Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (113 page)

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elections as an encouraging prelude to the Parliamentary conflict. These same reasons in reverse inclined the Conservative managers to June. At a meeting of the principal Conservative Ministers I took the unusual course of asking everyone to write his opinion on a slip of paper.

All but two were for June. This of course did not govern.

The right of recommending a dissolution to the Crown rests solely with the Prime Minister. Apart from this, my colleagues, when they saw from my demeanour how unwelcome a party struggle was to me, at once assured me they would support whatever choice I made.

I did not like either June or October. Six months before, when the defeat of Germany dwarfed all other issues, it had been easy to speak in a detached manner about what should happen after that. But now, with all the new and grave issues which foregoing chapters have described pressing upon me, I earnestly desired that the national comradeship and unity should be preserved till the Japanese war was ended. This might well have required a year, or even eighteen months, more of Coalition. Was this too much to ask of a nation we had not served ill? It certainly seemed to be in accord with the national interest.

But only a friendly agreement between the two parties would render it possible. Having regard to what I had said in the autumn of 1944, I had the feeling that we ought to ask the electors to approve by a referendum, or in some other way, this limited but reasonable prolongation of our tenure.

The electioneering atmosphere, which had oppressed us since the defeat of Germany drew near, would have been dissipated at any rate till the end of the year, and we might all have worked together at the great tasks which still lay ahead and required our combined strength. The worst of all solutions of our problem seemed to me an October election. This was too soon to give any effective relief to the Triumph and Tragedy

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political tension, which must increase with every one of the four or five months that were to pass, and must vitiate our thoughts and work at home and abroad. If there must be an election in 1945, the sooner it came the better.

No one could tell what the result would be. For the reasons which have been given, the Conservative organisation was far less prepared than that of Labour. On the other hand, many had confidence that the nation would not be likely to take the helm out of my hands. On both sides opinion about the result was divided, and contradictory guesswork reigned. I was myself deeply distressed at the prospect of sinking from a national to a party leader. Naturally I hoped that power would be accorded to me to try to make the settlement in Europe, to end the Japanese war, and to bring the soldiers home. This was not because it seemed less pleasant to live a private life than to conduct great affairs. At this time I was very tired and physically so feeble that I had to be carried upstairs in a chair by the Marines from the Cabinet meetings under the Annexe. Still, I had the world position as a whole in my mind, and I deemed myself to possess knowledge, influence, and even authority, which might be of service. I therefore saw it as my duty to try, and at the same time as my right. I could not believe this would be denied me.

I put the June or October issue bluntly to Mr. Eden at San Francisco.

Prime Minister to Mr.

11 May 45

Eden

Home politics. I have not finally settled between
June and October. May 17 is the latest for June 28 poll,
and a decision must be made within the next three or
four days. There is a consensus of opinion on our side
that June is better for our party; that October would
prolong the present uneasy electioneering atmosphere,
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in which many questions requiring settlement are
looked at from party angles, and Government may be
paralysed. When you left you were in favour of June.

Let me know if you have changed. If you and
Cranborne arrive no sooner than 16th this matter will
have to be settled without you.

2. On the other hand, the Russian peril, which I
regard as enormous, could be better faced if we remain
united. I expect the Labour Party will offer to stay on till
October, no doubt to their party advantage.

His reply, after stating the case impartially, was decided.

Foreign

Secretary

12 May 45

(San Francisco) to

Prime Minister

I agree that a June election would probably be better
for our party than an October one, though Labour Party
will no doubt blame us for ending the Coalition, which
the nation, I believe, would like to retain for a while yet.

But any advantage they might derive from this would be
lost as the campaign developed.

2. It is also inevitable that to continue the Coalition
until October, with certainty of parting then, will be an
uncomfortable business. Against this it would
presumably be advantageous from national standpoint
that present Minister of Labour [Mr. Ernest Bevin]

should continue to handle demobilisation plans during
that period.

3. Big question mark is foreign affairs. Dangers of
present situation need no emphasis. I sometimes feel
that we are entering period like that of second Balkan
war transferred on to world stage. We are clearly in a
stronger position to handle foreign affairs as a National
Government, and we shall have need of all our strength
in the next few months. Against this, will international
situation be any easier in October or need for National
Government any less then? As far as I can judge, all
signs point to greater difficulties in October than today.

An election in that month is likely to be even more
harmful in relation to the international situation than an
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election in June. Yet in October no further postponement will be possible. What therefore we have to
balance is the limited advantage of prolonging Coalition
on an uneasy basis until October against risk of
election at an even more dangerous period in
international affairs than now and increased chances of
a Socialist victory in October. After carefully weighing
all these conflicting considerations, I hold to the opinion
I had previously expressed that from the national point
of view the balance of arguments is in favour of an
election in June.

Prime Minister to Mr.

13 May 45

Eden (San Francisco)

I have received your message, which is in general
harmony with my own opinion and most of us here.

May I say how admirably you have balanced the
situation.

2. However, since then I have received the
President’s telegram of May 12 about Trieste,
2
which
has been transmitted to you. I must regard this as one
of the most far-sighted, surefooted, and resolute
telegrams which it has ever been my fortune to read. I
have telegraphed to him supporting him in every way. I
send you in my immediately following the text of my
reply, and there is also another telegram, of which I
have already sent you a copy, about not dispersing our
armies while all the fruits of our conquests are still
ungathered. I am sure you will do justice to all these
topics in conversation with the President, especially
about a standstill in the dispersal of our armies.

3. All this brings forth a new factor in the election
question. We can hardly ask for the support in so
serious a venture of our Labour colleagues and then
immediately break up the Government. If there is going
to be trouble of this kind the support of men like Attlee,
Bevin, Morrison, and George Hall is indispensable to
the national presentation of the case. In that event I
should on no account agree to an election in October,
but simply say that we must prolong our joint tenure. It

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is common objectives, not fixed dates, which should
determine the end of such an alliance as ours.

However, do not bother about this for the next two or
three days, and I will watch every step. An election on
July 5 would be quite possible, thus giving us an extra
week to consider all matters together.

The Labour Party were in conference at Blackpool and Mr.

Morrison was the reigning spirit in party manoeuvre. Mr.

Bevin did not want the Coalition to break up, for reasons which may not have been very different from those which guided me. Mr. Attlee had now returned from America, and before going to Blackpool he came to see me at Downing Street. I had a long talk with him, in which I urged most strongly that in one way or another we should postpone an election, not merely till October, but in some way or other till the end of the Japanese war. He too was not looking at the issue from a narrow party point of view, and listened with much apparent sympathy to the appeal which I made. I certainly had the impression when he left that he would do his best to keep us together, and so reported to my colleagues. However, the tide of party feeling proved too strong.

No satisfactory news arriving, I sent the following letter to Mr. Attlee:

18 May 45

My dear Attlee,

From the talks I have had with you and your
principal Labour colleagues I have gathered the
impression that the Labour Party, instead of leaving the
Government on the defeat of Germany, would be willing
to continue the Coalition until the autumn.

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I have given the most careful and anxious thought to
this suggestion, and I regret to say that in its present
form I cannot feel it would be in the public interest. A
union of parties like that which now exists should come
together and work together, not for a particular date
without regard to world events, but for the achievement
of some great national purpose transcending all party
differences. For the last five or six months our
Ministerial and Parliamentary affairs have been
increasingly affected by the assumed approach of a
General Election at the end of the German war. This
has not conduced to the national interest so far as
domestic affairs are concerned.

I therefore make you the following proposal, which I
earnestly hope you will not readily reject — namely,
that we should fix upon another object for our joint
endeavours and adjourn the question of our separation
until it is gained. The First Lord of the Admiralty [Mr.

Alexander] has already expressed in his speech in the
City of London his regret that a General Election should
be held before the Japanese war was finished. It would
give me great relief if you and your friends were found
resolved to carry on with us until a decisive victory has
been gained over Japan. In the meanwhile we would
together do our utmost to implement the proposals for
social security and full employment contained in the
White Papers which we have laid before Parliament.

On this basis we could work together with all the energy
and comradeship which has marked our long and
honourable association.

I am conscious however in the highest degree of our
duty to strengthen ourselves by a direct expression of
the nation’s will. If you should decide to stand on with
us, all united together, until the Japanese surrender is
compelled, let us discuss means of taking the nation’s
opinion — for example, a referendum — on the issue
whether in these conditions the life of this Parliament
should be further prolonged.

I am sending letters in similar terms to Sir Archibald
Sinclair and to Mr. Ernest Brown.