR at the same time is a challenging task mainly because the success of the process depends on its legitimacy. Legitimacy in turn, depends on the effective implementation of the components of both processes. Once established, the instruments of transitional justice and DDR develop their own dynamics, capable of moving the process forward—or backwards. For all its limitations, the Justice and Peace process marks a milestone in the quest for justice and accountability in Colombia.
The chapter begins with a brief history of the Colombian armed conflict, followed by an account of the transitional justice processes in the country and their current structure and implementation. The process involves various institutional actors, making inter-institutional coordination both a necessity and a challenge. I then briefly discuss the DDR policies implemented parallel to the transitional justice process, seeking to identify points of complementarity and contradiction between these two fields. I conclude with lessons learned concerning the combination of accountability with DDR measures in the Colombian experience.
The Colombian Armed Conflict
Armed conflict has been a feature of Colombian history since its independence in 1810, although the intensity, the locations, and the actors involved have changed over time. Before and during the nationwide civil war known as
La Violencia
(1948–57) the antagonists were the two economic, social, and political elites organized under the Liberal and Conservative parties. In 1957 they reached a peace agreement whereby power was to be shared equally between the parties for 16 years. The political regime thus changed from a two-party system to a consociational regime called the National Front.
5
However, the inter-elite war was soon replaced by an anti-regime insurgency waged by various guerrilla groups; this conflict continues until this day.
6
The human cost of this conflict has been considerable. It is estimated that 94,000 people (51,500 civilians) died as a consequence of the armed conflict in the period 1964–2007.
7
Close to 7,700 were forcibly disappeared, 51,500 were kidnapped, and at least 11,000 were tortured. About 4,500 massacres were carried out, and between 3 and 4.6 million people were forcibly displaced.
8
According to the CNRR, the current conflict can be traced back to 1964, when the first of the communist guerrillas, FARC-EP (
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
—
Ejército del Pueblo
), the ELN (
Ejército de Liberación Nacional
), and EPL (
Ejército Popular de Liberación
) were established.
9
In the 1970s these groups were joined by a “second wave of guerrillas,” most of which demobilized by 1989–90. The establishment of paramilitary groups coincided with the formation of the first communist guerrillas. The origin of paramilitary groups can be linked to the laws enabling and/or encouraging the existence of pro-systemic forces, in 1965.
10
This meant legalizing the formation of private self-defense or paramilitary groups, a measure later endorsed by Congress.
11
This legal framework remained in place until 1989, when it was eliminated during peace negotiations with the “second wave” of guerrillas.
12
As the FARC and ELN regained ground in the early 1990s, a new legal framework created self-defense groups, known as
Convivir
.
13
The differences between these and traditional paramilitaries were more a matter of definition than practice.
14
From these groups developed the modern paramilitaries, one of the most violent actors in the armed conflict, which were later organized under the banner
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
.
15
The AUC evolved from the regionally based
Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá
(ACCU), founded in 1986. By 2005 the AUC had some 30,000 members.
16
Over time, the paramilitaries consolidated control and started to engage and displace the guerrillas. The numerous local and regional self-defense groups enjoyed great support from the national army and their founders in local government, as well as from the drugs and rural elites. In the 1990s the balance of power within these fragmented groups shifted from the original leadership asserted by rural elites to military commanders. The paramilitaries took over areas controlled by drug-lords and guerrillas, co-opting and expelling cartels and rural elites, and eventually controlled a large percentage of the drug trade.
17
The military expansion of the paramilitary forces ran parallel with their incursion into politics. The areas under their control became strictly regulated, and the official decentralization process of the 1990s had the unintended effect of tightening their grip on local and regional political institutions. By controlling local constituencies, the paramilitaries were also given access to national politics. In 2002 they claimed to control 35 percent of the Colombian national Congress, and one-third of Colombia’s municipalities.
18
In December 2002 the AUC declared a unilateral ceasefire, a government precondition for talks with any of the armed groups. Negotiations were formalized on 15 July 2003 with the Pact of Santa Fé de Ralito, whereby AUC leaders agreed to fully demobilize by the end of 2005.
19
Starting in 2003—even before the negotiations had concluded—by 2006 some 37 AUC groups had demobilized.
20
