Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (74 page)

I said that this would of course set our minds at rest, and we could wholeheartedly support a freely elected Government which would supersede everything else, but we must not ask for anything which would in any way hamper the military operations. These were the supreme ends. If however the will of the Polish people could be ascertained in so short a time, or even within two months,

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the situation would be entirely different and no one could oppose it.

We thereupon agreed to let our Foreign Secretaries talk the matter over.

The three Ministers accordingly met at noon on February 9.

They were unable to agree. When however the Conference assembled in plenary session at four o’clock in the afternoon Molotov produced some fresh proposals which were much nearer to the American draft. The Lublin Government was to be “reorganised on a wider democratic basis, with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself, and also from those living abroad.” He and the British and American Ambassadors should consult together in Moscow about how this would be done. Once reorganised the Lublin Government would be pledged to hold free elections as soon as possible, and we should then recognise whatever Government emerged. Mr. Stettinius had desired a written pledge that the three Ambassadors in Warsaw should observe and report that the elections were really free and unfettered, but Molotov opposed this, because, he alleged, it would offend the Poles. Subject to this and to a few minor amendments, he accepted the United States plan.

This was a considerable advance, and I said so, but I felt it my duty to sound a general warning. This would be the last but one of our meetings.
2
There was an atmosphere of agreement, but there was also a desire to put foot in the stirrup and be off. We could not, I declared, afford to allow the settlement of these important matters to be hurried and the fruits of the Conference lost for lack of another twenty-Triumph and Tragedy

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four hours. A great prize was in view and decisions must be unhurried. These might well be among the most important days in our lives.

Mr. Roosevelt declared that the differences between us and the Russians were now largely a matter of words, but both he and I were anxious that the elections should really be fair and free. I told Stalin that we were at a great disadvantage, because we knew so little of what was going on inside Poland and yet had to take decisions of great responsibility. I knew, for instance, that there was bitter feeling among the Poles and that M. Osubka-Morawski had used very fierce language, and I had been told that the Lublin Government had openly said it would try as traitors all members of the Polish Home Army and underground movement. This, I said, caused me anxiety and distress. Of course I put the security of the Red Army first, but I begged Stalin to consider our difficulty. The British Government did not know what was going on inside Poland, except through dropping brave men by parachute and bringing members of the underground movement out. We had no other means of knowing, and did not like getting our information in this way.

How could this be remedied without in any way hampering the movements of the Soviet troops? Could any facilities be granted to the British (and no doubt to the United States) for seeing how these Polish quarrels were being settled? Tito had said that when elections took place in Yugoslavia he would not object to Russian, British, and American observers being present to report impartially to the world that they had been carried out fairly. So far as Greece was concerned, His Majesty’s Government would greatly welcome American, Russian, and British observers to make sure the elections were conducted as the people wished.

The same question would arise in Italy. When Northern Italy was delivered there would be a vast change in the Italian Triumph and Tragedy

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political situation, and there would have to be an election before it was possible to form a Constituent Assembly or Parliament. The British formula there was the same —

Russian, American, and British observers should be present to assure the world that everything had been done in a fair way. It was impossible, I said, to exaggerate the importance of carrying out elections fairly. For instance, would Mikolajczyk be able to go back to Poland and organise his party for the elections?

“That will have to be considered by the Ambassadors and M. Molotov when they meet the Poles,” said Stalin.

I replied, “I must be able to tell the House of Commons that the elections will be free and that there will be effective guarantees that they are freely and fairly carried out.”

Stalin pointed out that Mikolajczyk belonged to the Peasant Party, which, as it was not a Fascist party, could take part in the elections and put up its candidates. I said that this would be still more certain if the Peasant Party were already represented in the Polish Government, and Stalin agreed that the Government should include one of their representatives.

I said that we should have to leave it at that, and added that I hoped that nothing I had said had given offence, since nothing had been further from my heart.

“We shall have to hear,” he answered, “what the Poles have to say.”

I explained that I wanted to be able to carry the eastern frontier question through Parliament, and I thought this might be done if Parliament was satisfied that the Poles had been able to decide for themselves what they wanted.

“There are some very good people among them,” he replied. “They are good fighters, and they have had some

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good scientists and musicians, but they are very quarrelsome.”

“All I want,” I answered, “is for all sides to get a fair hearing.”

“The elections,” said the President, “must be above criticism, like Caesar’s wife. I want some kind of assurance to give to the world, and I don’t want anybody to be able to question their purity. It is a matter of good politics rather than principle.”

“I am afraid,” said Molotov, “that if we insert the American draft the Poles will feel they are not trusted. We had better discuss it with them.”

I was not content with this, and resolved to raise it with Stalin later on. The opportunity presented itself next day.

Just before our last effective meeting, on February 10, Mr.

Eden and I had a private conversation with Stalin and Molotov at the Yusupov Villa, at which I once more explained how difficult it was for us to have no representatives in Poland who could report what was going on. The alternatives were either an Ambassador with an embassy staff or newspaper correspondents. The latter was less desirable, but I pointed out that I should be asked in Parliament about the Lublin Government and the elections and I must be able to say that I knew what was happening.

“After the new Polish Government is recognised it would be open to you to send an Ambassador to Warsaw,” Stalin answered.

“Would he be free to move about the country?”

“As far as the Red Army is concerned, there will be no interference with his movements, and I promise to give the

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necessary instructions, but you will have to make your own arrangements with the Polish Government.”

Stalin also pointed out that de Gaulle had a representative in Poland.

We then agreed to add the following to our declaration:
As a consequence of the above, recognition should
entail an exchange of Ambassadors, by whose reports
the respective Governments would be informed about
the situation in Poland.

This was the best I could get.

When the Conference reassembled at a quarter to five Mr.

Eden read out a statement to which the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed. I was concerned to note that it said nothing about frontiers, and I said that the whole world would want to know why. We were all agreed in principle about the western frontier, and the only question was where exactly the line should be drawn and how much we should say about it. The Poles should have part of East Prussia and be free to go up to the line of the Oder if they wished, but we were very doubtful about going any farther or saying anything on the question at this stage, and I told the Conference that we had had a telegram from the War Cabinet which strongly deprecated any reference to a frontier as far west as the Western Neisse because the problem of moving the population was too big to manage.

Mr. Roosevelt said he would prefer to hear what the new Polish Government of National Unity said about it, and suggested omitting all reference to the line in the west.

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“We should certainly mention the eastern frontier,” said Stalin.

I supported him in this, although I knew there would be much criticism.

As for the western frontier, I said that the wishes of the new Polish Government should first be ascertained, and that the frontier itself should be determined as part of the peace settlements. After some further discussion, which was complicated by the President’s inability under the United States Constitution to settle matters of this kind without the approval of the Senate, we eventually agreed what to do.

The communique issued at the end of the Conference accordingly included a joint declaration about Poland, and ran as follows:

11 Feb. 45

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to
settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully
all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common
desire to see established a strong, free, independent,
and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions
we have agreed on the conditions in which a new
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may
be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major Powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:
A new situation has been created in Poland as a
result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This
calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional
Government which can be more broadly based than
was possible before the recent liberation of Western
Poland. The Provisional Government which is now
functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised
on a broader democratic basis, with the inclusion of
democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles
abroad. This new Government should then be called
the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

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M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are
authorised as a commission to consult in the first
instance in Moscow with members of the present
Provisional Government and with other Polish
democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad
with a view to the reorganisation of the present
Government along the above lines. This Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity shall be
pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections
as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage
and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and
anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to
put forward candidates.