Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (72 page)

Stalin then pointed out that we could not create a Polish Government unless the Poles themselves agreed to it.

Mikolajczyk and Grabski had come to Moscow during my visit there. They had met the Lublin Government, a measure of agreement had been reached, and Mikolajczyk had gone to London on the understanding that he would come back. Instead of that he had been turned out of office by his colleagues, simply because he favoured an agreement with the Lublin Government. The Polish Government in London were hostile to the very idea of the

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Lublin Government, and described it as a company of bandits and criminals. The Lublin Government had paid them back in their own coin, and it was now very difficult to do anything about it.

The Lublin or Warsaw Government, as it should now be called, wanted to have nothing to do with the London Government. They had told him they would accept General Zeligowski and Grabski, but they would not hear of Mikolajczyk becoming Prime Minister. “Talk to them if you like,” he said in effect. “I will get them to meet you here or in Moscow, but they are just as democratic as de Gaulle, and they can keep the peace in Poland and stop civil war and attacks on the Red Army.” The London Government could not do this. Their agents had killed two hundred and twelve Russian soldiers; they were connected with the Polish underground resistance and had raided supply dumps to get arms. Their radio stations were operating without permission and without being registered. The agents of the Lublin Government had been helpful, and the agents of the London Government had done much evil. It was vital for the Red Army to have safe rear areas, and as a military man he would only support the Government which could guarantee to provide them.

It was now late in the evening, and the President suggested adjourning till next day, but I thought it right to state that the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government had different sources of information in Poland and had received different accounts of what had happened. I said that according to our information not more than one-third of the Polish people would support the Lublin Government if they were free to express their opinion. This estimate of course was based

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on the best information which we could obtain, and we might be mistaken in certain particulars. I assured Stalin that we had greatly feared a collision between the Polish Underground Army and the Lublin Government. We had feared that this would lead to bitterness, bloodshed, arrests and deportations, and that was why we had been so anxious for a joint arrangement. We feared the effect which all this would have on the Polish question, already difficult enough. We recognised of course that attacks on the Red Army must be punished. But on the facts at my disposal I could not feel that the Lublin Government had a right to say that they represented the Polish nation.

The President was now anxious to end the discussion.

“Poland,” he remarked, “has been a source of trouble for over five hundred years.”

“All the more,” I answered, “must we do what we can to put an end to these troubles.” We then adjourned.

That evening the President wrote a letter to Stalin, after consultation with and amendment by us, urging that two members of the Lublin Government and two from London or from within Poland should come to the Conference and try to agree in our presence about forming a Provisional Government which we could all recognise to hold free elections as soon as possible. I favoured this course, and supported the President when we met again on February 7.

Mr. Roosevelt once more emphasised his concern.

Frontiers, he said, were important, but it was quite within our province to help the Poles to set up a united temporary Government, or even to set one up ourselves until they could produce one of their own founded on free elections.

“We ought to do something,” he said, “that will come like a Triumph and Tragedy

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breath of fresh air in the murk that exists at the moment on the Polish question.” He then asked Stalin if he would like to add anything to what he had said the day before.

Stalin replied that he had received the President’s letter only about an hour and a half before, and had immediately given instructions for Bierut and Morawski to be found so that he could talk to them on the telephone. He had just learned that they were in Cracow and Lodz respectively, and he promised to ask them how representatives from the opposition camp could be traced, as he did not know their addresses. In case there might not be time to get them to the Conference, Molotov had elaborated some proposals which to some extent met the President’s suggestions.

Molotov accordingly took the stage and read out the following summary:

1. It was agreed that the Curzon Line should be the
eastern frontier of Poland, with adjustments in some
regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland.

2. It was decided that the western frontier of Poland
should be drawn from the town of Stettin (which would
be Polish) and thence southward along the river Oder
and the Western Neisse.

3. It was considered desirable to add to the
Provisional Polish Government some democratic
leaders from Polish émigré circles.

4. It was considered desirable that the enlarged
Provisional Polish Government should be recognised
by the Allied Governments.

5. It was considered desirable that the Provisional
Polish Government, enlarged as suggested in
paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the
population of Poland to the polls for the establishment
by general vote of permanent organs of the Polish
Government.

6. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr
should be entrusted with the discussion of the question
of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and
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submitting their proposals for the consideration of the
three Allied Governments.

Mr. Roosevelt seemed encouraged, and declared that we were making definite progress, but he wanted to talk the matter over with Mr. Stettinius. “I do not like the word
émigré,”
he concluded. “I know none of the people concerned except Mikolajczyk, but I do not think we need only contact
émigrés.
We should also find some people in Poland itself.” Stalin agreed to postpone the discussion, but I now intervened, and the interchange which followed may be deemed significant in the light of what happened afterwards.

I said that I shared the President’s dislike of the word
émigré
. It was a term which originated with the French aristocracy who were driven out after the French Revolution, and was properly applied only to those who had been driven out of their own country by their own people.

But the Poles abroad had been driven out of their country by the Germans, and I suggested that the words “Poles abroad” should be substituted for
émigrés.
Stalin assented.

As for the river Neisse, mentioned in the second of Molotov’s proposals, I reminded my hearers that in previous talks I had always qualified the moving of the Polish frontier westward by saying that the Poles should be free to take territory in the West, but not more than they wished or could properly manage. It would be a great pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it died of indigestion. I was conscious of a large body of opinion in Great Britain which was frankly shocked at the idea of moving millions of people by force. A great success had been achieved in disentangling the Greek and Turkish populations after the last war, and the two countries had enjoyed good relations ever since; but in that case under a couple of millions of

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people had been moved. If Poland took East Prussia and Silesia as far as the Oder, that alone would mean moving six million Germans back to Germany. It might be managed, subject to the moral question, which I would have to settle with my own people.

Stalin observed that there were no Germans in these areas, as they had all run away.

I replied that the question was whether there was room for them in what was left of Germany. Six or seven million Germans had been killed and another million (Stalin suggested two millions) would probably be killed before the end of the war. There should therefore be room for these migrant people up to a certain point. They would be needed to fill the vacancies. I was not afraid of the problem of transferring populations, so long as it was proportionate to what the Poles could manage and to what could be put into Germany. But it was a matter which required study, not as a question of principle, but of the numbers which would have to be handled.

In these general discussions maps were not used, and the distinction between the Eastern and Western Neisse did not emerge as clearly as it should have done. This was however soon to be made clear.

In the early hours of the following morning I telegraphed to Mr. Attlee:

Prime Minister to Mr.

8 Feb. 45

Attlee

… An impressive letter was sent to Stalin last night
by the President, who wrote it after consultation with
and amendment by us. In it he proposed that in place
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of the existing Lublin Government a new All-Polish
Government should be formed containing representatives both from the Poles abroad and those within
Poland. An answer in five or six heads was put forward
by the Russians today, Wednesday. It does not
challenge in principle any of the broad issues. We have
asked for delay till tomorrow. The following counter-proposal drafted by the Foreign Secretary is being
telegraphed to you together with the original Soviet
proposal.

This matter is by no means settled. It is our plan to
fight hard for a Government in Poland which we and
United States can recognise and to which we can
attract the recognition of all the United Nations. In
return for this we require real substantial and effective
representation from the Polish element with whom we
have at present been associated, especially Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and Romer, as well as from a number of
Poles still in Poland, Witos, Sapieha, etc., whom the
Americans have listed. If it can be so arranged that
eight or ten of these are included in the Lublin
Government it would be to our advantage to recognise
this Government at once. We could then get ambassadors and missions into Poland, and find out at least
to some extent what is happening there and whether
the foundations can be laid for the free, fair, and
unfettered election which alone can give life and being
to a Polish Government. We hope that on this difficult
ground you will give us full freedom to act and
manoeuvre.