Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (130 page)

4.I had hoped to hear something from you before
now about replenishment of the bombarding fleet. I am
Triumph and Tragedy

814

quite ready to complain about the Americans, but let us
make sure that our own house is in order.

Prime Minister to First Sea

22 June 44

Lord

Pray let me have an immediate report on the
synthetic harbours. How have they stood up to the
recent rough weather, and how much has their
construction been delayed? How many units have we
lost on the way over or in any other way? And have we
replacements?

I had been expecting a report from you.

Prime Minister to General

23 June 44

Ismay

I am concerned to hear that the War Office have
circulated a report which raises doubt whether we shall
be able to destroy the U-boat and E-boat pens in
occupied Europe before handing over the ports to the
Allied Governments.

Of course the battle must not be hampered by
precipitate attempts at demolition. But we must reserve
our right to deal with such threats to our security when
leisure serves. It would be intolerable if an Allied
Government objected after their failure to defend their
country had exposed us to so much danger and after
we had shed so much blood in the liberation of their
people.

Pray let me have the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

Prime Minister to General

23 June 44

Hollis

I consider that the Polish Parachute Brigade should
not be lightly cast away. It may have a value in Poland
itself far out of proportion to its actual military power. I
trust that these views may be conveyed to Generals
Eisenhower and Montgomery before the brigade is
definitely established in France.

Triumph and Tragedy

815

Prime Minister to General

29 June 44

Hollis

Thank you for your analysis of the United States
troops arriving in the United Kingdom up to August
1944.

I am still by no means satisfied that the Americans
could not bring over more fighting divisions and less
ancillary troops. I am astonished, for example, that the
total number of corps and army troops (131, 243)
exceeds the number of men in the divisions (87, 689)
by 43, 554. And what is the function of the S.O.S.

troops, who amount to about one-fifth of the total?

What is the meaning of the sinister phrase “excluding
casuals”? How many casuals?

Prime Minister to Foreign

29 June 44

Secretary

I do not advise any decision at the present time on
the Palestine policy. It is well known I am determined
not to break the pledges of the British Government to
the Zionists expressed in the Balfour Declaration, as
modified by my subsequent statement at the Colonial
office in 1921. No change can be made in policy
without full discussion in Cabinet. We have so little to
do now, it should be easy to find an opportunity to do
this.

JULY

Prime Minister to Home

1 July 44

Secretary

The use of the air-raid sirens requires immediate
consideration. Undoubtedly they cause a great deal of
needless unrest. Vast numbers of people hear the
sirens who never hear or see the bomb. The question
presents itself differently in the country and in the town,
and particularly of course on the bomb highway, where
I spent last Friday. Here the “Alert” and the “All clear”

were almost continuous, with intervals of perhaps a
quarter ofhour.

Triumph and Tragedy

816

2.One ought to be able to answer the question,

“What do you want each given class of person to do on
hearing the alarm?” Is the ploughman to stop
ploughing, or the shopkeeper to retire into the cellar?

Are people who are congregated for any purpose to
disperse? What action, if any, do you wish them to
perform? If there is nothing for them to do different from
what they would be doing, as is the case with almost
every’ one, what is the use of sounding the sirens? In
the case of the old-fashioned air raids, falling now here,
now there, all over the country, the sirens were very
useful, and should be retained for this purpose.

3.I have watched from my windows a great many
people in the park to see what they do when the sirens
sound. They do nothing at all. The smallest shower of
rain will make them melt away, but they take not the
slightest notice of the banshee. Nor with these bombs
is it possible in most cases to give any local warning,
and even so I do not know what the people can do in
the day-time. At night they ought always to go to
whatever is the safest place, and forget their cares.

Once there they require no sirens to disturb their
slumber.

4.I have been this afternoon to see several scenes
of incidents. In one case the greater part of the
explosion was within four or five feet of the shelter. I
asked whether it was occupied, and they assured me it
was full and that was why there had been so little loss
of life. Not one person in the shelter had been hurt in
any way. But this is not the case in many places. I
should like a return of the London shelters and the use
made of them. For how many is there accommodation

— by which I mean bunks — and how many of them
are being used? Considering that you began strengthening the street shelters in good time, it seems a great
pity not to reap where you have sown.

Prime Minister to Paymaster
-

3 July 44

General

The point I object to is this. The casualties [in Italy]

are presented with various uneven dates at totals from
Triumph and Tragedy

817

September 3, 1943, or January 22, 1944. Each week
the casualties of the week are added, making
cumulative totals. This is not what one wants to know.

One wants to know how many have been killed,
wounded, and missing in the week, and then look back
to the general totals for reflection on the campaign. In
the present circumstances it is necessary to add up
each week the totals of the British, American, and other
forces killed, wounded, and missing, and subtract from
them the totals given in the return the week before. This
can of course be done; but why should it be done, and
why should the War Office impose it upon us? All that is
needed surely is to present the total casualties, killed,
wounded, and missing, armies and nations, and on the
lower part of the page the addition of the week or
fortnight, I care not which. I certainly do not intend to
accept the present lay-out. Pray arm me for a further
attack.

Prime Minister to General

5 July 44

Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

I cannot agree with this melting down of the Polish
2d Division. The few divisions they have embody the
life of Poland. They are not to be treated as ordinary
masses of men in the pool for replacements. Had not
this Polish Division better go and join the other two in
Italy, where it will be welcomed, to make a strong
corps? I am not prepared to agree to S.H.A.K.F.’s
proposals.

Prime Minister to General

5 July 44

Ismay

Pray thank General Bedell Smith from me for his
paper on build-up, and tell him with what great interest I
have read it.

2. It certainly seems a very serious thing that there
should be no increase in the United States forces
between D 90 and D 120, and an increase of only four

[divisions] between D 90 and D 150, which makes it all
the more necessary to capture the ports of St. Nazaire
and Havre, to develop the small ports, and not to
Triumph and Tragedy

818

dissipate the landing-craft which so much increase the
effectiveness of the small ports.

3. We are told that there are more than forty trained
divisions in the United States, and certainly a far larger
army than we now possess or have in prospect will be
needed to advance through France into Germany,
unless there is a total collapse on the Russian or
German front.

4. It is for this reason, among others, that I
deprecate the sending away of L.S.T.s from the
decisive theatre to operations so remote as those now
projected in Southern France. It seems to me the main
object should be to open the French ports and maintain
at their full or even enlarge the synthetic harbour which
remains to us, so that the immense armed strength of
America can be applied. He would be a bold man who
would say that the existing forces assigned have it in
their power to deliver decisive blows. The greatest
importance should be attached to the direct landing of
United States forces across the Atlantic. This will only
be possible when ports like the two additional ones I
have mentioned have been got into working order, as
well as Cherbourg.

I have ventured to put down my first thoughts on
reading General Bedell Smith’s paper, but I am keeping
it by me for further study.

The War Office should let me have a similar
statement on their build-up.

Prime Minister to General

6 July 44

Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

The one thing to fight for now is a clean cut, so that
Alexander knows what he has and we know what we
have a right to give him. Let them take their seven
divisions — three American and four French. Let them
monopolise all the landing-craft they can reach. But let
us at least have a chance to launch a decisive strategic
stroke with what is entirely British and under British
command. I am not going to give way about this for
anybody. Alexander is to have his campaign. If the
Americans try to withdraw the two divisions still left with
Triumph and Tragedy

819

him I shall ask you to send the 52d Division from the
United Kingdom to bridge the gap. I hope you realise
that an intense impression must be made upon the
Americans that we have been ill-treated and are
furious. Do not let any smoothings or smirchings cover
up this fact. After a little we shall get together again; but
if we take everything lying down there will be no end to
what will be put upon us.

Prime Minister to Secretary

7 July 44

of State for War

How is it that the 36th Indian Division consists of two
British brigades? There is much to be said for humility
in the world, but to call a British division an Indian
division is really going below the level of grovelling to
which we have been subject. If they are British troops
let them be called British troops.

Prime Minister to Minister of

8 July 44

Aircraft Production

Thank you for your minute of June 5 [about
centralising jet-propulsion research under one man,
with the best possible advice available from within and
without the Government service].

In research and development there is great risk in
too much centralisation, and the present move seems
likely to run this risk. But if you are anxious to take it I
leave the matter in your hands.

As you know, I have always taken a great personal
interest in this question of jet-propulsion, and I should
be obliged if you would let me have a note on the
progress made at, say, two-monthly intervals.

Prime Minister to Secretary

10 July 44

of State for War

Army psychiatric services: