Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (110 page)

4. Meanwhile the attention of our peoples will be
occupied in inflicting severities upon Germany, which is
ruined and prostrate, and it would be open to the
Russians in a very short time to advance if they chose
to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic.

5. Surely it is vital now to come to an understanding
with Russia, or see where we are with her, before we
weaken our armies mortally or retire to the zones of
occupation. This can only be done by a personal
meeting. I should be most grateful for your opinion and
advice. Of course we may take the view that Russia will
behave impeccably, and no doubt that offers the most
convenient solution. To sum up, this issue of a
settlement with Russia before our strength has gone
seems to me to dwarf all others.

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From the very first moment I took whatever practical steps were in my power to hold the position and prevent the melting of the Western armies.

Prime

Minister

to

9 May 45

General

Eisenhower

(France)

I have heard with some concern that the Germans
are to destroy all their aircraft in situ. I hope that this
policy will not be adopted in regard to weapons and
other forms of equipment. We may have great need of
these some day, and even now they might be of use,
both in France and especially in Italy. I think we ought
to keep everything worth keeping. The heavy cannon I
preserved from the last war fired constantly from the
heights of Dover in this war.

There is great joy here.

General Eisenhower

10 May 45

to Prime Minister

Our policy as laid down in the Act of Surrender is
that the Germans will not destroy aircraft, and this
policy applies to German action in respect of all their
equipment. If Germans are destroying equipment it is in
violation of the Act of Surrender, and I should be glad
to have any particulars which would enable me to
punish the offenders.

There is great joy [here] too.

Prime Minister to Mr.

11 May 45

Eden (San Francisco)

Today there are announcements in the newspapers
of the large withdrawals of American troops now to
begin month by month. What are we to do? Great
pressure will soon be put on us [at home] to demobilise
partially. In a very short time our armies will have
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680

melted, but the Russians may remain with hundreds of
divisions in possession of Europe from Lübeck to
Trieste, and to the Greek frontier on the Adriatic. All
these things are far more vital than the amendments to
a world constitution which may never well come into
being till it is superseded after a period of appeasement
by a third World War.

In Washington at my desire Mr. Eden on the 14th asked General Marshall and Mr. Stimson about the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. The General was on the whole reassuring. Actual figures of withdrawals for the next few months would not reach fifty thousand a month out of a total of three million. Eden then turned to the question of the withdrawal of Anglo-American forces within their previous agreed zones. Marshall, who had seen my telegram to the President, seemed sympathetic to what I had proposed. The Russians, he said, had however withdrawn in Austria from a small area of the American Zone which they had occupied. He thought that this had been done deliberately in order to strengthen their case when they asked that we should withdraw from areas of the Russian Zone which we were occupying.

I could at least keep the British Air Force in effective strength.

Prime

Minister

to

17 May 45

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee

All reduction of Bomber Command is to be stopped.

All reduction of the Metropolitan Air Force, except
Coastal Command, is to be stopped. In both cases
leave may be given where necessary, but the structure
and number of squadrons is not to be cut down till
further orders are received from the War Cabinet.

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681

Prime

Minister

to

17 May 45

Secretary of State

for Air and Chief of

the Air Staff

No weakening of the Air Force in Italy or demobilisation must take place at present.

Prime

Minister

to

17 May 45

Chief of the Air Staff

and General Ismay,

for all concerned

No German aircraft in British control which has a
serviceable war value, including spares, is to be
destroyed by the Germans or by us without Cabinet
sanction being obtained beforehand.

Prime

Minister

to

20 May 45

General Ismay, for

Chiefs

of

Staff

Committee

It is about a week since I sent instructions against
the further demobilisation of the Air Force, and for

“Steady on” in that of the Army. Of course I am relying
on the C.O.S. Committee to show the best and least
obtrusive measures in which these necessary
procedures can be carried out.

Smuts, who was at San Francisco, and whom I had apprised of all, was in full accord with my mood and actions.

Field-Marshal Smuts

14 May 45

to Prime Minister

The correspondence confirms forebodings which
have been forming in my mind for some time as Russia
has been showing her hand in Poland, Rumania,
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682

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. Now the same
thing is happening in more drastic form in Yugoslavia,
where it is the voice of Tito but the hand of Russia. To
this must be added Stalin’s surly and truculent reply to
your friendly letter. It looks as if the elimination of
Germany is looked upon as Russia’s opportunity, or as
if she intends to exact a heavy price for cooperation
against Japan.

I did not think that the point about Japan was valid, but I thought it might weigh unduly with the State Department. I therefore telegraphed to our Ambassador:
Prime

Minister

to

14 May 45

Lord

Halifax

(Washington)

We desire the entry of the Soviets into the war
against Japan at the earliest moment. Having regard to
their own great interests in the Far East, they will not
need to be begged, nor should their entry be purchased
at the cost of concessions prejudicing a reign of
freedom and justice in Central Europe or the Balkans.

A week passed before I heard again from Mr. Truman on the major issues. Then on May 22 he cabled that he had asked Mr. Joseph E. Davies to come to see me before the triple conference, about a number of matters he preferred not to handle by cable.

Mr. Davies had been the American Ambassador in Russia before the war, and was known to be most sympathetic to the regime. He had in fact written a book on his mission to Moscow which was produced also as a film which seemed in many ways to palliate the Soviet system. I of course made immediate arrangements to receive him, and he spent the night of the 26th at Chequers. I had a very long talk with him. The crux of what he had to propose was that the President should meet Stalin first somewhere in Europe Triumph and Tragedy

683

before he saw me. I was indeed astonished at this suggestion. I had not liked the President’s use in an earlier message of the term “ganging up” as applied to any meeting between him and me. Britain and the United States were united by bonds of principle and by agreement upon policy in many directions, and we were both at profound difference with the Soviets on many of the greatest issues.

For the President and the British Prime Minister to talk together upon this common ground, as we had so often done in Roosevelt’s day, could not now deserve the disparaging expression “ganging up.” On the other hand, for the President to by-pass Great Britain and meet the head of the Soviet State alone would have been, not indeed a case of “ganging up”— for that was impossible — but an attempt to reach a single-handed understanding with Russia on the main issues upon which we and the Americans were united. I would not agree in any circumstances to what seemed to be an affront, however unintentional, to our country after its faithful service in the cause of freedom from the first day of the war. I objected to the implicit idea that the new disputes now opening with the Soviets lay between Britain and Russia. The United States was as fully concerned and committed as ourselves. I made this quite clear to Mr. Davies in our conversation, which also ranged over the whole field of Eastern and Southern European affairs.

In order that there should be no misconception I drafted a formal minute which I gave to Mr. Davies, after cordial agreement with the Foreign Secretary, who had now returned to London.

NOTEBYTHE PRIME MINISTERON MR. DAVIES’S MESSAGE

27 May 45

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684

It is imperative to hold a conference of the three
major Powers at the earliest possible date. The Prime
Minister is prepared to attend on any date at any place
agreeable to the other two Powers. He hopes however
that the United States and Great Britain will not find it
necessary to go into Russian territory or the Russian
zone of occupation. Many visits have been paid to
Moscow, and the last meeting, at Yalta, was held upon
Russian soil. The Prime Minister declares that London,
the greatest city in the world, and very heavily battered
during the war, is the natural and appropriate place for
the Victory meeting of the three Great Powers.

However, if this is refused His Majesty’s Government
will none the less discuss with the United States and
with Soviet Russia what is the best place to be
appointed.

2. The Prime Minister received with some surprise
the suggestion conveyed by Mr. Davies that a meeting
between President Truman and Premier Stalin should
take place at some agreed point, and that the
representatives of His Majesty’s Government should be
invited to join a few days later. It must be understood
that the representatives of His Majesty’s Government
would not be able to attend any meeting except as
equal partners from its opening. This would be
undoubtedly regrettable. The Prime Minister does not
see that there is any need to raise an issue so
wounding to Britain, to the British Empire and
Commonwealth of Nations.
2
Meetings like these
always require two or three days of preliminary
discussions, when the agenda is framed and where
complimentary contacts are made between the three
heads of States. In such circumstances all the three
Great Powers are obviously free to make what contacts
they wish and when they please.