Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (13 page)

This accomplished, we planned to advance up the peninsula as far as the Pisa-Rimini line, and there hold as many enemy divisions as possible in Northern Italy. This however was not all. A third operation was also agreed upon, namely, an amphibious landing in the south of France, and it was on this project that controversy was about to descend. It was originally conceived as a feint or threat to keep German troops on the Riviera and stop them joining the battles in Normandy, but at Teheran the Americans had pressed for a real attack by ten divisions and Stalin had supported them. I accepted the change, largely to prevent undue diversions to Burma, although I contemplated other ways of exploiting success in Italy, and the plan had been given the code-name “Anvil.”

One thing was plain: it was no use landing in the south of France unless we did so at the right time. The mere threat of an assault would suffice to keep German troops in the region; a real invasion might induce the enemy to reinforce them; but once we joined battle in Normandy “Anvil’s” value was much reduced, because Hitler was not likely to detach troops from the main struggle in the north for the sake of keeping his hold on Provence. If we invaded the Riviera at all, we must do so at the same time as or just before we landed in Normandy, and this was what we intended to do when we made our plans at Teheran.

A second condition also governed “Anvil’s” usefulness.

Many of the forces needed for the operation — that is to Triumph and Tragedy

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say, for the full-scale invasion as opposed to a feint or threat — would have to come from our armies in Italy. But these had first to accomplish the arduous and important task of seizing Rome and the airfields. Until this was done little could be spared or taken from Alexander’s forces.

Rome must fall before “Anvil” could start.

All turned on the capture of Rome. If we could seize it quickly all would be well. Troops could then be withdrawn from the Italian front and “Anvil” launched in good time. If not, a feint landing would suffice. If we landed in earnest, but after “Overlord” had started, our forces would have a long way to go before they could reach Eisenhower’s armies, and by then the battle of the beaches would be over. They would be too late to help. This in fact was what happened, and indeed already seemed likely to happen early in 1944.

At Teheran we had confidently expected to reach Rome early in the spring, but this had proved impossible. The important descent at Anzio to accelerate the capture of Rome had drawn eight or ten German divisions away from the vital theatre, or more than was expected to be attracted to the Riviera by “Anvil.” This in effect superseded it by achieving its object. Nevertheless, the Riviera project went forward as if nothing had happened.

Apart from “Anvil” hanging somewhat vaguely in the future, some of the finest divisions of the Armies in Italy had rightly been assigned to the main operation of “Overlord” and had sailed for England before the end of 1943. Alexander had thus been weakened and Kesselring had been strengthened. The Germans had sent reinforcements to Italy, had parried the Anzio swoop, and had stopped us entering Rome until just before D-Day. The hard fighting had of course engulfed important enemy reserves which

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might otherwise have gone to France, and it certainly helped “Overlord” in its critical early stages, but none the less our advance in the Mediterranean had been gravely upset. Landing-craft were another obstacle. Many of them had been sent to “Overlord.”“Anvil” could not be mounted until they came back, and this depended on events in Normandy. These facts had been long foreseen, and as far back as March 21 General Maitland Wilson, the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, reported that “Anvil”

could not be launched before the end of July. Later he put it at mid-August, and declared that the best way to help

“Overlord” was to abandon any attack on the Riviera and concentrate on Italy.

When Rome fell on June 4 the problem had to be reviewed.

Should we go on with “Anvil” or should we make a new plan?

General Eisenhower naturally wanted to strengthen his attack in Northwest Europe by all available means.

Strategic possibilities in Northern Italy did not attract him, but he consented to return the landing-craft as soon as possible if this would lead to a speedy “Anvil.” The American Chiefs of Staff agreed with Eisenhower, holding rigidly to the maxim of concentration at the decisive point, which in their eyes meant only Northwest Europe. They were supported by the President, who was mindful of the agreements made with Stalin many months before at Teheran. Yet all was changed by the delay in Italy.

Soon after D-Day General Marshall came to England and expressed his concern about yet another problem.

Enormous forces were accumulating in the United States, and should join the battle as soon as possible. This they Triumph and Tragedy

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could do either by sailing direct to France or by coming through the United Kingdom, and arrangements had been made accordingly, but so great was the promised influx that Marshall doubted whether our ports would suffice. At this period we held only a few harbours along the French coast of the Channel, and although Eisenhower intended to capture Brest, and other landing-places in the Bay of Biscay might also fall to us if things went well, we could not be sure of seizing them, and still less of clearing them, in sufficient time. Yet a full and speedy build-up was vital to the success of “Overlord.” The solution which General Marshall proposed was to capture entirely new bases in either the west or the south of France, and preferably in the west because this was the more quickly reached from America.

I was fully alive to all this, and had for some time contemplated a descent on the Biscay coast from North Africa, even though this could not be achieved before the end of July or early in August. But I was equally anxious not to wreck Alexander’s victory in Italy. I considered that the options might still remain open and all preparations should be made to move in whatever direction seemed best.

On June 14 the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to prepare an amphibious operation in the Mediterranean which might strike either in the south of France or in the Bay of Biscay or at the head of the Adriatic. Its destination could be left open for the moment. Three days later General Marshall visited the Mediterranean to confer with the commanders. General Wilson was impressed with

“Overlord’s” need for more ports, of which he then learnt for the first time, but he did not alter his judgment against

“Anvil,” and on June 19 told the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he still thought his best contribution to the common end would be to press forward with all his resources into the Po valley. Thereafter, with the help of an amphibious operation Triumph and Tragedy

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against the Istrian peninsula at the head of the Adriatic which is dominated by and runs south from Trieste, there would be attractive prospects of advancing through the Ljubljana Gap into Austria and Hungary and striking at the heart of Germany from another direction. Alexander agreed.

Smuts was in Italy at the time and telegraphed to me:
Field-Marshal Smuts

23 June 44

to Prime Minister

I have discussed with Wilson and Alexander the
future employment of latter’s forces, and summarise
results for your information. Neither of them favours any
of present “Anvil” proposals, as their results will be at
least doubtful in directly helping Eisenhower, and in any
case would involve very serious loss of time when time
is so important to us. The success already achieved by
Alexander and present high morale of his army tells
strongly against any break-up of his forces and
interruption of their victorious advance. With the
reinforcements forthcoming for Eisenhower he should
be able not only to hold his own and extend his right
flank to the Loire, but also to advance eastward
towards or beyond Paris. The extension of his left flank
is a matter for Staff consideration and report, but this
ought not to delay a decision on present question of the
switch-over, which is both most urgent and critical.

As regards plan for Alexander’s advance, he and
Wilson agree that there will be no difficulty in his breakthrough to the Po and thereafter swinging east towards
Istria, Ljubljana, and so on to Austria. Alexander
favours an advance both by land and sea, while Wilson
favours the latter and thinks three seaborne divisions
with one or two airborne divisions would suffice and
make possible capture of Trieste by beginning of
September. Thereafter the advance will reopen
eastward, gathering large Partisan support and perhaps
forcing the enemy out of the Balkans. The co-operation
between our and the Russian advance towards Austria
and Germany would constitute as serious a threat to
the enemy as Eisenhower’s advance from the west,

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and the three combined are most likely to produce early
enemy collapse.

Alexander, who has just held a meeting with his
commanders, is sending C.I.G.S. separately his views. I
would only add that considered views of two such
competent and experienced leaders as Wilson and
Alexander weigh heavily with me, and should not lightly
be set aside by Combined Chiefs of Staff, whose
planning in any case does not exclude alternative now
pressed by both of them. Both have impressed on me
urgency of a decision on many grounds, if possible
before end of next week.

On June 23 General Eisenhower advised the Combined Chiefs of Staff to concentrate our forces in direct support of the decisive battle in Northern France. He admitted that an advance through the Ljubljana Gap might contain German troops, but it would not draw any of their divisions from France. As for a descent in the Bay of Biscay, he agreed that Bordeaux was closer to the United States than Marseilles, but maintained that the latter could be captured more quickly by forces already in the Mediterranean, and would furnish a direct route northward to join in the battle for the Ruhr. He therefore urged that “Anvil” should be undertaken, at the expense of course of our armies in Italy, since “in my view the resources of Great Britain and the United States will not permit us to maintain two major theatres in the European war, each with decisive missions.”

We were all agreed of course that “Overlord” took priority; the point was how the armies in the secondary theatre, Italy, could best help to overthrow Germany. The American Chiefs of Staff strongly supported Eisenhower. They condemned what they called the “commitment of Mediterranean resources to large-scale operations in Northern Italy and into the Balkans.” Our own Chiefs of Triumph and Tragedy

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Staff took the opposite view. On June 26 they declared that the Allied forces in the Mediterranean could best help

“Overlord” by destroying the Germans who faced them. In order to launch “Anvil” on August 15 withdrawals from the Italian front would have to begin at once, and rather than land on the Riviera they preferred to send troops by sea direct to Eisenhower. With much prescience they remarked:

“We think that the mounting of ‘Anvil’ on a scale likely to achieve success would hamstring General Alexander’s remaining forces to such an extent that any further activity would be limited to something very modest.”

They urged that Alexander should develop his offensive in Italy so as to engage and destroy all the German forces opposed to him; that General Wilson should do all he could to emphasise
the threat of an assault
1
on the south of France: and that Wilson should prepare to send Eisenhower one or more American divisions and/or all the French divisions which he was capable of receiving and which our shipping resources would permit.